WOODALL v. PORRINO et al

Filing 10

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 2/1/2018. (tf, n.m.)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

DARA WOODALL,
Petitioner,
v.
WILLIAM ANDERSON, et al.,
Respondents.

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Civil Action No. 17-1847 (RMB)

OPINION

BUMB, United States District Judge
On March 16, 2017, Petitioner Dara Woodall (“Woodall”), a
state prisoner incarcerated in Edna Mahan Correctional Facility in
Clinton, New, Jersey, filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for
Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person In State Custody, challenging
her October 8, 2009 conviction and sentence in Atlantic County,
New Jersey for murder and weapons charges. (Pet., ECF No. 1, ¶¶15.) This Court ordered Respondents to file either a motion to
dismiss on timeliness grounds or a full answer to the merits of
the petition. (Order, ECF No. 4.)
This matter comes before the Court upon Respondents’ motion
to dismiss the petition as barred by the statute of limitations,
(Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8), and Petitioner’s brief in opposition
to the motion to dismiss. (“Petr’s Opp. Brief,” ECF No. 9.)

I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 8, 2009, a judgment of conviction (“JOC”) was

entered against Woodall in New Jersey Superior Court, Atlantic
County

upon

her

conviction

on

charges

of

murder,

unlawful

possession of a weapon, and possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose. (JOC, ECF No. 8-3.) She was sentenced to 70-year term of
imprisonment, and five years of parole supervision.

(Id.)

Woodall appealed her conviction and sentence on November 25,
2009. (Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 8-4.) The Appellate Division
affirmed the conviction and sentence on July 1, 2011. (App. Div.
Opinion, ECF No. 8-5.) Woodall filed a petition for certification
in the New Jersey Supreme Court, and the New Jersey Supreme Court
denied the petition on December 8, 2011. State v. Woodall, 208
N.J. 601 (Dec. 8, 2011). Woodall did not file a petition for writ
of certification in the United States Supreme Court. (Mot. to
Dismiss, ECF No. 8 at 5.)
On March 4, 2014, Woodall filed a Verified Petition for PostConviction

Relief

in

the

Superior

Court

of

New

Jersey,

Law

Division, Atlantic County. (PCR Pet., ECF No. 8-7.) The PCR Court
denied the petition on October 16, 2014. (Order on Post-Conviction
Application on Indictable Offenses, ECF No. 8-8.) Woodall filed a
Notice of Appeal with the Appellate Division on November 20, 2014.
(Notice of Appeal, ECF No. 8-9 at 3-5.) The Appellate Division
affirmed the PCR Court on April 5, 2016. (App. Div. Opinion, ECF
2

No. 8-10.) Woodall subsequently filed a petition for certification
in the New Jersey Supreme Court, and the New Jersey Supreme Court
denied certification on November 29, 2016. (N.J. S. Ct. Order, ECF
No. 8-11.)
Woodall filed the instant petition on March 16, 2017. (Pet.,
ECF No. 1.) She signed the petition on March 7, 2017, although she
did not fill in the date when she placed the petition in the prison
mailing system for purposes of the prison mailbox rule. 1 (Pet.,
ECF No. 1 at 14.) In Paragraph 18 of the petition, Petitioner
explained why the one-year statute of limitations should not bar
her petition. First, she acknowledged that her direct review
apparently became final on March 7, 2012, starting the one-year
period. (Pet., ECF No. 1, ¶18.) Second, she asserted that either
equitable tolling or a state action impediment to filing should
toll

the

limitations

period

because

she

did

not

receive

the

necessary documents for filing her habeas petition from the Public
Defender’s Office until February 20, 2017. 2 (Id.) Third, she argued
her appellate attorney abandoned her, telling her to be patient

1

Under the “prison mailbox rule,” a § 2254 habeas petition is
deemed filed at the moment the inmate delivers the petition to
prison officials for mailing. Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 113
(3d Cir. 1998).
2

Woodall submitted a copy of a letter, dated February 16, 2017,
that was sent to her from the New Jersey Public Defender’s Office
in response to her request the previous month for copies of
documents pertaining to her case. (Pet., Ex. A, ECF No. 1 at 16.)
3

and wait for him to file her PCR petition, and ultimately she had
to file her own PCR petition in March 2014. (Id.)
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

The Parties’ Arguments

Respondents submit that the habeas petition is untimely under
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 8.) The statute
of limitations for petitions under § 2254 is one year. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(d). Respondents assert that direct review became final and
the one-year period began on March 7, 2012, 90 days after the New
Jersey Supreme Court denied certification on direct review. (Id.
at 5.) Woodall did not file her petition for post-conviction relief
until March 4, 2014. (Id.) At that point, 727 days lapsed since
her conviction became final. (Id.) Respondents acknowledge that
Woodall’s

PCR

proceeding

began

on

March

4,

2014,

and

the

proceedings became final on November 29, 2016, and suggested that
the

statute

Respondents

of

limitations

assert

another

tolled
107

days

for

that

lapsed

period.
after

the

(Id.)
PCR

proceedings were final before Woodall filed the instant habeas
petition, for a total of 834 days “of non-excusable time.” (Id. at
5-6.)
In opposition to Respondent’s motion to dismiss, Woodall
offered several reasons to excuse the untimeliness of her habeas
petition. (Petr’s Opp. Brief, ECF No. 9.) First, she asserted:

4

In petitioner’s case, she had little or no
knowledge of federal habeas procedure, not
even the basics on what form to use and the
statute of limitations. The prison paralegals
failed to or did not adequately explain to
petitioner what form to use and the statute of
limitations. The prison paralegals failed to
or did not adequately explain to petitioner
the intricacies of habeas procedure. Finally,
petitioner knew nothing about what books (if
any) in the prison law library contained the
habeas statutes.
(Id. at 5.)
Second, Woodall alleged that the New Jersey Public Defender’s
Office (“NJPDO”) does not provide assistance or representation to
prison inmates who seek to pursue habeas claims in federal court.
(Petr’s Opp. Brief, ECF No. 9 at 5.) The NJPDO advises inmates by
letter of the results of their state court appeals “and then
suggests that the inmate might wish to file a federal habeas
petition.” (Id. at 5-6.) Woodall alleges that such letter does not
include

a

habeas

corpus

form,

nor

does

it

explain

the

time

deadlines and need to exhaust all claims. (Id. at 6.)
Third, Woodall states she was under the impression that her
appellate lawyer would represent her in her entire post-conviction
process, including federal habeas corpus. (Id.) She does not
explain why she was under this impression.
Woodall further argues that equitable tolling should apply to
excuse her untimely habeas petition. (Id. at 7.) She suggests there
is a presumption in favor of equitable tolling, quoting Holland v.

5

Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 645 (2010) (“we have previously made clear
that

a

nonjurisdictional

federal

statute

of

limitations

is

normally subject to a rebuttable presumption in favor of equitable
tolling.”)
Woodall explains that her lack of diligence “is largely
attributable to her being unaware of the strict time deadlines for
habeas filings which in turn was based on the inadequacies of the
Public Defender’s Office and prison law library workers.” (Petr’s
Opp. Brief, ECF No. 9 at 8-9.) Woodall asserts that the rebuttable
presumption of equitable tolling has not been overcome. (Id. at
9.)
B.

Legal Standard

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides:
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall
apply to an application for a writ of habeas
corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the
judgment of a State court. The limitation
period shall run from the latest of—
(A) the date on which the judgment became
final by the conclusion of direct review
or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to
filing an application created by State
action in violation of the Constitution
or laws of the United States is removed,
if the applicant was prevented from
filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional
right asserted was initially recognized
by the Supreme Court, if the right has
6

been newly recognized by the Supreme
Court and made retroactively applicable
to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual
predicate
of
the
claim
or
claims
presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other
collateral
review
with
respect
to
the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall
not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.
After a petitioner seeks review from the State’s highest court,
the judgment of conviction becomes final, and the limitations
period begins to run after expiration of the 90-day period for
filing a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court. Swartz v. Meyers, 204 F.3d 417, 419 (3d Cir. 2000).
A properly-filed application for post-conviction relief tolls the
habeas statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Pace
v. Diguglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 410 (2005). Time limits on postconviction petitions are “filing” conditions that must be met for
a PCR petition to be properly-filed. Id. at 417.
The Supreme Court noted that there is a rebuttable presumption
in favor of equitable tolling in the case of a nonjurisdictional
federal statute of limitations. Holland, 560 U.S. at 645-46.
Therefore, the Court held that equitable tolling applies to the
one-year statute of limitations under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) in
appropriate cases. Holland, 560 U.S. at 645.
7

The

rebuttable

presumption

described

in

Holland

was

a

presumption in favor of finding that the equitable tolling doctrine
applies

in

cases

of

nonjurisdictional

federal

statutes

of

limitations such as 28 U.S.C. § 2244. The Supreme Court did not
adopt a rebuttable presumption, as Woodall appears to suggest, in
favor of accepting a petitioner’s claim that equitable tolling
should be granted in his or her particular case.
A petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling “only if he
shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and
(2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way’ and
prevented timely filing.” Id. (quoting Pace, 544 U.S. at 418.)
Garden variety attorney neglect, such as a miscalculation that
leads to missing a deadline, is not an extraordinary circumstance
that warrants equitable tolling, but more serious instances of
attorney misconduct may warrant equitable tolling. Id. at 651-52.
The diligence required of a habeas petitioner in pursuing his
or her remedies is “reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible
diligence.” Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 330 (3d Cir. 2012)
(quoting Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2565 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)). “The diligence inquiry is fact-specific and
depends on the circumstances faced by the particular petitioner.”
Id. at 331. Thus, “[i]f a petitioner ‘did what he reasonably
thought

was

necessary

to

preserve

his

rights

...

based

on

information he received ..., then he can hardly be faulted for not
8

acting more ‘diligently’ than he did.’” Id. (quoting Holmes v.
Spencer, 685 F.3d 51, 65 (1st Cir. 2012)).
C.

Analysis
1.

The statute of limitations period began on March
7, 2012

Direct review of Woodall’s conviction and sentence became
final on March 7, 2012. The one-year statute of limitations began
on March 8, 2012, and it expired on March 8, 2013. When Woodall
filed her PCR petition on March 4, 2014, it was too late to toll
the already expired habeas statute of limitations.
2.

Equitable tolling

First, the Court rejects Petitioner’s arguments that the
general difficulty of a pro se prisoner in locating the statute of
limitations and understanding its application is an extraordinary
circumstance

justifying

equitable

tolling.

“[L]ack

of

legal

knowledge or legal training does not alone justify equitable
tolling.” Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 800 (3d Cir. 2013).
Moreover, pro se petitioners are “expected to know [or learn] when
the limitations period expires.” See id. (quoting Doe v. Menefee,
391 F.3d 147, 177 (2d Cir. 2004) (parenthetical added)).
Woodall further contends that abandonment by her PCR attorney
is an extraordinary circumstance justifying equitable tolling. In
her petition, Woodall alleged:
[A]fter petitioner’s state direct appeal
became final on March 7, 2012, she was in
9

communication repeatedly with Stephen Kirsch,
the attorney who represented her on direct
appeal, requesting that the Public Defender
proceed with preparation and filing of her
post-conviction relief petition. She was
repeatedly told to “wait” and “give it time”
and the Public Defender never did prepare and
file
the
documents.
Finally,
petitioner
prepared and filed her own petition in March
2014.
(Pet., ECF No. 1, ¶18.)
In her reply brief, Woodall alleges the New Jersey Public
Defender’s Office typically sends a letter advising inmates of the
results of their state court appeals “and then suggests the inmate
might wish to file a federal habeas petition.” 3 (Reply, ECF No. 9
at

5-6.)

Furthermore,

she

asserts

that

she

was

“under

the

impression that her appellate lawyer would continue to represent
her

through

her

entire

post-conviction

process

attacking

her

conviction and sentence, including federal habeas corpus.” (Id. at
6.)
If indeed Woodall’s public defender agreed to represent her
in her post-conviction proceedings and told her to wait and give
it time before starting the proceedings, without informing her of
the potential consequences to her federal habeas claims, Woodall
may

be

entitled

to

equitable

tolling.

Woodall

has

alleged

sufficient facts to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the

3

Woodall did not submit a copy of this letter. She may do so
prior to the evidentiary hearing.
10

circumstances surrounding her late filing of a PCR petition after
the federal habeas limitation period expired.

See Holland, 560

U.S. at 651 (citing examples Nara v. Frank, 264 F.3d 310, 320
(C.A.3 2001) (“ordering hearing as to whether client who was
“effectively abandoned” by lawyer merited tolling”) and Baldayaque
v. U.S., 338 F.3d 145, 152–153 (2d Cir. 2003) (“finding that where
an attorney failed to perform an essential service, to communicate
with the client, and to do basic legal research, tolling could,
under the circumstances, be warranted.”)
III. CONCLUSION
For

the

reasons

discussed

above,

Respondents’

motion

to

dismiss will be administratively terminated, subject to reopening
upon the Court’s appointment of counsel to represent Woodall in an
evidentiary

hearing

on

her

claim

of

attorney

abandonment

justifying equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.

An appropriate order follows.

Dated:

February 1, 2018

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

11