WILLIAMS v. SOUMILAS et al

Filing 10

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 7/23/2018. (tf, n.m.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

DAMON WILLIAMS,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 17-2433 (JBS-AMD)

v.
ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR NEVAN
SOUMILAS, et al.,

OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Damon Williams, Petitioner pro se
SBI #244972C
South Woods State Prison
215 Burlington Rd. South
Burlington, NJ 08302

SIMANDLE, U.S. District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court on a civil rights
complaint filed by Plaintiff Damon Williams. Docket Entry 1. At
this time, the Court must review the complaint, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915 to determine whether it should be dismissed as
frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. For the reasons set
forth below, the Court concludes that the complaint will be

dismissed without prejudice with two exceptions that shall be
dismissed with prejudice.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this complaint against the Camden County
Prosecutor’s Office, the Camden County Sheriff’s Department
Identification Unit, Assistant Prosecutor Nevan Soumilas, and
Record Support Technician (“RST”) Sheryl Klemowitz for perjury,
subornation of perjury, and official misconduct. Complaint at 1.1
Plaintiff indicates he is the defendant in Indictment 3823-12-14
wherein he was charged with robbing a Bank of America branch on
August 13, 2014. According to Plaintiff, Assistant Prosecutor
Soumilas submitted false evidence to the trial court in response
to Plaintiff’s motion to suppress the fingerprint evidence from
the scene of the crime: a demand note with six partial prints.
Id. He also alleges that Assistant Prosecutor Soumilas
purposefully presented false evidence at trial through RST
Klemowitz and Detective Fallon. Id. at 2. “[T]he deliberate
deception of the court and jurors, the repeated inconsistencies
in regard to the fingerprint evidence, and the perjury requires
the assumption that these deceitful action refer to somemore,
[sic] and calls into question the good faith of Assistant

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The complaint consists of a letter written to former New Jersey
Attorney General John Hoffman along with several exhibits.
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Prosecutor Soumilas, my arrest, and this fingerprint evidence
which was the probable cause of my arrest.” Id.
Plaintiff asks that a criminal complaint be filed against
Assistant Prosecutor Soumilas and RST Klemowitz and that an
investigation be conducted into his case. Id. at 3.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis.
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
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United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). According
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a
pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim,2 the complaint must
allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).

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“[T]he legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim . . . is identical to the legal standard employed
in ruling on 12(b)(6) motions.” Courteau v. United States, 287
F. App'x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Allah v. Seiverling,
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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B. Section 1983 Actions
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory ... subjects, or causes to be subjected,
any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress ....
§ 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second,
that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255-56 (3d Cir.
1994).
ANALYSIS
The only explicit relief sought by Plaintiff is for a
criminal complaint to be filed against Assistant Prosecutor
Soumilas and RST Klemowitz. This Court lacks the authority to
initiate criminal proceedings as that power is reserved for the
executive branches of government. Further, decisions of a
prosecutor whether to investigate or charge criminal conduct are
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within prosecutorial discretion and cannot be mandated by a
court under its mandamus jurisdiction. Thus, the complaint is
dismissed with prejudice to the extent it asks the Court to
initiate criminal proceedings.
As the Court must liberally construe complaints brought by
pro se plaintiffs, the Court also interprets the complaint as
raising false arrest and malicious prosecution claims.3
A. False Arrest
“The Fourth Amendment prohibits government officials from
detaining a person in the absence of probable cause.” Manuel v.
City of Joliet, Ill., 137 S. Ct. 911, 913 (2017). “To state a
claim for false arrest under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff
must establish: (1) that there was an arrest; and (2) that the
arrest was made without probable cause.” James v. City of
Wilkes–Barre, 700 F.3d 675, 680 (3d Cir. 2012). “Probable cause
to arrest exists when the facts and circumstances within the
arresting officer's knowledge are sufficient in themselves to
warrant a reasonable person to believe that an offense has been

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There is no claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for perjury, and the
Supreme Court has long held that witnesses have civil immunity
for their testimony during trial proceedings. “The immunity of
parties and witnesses from subsequent damages liability for
their testimony in judicial proceedings was well established in
English common law.” Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 330–31
(1983) (citing Cutler v. Dixon, 76 Eng. Rep. 886 (K.B.1585)).
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or is being committed by the person to be arrested.” Orsatti v.
New Jersey State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1995).
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Supreme Court held that before a §
1983 plaintiff may “recover damages for allegedly
unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction
or sentence invalid,” he must first “prove that the conviction
or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by
executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]” 512 U.S. 477,
486–87 (1994). See also Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cty., 804 F.3d
338, 346 (3d Cir. 2015) (“‘[A] prior criminal case must have
been disposed of in a way that indicates the innocence of the
accused in order to satisfy the favorable termination element.’
” (alteration in original) (quoting Kossler v. Crisanti, 564
F.3d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 2009))).
Under some circumstances, a false arrest claim may proceed
in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 despite a valid conviction.”
Woodham v. Dubas, 256 F. App'x 571, 576 (3d Cir. 2007). See also
Shelley v. Wilson, 152 F. App'x 126, 129 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
Gibson v. Superintendent of N.J., 411 F.3d 427, 449 (3d Cir.
2005) (“A claim for false arrest does not necessarily implicate
the validity of a conviction or sentence.”)). However under the
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circumstances alleged in the complaint, success on a false
arrest claim would necessarily invalidate Plaintiff’s
conviction. Plaintiff states that his arrest, indictment, and
conviction all depend on the validity of the fingerprint
evidence. Complaint at 2-3. He alleges that RST Klemowitz lied
about the date on which she performed the fingerprint analysis,
which allegedly provided the probable cause to arrest Plaintiff
and was used to convict Plaintiff at trial. Id. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s false arrest claim may not proceed at this time
under the facts alleged. Unless Plaintiff’s conviction for bank
robbery is reversed or vacated, that conviction presently bars
his claim that he was arrested for that crime without probable
cause.
B. Malicious Prosecution
To the extent Plaintiff’s complaint could be construed as
raising a malicious prosecution claim, he has also failed to
state a claim. For a malicious prosecution claim, Plaintiff must
plead facts indicating “(1) the defendant initiated a criminal
proceeding; (2) the criminal proceeding ended in plaintiff's
favor; (3) the proceeding was initiated without probable cause;
(4) the defendant acted maliciously or for a purpose other than
bringing the plaintiff to justice; and (5) the plaintiff
suffered deprivation of liberty consistent with the concept of
seizure as a consequence of a legal proceeding.” Kossler v.
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Crisanti, 564 F.3d 181. 186 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff has not pled facts indicating the criminal
proceeding ended in his favor. He has therefore failed to state
a malicious prosecution claim. This claim is dismissed without
prejudice, except that it must be dismissed with prejudice as to
Assistant Prosecutor Soumilas. A prosecutor has absolute
immunity under § 1983 from actions for malicious prosecution.
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (holding prosecutors
have absolute immunity “in initiating a prosecution and in
presenting the State's case”). “This is true even where a
prosecutor has acted maliciously or dishonestly.” Mujaddid v.
Wehling, 663 F. App'x 115, 119 (3d Cir. 2016).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, the complaint is dismissed
with prejudice to the extent it requests the Court to file
criminal charges against defendants. The malicious prosecution
claim against Assistant Prosecutor Soumilas is also dismissed
with prejudice. The remainder of the complaint is dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim. Where the Court
uses the phrase “dismissed without prejudice,” it means that
Plaintiff may be able to reassert the claim by filing an Amended
Complaint upon this docket only if his conviction has been
reversed or vacated on appeal or post-conviction relief.
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An accompanying Order will be entered.

July 23, 2018
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

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