WILLIAMS v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al

Filing 5

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 4/30/18. (jbk, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

JAMES D. WILLIAMS,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE

Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 17-cv-2748(JBS-AMD)

v.
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY; ERIC TAYLOR, FORMER
WARDEN; FRANK LOBERTO, FORMER
DEPUTY WARDEN; JOSEPH RIBA,
CAMDEN COUNTY CLERK; DAVID
OWENS, WARDEN; and KATE
TAYLOR, WARDEN,

OPINION

Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
James D. Williams, Plaintiff Pro Se
4327909
330 Federal Street
Camden, NJ 08103
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
1.

Plaintiff James D. Williams (“Plaintiff”) seeks to

bring a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Plaintiff
has filed suit against: Camden County Correctional Facility
(“CCCF”); Eric Taylor (“E. Taylor”) as Former Warden at CCCF;
Frank Loberto (“Loberto”) as Former Deputy Warden at CCCF;
Joseph Riba (“Riba”) as Camden County Clerk; David Owens
(“Owens”) as Warden at CCCF; and Kate Taylor (“K. Taylor”) as

Warden at CCCF (E. Taylor, Loberto, Riba, Owens, and K. Taylor
are referred to collectively as “the Individual Defendants”).
(ECF No. 1.)
2.

At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to

determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
3.

For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint: (a) is

dismissed with prejudice as to CCCF; (b) is dismissed with
prejudice as to claims of overcrowding that arose during CCCF
incarcerations from which Plaintiff was released before April
21, 2015; (c) shall proceed against the Individual Defendants as
to claims of overcrowding that arose during CCCF incarcerations
from which Plaintiff was released on or after April 21, 2015;
(d) is dismissed with prejudice as to Plaintiff’s claims of
uncleanly conditions of confinement regarding scabies and a
lesion; and (e) is dismissed without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s
claim of uncleanly conditions of confinement regarding change of
eye color and loss of vision.
BACKGROUND
4.

The following factual allegations are taken from the

Complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.

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The Court makes no findings as to the truth of Plaintiff’s
allegations.
5.

Plaintiff alleges he endured unconstitutional

conditions of confinement in CCCF from overcrowding and
unsanitary living conditions. (ECF No. 1 at 4-5.)
6.

Plaintiff alleges that these events occurred “in the

years 2005 & 2006,” “in the years 2010 [and] 2011,” and 2016.
(Id. at 4, 5.)
7.

Plaintiff contends that he sustained various injuries

in connection with the alleged events, including scabies
infection, hernia tear, “cervical vertebrae misalignment,” “near
constant sharp shooting pain down my neck and into my left arm &
my left shoulder,” and vision impairment. (Id.)
8.

As to requested relief, Plaintiff seeks “a sound

judgment to rectify this situation as soon as possible and to
resolve peacefully monetary values concerning my life an[d]
health.” (Id. at 5.)
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
9.

Section 1915(e)(2) requires review of complaints prior

to service in cases in which plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
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who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis and
is filing a claim about the conditions of his confinement.
10.

To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a

claim, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
B. Section 1983 Actions
11.

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. That
statute provides, in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the
United
States
or
other
person
within
the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
12. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
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must allege: (1) the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
13.

Plaintiff’s claims of unconstitutional conditions of

confinement due to overcrowding and uncleanly conditions will be
dismissed with prejudice in part, will proceed in part, and will
be dismissed without prejudice in part, as explained below.
A.
14.

Claims Against CCCF: DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
Plaintiff’s claims against CCCF must be dismissed with

prejudice because CCCF is not a “state actor” within the meaning
of § 1983. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.
Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983).
B.

Overcrowding Claim: DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE IN PART
and SHALL PROCEED IN PART AGAINST THE INDIVIDUAL
DEFENDANTS

15.

Construing the Complaint’s factual allegations

liberally in Plaintiff’s favor based on his pro se status (see
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)), the Court finds
5

that they plausibly set forth sufficient factual support for a
claim regarding unconstitutionally overcrowded conditions of
confinement. However, the Court accepts the Complaint’s factual
allegations as true for screening purposes only and makes no
finding about the actual merits, if any, of Plaintiff’s
overcrowding claim.
16.

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that CCCF’s

overcrowded conditions of “never less than 3 people in any cell”
compelled him “to keep [my] legs under the steel frame of the
sleeping racks which are 6”-9” off the cement floor” and
resulted in “nearly unbearable pain” and his subsequent need to
use “a hernia retention belt.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) He maintains
that as a result of these conditions, he “now ha[s] cervical
vertebrae misalignment and near constant sharp shooting pain
down my neck and into my left arm.” (Id. at 6-7 (referred to as
the “Overcrowding Claim”).) Plaintiff alleges that “my medical
problems have been caused by conditions at this jail.” (Id. at
5.) Plaintiff further states that “CCCF & its correctional
officers staff inclusive from guards to management staff
including wardens & [E. Taylor, Loberto, Owens] as well as the
outsourced medical, food & ancillary staff have all known the
severe overcrowding at CCCF is primarily if not exclusively
responsible for the serious health and personal safety issues at

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this jail which were not addressed in any way until September of
2016.” (Id. at 4.)
17.

“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be

punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with
due process of law.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell
with more persons than its intended design does not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation. See Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment’” (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542). Overcrowding
leading to conditions that “cause inmates to endure such genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time” and
that “become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to
them” does constitute unconstitutional punishment, however.
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of confinement
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.” Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 233.

7

18.

Here, liberally construing the Complaint as this Court

is required to do, Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
245 (3d Cir. 2013), Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to
plausibly support a reasonable inference that an
unconstitutional overcrowding violation occurred in order to
survive review under § 1915. Considering the totality of the
circumstances alleged by Plaintiff, the Court finds that he has
sufficiently pled that he experienced unconstitutionally
punitive conditions at CCCF. Furthermore, Plaintiff has also
alleged the requisite “personal involvement by [individual jail
personnel] in a[] constitutional violation.” Baker v. Flagg, 439
F. App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Bob v. Kuo, 387 F.
App’x 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution”) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).
19.

The Overcrowding Claim shall therefore be permitted to

proceed against the Individual Defendants in their individual
capacities, but only to the extent this Claim arises from
incarcerations from which Plaintiff was released on or after
April 21, 2015.1

1

Civil rights claims under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's
limitations period for personal injury and must be brought
8

20.

With respect to Plaintiff’s request for “a sound

judgment to rectify this situation as soon as possible” (ECF No.
1 at 5 (seeking both injunctive and monetary relief)), the Court
advises Plaintiff that he was one of thousands of members of a
certified class in the case on this Court's docket entitled,
Dittimus-Bey v. Camden County Correctional Facility, Civil No.
05-cv-0063 (JBS), which was a class action case. The class
plaintiffs were all persons confined at the Camden County
Correctional Facility (“CCCF”), as either pretrial detainees or
convicted prisoners, at any time from January 6, 2005 until June
30, 2017. The class of plaintiffs sought injunctive and
declaratory relief about unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at the CCCF involving overcrowding. That class
action did not involve money damages for individuals. A proposed
final settlement of that case, which describes the settlement in
detail, was preliminarily approved on February 22, 2017. Various

within two years of the claim’s accrual. See Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d
181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa.
Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). Allegedly
unconstitutional conditions at CCCF would have been immediately
apparent to Plaintiff during detention. Therefore, to the extent
the Complaint seeks relief for overcrowding that Plaintiff
encountered during periods of confinement that ended prior to
April 21, 2015, those claims are time-barred because the twoyear statute of limitations expired before the Complaint was
filed on April 21, 2015.
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measures undertaken in several Consent Decrees under court
approval reduced the jail population to fewer prisoners than the
intended design capacity for the jail. This greatly reduced or
eliminated triple and quadruple bunking in two-person cells, as
explained in the Sixth and Amended Final Consent Decree, which
continues those requirements under court supervision. According
to the Notice to all class members that was approved in the
Dittimus-Bey case on February 22, 2017, any class member could
object to the proposed settlement by filing an objection in the
Dittimus-Bey case before April 24, 2017. A court hearing
occurred on May 23, 2017, at which objections were to be
considered. This Court finally approved the Dittimus-Bey
settlement on June 30, 2017, and that settlement bars Plaintiff
and other class members from seeking injunctive or declaratory
relief for the period of time from January 6, 2005 through June
30, 2017, but the settlement did not bar any individual class
member from seeking money damages in an individual case. In
other words, the Final Consent Decree in Dittimus-Bey did not
adjudicate or deal with any individual money damage claims.
Indeed, claims for money damages were not sought in Dittimus-Bey
and inmates were free to pursue individual claims for monetary
relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by filing an individual complaint.
21.

Plaintiff, a class member in Dittimus-Bey, is bound by

that case’s final judgment in which class members are deemed to
10

release claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against
Camden County and its officers and employees through the final
judgment date of June 30, 2017. This means that Plaintiff, like
all class members, can no longer obtain injunctive relief beyond
that authorized in the Consent Decree for jail conditions during
the class period. But that litigation did not involve individual
inmates’ or detainees’ claims or class claims for money damages,
which must be sought and proved on an individual claim basis
C.

Uncleanly Conditions Claims: DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
IN PART and DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE IN PART

22.

Plaintiff asserts that: (a) CCCF had an “infestation

of scabies” in “the years of 2005 & 2006” (ECF No. 1 at 4-5
(referred to as the “Scabies Claim”)); (b) he experienced “a
small bump (approximately quarter sized in my left groin area)
in the years 2010 [and] 2011” (id. at 5 (referred to as the
“Lesion Claim”)); and (c) “some environmental factor or factors
at the jail” have caused him to experience “vision loss” and
change of eye color “from blue to grayish brown.” (Id. at 5
(referred to as the “Eye Claim”).) This Court reasonably
construes these three claims to allege that Plaintiff suffered
injuries from uncleanly conditions while incarcerated at CCCF.
23.

A failure of prison officials to provide minimally

civil conditions of confinement to pre-trial detainees violates

11

their right not to be punished without due process of law.
Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1997).
24.

Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process

Clause, prison officials must satisfy “basic human needs -e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). When a
pretrial detainee complains about the conditions of his
confinement, courts are to consider, in accordance with the
Fourteenth Amendment, whether the conditions “amount to
punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with
law.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005).
Courts must inquire as to whether the conditions “‘cause
[detainees] to endure [such] genuine privations and hardship
over an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions
become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them.’”
Id. at 159-60 (citations omitted). The objective component of
this unconstitutional punishment analysis examines whether “the
deprivation [was] sufficiently serious,” and the subjective
component asks whether

“the officials act[ed] with a

sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]” Stevenson v. Carroll,
495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39,
n.20), cert. denied, Phelps v. Stevenson, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008).
25.

In this case, however, Plaintiff’s Scabies Claim and

Lesion Claim must be dismissed with prejudice as they are
12

untimely and therefore barred by the statute of limitations. As
noted above, civil rights claims under § 1983 are governed by
New Jersey's limitations period for personal injury and must be
brought within two years of the claim’s accrual. Wilson, 471
U.S. at 276; Dique, 603 F.3d at 185. Here, Plaintiff alleges the
scabies “infestation” occurred in 2005-2006 (ECF No. 1 at 4-5),
and the “small bump” occurred in 2010-2011. (Id. at 5.)
Therefore, to the extent the Complaint seeks relief for
uncleanly conditions that would have been immediately apparent
to Plaintiff during confinements that ended prior to April 21,
2015, those claims are time-barred; the two-year statute of
limitations for such claims expired before the Complaint was
filed on April 21, 20173. Although courts may extend statutes of
limitations in the interests of justice, certain circumstances
must be present. Tolling is not warranted here because Plaintiff
has not been “actively misled” as to the existence of his causes
of action, there are no extraordinary circumstances that
prevented Plaintiff from filing his claims, and there is nothing
to indicate he filed his claims on time but in the wrong forum.
See Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
26.

As to Plaintiff’s third uncleanly conditions of

confinement claim, the Eye Claim must be dismissed without
prejudice as it fails to state a claim. Specifically, Plaintiff
does not allege facts to satisfy the objective or subjective
13

components of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process analysis, as the
Court now explains.
27.

As to the constitutional test’s objective prong,

Plaintiff does not offer any facts identifying or otherwise
describing the supposed “environmental factor or factors” (ECF
No. 1 at 5) purportedly prompting “vision loss” and causing his
eyes to change color. Rather, he merely states in conclusory
fashion without any factual support: “My medical problems have
been caused by conditions at this Jail, plain & simple. It can’t
be denied.” (ECF No. 1 at 5 (“I’m supposed to see an eye
specialist, . . . but I still have not seen anyone other than
jail medical staff to this point in time”).) In short, there are
no facts in the Complaint plausibly suggesting that any
particular unsanitary condition at CCCF was imposed as
“punishment” upon Plaintiff.
28.

As to the constitutional test’s subjective prong,

Plaintiff also has not alleged facts plausibly raising a
reasonable inference that CCCF personnel were aware of, and
disregarded, a substantial risk to Plaintiff’s eye health and
safety from uncleanly conditions at CCCF. (Id. at 5.) Rather,
Plaintiff states that he complained to CCCF personnel only as to
overcrowding. (Id. at 4.)
29.

Accordingly, the Eye Claim shall be dismissed without

prejudice for failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. §
14

1915(e)(2)(b)(ii). Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint
to particularly identify uncleanly conditions that were caused
by specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure
genuine privations and hardship over an extended period of time,
and that were excessive in relation to their purposes. To that
end, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint within 30 days after the date this Opinion and Order
are entered on the docket.2
V.

CONCLUSION
30.

Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice in

part, shall proceed in part, and is dismissed without prejudice
in part, as follows:

2

The amended complaint shall be subject to judicial screening
prior to service. Plaintiff is further advised that any amended
complaint must plead specific facts regarding the uncleanly
conditions of confinement. In the event Plaintiff files an
amended complaint, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to
support a reasonable inference that a constitutional violation
has occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under §
1915. Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint is
filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function in
the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the amended
complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
15

a.

The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to

CCCF;
b.

The Overcrowding Claim is dismissed with

prejudice as to incarcerations from which Plaintiff was
released prior to April 21, 2015, meaning that Plaintiff
cannot recover for those claims because they have been
brought too late and are time-barred by the statute of
limitations;
c.

The Overcrowding Claim shall proceed against the

Individual Defendants with respect to incarcerations from
which Plaintiff was released on or after April 21, 2015;
d.

The Scabies Claim and Lesion Claim are dismissed

with prejudice because they have been brought too late
and are time-barred by the statute of limitations; and
e.

The Eye Claim is dismissed without prejudice for

failure to state a claim.

An appropriate order follows.

April 30, 2018
Dated

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

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