CHAPMAN v. INSPIRA HEALTH NETWORK, INC. et al

Filing 71

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 9/25/2020. (dmr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
AUDREY CHAPMAN
1:17-cv-03145-NLH-JS
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
INSPIRA HEALTH NETWORK, INC.
et al.
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
JEREMY CHARLES ROSENBAUM
THE LAW OFFICES OF JEREMY C. ROSENBAUM
2323 RACE STREET - SUITE 1016
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103-1089
Attorney for the Plaintiff.
THOMAS PASCHOS
THOMAS PASCHOS & ASSOCIATES, PC
30 NORTH HADDON AVENUE - SUITE 200
HADDONFIELD, NJ 08033
Attorney for the Defendants.
HILLMAN, District Judge
This action concerns Plaintiff Audrey Chapman’s employment
at Inspira Health Network, Inc.

Plaintiff has alleged that in

the course of her employment, Defendants discriminated against
her on the basis of race, retaliated against her for her
whistleblower activity, breached its contract with her, and
tortiously interfered with her contractual rights.

This matter

comes before the Court on Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment and a joint motion to seal.

For the reasons that follow, the Court will grant in part
and deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The

Court will grant the parties’ joint motion to seal.
BACKGROUND
The Court takes its facts from the parties’ briefing, the
material facts not in dispute, and the procedural history of
this case.

The facts relevant to this case are summarized

below.
Plaintiff, Dr. Audrey Chapman (“Chapman”), is an AfricanAmerican woman.

She graduated from Edward Via Virginia College

of Osteopathic Medicine in October 2014.

Inspira Health

Network, Inc. (“Inspira”) is a private corporation, organized as
a nonprofit entity under the laws of New Jersey.

Inspira’s

principal place of business is located in Vineland, New Jersey.
Inspira facilitates several medical residency programs for
licensed physicians at the beginning of their careers.
Defendant Dr. Michael Geria is a doctor of osteopathy and
Inspira’s Director of Medical Education.

Dr. Douglas Hargrave

served as Inspira’s program director for family residents.
Defendant Nicole Zucconi is a doctor of osteopathy who served as
assistant program director for family medicine residents.
Plaintiff was accepted into the family medicine residency
program at Defendant Inspira on a “scramble” basis in 2015.
signed her Residency Agreement in March 2015 for a one-year

2

She

term.

This Agreement states that her residency would start on

July 1, 2015 and end on June 30, 2016.

This Agreement also

included several terms that obligated Inspira to meet certain
educational and professional requirements throughout the course
of Plaintiff’s residency.1

Plaintiff alleges that at the time

she started her residency, she was the only African-American
resident in the family medicine program at Inspira.
According to Plaintiff, residents in the family medicine
program rotated to a different subspecialty at the beginning of
each month.

Plaintiff states that she completed her first

rotation in surgery in July 2015 before moving to inpatient
family medicine in August.

During her inpatient rotation,

Plaintiff was supervised by Dr. David Aderholdt, a white, thirdyear resident in family medicine.

Plaintiff alleges Aderholdt

has a close friendly relationship with Defendant Zucconi through
Aderholdt’s wife.

Plaintiff alleges that Aderholdt harassed her

and treated with “unreasonable disfavor, particularly as
compared to non-black interns.”2

Specifically, Plaintiff’s complaint highlights Sections 3.2,
3.3, 3.5, 3.6, 3.8, and 3.9 of the agreement. ECF No. 1, at ¶
9.
1

Plaintiff details a number of instances of this alleged
harassment, including “(a) speaking to her in a belittling tone
and/or screaming at her, and embarrassing her in front of others
(b) threatening Plaintiff’s position by telling her ‘we have
fired people before’ and making her feel that she would have not
a job with Defendant IHN the following year; (c) telling
2

3

Plaintiff also claims that Aderholdt told her to “go home”
and “leave the building” in August 2015.

Plaintiff contends

that doing so would have constituted abandonment of her job, and
she did not comply with Aderholdt’s instructions to leave.

This

incident prompted Plaintiff to contact Defendant Zucconi and
inform her of Aderholdt’s conduct.

Plaintiff alleges that

during her conversation with Zucconi, she sought to “find
productive alternatives to being paired with Dr. Aderholdt in
the future” but asked not to escalate the issues beyond the
Zucconi.
In August 2015, Plaintiff alleges that during a meeting
with Dr. Stephanie Flaherty, the chief resident in family
medicine, she alerted Flaherty, Ralph Vicente, and another
Inspira employee that Aderholdt had sent text messages with
patient names, which Plaintiff alleges amounted to a Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)
violation.

According to Plaintiff, Flaherty noted that text

messaging was an improper way to avoid Inspira’s sign-out
procedure.

Plaintiff claims to have seen and received similarly

Plaintiff he did not want her on his rotation; (d) telling
Plaintiff she could not see any of his patients; (e) telling
Plaintiff she was a ‘problem’ and threatening to email
Defendants Geria and Zucconi, as well as Douglas Hargrave, DO,
the official Program Director of the Family Medical Residency
Program; and, (f) referring to other residents as “Dr.” and
referring to Plaintiff by her first name, as if she were a
medical student.” ECF No. 1, at ¶ 15.
4

improper text messages from Inspira’s other attending
physicians.

According to Plaintiff, no action was taken to

address this practice.
Flaherty testified that in August 2015, the family medicine
faculty meeting held a meeting.

During this meeting, various

residents discussed Plaintiff’s difficulty accepting
constructive criticism.

Plaintiff’s disagreements with

Aderholdt were also considered at this meeting.

Flaherty

further testified that in September 2015, an email between
Flaherty, Hargrave, Zucconi, and Brenda Mulford, the office
coordinator for the family medicine residency program, noted
many instances of Plaintiff’s unprofessional behavior as well as
concerns about her medical knowledge and efficiency.
On October 16, 2015, Plaintiff met with Defendant Geria,
Hargrave, Mulford, and Ralph Vicente, Inspira’s Director of
Human Resources.

According to Plaintiff, she was informed that

the purpose of this meeting was the discuss the findings of
Inspira’s investigation into her complaint against Aderholdt in
August 2015.

Plaintiff alleges that she was told Inspira had

“done its ‘due diligence,’ and found no grounds for disciplining
Dr. Aderholdt” and that her request not to work with him in the
future was denied.

Plaintiff contends that Inspira did not do

its due diligence during the course of this investigation
because it did not interview certain witnesses.

5

Plaintiff alleges that this meeting turned to complaints
that had supposedly been received about the Plaintiff and her
behavior.

According to the Plaintiff, during the course of this

discussion, she expressed alarm about what she perceived to be
unlawful deception committed by Inspira’s medical staff,
including falsification of a patient’s medical history to cover
up for “recklessly botching surgery.”3

Plaintiff contends that

Defendants Geria and Inspira did not respond receptively to this
disclosure.

Inspira contends that Plaintiff refused to provide

any details of this event, including the date of the incident,
any details about the patient, or the doctors allegedly
involved.

According to Plaintiff, when the meeting ended,

Defendant Geria stated that unless new allegations arose, he
would consider the complaints against Aderholdt and the
Plaintiff closed.
On October 19, 2015, Plaintiff contends that she wrote to
Defendant Geria regarding bullying and “tattling” among

Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that she witnessed an attending
physician perform a procedure on a patient “despite clearly not
knowing what he was doing, fumbling around and failing to
properly assemble or operate the surgical equipment.” Plaintiff
alleges that a pulmonologist had been called to perform this
procedure, but was not permitted to do so. Plaintiff alleges
that this procedure was dangerous because the attending
physician did not use an ultrasound, but instead “instructed a
resident to blindly poke around,” resulting in “serious and
unnecessary complications, such as difficulty breathing and
procedures to re-intubate the patient and re-inflate her lung.”
ECF No. 1, at ¶ 25.
3

6

residents.

Plaintiff alleges she requested that Defendant

Geria, as the head of residency programs, either hold a
conference or send a mass email regarding this issue.

According

to Plaintiff, Defendant Geria declined to take either action.
Plaintiff contends that at the end of October 2015, Defendant
Geria confirmed that the allegations against her were no longer
an issue and that neither Plaintiff nor Geria referenced these
complaints in a November 2015 meeting.
In December 2015, Plaintiff alleges that every resident
except her received a $100 gift card from Defendant Zucconi for
Christmas.

Plaintiff alleges that she was subjected to a

“humiliating runaround” when she tried to claim her gift card.
After Defendant Zucconi returned from maternity leave, she
met with Plaintiff on December 18, 2015.

The purpose of this

meeting was purportedly to discuss Plaintiff’s six-month
evaluation.

Plaintiff contends that this evaluation did not

occur and she never learned if she had passed or failed her
rotations.

Instead, Plaintiff alleges she was presented with a

Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”) as a disciplinary measure.
Plaintiff alleges that the only stated grounds for this measure
were the same allegations that Defendant Geria had confirmed
were no longer an issue.

Zucconi testified that in her opinion,

Plaintiff was creating a hostile work environment for the other
residents.

7

Plaintiff alleges that following this meeting, she returned
to work and had a conversation with Dr. Shirley Ayuk-Takem.
Plaintiff alleges that during this conversation she expressed
her frustration with the attacks on her professionalism.
Plaintiff alleges that she was “noting the absurdity of the
situation” when she remarked “I should just kill myself” to
Ayuk-Takem.
Ayuk-Takem reported this comment to the attending
physician, who asked Plaintiff to report to the emergency room
for evaluation.

Plaintiff was examined by a doctor and a social

worker before seeing a psychiatrist.

Plaintiff alleges that she

was told she could safely return to work following these
examinations.
On December 21, 2015, Plaintiff reported for work and
alleges she was told to meet with Defendant Geria before
beginning her shift.

Plaintiff alleges she was placed on an

immediate and involuntary paid leave of absence.

Plaintiff

states she was in her intensive care rotation, which was
scheduled to end on January 3, 2016.

Plaintiff alleges that she

underwent a psychological/psychiatric examination on January 12,
2016 and was cleared to return to work.
Plaintiff returned to work on January 27, 2016 and was
presented with a PIP.
first contemplated.

The parties dispute when this PIP was
Plaintiff alleges this process started as

8

early as October 14, 2015.

Defendant alleges this action was

contemplated starting in December 2015.
The January 2016 PIP states, in part, that Plaintiff was
placed on a PIP for unprofessional behavior.

According to

Plaintiff, the PIP stated she would be placed on probation for
three months and would have “monthly meetings with the program
directors (either Dr. Hargrave or Dr. Zucconi).”

Plaintiff

alleges that only one monthly meeting occurred on February 19,
2016.

Plaintiff states that during this meeting, Defendant

Geria and Hargrave addressed her behavior and performance during
her obstetrics and gynecology rotation, describing her
performance as very good.

Plaintiff also alleges that other,

non-black residents who received a PIP or notifications of
performance issues did have monthly meetings with Defendant
Zucconi.
Zucconi testified that it was not uncommon for residents to
be placed on a PIP or face discipline.

Of the six family

medicine residents who started in July 2015, two were terminated
before the year ended, one transferred to internal medicine, and
another transferred to another program in New Brunswick, New
Jersey.

That year, only one of six residents completed a

residency at Inspira.
In March 2016, Plaintiff filed her first complaint about
another resident, specifically Dr. Kristen Trom.

9

According to

Plaintiff, Trom is not black.

Trom had previously been a topic

of discussion at a faculty meeting and had been warned to “watch
what she says,” and reprimanded for “talking badly about
attendings.”

Trom was eventually cleared on any accusations

and, according to Plaintiff, did not receive any discipline.
Plaintiff alleges that on March 6, 2016, during a night
shift, she overheard Dr. Sandra Mason, a second-year resident in
family medicine, making “unprofessional and disparaging remarks”
about Plaintiff to another doctor.
Mason is not black.

According to Plaintiff,

Plaintiff alleges that she had observed

other unprofessional behavior by Mason before March 6 and had
previously made a complaint to Defendant Geria, Hargrave, and
Vicente on March 8.
against Mason.

Plaintiff filed another formal complaint

On April 25, 2016, Plaintiff received a letter

from Vicente stating that it did not appear that any
inappropriate behavior or violations of company policy had taken
place with regard to Mason.
According to Vicente, he had observed what he characterized
as “very odd behavior” by Plaintiff, including covering her ears
and saying she did not want to hear anything Vicente was saying
and falling on the floor crying in the face of criticism.
According to Dr. George Dendrinos, a member of the faculty at
Inspira, Plaintiff had many interpersonal conflicts with other
residents at Inspira.

Dendrinos stated that other residents did

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not want to work with Plaintiff, that Plaintiff was
confrontational and that Plaintiff did not properly follow-up
with patients.

Dendrinos also stated that Plaintiff had accused

Defendants Geria and Zucconi of lying and called them liars.
Flaherty testified that she also did not observe any improvement
in Plaintiff’s performance or demeanor after the Plaintiff was
placed on a PIP.
In April 2016, the family medicine faculty met again.

Dr.

Jack Shields, a member of Inspira’s family medicine department,
attended this meeting and testified that everyone was “in
agreement of the mutual release of contract or non-renewal for
PGY2 contract” for Plaintiff.

According to Plaintiff, the

minutes of this meeting also show that the faculty “fear[ed]
working with [Plaintiff] due to her accusations.”
Plaintiff met with Defendants Geria and Zucconi, Hargrave,
and Vicente on May 5, 2016.

At this meeting, Plaintiff alleges

she was told that her residency agreement was not going to be
renewed and that she was being dismissed from the residency
program for “persistent unprofessional behavior and failure to
comply with a performance improvement plan.”

Zucconi testified

that she felt threatened at this meeting because Plaintiff made
the remark “life changes in an instant” after being told her
contract would not be renewed.

11

Plaintiff alleges that she requested an extension of
approximately six weeks so she could complete the intensive care
rotation that had been cut short by her involuntary leave of
absences.

On June 24, 2016, the last day of Plaintiff’s

scheduled residency, Plaintiff alleges that she met with
Defendant Zucconi.

At this time, Plaintiff claims that Zucconi

have her a document called a “ACOFP Core Competency” Evaluation.
According to Plaintiff, this document states that Plaintiff
received credit for ten months of her training.

This document

also shows that Plaintiff had reached an appropriate level of
training in the area of “Interpersonal and Communication
Skills.”

Another evaluation Zucconi prepared and signed

acknowledged that Plaintiff’s “performance in June on the Family
Medicine service did improve.”

Hargrave testified that he

provided Plaintiff with letters of recommendation, despite
believing that some of her behavior had been inappropriate.
Plaintiff also alleges that at this time she was informed
her request for an extension had been denied.

Plaintiff alleges

that Inspira has made such an accommodations for another intern,
Dawn Krystusa, after she took a leave of absence during her
residency the previous year.

Inspira contends that Plaintiff

received full credit for her first year of residency and that
after Hargrave looked at her rotations, he determined that
Plaintiff was not required to do any additional time.

12

Plaintiff

asserts that her documents reflect that she had “one year of
family medicine training” but do not reflect the credit she
earned.

Plaintiff also contends that she was only given credit

for ten months of her residency, not twelve.
Plaintiff filed this complaint on May 5, 2017, including
several counts: (1) violations of Section 1981: race
discrimination in employment (against all Defendants); (2)
violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(“NJLAD”): race discrimination in employment (against all
Defendants); (3) Violations of the New Jersey Conscientious
Employee Protection Act (“CEPA”): whistleblower retaliation
(against all Defendants);(4) breach of contract (against
Inspira); (5) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing (against Inspira); and (6) tortious interference
(against Geria and Zucconi).

Defendants answered this complaint

on September 27, 2017, asserting twenty-three affirmative
defenses.4

These defenses include: (1) Plaintiff failed to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted; (2) Plaintiff is not entitled
to the relief sought as a matter of law; (3) Plaintiff failed to
mitigate damages; (4) Defendants have not committed any unlawful
discrimination and Plaintiff is not entitled to relief; (5)
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations; (6)
Defendants did not violate any legal duties owed to Plaintiff;
(7) any injury to Plaintiff was the result of her own conduct or
persons other than Defendants; (8) Plaintiff cannot establish a
prima facie case of discrimination; (9) Plaintiff has failed to
state a claim for pain, suffering emotional distress,
embarrassment, humiliation, illness and emotional injury; (10)
4

13

During discovery, Plaintiff produced eighty-nine recordings
of staff and faculty at Inspira taken while in her residency.
Plaintiff claims she started making recordings while at Inspira
because Flaherty told Plaintiff “it’s your word versus their
word,” regarding an incident that occurred during Plaintiff’s
shift.

Plaintiff had allegedly informed a number of Inspira

staff members that she was recording them during the course of

Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which pack pay, front
pay, overtime, lost fringe benefits, attorney’s fees and costs,
declarative or injunctive relief can be awarded; (11) Plaintiff
has failed to state a claim upon which relief of compensatory or
punitive damages may be granted; (12) Plaintiff’s claims are
barred by her failure to mitigate damages; (13) Plaintiff’s
claim for punitive damages is barred by public policy; (14)
Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages is in contravention of
Defendants’ rights under the Commerce Clause, the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; the equal
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, constitutional
prohibition against vague and overbroad laws and the
corresponding provisions under the Pennsylvania state
constitution; (15) Plaintiff did not suffer any intentional
discrimination based on her race, gender, age and/or any
retaliation by Defendants; (16) Defendants did not discriminate
against Plaintiff because of her race, sex, age, harassed
Plaintiff, and/or subjected Plaintiff to a hostile work and/or
retaliated against Plaintiff; (17) there is no merit to
Plaintiff’s allegations of race discrimination, gender
discrimination, sexual harassment, hostile work environment,
retaliation, and/or constructive discharge; (18) the allegations
do not establish a constructive discharge claim; (19)
Plaintiff’s claims are barred by estoppel and/or equitable
estoppel; (20) Plaintiff’s claims are barred by her own breaches
of contract or other duties; (21) Defendants did not breach a
duty, contractual or otherwise, to Plaintiff; (22) Plaintiff’s
damages are not attributable to any breaches or wrongdoing by
Defendants; (23) Defendants reserve the right to amend its
answer to assert additional affirmative defenses based on
information obtained during discovery.
14

her residency and contends that on at least one occasion
Defendant Geria told her it was “fine” for her to tape record a
meeting.

Plaintiff further stated that she was never told not

to record her coworkers and that the recordings were not
mentioned in her PIP.

At least one member of Inspira’s faculty

has testified that it was “common knowledge” that Plaintiff made
these recordings.
Plaintiff does not contend that these recordings include
comments made about her race.

Plaintiff has conceded that

“there were no ‘words’ or comments regarding her race on the
recordings, but argued that the actions addressed do indicate
discrimination.”

ECF No. 62, at ¶ 20.

Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on September
30, 2019.

The parties filed a joint motion to seal certain

documents on December 24, 2019.

These matters have been fully

briefed and are ripe for adjudication.
ANALYSIS
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court has original federal question jurisdiction over
this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

Plaintiff has alleged
The Court has supplemental

jurisdiction over any common law causes of action asserted by
Plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because these claims are part
of the same case or controversy.

15

B. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when the Court is satisfied
that “‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits if any,’ .
. . demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact”
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.

Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P.

56).
An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving
party’s favor.
248 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

A fact is “material” if, under the governing

substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the
outcome of the suit.

Id.

“In considering a motion for summary

judgment, a district court may not make credibility
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence;
instead, the non-moving party’s evidence ‘is to be believed and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.’”
Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004)
(citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
Initially, the moving party bears the burden of
demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 (“[A] party seeking summary judgment
always bears the initial responsibility of informing the

16

district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying
those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence
of a genuine issue of material fact.”).
Once the moving party has met this burden, the nonmoving
party must identify, by affidavits or otherwise, specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
U.S. at 324.

Celotex, 477

A “party opposing summary judgment ‘may not rest

upon the mere allegations or denials of the . . . pleading[s].’”
Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 260 F.3d 228, 232 (3d Cir. 2001).

For

“the non-moving party[] to prevail, [that party] must ‘make a
showing sufficient to establish the existence of [every] element
essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial.’”

Cooper v. Sniezek, 418 F.

App’x 56, 58 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322).
Thus, to withstand a properly supported motion for summary
judgment, the nonmoving party must identify specific facts and
affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving
party.

Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257.

C. Inspira’s Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff has withdrawn her claims under CEPA and the NJLAD
(Counts II and III).

ECF No. 64, at 20 n. 6.

address the remaining counts below.

17

This opinion will

1. Chapman’s Race Discrimination in Employment Claims (Count
I)
The Court will analyze Count I of Plaintiff’s claim using
the McDonnel Douglas burden-shifting framework.

See Stewart v.

Rutgers Univ., 120 F.3d 426, 432 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1972)).

This

framework has three basic steps and is its own separate
analysis.

Hicks v. New Jersey Department of Corrections, et

al., No. 3:16-cv-00927, 2019 WL 5587324, at * 4 (D.N.J. Oct. 30,
2019).

First, a plaintiff must put forward a prima facie case

of race discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.
Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 797 (3d Cir. 2003).
If a plaintiff succeeds at this step, the analysis continues to
step two, where the burden shifts to the defendant to provide “a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions.”

Tucker

v. Thomas Jefferson Univ., 484 F.App’x 710, 712 (3d Cir. 2012).
If the defendant can provide such an explanation, the analysis
proceeds to the third step.

At this step, “the inference of

discrimination drops and the burden shifts back to the plaintiff
to show that the defendant’s proffered reason is merely a
pretext for intentional discrimination.”
F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008).

Makky v. Chertoff, 541

If each side meets its burden at

each stage, then summary judgment is inappropriate.
Potter, 476 F.3d 180, 185 (3d Cir. 2007).

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Whishkin v.

Step One: Chapman’s Prima Facie Case
The prima facie case “raises an inference of discrimination
only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained,
are more likely than not based on the consideration of
impermissible factors.”

Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v.

Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (quoting Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978)).

For her claim of

discrimination under Section 1981, McDonald must show: “(1) she
belongs to a protected class; (2) she is qualified for her
position; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)
the circumstances support an inference of unlawful
discrimination.”

Hicks, 2019 WL 5587324 at *4 (citing In re

Tribune Media Co., 902 F.3d 384, 402 (3d Cir. 2018)).

The

elements of the prima facie case are not meant to be “applied
woodenly, but must rather be tailored flexibly to fit the
circumstances of each type of illegal discrimination.”
v. Moody-Tottrup Int’l, 82 F.3d 578, 581 (3d Cir. 1996).

Geraci
The

Supreme Court has held that this “burden of establishing a prima
facie case of disparate treatment is not onerous.”

Burdine, 450

U.S. at 253.
If non-members of the protected class receive more
favorable treatment than plaintiff under similar circumstances,
these circumstances support an inference of unlawful
discrimination.

Hicks, 2019 WL 5587324, at * 4 (citing Sarullo,

19

352 F.3d at 797 n 7).

Hiring someone not in the protected class

as a replacement is also a common circumstance giving rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination.

May v. PNC Bank, No. 18-

2933, 2020 WL 370043, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2020).
Defendants do not contest that Plaintiff belongs to a
protected class, is qualified for her position, or that she
suffered an adverse employment action.

Defendants argue that

the circumstances surrounding Plaintiff’s employment at Inspira
do not support an inference of unlawful discrimination.
Defendants point to Plaintiff’s own testimony to support its
argument that Plaintiff cannot prove any discrimination due to
her race or any discriminatory intent because of her race.
No. 52-2, at 22-24.

ECF

In her deposition, Plaintiff stated that

she contends that her contract was not renewed because of her
race.

Plaintiff also stated that she talked about her race at

meetings, but none of her supervisors or fellow residents made
disparaging comments regarding her race.

She further stated

that Defendant Geria, Defendant Zucconi, Vicente, and Hargrave
did not make comments about her race.

Instead, Plaintiff stated

that “the actions that they were doing suggested race.”
Plaintiff admitted that in the eighty-nine recordings she took
and the emails she produced, the subject of race was not
discussed.

ECF No. 52-3, at 306-09.

20

Defendants also point to

Inspira’s hiring record as evidence that there is no pattern of
discrimination due to race at Inspira.5
Plaintiff counters that she has introduced enough
comparator evidence to establish a prima facie case of racially
disparate treatment.

According to Plaintiff, it is indisputable

that she was the only African-American or black resident and
that she was treated differently.

To support this claim,

Plaintiff highlights that she only had one meeting with
Defendant Geria and Hargrave during the course of her PIP, while
other, non-black residents had multiple meetings after being
placed on a PIP.

Plaintiff further emphasizes that Defendant

Zucconi avoided her, refused to take her phone calls, and failed
to schedule meetings with Plaintiff.

Plaintiff also asserts

that two other non-black doctors, Dr. Trom and Dr. Mason,
received more favorable treatment after Plaintiff made
legitimate complaints about their objectionable conduct.
Plaintiff also highlights that Inspira granted a white intern in
the same residency program a four to six-week extension to
complete her intern year following a year of absence, but denied
Plaintiff’s similar request.

As part of her prima facie case,

Plaintiff has asserted that Defendant Inspira hired a non-

In support of this argument, Inspira introduced evidence that
since its inception, Inspira has accepted into its residency
program 23 Black-Americans, 15 Hispanic-Americans, and 67 Asian
Americans. ECF No. 52-2, at 24.
5

21

African American as a replacement after she left the Family
Medical Residency Program.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has met her burden in
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

Recognizing

that this is not an onerous burden, the Plaintiff has shown that
the different treatment she faced, if otherwise unexplained, is
more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors.

Defendants’ explanations for this treatment will be

discussed in the next step of the McDonnel Douglas analysis.
Step Two: Defendants’ Legitimate, Nondiscriminatory Reasons for
its Actions
At this stage, defendants need only “introduce[e] evidence
which, taken as true, would permit the conclusion that was a
nondiscriminatory reason for the unfavorable employment
decision.”

Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994).

A defendant only has the burden of production, not the burden of
persuasion at this stage and “need not prove that the tender
reason actually motivated its behavior.”
original).

Id. (emphasis in

The Third Circuit has characterized this burden is

“relatively light.”

Id. at 762

Defendants argue that it has the freedom to fire its
employees “‘for a good reason, bad reason or reason at all,’ as
long as there is no intentional discrimination.”

ECF No. 52-2

at 26 (citing Maiorino v. Sherign-Plough Corp., 302 N.J. Super.

22

323, 345 (App. Div. 1997)).

In this case, Defendants argue that

they did have a good, non-discriminatory reason for not renewing
Plaintiff’s contract.

Defendants explain the adverse employment

actions taken against Plaintiff by highlighting that she
violated HIPAA, created a hostile work environment, secretly
recorded Inspira employees, doctors, and human resources
personnel, called Defendants Geria and Zucconi liars, and acted
unprofessionally.
In contrast, Plaintiff refers to Defendants’ explanations
as a “mishmash of nonsensical excuses.”

ECF No. 64, at 13.

Plaintiff argues that the recordings she took were not secret,
and Defendants did not become aware of any HIPAA violations
until after the commencement of litigation.

Therefore,

Plaintiff characterizes Defendants’ explanation as an “absurd
post hoc fabrication.”

ECF No. 64, at 14.

Because this burden is “relatively light,” Fuentes, 32 F.3d
at 762, the Court finds that Defendants have met their burden at
this step of the analysis.

Defendants have offered a non-

discriminatory explanation for the incidents Plaintiff
describes, including the non-renewal of her contract.

The Court

will proceed to step three of the McDonnel Douglas analysis.
Step Three: Whether Defendants’ Explanation is Pretextual
At this step, a plaintiff must “convince the fact finder
‘both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the

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real reason.’”

Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 763 (quoting St. Mary’s

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993) (emphasis in
original)).

This analysis “focuses on whether there is

sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the
purported reasons for the defendant’s adverse employment actions
were in actuality a pretext for intentional race discrimination.
Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 413 (3d Cir. 1999).
A plaintiff can meet his or her burden in several ways: by
showing that the defendant had previously discriminated against
the plaintiff, that the defendant had previously discriminated
against other persons within the plaintiff’s protected class, or
that the defendant has treated more favorably similarly situated
persons not within the protected class.

See Simpson v. Kay

Jewelers, Div. of Sterling, Inc., 142 F.3d 639, 645 (3d Cir.
1998).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants’ reasons are pretextual
because she was never disciplined for her alleged HIPAA
violations or recordings.

Plaintiff also emphasizes that if she

was disciplined for her alleged violations of HIPAA, this is
further evidence of discrimination because Inspira did not
discipline Aderholdt for his violations of HIPAA.

Next,

Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ explanation that she was
creating a hostile work environment is pretextual because
Inspira had allowed an “environment of gossip, rumor and

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accusation to thrive” and that Plaintiff is a victim of this
culture.

ECF No. 64, at 16-17.

Finally, Plaintiff points to

her evaluations, which show that Defendant Zucconi indicated
Plaintiff “meets expectation” and exhibited professionalism.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to refute
Defendants’ legitimate business reasons for not renewing her
contract.

Defendants emphasize again that “courts have no

business telling [companies] . . . how to make personnel
decisions, which may be objectively or subjectively based.”

ECF

No. 52-2, at 25 (citing Maiorino, 302 N.J. Super. 323).
The Court finds that Plaintiff has not met her burden at
this stage.

Plaintiff not proven that a reasonable factfinder

could conclude Inspira’s reasons were false or that
discrimination was the real reason for Inspira’s decision not to
renew her contract or its handling of her PIP.

Plaintiff has

not shown that Inspira had previously discriminated against her,
nor has the Plaintiff shown that Defendants have previously
discriminated against others in her protected class.

In fact,

several Inspira residents were placed on PIPs as Plaintiff was.
Furthermore, multiple Inspira family medicine residents were
terminated before their year was finished.
Plaintiff has not established that Defendants treated more
favorably similarly situated employees not within Plaintiff’s
protected class.

Though Plaintiff has identified other

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employees at Inspira who were subject to PIPs and faced
complaints for unprofessional behavior, Plaintiff has not shown
that these employees were similarly situated to Plaintiff.
Inspira has shown that other employees had concerns about
Plaintiff’s medical knowledge and efficiency, her practice of
recording her coworkers, and her ability to take constructive
criticism, none of which seem to be concerns with the other
employees subject to PIPs or complaints of unprofessionalism.
In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not introduced
sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the
Defendants’ purported reasons for not renewing Plaintiff’s
contract were in actuality a pretext for intentional race
discrimination.

As such, Plaintiff has not met her burden at

this step and the Court will grant Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment with respect to Count I.
2. Chapman’s Breach of Contract Claim (Count IV)
Plaintiff contends that the Residency Agreement she signed
with Inspira constitutes a contract.

Plaintiff further contends

that an employer’s right to terminate an employee at will is
limited by statutes that proscribe retaliation.

Plaintiff also

argues that any accusation of her own wrongdoings or violations
of her contract are evidence Defendants’ pretextual explanations
for its treatment of her and do not defeat her breach of

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contract claim.

Plaintiff also disputes Defendants’ claims that

Inspira is an academy and its residents are students.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff was an employee at will and
therefore has no claim for breach of contract regarding her
termination or the non-renewal of her contract.

Defendants also

assert that this claim is duplicative of Plaintiff’s now
withdrawn NJLAD claim.

Defendants further contest Plaintiff’s

reliance on Inspira’s Resident Manual or Resident Agreement,
emphasizing both the overlap with Plaintiff’s discrimination
claim and Plaintiff’s actions in violation of this manual.
According to the Defendants, the Court should defer to Defendant
Inspira’s decision not to renew Plaintiff’s contract because
this decision was an academic judgment and medical residents are
students.
A breach of contract claim has four elements: (1) a
contract between the parties; (2) a breach of that contract; (3)
damages flowing there from; and (4) that the party stating the
claim performed its own contractual obligations.

Gordon v.

United Continental Holding Inc., 73 F.Supp.3d 471, 478 (D.N.J.
2014) (citing Frederic v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir.
2007)).
The parties do not dispute that the Resident Agreement
Plaintiff signed in March 2015 constitutes a contract between
the parties.

Defendants maintain that they did not breach this

27

contract, but rather that Plaintiff breached the contract by
failing to adhere to state federal and local laws.

Defendants

do not speak to damages flowing from the alleged breach in their
motion for summary judgment.
The Court notes that Defendants argue both that Plaintiff
is an at-will employee and that Plaintiff is a student in an
academic program.

Defendants argue that because of this dual

status as an at-will employee and student, Plaintiff could be
discharged for any reason and that Courts must defer to
Defendant Inspira’s decision-making process.

Though Defendants

cite cases that speak to the subject of judicial deference to
academic institutions and their administrative decisions such as
Beukas v. Board of Trustees of Farleigh Dickinson University,
255 N.J. Super. 522 (N.J. 1992) (discussing dental student’s
challenge of a private university’s decision to close its dental
school) and Napolitano v. Princeton University Trustees, 186
N.J. Super. 548 (N.J. App.Div. 1982) (discussing a student’s
challenge of the trustee’s decision to withhold her degree for
one year for academic fraud), the Court declines to extend this
reasoning to Inspira’s residency program at this stage.6

While it is true that participants in Inspira’s family medicine
residency program attend lectures and receive grades, they also
work full time, a factor the Supreme Court considered in
deciding whether medical residents were classed as students or
employees for tax purposes in Mayo Foundation for Medical Educ.
& Research v. U.S., 562 U.S. 44 (2011).
6

28

The Court also recognizes that Defendants have
characterized Plaintiff’s claim as asserting that Defendant
Inspira breached its contract when it decided not to renew
Plaintiff’s residency agreement for another year.

In fact,

Plaintiff claims that Defendant Inspira breached its contract
with her by failing to provide a complaint procedure consistent
with the terms of her contract and not allowing her to complete
her training.
Characterizing the claim as Plaintiff does, the Court finds
that there is a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether Defendants violated its contract with Plaintiff and
whether Plaintiff performed her own contractual obligations.
Whether the Resident Agreement obligated Defendants to provide a
different or more robust complaint procedure and, if so, whether
Defendants failed to do so remains a genuine dispute of material
fact.

Plaintiff’s own actions in compliance with local, state,

and federal laws are also subject to a genuine dispute of
material fact.
As such, the Court will deny Defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as it relates to this count.
3. Chapman’s Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair
Dealing Claim (Count V)
Plaintiff contends that Defendant Inspira engaged in bad
faith in its contractual dealing and failed to carry out its

29

contractual obligations to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff argues this

claim should go to trial because a jury could reasonably find
that Defendant Inspira made it impossible for Plaintiff to enjoy
the fruits of her employment contract.

Plaintiff further

contends that her contract includes the “right to be free to
present her concerns and grievances for a hearing without fear
of reprisal.”

Plaintiff asserts that when she exercised this

right, she was terminated and denied the opportunity to get full
credit for the year.

Plaintiff also contends that Defendants

acted in bad faith when they forced her to take a leave of
absence for an offhand comment about self-harm.

Plaintiff

points to the actions of Defendants Zucconi and Geria as further
evidence of bad faith.
Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot recover on both an
express contract provision and on the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing because the two breaches arose from the
identical alleged conduct.

Defendants also argue that the

renewal of Plaintiff’s contract was optional, and therefore
cannot form the basis of a claim for breaching the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Under New Jersey Law, every contract contains an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Luongo v. Village

Supermarket, Inc., 261 F.Supp.3d 520, 531 (D.N.J. 2017) (citing
Sons of Thunder, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., 148 N.J. 396 (N.J.

30

1997)).

However, “a breach of the implied covenant of good

faith and fair dealing differs from a literal violation of the
contract.”

Spellman v. Express Dynamics, LLC, 150 F.Supp.3d

378, 389 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing Wade v. Kessler Inst., 172 N.J.
327, 340 (N.J. 2002)).

A party, even if it does not breach an

express term of a contract, can act in bad faith to interfere
with the other party’s ability to enjoy the fruits of the
contract.

Luongo, 261 F.Supp.3d at 531 (citing Wilson v.

Amerada Hess Corp., 168 N.J. 236 244 (N.J. 2001)).

When a party

has breached a specific term of a contract, that party cannot be
found separately liable for breaching the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing “when the two asserted breaches
basically rest on the same conduct.” Id.
To recover for a breach of the implied covenant, a
plaintiff must prove that: (1) a contract exists between the
parties; (2) the plaintiff performed under the terms of the
contract; (3) the defendant acted in bad faith with the purpose
of depriving the plaintiff of rights or benefits under the
contract; and (4) the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff
to sustain damages.

Luongo, 261 F.Supp.3d at 531-32 (citing TBI

Unlimited, LLC v. Clear Cut Lawn Decisions, LLC, No. 12-3355,
2014 WL 3853900, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 5, 2014)).
The Court finds that this claim is duplicative of
Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim.

31

Plaintiff cannot rely on

evidence that Defendants did not comply with the grievance
procedure described in the Resident Agreement as evidence of
both a breach of contract and as evidence of a breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

Likewise,

Plaintiff’s assertions that Defendants Zucconi and Geria’s
action, or lack thereof, in regards to Plaintiff’s complaints
about her co-residents constitute “subterfuges and evasions” in
the performance of the contract cannot be the basis of both
Count IV and Count V.

These two asserted breaches rest on

basically the same conduct and therefore cannot both continue
forward.

Furthermore, Plaintiff has not introduced sufficient

evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact regarding
whether Defendant Zucconi and Geria’s purpose was to deprive
Plaintiff of rights or benefits under the Resident Agreement.
The Court will grant Defendants’ motion for summary judgment
with respect to this count.
4. Chapman’s Tortious Interference Claim (Count VI)
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Zucconi and Geria
interfered with her contract with Inspira through their
“deliberate dismantlement of Plaintiff’s ability to adequately
complete her internship requirements and continue the normal
course of a residency.” ECF No. 1, at ¶ 94.

Plaintiff points to

Defendant Zucconi and Geria’s decision not to let her make up
her rotation time, dismissal of her complaints about her

32

colleagues, and discontinuation and nonrenewal of her residency
contract as being motivated by biases rather than business
interests.

Plaintiff contends that these actions were motivated

by Defendants Zucconi and Geria’s personal vendetta against
Plaintiff for opposing harassment by Aderholdt.
Defendants counter that Plaintiff does not refer to any
specific contract that could be the basis of a tortious
interference claim.

Defendants further state that Plaintiff

cannot prove that Defendant Geria or Zucconi acted with malice.
Defendants highlight that Geria and Zucconi have sole discretion
to decide if Plaintiff’s agreement would be renewed for a second
year of residency.

Defendants argue that it was well within

Defendants Zucconi and Geria’s discretion to determine that
renewing Plaintiff’s contract did not further Inspira’s
objectives.

Lastly, Defendants assert that Defendants Zucconi

and Geria cannot be liable for tortious interference because
they are co-employees of a party to an employment relationship
and acting within the scope of their employment.
Under New Jersey law, tortious interference with a contract
has four elements: (1) an existing contractual relationship; (2)
intentional and malicious interference with that relationship;
(3) loss or breach of a contract as a result of the
interference; and (4) damages resulting from that interference.
DiGiorgio Corp. v. Mendez & Co., Inc., 320 F.Supp.2d 552, 558

33

(D.N.J. 2002) (citing Printing Mart-Morristown v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 116 N.J. 729, 751-52 (1989)).

“Interference is

intentional when ‘the actor desires to bring it about or if he
knows that the interreference is certain or substantially
certain to occur as a result of his action.’”

Cargill Global

Trading v. Applied Dev. Co., 706 F.Supp.2d 563, 575 (D.N.J.
2010) (quoting Dello Russo v. Nagel, 358 N.J. Super. 254, 268
(N.J. Super.App.Div. 2003)).

In this context, malice “does not

require ill will toward the plaintiff, but rather ‘is defined to
mean that the harm was inflicted intentionally and without
justification or excuse.”

Matrix Essentials, Inc. v. Cosmetic

Gallery, Inc., 870 F.Supp.1237, 1248 (D.N.J. 1994) (quoting
Printing Mart-Morristown, 116 N.J. at 751).

Put differently, to

demonstrate malice, a plaintiff must “show that the defendant’s
conduct was ‘“transgressive of generally accepted standards of
morality”; that is, a violation of standards of “socially
acceptable conduct.”’”

Id. (quoting Baldasarre v. Butler, 254

N.J. Super. 502, 526 (N.J. App.Div. 1992) (quoting Leslie Blau
Co. v. Alfieri, 157 N.J. Super. 172, 189 (N.J. App.Div. 1978))).
The Court finds that there is no genuine dispute of
material fact with regard to this count.

Plaintiff cannot show

that Defendants Zucconi and Geria acted intentionally and with
malice.

Though Plaintiff did not seem to have good professional

or personal relationships with Defendants Zucconi or Geria

34

during her employment at Inspira, none of the evidence Plaintiff
introduced shows that the Defendants’ conduct was transgressive
of generally accepted standards of morality or outside of
socially acceptable conduct.

Furthermore, any harm that

Defendants Zucconi and Geria inflicted by not recommending that
Plaintiff’s contract be renewed was justified or with excuse,
given the issues raised by Plaintiff’s conduct and performance
as a resident.

The Court will grant Defendants’ motion for

summary judgment with respect to this count.
D. Motion to Seal
In this District, Local Civil Rule 5.3 governs motions to
seal or otherwise restrict public access to materials filed with
the Court and judicial proceedings themselves.

To place a

docket entry under seal, the Rule requires that the motion to
seal must be publicly filed and “shall describe (a) the nature
of the materials or proceedings at issue, (b) the legitimate
private or public interests which warrant the relief sought, (c)
the clearly defined and serious injury that would result if the
relief sought is not granted, and (d) why a less restrictive
alternative to the relief sought is not available.”
5.3(c)(2).

L.Civ.R.

The party moving to seal must submit a proposed

order that contains proposed findings of fact and conclusions of
law.

L.Civ.R. 5.3(c)(3).

35

In this case, the parties filed a joint motion seeking to
redact certain portions of documents and seal the entirety of
one document.

These documents contain certain personally

identifiable information such as Plaintiff’s date of birth and
her personal identification numbers with several academic and
professional organizations, and Plaintiff’s psychiatric
evaluation.

The information in the parties’ submission

satisfies the standards set forth in Local Rule 5(c)(3) and
there is no less restrictive alternative to sealing the
confidential information.
The Court will grant the joint motion to seal.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Court will grant in part
and deny in part Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

The

Court will also grant the parties’ joint motion to seal.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: September 25, 2020
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman_______
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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