STILE v. HOLLINGSWORTH et al

Filing 80

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 5/29/2020. (tf, )

Case 1:17-cv-02693-RMB-AMD Document 80 Filed 05/29/20 Page 1 of 12 PageID: 650

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

DKT. No. 66

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
JAMES STILE,
Plaintiff
v.
WARDEN JORDAN HOLLINGSWORTH
et al.,
Defendants

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Civ. Action No. 17-2693(RMB)

OPINION

APPEARANCES:
Francis X. Manning, Esq.
STRADLEY, RONON, STEVENS & YOUNG, LLP
Liberty View
457 Haddonfield Road
Suite 100
Cherry Hill, NJ 08002
Adam Joseph Petit, Esq.
Joseph William Catuzzi, Esq.
STRADLEY RONON STEVENS & YOUNG LLP
2005 Market Street
Suite 2600
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Samantha Beth Kats, Esq.
STRADLEY RONON STEVENS & YOUNG LLP
Great Valley Corporate Center
30 Valley Stream Parkway
Malvern, PA 19355
On behalf of Plaintiff
Jessica Rose O’Neill, Assistant United States Attorney
Office of the U.S. Attorney, District of New Jersey
401 Market Street
4th FLOOR
P.O. BOX 2098
Camden, NJ 08101
On behalf of Defendants

Case 1:17-cv-02693-RMB-AMD Document 80 Filed 05/29/20 Page 2 of 12 PageID: 651

BUMB, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon Defendant Ravi Sood’s
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IV of Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint. (“Def’s Partial Mot. for Summ. J.,” Dkt. No.
66); Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Partial Motion for
Summary Judgment on Count IV of Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint (Pl’s
Opp. Brief,” Dkt. No. 72); Reply Brief in Further Support of
Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IV of Plaintiff’s
Amended

Complaint

Plaintiff’s

(“Def’s

Sur-Reply

Brief

Reply
in

Brief,”

Support

of

Dkt.
his

No.

77);

Opposition

and
to

Defendant’s for Summary Judgment on Count IV of Plaintiff’s Amended
Complaint. (“Pl’s Sur-Reply Brief,” Dkt. No. 78.) This Court will
decide the motions on the briefs without an oral hearing, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b). For the reasons discussed
below, the Court will grant Defendant’s partial motion for summary
judgment on Count IV of Plaintiff’s amended complaint.
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff initiated this action on April 20, 2017. (Compl.,

Dkt. No. 1). This Court reviewed the Complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b) and § 1915A, and, in an Opinion and Order
dated October 23, 2017, the Court dismissed certain claims and
permitted claims to proceed. (Opinion and Order, Dkt. Nos. 4, 5.)
Defendants moved for dismissal of Plaintiff’s remaining claims.
(First Mot. to Dismiss, Dkt. No. 29.) Plaintiff responded with a
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motion to amend his complaint to state his constitutional claims
as tort claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act. (Mot. to Amend,
Dkt. No. 32.) Plaintiff was appointed counsel on March 20, 2019.
(Order, Dkt. No. 42.) After discussions with the Court, Plaintiff’s
counsel filed an amended complaint on August 13, 2019. (Am. Compl.,
Dkt. No. 51.) Upon service of the amended complaint, Defendant
Ravi Sood filed the motion for partial summary judgment on Claim
IV.
II.

AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff alleges the following in his amended complaint,

pertinent to the present partial motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff was confined at Fort Dix from June 2015 to December 2017.
(Am. Compl. ¶1, Dkt. No. 51.) Dr. Ravi Sood was Plaintiff’s primary
care physician at FCI Fort Dix. (Id. ¶7.) Under Dr. Sood’s care,
Plaintiff

suffered

from

at

least

four

painful

urinary

tract

infections in less than one year. (Id. ¶122.) During one of those
infections, Plaintiff took a urine test but was not apprised of
the positive results of his infection by Dr. Sood for more than a
month. (Id. at ¶125.) Even after he was belatedly informed of the
positive result, Plaintiff was not given medication for a week.
(Id. ¶126.) Plaintiff needlessly suffered painful symptoms for
more than a month without medication. (Id. ¶129.)

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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary Judgment is proper where the moving party “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a);
Daubert v. NRA Group, LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d Cir. 2017). “A
dispute is “genuine” if ‘a reasonable jury could return a verdict
for the nonmoving party[.]’” Baloga v. Pittston Area Sch. Dist.,
927 F.3d 742, 752 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting Santini v. Fuentes, 795
F.3d 410, 416 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). “[A] fact is ‘material’ where
‘its existence or nonexistence might impact the outcome of the
suit under the applicable substantive law.’” Id. (citing Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248).
The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show, beyond the
pleadings, “‘that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Daubert,
861 F.3d at 391 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317,
324 (1986) (emphasis in Daubert)). “With respect to an issue on
which the non-moving party bears the burden of proof, the burden
on the moving party may be discharged by ‘showing’… that there is
an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.”
Conoshenti v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 145–46
(3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325).
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
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(A) citing to particular parts of materials in
the record, including depositions, documents,
electronically stored information, affidavits
or
declarations,
stipulations
(including
those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other
materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not
establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot
produce admissible evidence to support the
fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
“At the summary judgment stage, facts must be viewed in the
light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a
‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S.
372, 380 (2007) (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56(c)). The court’s
role is “‘not ... to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of
the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Baloga, 927 F.3d at 752 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at
249)).
IV. DISCUSSION
A.

Under

Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies is Mandatory under
the PLRA
the

PLRA,

inmates

must

“first

exhaust

the

administrative remedies available at the prison level” before
proceeding to federal court. Williams v. Beard, 482 F.3d 637, 639
(3d Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)). Failure to exhaust
under the PLRA is an affirmative defense. Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S.

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199, 216 (2007). To comply with this process and fully exhaust
administrative remedies, an inmate must first attempt an informal
resolution with prison staff. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.13(a). If these
efforts fail, the inmate must then submit an administrative remedy
request to the warden within twenty days of the occurrence that is
the basis of the request. See 28 C.F.R. § 542.14(a), (c). If the
inmate is unsatisfied with the warden’s response, the inmate may
then submit an appeal to the appropriate Regional Director within
twenty days of the date of the warden’s response. See 28 C.F.R. §
542.15(a). An inmate may appeal the Regional Director’s response
to BOP’s Central Office, General Counsel, within thirty days of
the Regional Director’s response. Id. An inmate has fully exhausted
administrative remedies only when the General Counsel considers
the appeal or time for doing so expires. 28 C.F.R. § 542.15(a).
B.

Undisputed Material Facts
1. At all times relevant to the allegations in
the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was a federal
inmate designated to FCI Fort Dix.
2. On May 9, 2016, Plaintiff visited Health
Services at FCI Fort Dix for medical treatment
for a urinary tract infection.
3. Plaintiff was assessed a $2.00 copay.
4. On June 1, 2016, Plaintiff filed a request
for an administrative remedy regarding the
imposition of the $2.00 copay.
5.
On
June
Hollingsworth

15,
2016,
Warden
Jordan
responded
to
Plaintiff’s

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request for an administrative remedy regarding
the copay and denied the request.
6. On June 22, 2016, Plaintiff appealed the
denial of his request for an administrative
remedy concerning the copay for the May 2016
visit to Health Services.
7. On July 25, 2016, the Regional Director
responded to Plaintiff’s appeal and denied it.
8. On August 9, 2016, Plaintiff appealed the
denial of his appeal by the Regional Director
to the Central Office.
9. On September 7, 2016, the Central Office
denied this appeal.
10. Plaintiff filed administrative remedy
requests in November 2016 and December 2016.
(Def’s

SOMF,

Dkt.

No.

66-2;

Declaration

of

Corrie

Dobovich

(“Dobovich Decl.”), Dkt. No. 66-3; Declaration of James Stile
(“Stile Decl.”), Dkt. No. 72 at 18-46; Supplemental Declaration of
Corrie Dobovich (“Dobovich Suppl. Decl.”), Dkt. No. 77-1; Ex. 1.)
The parties dispute whether Petitioner exhausted his present claim
against Dr. Sood in the above described appeals to the Regional
Director and the Central Office.
C.

The Parties’ Arguments

Defendant submits that Plaintiff did not meet any of the four
levels of exhaustion with respect to his claim that Dr. Sood
delayed in treating a urinary tract infection, and he cannot
demonstrate that exhaustion would have been futile. According to
the BOP’s records of administrative remedy requests, as set forth

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in the declarations of Corrie Dobovich, Plaintiff has never filed
an administrative remedy request challenging any aspects of the
care provided for this condition; the only remedy he sought was
related to the copay associated with his treatment. (Dobovich Decl.
¶4; see generally Dobovich Suppl. Decl.))
To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that he fully exhausted
his administrative remedies regarding his claim against Dr. Sood.
Plaintiff provides a May 5, 2016 informal remedy request submitted
on BOP form BP-8 (Ex. A, Dkt. No. 72 at 27), where he complained
to medical staff, to not avail, of having kidney pain throughout
April, though medical staff knew of his history of kidney cysts
and

urinary

tract

infections.

The

BOP

responded

that

he

was

scheduled for an evaluation on May 13. Then, on May 10, 2016,
Plaintiff filed another BP-8 form (Stile Decl. ¶11; Ex. B, Dkt.
No. 72 at 30) complaining of kidney pain and demanding an immediate
examination.
Plaintiff

contends

that

he

exhausted

his

administrative

remedies concerning his kidney pain and urinary tract infections
by filing forms BP-9 on June 1, 2016 (Id. ¶12; Ex. D), and appealing
denial of that administrative remedy on form BP-10 to the BOP
Northeast Regional Director (Id. ¶13; Ex. E), and appealing that
denial on form BP-11 to the General Counsel in the BOP Central
Office. (Id. ¶¶14, 15; Ex. F).

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In reply, Defendant submitted the supplemental declaration of
Corrie Dobovich. (Dkt. No. 77-1.) Ms. Dobovich provided a summary
of

all

Plaintiffs’

requests

for

administrative

remedies

from

January 1, 2016, to December 23, 2016. (Id.; Ex. 1.) Plaintiff
filed 104 requests for administrative remedies during that time,
but only four remedies were associated with complaints regarding
his kidneys or a urinary tract infection. (Dobovich Suppl. Decl.
¶2.)
For example, in Remedy ID Number 862608-Fl, filed with the
Warden of FCI Fort Dix on or about May 17, 2016, Plaintiff
requested a plan for his kidney issues. (Dobovich Suppl. Decl.
¶3.) Plaintiff did not appeal the Warden’s response through the
required levels of the Administrative Remedy process. (Id.)
Plaintiff

subsequently

filed

three

requests

for

administrative remedies challenging the $2.00 copay associated
with kidney-related medical appointments. (Id. ¶4, citing Exs. D
through F to Stile Decl.) In those requests, Plaintiff did not
complain about waiting for his urinary infection test results;
rather, he was seeking relief from having to pay $2.00 each time
he saw medical providers about his condition. Defendant argues
that these administrative remedy requests did not put the agency
on notice of Plaintiff’s complaint about Dr. Sood. In his surreply,

Plaintiff

maintains

that

the

BOP’s

response

to

his

administrative complaints show that the BOP was aware he was
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complaining about indifference to his medical care. (Pl’s SurReply Brief, Dkt. No. 78.)
D.

Analysis

The PLRA demands proper exhaustion of administrative remedies
before a prisoner may file suit about any prison conditions. 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. at 93 (“the PLRA
exhaustion requirement requires proper exhaustion.”) “The level of
detail necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance
procedures will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but
it is the prison's requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the
boundaries of proper exhaustion.” Jones, 549 U.S. at 218.
After an attempt at informal resolution of a prisoner’s
complaint

fails,

the

BOP’s

administrative

remedy

procedure

requires:
The inmate shall place a single complaint or
a reasonable number of closely related issues
on the form. If the inmate includes on a single
form multiple unrelated issues, the submission
shall be rejected and returned without
response, and the inmate shall be advised to
use a separate form for each unrelated issue.
For DHO and UDC appeals, each separate
incident report number must be appealed on a
separate form.
28 C.F.R. § 541.14(c)(2).
Pertinent to this motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff
alleges Dr. Ravi Sood was deliberately indifferent to his serious
medical needs by failing to advise Plaintiff of his positive test

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results

for

a

urinary

tract

infection

and

not

prescribing

medication for that infection until more than a month later. While
it

is

true

that

Plaintiff

generally

complained

in

his

administrative remedies that his kidney pain was not addressed as
expeditiously as he desired, and that he had a history of urinary
tract infections, nothing in the administrative remedies that were
exhausted through the Central Office level would have put the BOP
on notice that Plaintiff was tested for a urinary tract infection
on a certain date and that he did not get the positive tests
results or any treatment for the condition until more than one
month after the test results. In fact, even the amended complaint
is unclear as to when Plaintiff tested positive for a urinary tract
infection. 1

1

It appears that Plaintiff had an ultrasound in March 2016 and
that he was scheduled for another test on May 13, 2016, but neither
the amended complaint nor the administrative remedy requests
demonstrate when Plaintiff tested positive for a urinary tract
infection but was not treated for it until a month later. (See Am.
Compl. ¶¶125-127.) Plaintiff further alleged “under Dr. Sood’s
care, Mr. Stile suffered from at least four painful urinary tract
infections in less than one year.” (See Am. Compl. ¶122.) A medical
provider is not deliberately indifferent solely because a patient
suffers recurring infections. See Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d
313, 337 (3d Cir. 2016) (“We have found ‘deliberate indifference’
in a variety of circumstances, including where the prison official
(1) knows of a prisoner's need for medical treatment but
intentionally refuses to provide it; (2) delays necessary medical
treatment based on a non-medical reason; or (3) prevents a prisoner
from receiving needed or recommended medical treatment.” (citing
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)).
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The

purpose

of

mandatory

exhaustion

of

administrative

remedies is to permit the agency to resolve issues without the
necessity of a lawsuit. See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89. (“Claims
generally can be resolved much more quickly and economically in
proceedings before an agency than in litigation in federal court.”)
Agencies cannot be expected to resolve issues that are not clearly
presented. If Plaintiff had complained that he was tested for a
urinary tract infection on a particular date and did not yet have
the results, the BOP would have had an opportunity to do something
about it. By not clearly stating the issue, Plaintiff failed to
properly exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, the Court will
grant Dr. Sood’s motion for summary judgment. 2
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Defendants’ Partial Motion

for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

An appropriate Order follows.
Date:

May 29, 2020
`

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

2

Plaintiff requested discovery on the issue of exhaustion in the
event the Court was inclined to grant Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment. (Pl’s Opp. Brief, Dkt. No. 72 at 16.) In
Plaintiff’s declaration in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment he argued that he exhausted administrative remedies as of
August 2016. Plaintiff has not proffered what further discovery
would yield.
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