DONAHUE v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al
Filing
4
OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 5/1/2018. (rss, n.m )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
THOMAS M. DONOHUE,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 17-cv-2750(JBS-AMD)
v.
OPINION
CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL
FACILITY; DAVID OWENS, WARDEN;
and KATE TAYLOR, WARDEN,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Thomas M. Donohue, Plaintiff Pro Se
502 State Street
Camden, NJ 08103
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
1.
Plaintiff Thomas M. Donohue
(“Plaintiff”) seeks to
bring a civil rights action against Camden County Correctional
Facility (“CCCF”), David Owens (“Owens”) as Warden at CCCF, and
Kate Taylor (“Taylor”) as Warden at CCCF (Owens and Taylor
referred to collectively as “the Individual Defendants”)
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for allegedly unconstitutional
conditions of confinement. (ECF No. 1.)
2.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint to
determine whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or
malicious, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
1
granted, or because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief.
3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Complaint: (a) is
dismissed with prejudice as to CCCF; (b) is dismissed with
prejudice as to Plaintiff’s claims of overcrowding, uncleanly
living conditions, and inadequate medical care -- to the extent
such claims arose during incarcerations from which Plaintiff was
released from CCCF before April 21, 2015; (c) shall proceed
against the Individual Defendants as to Plaintiff’s claims of
overcrowding, uncleanly living conditions, and inadequate
medical care -- to the extent such claims arose during
incarcerations from which Plaintiff was released from CCCF on or
after April 21, 2015; (d) is dismissed without prejudice as to
Plaintiff’s claim of failure to protect; and (e) is dismissed
without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s claim of excessive use of
force.
BACKGROUND
4.
The following factual allegations are taken from the
Complaint and are accepted for purposes of this screening only.
The Court makes no findings as to the truth of Plaintiff’s
allegations.
5.
Plaintiff alleges he endured unconstitutional
conditions of confinement in CCCF from overcrowded conditions of
confinement, unsanitary living conditions, and inadequate
2
medical care. (ECF No. 1 at 5-7.) Plaintiff also asserts claims
for failure to protect and excessive use of force. (Id. at 7.)
6.
Plaintiff alleges that these events occurred “for more
th[a]n 1400 days since 12/22/2012.” (Id. at 2.)
7.
Plaintiff contends that he sustained injuries such as
“lumbar disk problems and sciatica,” depression, a fungal
infection of the scalp with associated hair loss, and “7 MRSA
lesions” in connection with the alleged events. (Id. at 6-7.)
8.
As to requested relief, Plaintiff seeks: transfer to a
detention facility located in another state1; “compensat[ion] at
the maximum levels for my damages sustained during my 1,400+
days of incarceration,” and for this Court “to hold all involved
parties accountable to the highest degree.” (Id. at 7-8.)
1
Plaintiff seeks transfer from CCCF to another correctional
facility (ECF No. 1 at 7), but it is not within this Court’s
power or authority to order such relief. Under New Jersey law,
the Commissioner of the Department of Corrections has broad
authority to confine inmates in any penal institution. See,
e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4-85; Jenkins v. Fauver, 108 N.J.
239, 252 (1987); Dozier v. Hilton, 507 F. Supp. 1299, 1306
(D.N.J. 1981) (a prison inmate has no right or justifiable
expectation under New Jersey law as to transfer from one prison
to another). See also Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 224-25
(1976) (“That life in one prison is much more disagreeable than
in another does not in itself [implicate] a Fourteenth Amendment
liberty interest”); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 248 n.9
(1983) (“A conviction . . . empowers the State to confine the
inmate in any penal institution in any State unless there is
state law to the contrary or the reason for confining the inmate
in a particular institution is itself constitutionally
impermissible”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for transfer
from CCCF to another institution must be denied.
3
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
9.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires review of complaints prior
to service in cases in which plaintiff is proceeding in forma
pauperis. The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim that is
frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant
who is immune from such relief. This action is subject to sua
sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 2.)
10.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).
B. Section 1983 Actions
11.
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights. That
statute provides, in relevant part:
4
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the
United
States
or
other
person
within
the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
12. To state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege: (1) the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States; and (2) that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48
(1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011).
DISCUSSION
13.
Plaintiff’s claims of unconstitutional conditions of
confinement at CCCF due to overcrowding, uncleanly conditions,
and inadequate medical care will be dismissed in part and will
proceed in part, as explained below.
A.
14.
Claims Against CCCF: DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE
Plaintiff’s claims against CCCF must be dismissed with
prejudice because CCCF is not a “state actor” within the meaning
of § 1983. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App'x 113, 116 (3d
Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject to suit under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474 F.2d 991, 992
(3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr. Facility, 726 F.
5
Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional facility is not a
“person” under § 1983).
B.
Overcrowding Claim: WILL PROCEED AS AGAINST THE
INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
15.
Construing the Complaint liberally and giving
Plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, he has
sufficiently stated a claim for unconstitutionally overcrowded
conditions of confinement against the Individual Defendants.
16.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that the overcrowded
conditions of “5 people in a cell designed for 1 which is barely
tolerable with 2 in a cell” resulted in him “sleeping on a
cement floor with ½ of your body under a steel rack 6”-9” off
the floor or if there are 4 in a cell ½ of your body under a
steel bench 3”-15” off the cement floor.” (ECF No. 1 at 6.) He
maintains that these conditions “have made my symptoms /
disabilities significantly worse than they have ever been, and I
never suffered from sciatica until my 1st arrest in Dec. of 2012
. . . I have now had cervical disk misalignment & subluxations
caused directly / exclusively because of sleeping on a cement
floor & half under a steel rack (the beds) and the near
impossibility to obtain proper non-traumatic lumbar & cervical
positioning when attempting to sleep. The intentional infliction
of sleep depr[i]vation [is] due to gross overcrowding.” (Id. at
6-7 (referred to as the “Overcrowding Claim”).) Plaintiff
6
alleges that “sleep[ing] on this jail floor has been directly
responsible for sciatica exacerbation, lumbar disk pathologic
exacerbation, and r[ight] & l[eft] leg sciatica.” (Id. at 5-6.)
Plaintiff further states that “[d]uring this time I have spoken
directly to Director Owens [and] Warden Taylor about the
overcrowding.” (Id. at 5.)
17.
“[U]nder the Due Process Clause, a detainee may not be
punished prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with
due process of law.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily in a cell
with more persons than its intended design does not rise to the
level of a constitutional violation. See Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment’” (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 542). Overcrowding
leading to conditions that “cause inmates to endure such genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time” and
that “become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to
them” does constitute unconstitutional punishment, however.
Hubbard v. Taylor, 538 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of confinement
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
7
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.” Hubbard, 538 F.3d at 233.
18.
Here, liberally construing the Complaint as this Court
is required to do, Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239,
245 (3d Cir. 2013), Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to
plausibly support a reasonable inference that an
unconstitutional overcrowding violation occurred in order to
survive review under § 1915. Considering the totality of the
circumstances alleged by Plaintiff, the Court finds that he has
sufficiently pled that he experienced unconstitutionally
punitive conditions at CCCF. Furthermore, Plaintiff has also
alleged the requisite “personal involvement by [individual jail
personnel] in a[] constitutional violation.” Baker v. Flagg, 439
F. App’x 82, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Rode v. Dellarciprete,
845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). See also Bob v. Kuo, 387 F.
App’x 134, 136 (3d Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff must plead that
each Government-official defendant, through the official's own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution”) (citing
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 676 (2009)).
19.
The Overcrowding Claim shall therefore be permitted to
proceed against the Individual Defendants in their individual
capacities.
8
C.
Uncleanly Conditions Claim: WILL PROCEED AS AGAINST
THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
20.
Plaintiff states that CCCF had “unsanitary conditions
(generalized filth in all areas of this jail), including but not
limited to mold growing in every shower & common area lavatory,
rodents in the living areas & rodent infestation in the jail’s
kitchen, common area & cell floors, walls and ceilings covered
with stains from who knows what from top to bottom.” (ECF No. 1
at 5 (referred to as the “Uncleanly Conditions Claim”).)
21.
A failure of prison officials to provide minimally
civil conditions of confinement to pre-trial detainees violates
their right not to be punished without due process of law.
Reynolds v. Wagner, 128 F.3d 166, 173-74 (3d Cir. 1997).
22.
Pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause, prison officials must satisfy “basic human needs -e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). When a
pretrial detainee complains about the conditions of his
confinement, courts are to consider, in accordance with the
Fourteenth Amendment, whether the conditions “amount to
punishment prior to an adjudication of guilt in accordance with
law.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 158 (3d Cir. 2005).
Courts must inquire as to whether the conditions “‘cause
[detainees] to endure [such] genuine privations and hardship
9
over an extended period of time, that the adverse conditions
become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned to them.’”
Id. at 159-60 (citations omitted). The objective component of
this unconstitutional punishment analysis examines whether “the
deprivation [was] sufficiently serious,” and the subjective
component asks whether
“the officials act[ed] with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind[.]” Stevenson v. Carroll,
495 F.3d 62, 68 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39,
n.20), cert. denied, Phelps v. Stevenson, 552 U.S. 1180 (2008).
23.
Here, Plaintiff alleges sufficient facts to satisfy
the objective and subjective components of Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process analysis pertinent to the Uncleanly Conditions Claim
24.
As to the test’s objective prong, Plaintiff offers
these facts about the supposed uncleanly conditions jeopardizing
his health and causing him injuries: “I have written to this
jail’s administration at least 20 times regarding health issues
caused by the overcrowding and apathetic staff and of course
grossly unsanitary conditions and gotten virtually NO POSITIVE
response from any staff but of course I have been sanctioned for
voicing my educated opinion. (I have a nursing degree & a
respiratory therapy degree & more th[a]n 20 years of actual
clinical experience . . . [While at CCCF], I contracted a fungal
infection in my scalp . . . I’m still missing a huge area of
scalp hair on the front of my head above my left eye . . . I
10
have also contracted 7 MRSA lesions.” (ECF No. 1 at 5, 7.) These
facts plausibly suggest that Plaintiff’s housing conditions as
he describes them were imposed as “punishment.”
25.
As to the constitutional test’s subjective prong,
Plaintiff has alleged facts plausibly raising a reasonable
inference that CCCF personnel were aware of, and disregarded, a
substantial risk to Plaintiff’s health and safety from uncleanly
conditions. (Id. at 5 (“I have written to this jail’s
administration at least 20 times regarding health issues caused
by the overcrowding and apathetic staff and of course grossly
unsanitary conditions and gotten virtually NO POSITIVE response
from any staff but of course I have been sanctioned for voicing
my educated opinion”).)
26.
Accordingly, the Uncleanly Conditions Claim shall
proceed as against the Individual Defendants in their individual
capacities.
D.
Inadequate Medical Care Claim: WILL PROCEED AS AGAINST
THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
27.
Plaintiff claims that “the jail would NOT screen my
blood for HEPC” after he inadvertently “shaved with the same
razor” as his cellmate who “is hepatitis C & B positive.”
Plaintiff states: “I cut myself [while shaving] several times .
. . So now there is a very good chance I’m also Hep C positive.
Being a RN & RRT, I had been vaccinated for HEP B years ago, but
11
I’ve now most likely contracted HEPC because of the blood to
blood contact.” (ECF No. 1 at 7 (referred to as the “Inadequate
Medical Care Claim”).)
28.
To allege a prima facie claim for violation of the
right to adequate medical care, a pretrial detainee must allege:
(a) a serious medical need; and (b) behavior on the part of
prison officials that constitutes deliberate indifference to
that need. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Natale v.
Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003);
Bocchino v. City of Atlantic City, 179 F. Supp.3d 387, 403
(D.N.J. 2016).
29.
To satisfy Estelle’s first prong, an inmate must
demonstrate that his medical needs are serious. Atkinson v.
Taylor, 316 F.3d 257, 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
30.
Estelle’s second element is subjective and “requires
an inmate to show that prison officials acted with deliberate
indifference to his serious medical need.” Holder v. Merline,
No. 05-1024, 2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (D.N.J. June 27, 2005)
(citing Natale, 318 F.3d at 582).
31.
Here, the Complaint alleges sufficient facts
supporting a reasonable inference that a constitutional
violation from inadequate medical care has occurred.
12
32.
First, Plaintiff’s allegation of hepatitis B exposure
plausibly suggests a serious medical condition for which “the
denial of treatment would result in the unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain” or “a life-long handicap or permanent loss.”
Atkinson, 316 F.3d at 272-73 (3d Cir. 2003).
33.
Second, Plaintiff offers facts raising a reasonable
inference that he alerted CCCF personnel to his serious medical
need, but they disregarded the risk to his health or safety.
Holder, 2005 WL 1522130, at *4 (citing Natale, 318 F.3d at 582
and Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994)).
34.
Therefore, the Inadequate Medical Care Claim shall
proceed as against the Individual Defendants in their individual
capacities.
E.
Failure to Protect Claim: DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJDICE
35.
Plaintiff alleges that he “was the near victim of a
sexual assault . . . A 6’1” 285+ pound man ripped my underware
attempting to rip them off so he could rape me I suppose. [I]f
you think someone is going to ‘rat’ on someone for a repulsive
act like that you[’]r[e] kidding yourself.” (ECF No. 1 at 7)
(referred to as the “Failure to Protect Claim”).)
36.
Given that Plaintiff is a pro se litigant and the
Court is required to construe the Complaint liberally, the Court
will proceed to review the Failure to Protect Claim as against
the Individual Defendants. However, Plaintiff has not offered
13
any facts from which this Court could reasonably infer a
constitutional violation as to this Claim.
37.
In order to state a claim for failure to protect, a
plaintiff must plead facts showing that: “(1) he was
incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm, (2) the [defendant] was deliberately indifferent
to that substantial risk to his health and safety, and (3) the
[defendant’s] deliberate indifference caused him harm.” Bistrian
v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 366-67 (3d Cir. 2012). “‘Deliberate
indifference’ in this context is a subjective standard: the
prison official-defendant must actually have known or been aware
of the excessive risk to inmate safety.” Id. at 367 (citing
Beers-Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 125 (3d Cir. 2001)). “It
is not sufficient that the official should have known of the
risk.” Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367 (citing Beers-Capitol, 256 F.3d
at 133 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38)).
38.
Plaintiff’s conclusory and unsupported contention that
he “suppose[s]” that he was “the near victim” of a sexual
assault (ECF No. 1 at 7) is insufficient to demonstrate that “he
was incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of
serious harm.” Bistrian, 696 F.3d at 367.
39.
Moreover, the Complaint does not allege any facts
suggesting that the purported assault occurred as a result of
deliberate indifference by CCCF personnel. Burton v. Kindle, 401
14
F. App’x 635, 637 (3d Cir. 2010). Defendants “must actually have
been aware of the existence of the excessive risk; it is not
sufficient that [Defendants] should have been aware.” BeersCapitol, 256 F.3d at 133 (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837-38).
Plaintiff here has offered no facts showing that any
correctional officers were aware of any risk whatsoever to
Plaintiff’s safety in his CCCF cell (let alone that such risk
was substantial) or that the officers were deliberately
indifferent to such. In fact, Plaintiff acknowledges that CCCF
personnel did not know of the alleged event. (ECF No. 1 at 7.)
40.
Accordingly, the Failure to Protect Claim will be
dismissed without prejudice, with leave to amend the Complaint,
within 30 days after the date this Opinion and Order are entered
on the docket, to meet the pleading deficiencies noted above. If
he wishes to pursue the Failure to Protect Claim, Plaintiff
bears the burden of supplying the facts of the claim, as
discussed above. The amended complaint may not adopt or repeat
claims that have been dismissed with prejudice by the Court in
this Opinion and the accompanying Order.
F.
Excessive Force Claim: DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
41.
Plaintiff alleges that he was “physically assaulted 5
other times including once by a guard Thomas Grazmic who was
fired for other reasons but his brutal assault on me was covered
up & I was told to ‘let it go’ so something worse did not happen
15
to me.” (ECF No. 1 at 7 (referred to as the “Excessive Force
Claim”).) Plaintiff seeks to “hold all involved parties
accountable to the highest degree for a criminal incident
perpetrated against me by C.C. Jail guards on 7/8/2016 which has
been covered up intentionally by this facility.” (Id. at 8.)
Although not specified in the Complaint, this Court construes
this Claim as a contention that Plaintiff suffered physical
abuse amounting to a violation of his constitutional rights.
42.
Even construing the Complaint liberally and giving
Plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, he has not
stated a claim for unconstitutionally excessive use of force.
43.
A pretrial detainee’s claim of excessive force is
governed by “the Due Process Clause [of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which] protects a pretrial detainee from the use of
excessive force that amounts to punishment.” Kingsley v.
Hendrickson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015) (quoting Graham v.
Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989)). To state a claim for use
of excessive force, a pretrial detainee must prove that the
force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively
unreasonable, meaning that the actions were not rationally
related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose.
Kingsley, 135 S.Ct. at 2473. Some objective circumstances
“potentially relevant to a determination of excessive force”
include “the relationship between the need for the use of force
16
and the amount of force used; the extent of the plaintiff’s
injury; any effort made by the officer to temper or to limit the
amount of force; the severity of the security problem at issue;
the threat reasonably perceived by the officer; and whether the
plaintiff was actively resisting.” Id. at 2473 (citing Graham,
490 U.S. at 396). The “objective reasonableness [standard] turns
on the ‘facts and circumstances of each particular case.’” Id.
44.
However, the Complaint here does not set forth any
facts for the Court to infer whether a constitutional violation
occurred. Plaintiff complains of “brutal assault” (ECF No. 1 at
7), but the circumstances surrounding the incident are left to
speculation. Mere labels and conclusory statements without
factual grounds do not suffice to state a claim.
45.
The Excessive Force Claim therefore fails to state a
cause of action and shall be dismissed without prejudice.
However, the Court shall grant Plaintiff leave to amend the
Complaint within 30 days after the date this Opinion and Order
are entered on the docket. Plaintiff is further advised that any
amended complaint must plead specific facts regarding whether
particular CCCF officials acted with a sufficiently culpable
state of mind to cause Plaintiff harm.2
2
The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
17
46.
Plaintiff should note that when an amended complaint
is filed, the original complaint no longer performs any function
in the case and cannot be utilized to cure defects in the
amended complaint, unless the relevant portion is specifically
incorporated in the new complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane,
Federal Practice and Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990) (footnotes
omitted). An amended complaint may adopt some or all of the
allegations in the original complaint, but the identification of
the particular allegations to be adopted must be clear and
explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer course is to file an
amended complaint that is complete in itself. Id. The amended
complaint may not adopt or repeat claims that have been
dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
V.
CONCLUSION
47.
Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice in
part, is dismissed without prejudice in part, and shall proceed
in part as follows:
a.
The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to
CCCF;
b.
The Complaint is dismissed with prejudice as to
the Overcrowding Claim, Uncleanly Conditions Claim, and
Inadequate Medical Care Claim to the extent such claims
arose during incarcerations from which Plaintiff was
released before April 21, 2015, meaning that Plaintiff
18
cannot recover for those claims because they have been
brought too late3;
c.
The Complaint shall proceed against the
Individual Defendants as to the Overcrowding Claim,
Uncleanly Conditions Claim, and Inadequate Medical Care
Claim to the extent such claims arose during
incarcerations from which Plaintiff was released on or
after April 21, 2015;
d.
The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice as
to the Failure to Protect Claim; and
3
Civil rights claims under § 1983 are governed by New Jersey's
limitations period for personal injury and must be brought
within two years of the claim’s accrual. See Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261, 276 (1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d
181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action
accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the
injury upon which the action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa.
Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d 472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). Here,
Plaintiff alleges the events giving rise to his claims occurred
while he was detained “for more than 1400 days since Dec. 22,
2012.” (ECF No. 1 at 5.) Allegedly unconstitutional conditions
at CCCF would have been immediately apparent to Plaintiff during
detention. Therefore, to the extent the Complaint seeks relief
for conditions Plaintiff encountered during periods of
confinement that ended prior to April 21, 2015, those claims are
barred by the statute of limitations because the two-year
statute of limitations expired before the Complaint was filed on
April 21, 2015. Although courts may extend statutes of
limitations in the interests of justice, certain circumstances
must be present. Tolling is not warranted here because Plaintiff
has not been “actively misled” as to the existence of his causes
of action, there are no extraordinary circumstances that
prevented Plaintiff from filing his claims, and there is nothing
to indicate he filed his claims on time but in the wrong forum.
See Omar v. Blackman, 590 F. App’x 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2014).
19
e.
The Complaint is dismissed without prejudice as
to the Excessive Use of Force Claim.
An appropriate order follows.
May 1, 2018
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
2
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?