HUERTAS v. FOULKE MANAGMENT, CORP. et al
Filing
50
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 8/13/2018. (tf, )
[Docket No. 38]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
HECTOR L. HUERTAS,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 17-1891 (RMB/AMD)
v.
OPINION
FOULKE MANAGEMENT CORP., CHERRY
HILL MITSUBISHI, ANTHONY
TRAPANI, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Hector L. Huertas, pro se
P.O. Box 448
Camden, New Jersey 08101
CAPEHART & SCATCHARD, P.A.
By: Laura D. Ruccolo, Esq.
8000 Midlantic Drive, Suite 300S
P.O. Box 5016
Mount Laurel, New Jersey 08054
Counsel for Defendant Foulke Management Corp.
MCGUIREWOODS LLP
By: Graham Howard Claybrook, Esq.
201 North Tryon Street, Suite 3000
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202
Counsel for Defendant Capital One Bank, N.A.
BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:
Pro se Plaintiff Hector Huertas brings this suit against
various defendants in connection with his purchase of a used Hyundai
Sonata on December 22, 2016.
In the Court’s previous Opinion and
Order in this suit, the Court granted Defendant Foulke Management
1
Corp.’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and granted Plaintiff leave to
file a Motion to Amend his Complaint before addressing Defendant
Capital One’s Motion to Compel Arbitration.
Court is Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.
Presently before the
Capital One opposes the
Motion, arguing that amendment would be futile in two respects.
Capital One asserts that (1) all claims in the proposed amended
complaint are subject to arbitration, and (2) the proposed amended
complaint fails to state a claim.
For the reasons stated herein,
the Motion to Amend will be granted in part, denied in part, and
denied without prejudice in part.
I.
FACTS
The proposed amended complaint (“P.A.C.”) includes all of the
same allegations as the original complaint, and then adds new
allegations. 1
As the original allegations are set forth in the
Court’s previous opinion in this suit, see Huertas v. Foulke Mgmt
Corp., et al., No. CV 17-1891 (RMB/AMD), 2017 WL 6447868 (D.N.J.
Dec. 18, 2017), they will not be repeated here, except to the extent
necessary to place the proposed claims against Capital One in proper
context.
Defendant Foulke Management allegedly provided the financing
for Plaintiff’s purchase of a car pursuant to a Retail Installment
Sale Contract (RISC), and then immediately “assigned” its rights
1
The original complaint is 36 pages long and contains 173
numbered paragraphs. The proposed amended complaint is 72 pages
long and contains 350 numbered paragraphs.
2
under the RISC to Defendant Capital One.
(P.A.C. ¶¶ 4, 88, 91, 95-
97, 161-62 and Ex. C to original complaint)
The RISC was signed by
Plaintiff the day he purchased the car-- December 22, 2016.
(Ex. C)
The RISC provides that Plaintiff will repay the loan in 72 monthly
payments of $354.80 beginning on February 4, 2017, at an interest
rate of 14.28%. (P.A.C. ¶ 147 and Ex. C to original complaint)
“On January 14, 2017,” Plaintiff received his “first ‘Monthly
eStatement’” from Capital One, which “shows that $152.79 worth of
interest had accrued during the period of December 22 to December
28, 2016.”
(P.A.C. ¶ 192)
“On February 11, 2017,” Plaintiff received his “second Monthly
eStatement that showed total interest of $339.03 had accrued for the
period ending on February 4, 2017.”
(P.A.C. ¶ 193)
“On March 4, 2017,” Plaintiff allegedly “began paying off the
car loan with the first payment that comprised the February 4
($354.80) and March 4, 2017 ($354.80) payments due, plus a $10.00
late fee for a $719.60 total.”
(P.A.C. ¶ 196)
“On April 13, 2017,” Plaintiff received his “fourth Monthly
eStatement that showed $196.24 in interest had accrued for the
period ending April 4 plus $72.14 of prior unpaid interest for a
total interest expense of $268.38 for the period ending April 4,
2017.”
(P.A.C. ¶ 193)
Plaintiff contends that the April eStatement
evidences an interest rate of 19.29%.
(Id. ¶ 198)
Similarly,
Plaintiff contends that the May eStatement evidences an interest
rate of 19.32%; the June eStatement evidences an interest rate of
3
16.05%; and the July eStatement evidences an interest rate of
16.99%.
(Id. ¶¶ 200-207)
The Proposed Amended Complaint asserts the following claims
against Capital One: violations of the Truth In Lending Act
(“TILA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq.; violation of U.C.C. § 2-312;
fraud; civil conspiracy; and violations of the RICO Act.
II.
MOTION TO AMEND STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), states in relevant
part, “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party’s
written consent or the court’s leave.
The court should freely give
leave when justice so requires.”
“[T]he grant or denial of an opportunity to amend is within the
discretion of the District Court.”
182 (1962).
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
The District Court may deny leave to amend “if it is
apparent from the record that (1) the moving party has demonstrated
undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment would
be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the other party.”
Lake v. Arnold, 232 F.3d 360, 373 (3d Cir. 2000).
“Amendment would be futile if the amended complaint would not
survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.”
Budhun
v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 245, 259 (3d Cir. 2014).
Therefore, in determining whether an amendment is futile, this Court
must apply “the same standard of legal sufficiency as applies under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).”
Travelers Indem. Co. v.
Dammann & Co., 594 F.3d 238, 243 (3d Cir. 2010).
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That is, when the
party opposing the motion to amend asserts that amendment is futile,
a motion to amend should only be granted if the proposed amended
complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual material, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
III. ANALYSIS
A. Arbitration of proposed claims against Capital One
Capital One asserts that amendment would be futile because
“this Court has already ruled” that “the claims are subject to
mandatory arbitration.”
(Opposition Brief, Dkt No. 48, p. 2 of 7)
To the contrary, the Court did not rule on whether Plaintiff’s
claims against Capital One are subject to arbitration; indeed, the
Court did not even rule that Plaintiff’s claims against Foulke
Management were subject to arbitration.
Rather, the Court ruled
that the arbitrability of Plaintiff’s claims against Foulke
Management is an issue for an arbitrator to decide, pursuant to the
valid delegation clause in the Arbitration Agreement signed by
Plaintiff and Foulke Management.
Foulke Mgmt Corp., 2017 WL
6447868, at *5 (D.N.J. Dec. 18, 2017) (“in accordance with the
delegation clause and Rent–A–Center, the Court holds that Huertas’
substantive claims, as well as his challenges concerning
arbitrability, all must be decided by the arbitrator.”).
Capital One’s argument assumes that the same analysis applies
to Plaintiff’s claims against it, but ignores the critical fact
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that, unlike Foulke Management, Capital One is not a signatory to
the Arbitration Agreement.
Contrary to Capital One’s assertion, the
Court has not “already found that” the Arbitration Agreement between
Plaintiff and Foulke Management “covers third parties sued by
Plaintiff on the same basis.”
(Opposition Brief, Dkt No. 48, p. 6
of 7)
Moreover, (1) the RISC itself contains no arbitration clause,
and (2) Capital One’s “welcome letter” to Plaintiff concerning the
loan at issue states, “Contract Provisions:
If your contract
contains an arbitration, waiver of jury trial, or confession of
judgment provision, please be advised that Capital One Auto Finance
does not enforce these provisions.”
(P.A.C. ¶ 184 and Exhibit at
Dkt No. 20)
Thus, the Court cannot rule, on the present record, that
Plaintiff’s proposed claims against Capital One are futile on the
basis that the claims, or the issue of arbitrability of the claims,
are subject to arbitration.
B. The merits of the proposed claims against Capital One
(1)
TILA
Plaintiff alleges that the RISC made two misrepresentations,
which Plaintiff asserts violate the TILA 2: (1) the RISC allegedly
misrepresented that the loan’s interest rate was 14.28% when the
2
The TILA-required disclosures are contained in the RISC, and
are entitled “FEDERAL TURTH-IN-LENDING DISCLOSURES.” (Ex. C to the
original complaint) (caps in original)
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actual rate charged allegedly was significantly higher; and (2) the
RISC allegedly misrepresented that interest on the loan began to
accrue immediately, not starting on February 4, 2017, when
Plaintiff’s first loan payment was due.
Capital One asserts that the proposed amendment would be futile
because “the terms of the RISC itself” “directly contradict”
Plaintiff’s allegations that the RISC misrepresented either the
interest rate or the date on which interest began to accrue on the
loan.
(Opposition Brief, Dkt No. 48, p. 4 of 7)
Capital One
contends that the documents Plaintiff relies upon conclusively
demonstrate that the interest rate Capital One charged was, indeed,
14.28%, and that the RISC indicates that interest on the loan begins
to accrue as of December 22, 2016.
Therefore, Capital One reasons,
the Proposed Amended Complaint fails to plausibly plead that a TILA
violation occurred.
As to the interest rate issue, Plaintiff articulates his theory
of liability thusly: “By improperly including the $469.45 in
processing fees 3 in the RISC [‘]amount financed[’] instead of the
RISC [‘]finance charge[’] the creditor disclosed the annual
percentage rate as lower than the true annual percentage rate, and
misdisclosed [sic] the amount financed and the finance charge.”
(P.A.C. ¶ 273)
The RISC’s “Federal Truth-In-Lending Disclosures”
3
The “processing fees” are a $170.45 fee for “Government
License / and or Registration” and a $299.00 “Documentary Fee” paid
to Foulke Management. (Ex. C to original complaint)
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state that the “finance charge”-- defined as “[t]he dollar amount
the credit will cost you”-- is $8,544.65; and the “amount financed”- defined as “[t]he amount of credit provided to you on your
behalf”-- is $17,000.95.
(Exhibit C to original complaint)
Thus,
Plaintiff asserts that the RISC’s TILA disclosures should have
stated that the “amount financed” was $16,531.50 (i.e., $17,000.95
minus $469.45), and the “finance charge” was $9,014.10 (i.e.,
$8,544.65 plus $469.45), which would result-- as a matter of
mathematics-- in a higher interest rate.
Stated differently,
Plaintiff apparently contends that Capital One erroneously included
the license and registration fee of $170.45, and the documentary fee
of $299.00, in the “amount financed” to mislead Plaintiff into
believing that he was getting better credit terms, in the form of a
lower annual percentage rate.
Such allegations are sufficient to state a claim for violation
of the TILA and Regulation Z; understating the finance charge
violates 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(3) and 12 C.F.R. § 226.18(d),
overstating the amount financed violates 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(2) and
12 C.F.R. § 226.18(b), and the resulting understatement of the
annual percentage rate violates 15 U.S.C. § 1638(a)(4) and 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.18(e).
See also, Jones v. Koons Auto., Inc., 752 F. Supp. 2d
670, 683 (D. Md. 2010) (“Koons purportedly failed to disclose
certain specified finance charges (i.e., a processing fee, a lien
fee, and certain taxes) and failed to disclose the ‘correct amount
financed.’
These factual allegations of inaccuracy are enough to
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state a plausible claim for relief.”); see generally, In re Sterten,
546 F.3d 278, 287 (3d Cir. 2008) (in a TILA case, observing that,
“[u]nder notice pleading standards, it is sufficient for a plaintiff
to plead an error in the disclosed finance charges to bring the
statutory definition of error into play.”) (citing Twombly).
Contrary to Capital One’s argument, the face of the RISC does
not answer the question of whether the license and registration fee
of $170.45, and the documentary fee of $299.00, were properly
included in the “amount financed,” as opposed to the “finance
charge.”
See Hopkins v. First NLC Financial Servs., LLC, (In re:
Hopkins), 372 B.R. 734, 750 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (holding that
allegations concerning miscalculation of finance charge survived a
motion to dismiss, explaining that “for purposes of the instant
motion, there is insufficient information to enable the court to
determine whether the finance charge was correctly calculated,” and
observing that the document containing the TILA disclosures, which
was attached to the complaint, merely identified the fees but not
how they were calculated).
The question presented-- whether TILA
and Regulation Z require the calculation of the “finance charge” to
include the two fees at issue -- is more appropriately addressed at
summary judgment.
Capital One may very well prevail at summary
judgment, but the issue cannot be resolved at the motion to dismiss
stage.
See, e.g., Tripp v. Charlie Falk’s Auto Wholesale Inc., 290
F. App’x 622, 628 (4th Cir. 2008) (affirming district court’s grant
of summary judgment to defendants, stating, “[b]ecause the Tripps
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have not produced evidence to refute CFAW’s general practice of
charging the $395 processing for both cash and credit transactions,
we find that the $395 processing fee was not a ‘finance charge’
under TILA, and CFAW was not required to disclose it as a ‘finance
charge.’”);
Williams v. Lynch Ford, Inc., 2004 WL 2997508 at *6-7
(N.D. Ill. 2004) (granting summary judgment to defendants on TILA
claims holding that a “documentary fee” was appropriately included
in the “amount financed,” as opposed to the “finance charge”);
Hook
v. Baker, 352 F. Supp.2d 839, 844 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (granting summary
judgment to plaintiff on her TILA claim, explaining, “[t]he
testimony of defendant himself supports plaintiff’s claim that the
$200.00 document fee was assessed only to customers purchasing
automobiles from defendant on credit and not to customers who bought
such vehicles with cash.”);
Hodges v Koons Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc.,
180 F. Supp. 2d 786, 793 (E.D. Va. 2001) (granting summary judgment
to defendants on TILA claim that $289.00 “processing fee” was
erroneously included “as part of the amount financed rather than as
a finance charge” finding that plaintiff had produced no evidence to
contradict defendants’ evidence that “it charges a $289.00
dealership processing fee on all sales, whether for cash or for
credit.”);
Brown v. Coleman Investments, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 416,
422 (M.D. La. 1998) (“The Court finds there are genuine issues of
material fact in dispute which preclude summary judgment on the
issue of whether the $40 ‘license fee’ meets the comparable cash
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transaction exception to the [TILA’s] definition of ‘finance
charge.’”).
As to the interest accrual date, Plaintiff asserts that the
RISC misled him to believe that he was given a “43-day leeway” -i.e., a grace period from the date of the RISC’s execution until the
first payment due date of February 4, 2017 -- before interest would
accrue.
(P.A.C. ¶ 174)
Unlike the TILA claim based on the interest
rate, this TILA claim based on the accrual date is directly refuted
by the RISC itself.
Nothing in the RISC suggests that there would
be any delay in the accrual of interest.
To the contrary, the RISC
states that the first monthly payment is “due” on February 4, 2017,
indicating that interest must have begun to accrue before February
4, 2017.
(Exhibit C to original complaint)
Additionally, the RISC
states in two different places that “we will figure your finance
charge on a daily basis.”
(Id.)
Nothing about these statements
could be interpreted as stating that a loan disbursed on December
22, 2016 would not start to accrue interest until February 4, 2017.
Therefore, the Proposed Amended Complaint does not plausibly plead
that the RISC misrepresented the interest accrual date.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend as to the TILA claim based
on the interest accrual date will denied.
(2)
Fraud
Plaintiff’s fraud claims are premised upon the same factual
averments as his TILA claims.
For the reasons stated as to the TILA
claims, to the extent the fraud claims are based on the TILA
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interest rate issue the Motion to Amend will be granted, and to the
extent the fraud claims are based on the TILA interest accrual date
issue the Motion to Amend will be denied.
(3)
Substantive RICO
In the section of the Proposed Amended Complaint entitled “How
Foulke and Capital One violate the Federal RICO Statute,” Plaintiff
alleges that Foulke Management and Capital One “compel[ed] the
Plaintiff to pay a higher monthly interest rate than the original
TILA disclosure.”
(P.A.C. ¶¶ 152-54)
The RICO enterprise is
alleged to be the business relationship between Foulke Management
and Capital One, whereby Foulke Management allegedly “originates”
the loan documented by the RISC and then immediately assigns its
rights under the RISC to Capital One.
(Id. ¶ 166) 4
“To prove the existence of a RICO enterprise, a plaintiff must
show: (1) that the enterprise is an ongoing organization with some
sort of framework for making or carrying out decisions; (2) that the
4
Such practice of automobile dealers assigning notes to
finance companies appears to be rather common. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Quality Hyundai, Inc., 150 F.3d 689, 691 (7th Cir. 1998) (“After the
sale [of the motor vehicle], Quality assigned the entire installment
contract to Bank One Chicago.”); Cenance v. Bohn Ford, Inc., 621
F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 1980) (“[t]he dealer and Ford prearranged
for the assignment of the finance instrument. At no time did the
risk of finance reside with the dealer.”); Hodges v. Koons Buick
Pontiac GMC, Inc., 180 F. Supp.2d 786 (E.D. Va. 2001); Brown v.
Coleman Investments, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 416, 420 (M.D. La. 1998)
(“Brown’s retail installment contract was assigned to TMCC as TMCC
provided the financing for the sale [of the Toyota Tercel].”);
Kinzel v. Southview Chevrolet Co., 892 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (D. Minn.
1995) (“Eastern Heights [State Bank of Saint Paul] is the assignee
of Ms. Kinzel’s and Southview Chevrolet’s retail installment
contract.”).
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various associates function as a continuing unit; and (3) that the
enterprise be separate and apart from the pattern of activity in
which it engages.
Simply listing a string of individuals or
entities that engaged in illegal conduct, without more, is
insufficient to allege the existence of a RICO enterprise.”
McCullough v. Zimmer, Inc., 382 F. App’x 225, 231 (3d Cir. 2010)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
The Proposed Amended Complaint fails to allege sufficient facts
to plausibly support a conclusion that Foulke Management and Capital
One function as a RICO enterprise.
Indeed, other courts have
dismissed RICO claims in analogous cases.
See Brown v. Coleman
Investments, Inc., 993 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. La. 1998); Vandenbroeck v.
CommonPoint Mortgage Co., 22 F.Supp.2d 677 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
Moreover, because the substantive RICO claim fails, the RICO
conspiracy claim necessarily fails as well.
App’x at 232 n.9.
McCullough, 382 F.
Accordingly, the Motion to Amend will be denied
as to all proposed RICO claims.
(4)
Conspiracy
Capital One asserts that Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations are
merely conclusory and not based on allegations of fact, thereby
falling short of Twombly / Iqbal’s plausibility standard.
agrees.
The Court
It appears that the common law conspiracy claim is based on
the same facts alleged in support of the proposed RICO claims.
The
factual allegations are not sufficiently fleshed-out with regard to
the alleged conspiracy between Foulke Management and Capital One.
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Accordingly, with regard to the proposed common law conspiracy
claim, the Motion to Amend will be denied.
(5)
U.C.C. § 2-312-- Warranty of Title
Plaintiff asserts that Foulke Management breached the U.C.C.’s
warranty of title when it sold Plaintiff a car to which it allegedly
did not possess title.
Further, Plaintiff asserts that Capital One
is liable for Foulke Management’s alleged breach of warranty by
virtue of the FTC holder rule. 5
Capital One responds that it “does
not dispute that it is the holder of the RISC for purposes of the
FTC holder rule, and does not factually object to the extent
Plaintiff’s claims are limited to Capital One’s status as holder.”
(Opposition Brief, p. 3 n.2)
Nonetheless, Capital One asserts that
leave to amend should not be granted as to this claim insofar as its
liability is entirely dependent upon a finding of Foulke
Management’s liability, and all claims against Foulke Management are
presently in arbitration. 6
In light of the ongoing arbitration with Foulke Management, the
Court will not grant leave to amend as to this proposed claim at
5
The RISC states “any holder of this consumer credit contract
is subject to all claims and defenses which the debtor could assert
against the seller of goods or services obtained pursuant hereto or
with the proceeds hereof.” (Ex. C to the original complaint)
6
It is not clear whether Plaintiff has actually asserted a
breach of warranty claim against Foulke Management in the ongoing
arbitration. However, as set forth in the Court’s previous Opinion,
the factual question of whether Foulke Management did, or did not,
possess title to the car Plaintiff purchased is before the
arbitrator.
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this time.
In this regard, the Motion to Amend will be denied
without prejudice, with leave to refile after the arbitration with
Foulke Management is completed.
C. Proposed claims against other Defendants / proposed Defendants
(1)
New claims against existing Defendant Foulke Management
The Proposed Amended Complaint seeks to add the following
claims against Foulke Management: (a) violation of U.C.C. § 2-312;
(b) fraud; (c) civil conspiracy; and (d) violations of the RICO Act.
Consistent with the law of the case as set forth in this Court’s
Order and Opinion of December 18, 2017, the Court cannot address the
merits of these proposed claims unless and until the arbitrator
determines that such proposed claims are not arbitrable.
Accordingly, the Motion to Amend, to the extent it seeks to add new
claims against Foulke Management, will be denied without prejudice.
If the arbitrator concludes that the proposed claims are not subject
to arbitration, Plaintiff may renew the Motion to Amend as to the
proposed claims against Foulke Management.
(2)
New claims against new Hyundai Defendants
Plaintiff alleges that Hyundai Motor America, Hyundai Capital
America and Burns Hyundai are liable for alleged unauthorized
vehicle repair and maintenance charges and alleged ineffectual
repairs.
(P.A.C. ¶¶ 105-26, 221-31, 291-22)
Allegedly, the
incident occurred sometime between June 15, 2017 and August 3, 2017.
(Id.)
The Proposed Amended Complaint asserts against the proposed
Hyundai Defendants claims for: violation of the Magnuson-Moss
15
Warranty Act (Count 7); violation of the New Jersey Unfair and
Deceptive Acts and Practices Act (Count 8); negligence (Count 9);
“violations of N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26C.2” (Count 10); and fraud (Count
11).
Such proposed claims against the proposed Hyundai Defendants
are not based on the same transaction or occurrence as the claims
asserted in the original complaint.
included in this suit.
Therefore, they may not be
See Sanders v. Rose, 576 F. App’x 91, 94 (3d
Cir. 2014) (“[Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure] 20 allows a
plaintiff to join defendants in one action if he asserts a right to
relief arising out of the same transaction or occurrence and any
question of law or fact common to all defendants will arise in the
action.”); see also, Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“The court may [] sever any
claim against any party.”).
With respect to the proposed claims against the proposed
Hyundai Defendants, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend will be denied.
(3)
New claims against new Defendant “Experian PLC”
The Proposed Amended Complaint asserts RICO claims against
“Experian PLC” as an alleged “aider and abettor” of Defendants
Foulke Management and Capital One (Counts 15 and 16).
The only
factual averment as to Experian is that it “fraudulently omitted”
“recall information” concerning the car Plaintiff purchased, thereby
allegedly artificially inflating the price of the car.
182, 341)
16
(P.A.C. ¶¶
These proposed claims fail for three independent reasons.
First, the lone allegation that Experian “fraudulently omitted”
“recall information” concerning the car Plaintiff purchased is
insufficient under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and Twombly / Iqbal.
Second,
the proposed aiding and abetting claims fail because the substantive
RICO claim fails.
Third, the proposed aiding and abetting claims
fail as a matter of law; the Third Circuit has held that “no such
cause of action exists under RICO.”
Pennsylvania Ass’n of Edwards
Heirs v. Rightenour, 235 F.3d 839, 840 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Rolo
v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644 (3d Cir.
1998)).
With respect to the proposed claims against proposed Defendant
Experian, Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend will be denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Motion to Amend will be granted
as to the TILA interest rate claim and attendant fraud claim and
denied in all other respects.
Such denial is without prejudice as
to all proposed claims against Foulke Management and the proposed
warranty of title and common law conspiracy claims against Capital
One, and with prejudice as to all other proposed claims.
An
appropriate Order shall issue on this date.
Dated: August 13, 2018
s/ Renée Marie Bumb
__________________________
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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