THE FIFE AND DRUM, INC. v. IL PORTICO RESTAURANT

Filing 128

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 11/1/2019. (rtm, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

THE FIFE AND DRUM, INC.,
Plaintiff,

Civil No. 17-3676 (NLH/JS)

v.

OPINION

DELBELLO ENTERPRISES, LLC
d/b/a IL PORTICO RISTORANTE
ITALIANO,
Defendant.

APPEARANCES:
NORMAN ELLIOT LEHRER
SUITE 1000
52 BERLIN ROAD
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08034
Attorney for Plaintiff The Fife And Drum, Inc.
AHMED M. SOLIMAN
SOLIMAN & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
923 HADDONFIELD ROAD
SUITE 300
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08002
Attorney for Defendant DelBello Enterprises, LLC d/b/a Il
Portico Ristorante Italiano.
HILLMAN, District Judge
This is a service mark infringement case between two
restaurants using the same name: “Il Portico.”
conducted a one-day bench trial on May 13, 2019.

The Court
For the

reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Plaintiff has
failed to prove that Defendant infringed on its trademark.
1

Even

if Plaintiff were able to prove its claim of trademark
infringement, injunctive relief would be barred by the equitable
doctrine of laches.

Accordingly, Judgment will be entered for

the Defendant.
BACKGROUND
The Court takes its facts from the trial record, including
those facts stipulated by the parties.

Plaintiff, Fife and

Drum, Inc., opened a restaurant named “Il Portico Ristorante” in
October 1988 in Tappan, New York (the “Tappan Il Portico” or
“TIP”).

TIP has operated continuously as an Italian fine dining

restaurant since 1988.

Fife and Drum, Inc.’s owner is Giuseppe

Peppe Pinton, who has a separate career as a soccer coach and
scout.

On June 12, 1990, Plaintiff obtained Federal Service

Mark Registration No. 1,601,605 for the mark “IL PORTICO” for
restaurant services (the “Mark”).

Plaintiff timely filed the

appropriate declarations and the parties agree that Plaintiff’s
registration became incontestable in 2010. 1

Since 1990,

Plaintiff has renewed its registration, and for the time period

1

The Lanham Act precludes a defendant from challenging the
ownership of a registered trademark after a period of five years
if the registered trademark owner complies with certain
formalities. These marks are referred to as “incontestable”
under the Lanham Act. See TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259,
271 n. 6 (3d Cir. 2019).
2

at-issue, the Mark was in full force and effect and Plaintiff
remains its owner.
In addition to this Mark, Plaintiff registered the domain
name “ilportico.com” in May 1998.

Plaintiff has continuously

operated this domain name since then.

Plaintiff also operates

two toll free telephone numbers for the restaurant: a national
number at 1-888-ILPORTICO and a New Jersey number at 1-800ILPORTICO.

Plaintiff advertises TIP in numerous publications,

mostly in New Jersey. 2

A number of publications have featured

TIP, including a Zagat survey, which named TIP as one of
America’s Top 1,000 Italian Restaurants in 2008.

Pinton

testified that as a restauranteur, he paid attention to dining
publications and newspaper reviews.
Tappan, New York is approximately 300 feet from Bergen
County, New Jersey.
from New Jersey.

As a result, most of TIP’s customers come

Close to the Hudson River, Tappen is north of

the George Washington Bridge but south of the Tappen Zee Bridge,
both of which span the Hudson.

Geographically, Bergen County

encompasses the state’s northeast corner and is generally
northwest of the five boroughs of New York City.

2

Some customers

Plaintiff submitted advertisements and reviews for TIP in “The
Record,” “Dining Out,” “Northern Valley Suburbanite,” “The Zagat
Guide,” “Zagat Survey of America’s 1,000 Top Italian
Restaurants,” and “The New York Times” as exhibits.
3

who previously lived in the area visit TIP when they return.
TIP also serves customers visiting from across the country, and
even across the world.

Pinton also testified that his

activities and travels as

a coach and scout helped spread the

reputation and renown of his restaurant beyond its immediate
geographical area, including the southern parts of New Jersey.
Around May 1995, IEJ Corporation (“IEJ”), a Pennsylvania
corporation based in Bensalem, Pennsylvania, opened an Italian
fine dining restaurant in Philadelphia named “Il Portico” (the
“Philadelphia Il Portico” or “PIP”). 3

Alberto DelBello a/k/a/

Ilyas Shah, was the principal of IEJ, and the owner and chef of
PIP.

DelBello is also the principal owner of Defendant,

DelBello Enterprises.
PIP operated continuously until mid-2012.

Between May 1995

and mid-2012, newspapers and other publications advertised and
reviewed PIP. 4

DelBello appeared on local, national, and

international television in connection to PIP.

During this

time, IEJ also maintained a website for PIP at “ilportico.com,”

3

Defendant asserts that PIP was 115 miles from TIP. Plaintiff
did not contest this assertion. Therefore, the Court will
accept as fact that the distance between PIP and TIP is 115
miles.
4

Defendant submitted newspaper reviews of PIP from “The Eating
Savant,” “The Legal Intelligencer,” “The Philadelphia Inquirer,”
“Chestnut Hill Local,” and “Philadelphia Daily News.”
4

where customers could make reservations. 5

Defendant also

maintained a profile on the website “OpenTable” to manage
reservations at PIP.
In 2012, PIP discontinued operations in Philadelphia under
the name “Il Portico” and instead used the name “Tiramisu” at
the same physical location until its permanent closure in 2016.
Therefore, from mid-2012 when PIP closed until the time of this
bench trial, there has not been a Philadelphia restaurant named
“Il Portico.”

DelBello testified that his intention was always

to reopen “Il Portico” at a different location closer to his
home in Bensalem, Pennsylvania.

In a similar vein, DelBello

eventually closed Tiramisu in Philadelphia and moved it to the
Philadelphia suburbs closer to his home.
DelBello did open another restaurant named “Il Portico” in
Burlington, New Jersey in 2016 (the “Burlington Il Portico” or
“BIP”). 6

Burlington is in Burlington County which borders on its

5

The parties did not explain how both Plaintiff and Defendant
could maintain the same domain, “ilportico.com,” at the same
time. Currently, “ilportico.com” directs to a website for TIP.
6

The Parties do not agree on the distance between TIP and BIP.
Pinton testified that BIP is 93 miles from TIP. The Defendant
claims that BIP, like PIP, is 115 miles from TIP. There are
many ways to measure this distance - by GPS, crow and Google
maps – but none of them are in the record. The Court will
resolve this dispute in favor of the non-prevailing party and
will accept Pinton’s estimation of 93 miles as it does not
change the Court’s analysis or the result.
5

easternmost edge the Delaware River and extends southwest across
the south central part of the state.

Burlington, the town, is

northeast of Philadelphia and southwest of Trenton, New Jersey.
The Burlington-Bristol Bridge spans the Delaware from Burlington
to Bristol, Pennsylvania.
BIP and its alleged trademark infringement are the subject
of this suit.

On August 25, 2016, Defendant registered the

domain name “ilporticorestaurant.com.”

DelBello explained the

four-year gap between discontinuing PIP and opening BIP by
asserting that it took that long to locate a property, renovate
it to his specifications, form several New Jersey corporations,
and obtain a liquor license, among other things.
DelBello testified he was advised to create several New
Jersey corporations in order to obtain a liquor license for BIP.
Other than the different legal entities, DelBello testified that
BIP and PIP share the same owner, decorations, furniture,
customers, chef, and menus.

DelBello testified that he

transferred the rights to the name “Il Portico” from PIP to BIP.
Plaintiff disagrees, noting that IEJ traded as “Il Portico” but
abandoned any rights to the name when it stopped using it in
2012.

Plaintiff further notes that Defendant offered no

evidence of assignment of rights to the name “Il Portico.”

6

During the time that PIP was in operation, Plaintiff did
not sue Defendant for trademark infringement.

Giuseppe Peppe

Pinton and Fife and Drum, Inc. have successfully asserted
Plaintiff’s trademark rights against two other restaurants using
the name “Il Portico” in Hanover and Carlstadt, New Jersey in
1995 and 1998 respectively. 7

Pinton, the sole witness for

Plaintiff, explained that while PIP was in operation, he was
unaware of its existence, and therefore had no occasion to
assert Plaintiff’s trademark rights against PIP.

Instead,

Pinton testified that he did not learn of PIP’s existence until
after filing this suit against BIP.

Pinton further testified

that none of his customers or friends from the southern part of
New Jersey mentioned PIP to him.
Since BIP opened in 2016, Pinton testified that TIP had
received at least one phone call intended for BIP.

Pinton also

described an incident in which a driver mistakenly headed toward
BIP to attend an event at TIP and had to call TIP for
directions.

Pinton further described conversations with his

7

Hanover is in Morris County, a northern county west of New York
City. Carlstadt is in Bergen County, the New Jersey county
closest to TIP. “Courts have traditionally taken judicial
notice of facts of universal truth which cannot be reasonably be
controverted, such as geography or weather.” NTP Marble, Inc.
v. AAA Hellenic Marble, Inc. 2012 WL 607975 at *7 n. 10 (E.D.
Pa. 2012) (citing In re Int’l Bldg. Components, 161 B.R. 764,
766 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (taking judicial notice that a city
was located in a particular county)).
7

customers who commented on Pinton opening another restaurant in
New Jersey.

Pinton believes that the confusion between TIP and

BIP is due to increased use of the Internet and mobile
navigation software.
Pinton testified that he did not begin to use the Internet
to search for possibly infringing restaurants until 2014 or
2015.

The Parties agree, and Pinton testified to the fact that

there are no other restaurants in the United States or New
Jersey using the name “Il Portico” besides TIP and BIP.
On May 23, 2017, Plaintiff filed its complaint with five
claims: (1) trademark infringement; (2) trademark
counterfeiting; (3) false designation of origin; (4) New Jersey
statutory trademark counterfeiting; and (5) common law trademark
infringement.

Plaintiff’s complaint requested an injunction

barring Defendant’s use of the Mark, actual and statutory
damages, and attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest.

On August

16, 2017, Plaintiff filed its first amended complaint (the
“FAC”).

The claims remained the same in the FAC.

Plaintiff now

seeks only injunctive relief and has waived claims for actual
and statutory damages, attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest. 8

8

Although Plaintiff raised five separate claims in both the
complaint and the FAC, the only claim submitted to the Court for
resolution at trial was Plaintiff’s first claim for trademark
8

The parties did not engage in any dispositive motion
practice relevant to this Opinion.

Instead, the Court scheduled

a bench trial for February 25, 2019.

The parties prepared

pretrial documents and motions in limine.

The Court decided the

parties’ motions in limine in a February 19, 2019 Order and
excluded certain exhibits.

The Court rescheduled the bench

trial for May 13, 2019.
A bench trial was conducted on May 13, 2019.

In addition

to receiving various exhibits, the Court heard testimony from
Pinton, DelBello, and Denise Norkus.

Norkus is DelBello’s wife,

business partner, and former manager of PIP.

The parties

submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on
July 18, 2019.

On August 8, 2019, Plaintiff submitted

responsive proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Therefore, the matter is ripe for final adjudication.
Analysis
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338.

infringement. As the other four counts were not tried, they are
not addressed in this opinion and are de facto abandoned.
9

B. Bench Trial Opinion Standard
This Opinion constitutes the Court's Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law pursuant to Rule 52(a)(1).

Pierre v. Hess

Oil Virgin Islands Corp., 624 F.2d 445, 450 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that to be in compliance with Rule 52(a), findings of
fact and conclusions of law do not need to be stated separately
in a court's memorandum opinion); see also Ciolino v. Ameriquest
Transp. Services, Inc., 751 F. Supp. 2d 776, 778 (D.N.J. 2010)
(issuing an opinion which constituted the courts findings of
fact and conclusions of law).
C. Bench Trial Opinion
Plaintiff’s sole claim in this action is that Defendant
infringed on its service mark, “IL PORTICO,” for use in
restaurant services.

Defendant disagrees, arguing that

Plaintiff has not shown any likelihood of confusion, a required
element of Plaintiff’s claim.

In the alternative, Defendant

argues that Plaintiff is barred from asserting this claim by the
equitable doctrine of laches.
The relevant statute, 15 U.S.C. § 1127, states:
The term “service mark” means any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof—
(1) used by a person, or

10

(2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use
in commerce and applies to register on the
principal register established by this Act,
to identify and distinguish the services of one person,
including a unique service, from the services of others
and to indicate the source of the services, even if that
source is unknown. Titles, character names, and other
distinctive features of radio or television programs may
be registered as service marks notwithstanding that
they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the
sponsor.
For registrability and protection purposes, trademarks and
service marks are treated identically.

See 15 U.S.C. § 1053

(“Subject to the provisions relating to the registration of
trademarks, so far as they are applicable, service marks shall
be registrable, in the same manner and with the same effect as
are trademarks, and when registered they shall be entitled to
the protection provided herein in the case of trademarks.
Applications and procedure under this section shall conform as
nearly as practicable to those prescribed for the registration
of trademarks.”); Park n’Fly v. Dollar Park & Fly, 469 U.S. 189,
192 n. 1 (1985) (“The Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act), 60
Stat. 427, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., generally
applies the same principles concerning registration and
protection to both trade and service marks.”) (citing 15 U.S.C.
§ 1053).

Therefore, in determining the merits of Plaintiff’s

Lanham Act claim for service mark infringement, the Court may

11

rely on law regarding either trademark or service mark
infringement.
1. Trademark Infringement
To prove infringement, a plaintiff must “demonstrate that
(1) it has a valid and legally protectable mark; (2) it owns the
mark; and (3) the defendant's use of the mark to identify goods
or services causes a likelihood of confusion.”

A&H Sportswear,

Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 210 (3d
Cir. 2000) (citing Commerce Nat’l Ins. Servs., Inc. v. Commerce
Ins. Agency, Inc., 214 F.3d 432, 437 (3d Cir. 2000)).

“If a

mark is both federally registered and ‘incontestible,’ see 15
U.S.C. §§ 1058, 1065, the mark is presumed to meet the first two
requirements.”

Express Servs. v. Careers Express Staffing

Servs., 176 F.3d 183, 185 (3d Cir. 1999).

The parties do not

dispute the Plaintiff has established the first two elements.
The only disputed issue is whether Plaintiff has demonstrated a
likelihood of confusion by a preponderance of the evidence.
A likelihood of confusion exists when “the consumers
viewing the mark would probably assume that the product or
service it represents is associated with the source of a
different product or service identified by a similar mark.” Ford
Motor Co. v. Summit Motor Products Inc., 930 F.2d 277, 292 (3d

12

Cir. 1991) (quoting Scott Paper Co. v. Scott’s Liquid Gold Inc.,
589 F.2d 1225, 1229 (3d Cir. 1978)).
In A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores,
Inc., the Third Circuit held that “whether or not the goods
directly compete, the Lapp factors should be employed to test
for likelihood of confusion.”

237 F.3d 198, 215 (3d Cir. 2000)

(citing Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3d
Cir. 1983)).

To determine the likelihood of confusion, the

Court will consider the following ten factors:
(1)

The degree of similarity between the owner’s mark and
the alleged infringing mark;

(2)

The strength of the owner’s mark;

(3)

The price of the goods and the other factors indicative
of the care and attention expected of consumers when
making a purchase;

(4)

The length of time the defendant has used the mark
without evidence of actual confusion arising;

(5)

The intent of the defendant in adopting the mark;

(6)

The evidence of actual confusion;

(7)

Whether the goods, competing or non-competing are
marketed through the same channels of trade and
advertised through the same media;

(8)

The extent to which the largest of the parties’ sales
efforts are the same;

(9)

The relationship of the goods in the minds of
consumers, whether because of the near-identify of the
products, the similarity of function, or other factors;

(10) Other factors suggesting that the consuming public
might expect the prior owner to manufacture both
13

products, or expect the prior owner to manufacture the
product in the defendant’s market, or expect that the
prior owner is likely to expand into the defendant’s
market.
This assessment is a qualitative inquiry and not all
factors will be relevant or afforded the same weight depending
on the factual setting.
215.

A & H Sportswear, Inc., 237 F.3d at

No one factor is determinative.

See Sabinsa Corp. v.

Creative Compounds, LLC, 609 F.3d 175, 182 (3d Cir. 2010).
The factors relevant to this case are discussed below:
(a)

Degree of Similarity (Lapp Factor 1)

Though not dispositive, the “degree of similarity of the
marks may be the most important of the ten factors in Lapp.”
Fisons Horticulture, Inc. v. Vigoro Indus., Inc., 30 F.3d 466,
476 (3d Cir. 1994).
Plaintiff holds a Federal Service Mark for the mark “IL
PORTICO” for restaurant services.

Defendant operates a

restaurant named “Il Portico Restaurant.”

These marks are

identical.
Because TIP and BIP bear identical names and this factor is
an important one, this factor weighs heavily in favor of a
finding of likelihood of confusion.

14

(b)

Strength of the Owner’s Mark (Lapp Factor 2)

The strength of a mark is determined by its (1) conceptual
strength and (2) commercial strength.

Sabinsa Corp., 609 F.3d

at 184-85.
The parties did not address this factor.

Judging by the

photographs in the record, the Mark appears to be descriptive of
the building where TIP is located, and except for the use of
romance language is otherwise fanciful and not descriptive of
the services offered (fine Italian dining).

It is a relatively

strong mark conceptually and Pinton’s testimony established the
Mark has achieved commercial strength at least in the New York
City and northern New Jersey areas.

In the Court’s view, this

factor favors a finding of infringement.
(c)

Sophistication of Consumers (Lapp Factor 3)

“More sophisticated consumers are more likely to take great
care when buying a product, rendering confusion less likely.”
Vynamic, LLC v. Diebold Nixdork, Inc., 2019 WL 193660 at *7
(E.D. Pa. 2019) (citing Steak Umm Co., LLC v. Steam ‘Em Up Inc.,
2011 WL 3679155 at *5 (E.D. Pa. 2011)).
The parties did not address this factor.

Both sides have

spent considerable efforts to promote the careers of their
respective chef/proprietors, testifying or implying that diners
patronize their respective restaurants because of their
individual renown and culinary reputations and the distinctive
15

cuisine offered by each.

This suggests that with regard to both

Plaintiff and Defendant, sophisticated consumers make informed
and deliberate choices about where, and with whom, they spend
their business lunch and date-night dollars.

In the Court’s

view, this factor weighs strongly against a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
(d)

Length of Time Without Actual Confusion (Lapp
Factor 4) 9

“If a defendant’s product has been sold for an appreciable
period of time without evidence of actual confusion, one can
infer that continued marketing will not lead to consumer
confusion in the future.

The longer the challenged product has

been in use, the stronger this inference will be.”

Versa

Products Co., Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Mfg.) Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 205
(3d Cir. 1995).
Defendant operated PIP from 1995 to 2012 without any
evidence of actual confusion with TIP.

Plaintiff introduced two

specific instances of confusion between BIP and TIP since 2016.
Plaintiff also spoke more generally about customers’ comments
congratulating him on opening a new location in New Jersey.

9

It strikes the Court as somewhat odd that a sequential
application of the Lapp factors calls upon the Court to consider
the length of time without actual confusion (Lapp Factor 4)
before the Court considers whether any actual confusion exists
at all (Lapp Factor 6). In any event, the Court will consider
the factors in the order set out in Lapp.
16

Because PIP operated for around 17 years without any
confusion, and the evidence of confusion from the operation of
BIP since 2016 is anecdotal, thin, and less than convincing. 10
Consistent with the findings set forth below, 11 this factor
weighs against a finding of likelihood of confusion.
(e)

Defendant’s Intent in Adopting the Mark (Lapp
Factor 5)

The intent factor asks whether the defendant intended to
confuse consumers by adopting a mark resembling the plaintiff’s
mark.

See A&H Sportswear, 237 F.3d at 225-26.

The plaintiff

must demonstrate that the defendant acted with an intent to
confuse, not merely an intent to copy when it adopted the mark.
Id.
The parties did not address Defendant’s intent when
adopting the mark “Il Portico” for PIP in 1995.

Defendant

stated that he did not intend to discontinue using the name “Il

10

The Court allowed Pinton to testify, over a hearsay objection,
to his personal perceptions of customer confusion. Pinton was
the only witness offered by the Plaintiff and no TIP customer
testified to actual confusion. As Plaintiff correctly points
out, no proof of actual confusion is required. The test is
likelihood of confusion. But Plaintiff seemingly wants it both
ways. On the one hand, it wants the Court to credit Pinton’s
recitation of out-of-court statements that customer were
actually confused and, on the other hand, disavows any
obligation to offer such proof. Under these circumstances, the
Court will discount somewhat the weight of Plaintiff’s selfserving testimony regarding isolated incidents of customer
confusion.
11

See infra pp. 18-19.
17

Portico” between the closure of PIP in 2012 and opening of BIP
in 2016 and there is no real evidence to the contrary.

While

Plaintiff sought to suggest that the long delay in opening BIP
proved abandonment and some form of mal intent in resurrecting
the name in the Burlington location, Defendant’s explanation
rings true.

The search for a suitable place, legal

entanglements and local regulations, and attendance to other
matters delayed the opening.

Throughout this lengthy relocation

process, Defendant testified he kept all of the original
furnishings and accoutrements of PIP in storage, down to the
paintings and menus, corroboration of his stated intent to
simply reopen the original restaurant in a new location close to
his home in the Philadelphia suburbs.
In the absence of evidence that Defendant intended to
confuse when he adopted the mark “Il Portico,” this factor
weighs against an intent to infringe and therefore against a
finding of likelihood of confusion.
(f)

Evidence of Actual Confusion (Lapp Factor 6)

Though proof of actual confusion is not required for a
successful trade dress infringement action, evidence of actual
confusion is highly probative of the likelihood of confusion.
See Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies,
269 F.3d 270, 291 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Versa Products Co.,
Inc., 50 F.3d at 205).
18

However, “a district court may weigh the sixth Lapp factor
in favor of a defendant when it concludes that the evidence of
actual confusion was isolated and idiosyncratic.”

McNeil

Nutritionals, LLC v. Heartland Sweeteners, LLC, 511 F.3d 350,
366 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d at
298) (finding that testimony from a single non-representative
consumer was insufficient to establish actual confusion).

“As

to those few customers who do not care about brands and do not
pay attention to them, such ‘brand indifferent’ customers do not
count in the equation of likelihood of confusion.”

Id.

(citing

4 J. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair
Competition § 23:5 (4th ed. 2006)).
Plaintiff offered two second-hand descriptions of customers
mistaking BIP for TIP or vice versa.

Plaintiff also gave a

second-hand account of comments by his customers about opening
another location in New Jersey.

Plaintiff did not provide any

testimony regarding actual confusion between PIP and TIP.
Because Plaintiff’s evidence of actual confusion is all
second-hand testimony, it is difficult to assess whether the
customers described are representative customers, or “brand
indifferent” customers.

Because Plaintiff’s evidence of actual

confusion is isolated and idiosyncratic, this factor weighs
against a finding of likelihood of confusion.

19

(g)

Advertisement through the Same Channels of Trade
and Media and Overlap of Sales Efforts (Lapp
Factor 7)

The greater the similarity in advertising and marketing,
the greater the likelihood of confusion.
Inc., 269 F.3d at 288-90.

See Checkpoint Sys.

This fact-intensive inquiry requires

that courts examine trade exhibitions, publications, and other
media the parties to use to market and sell their products.

Id.

at 289.
The parties did not directly address this factor.
Plaintiff testified that he advertises TIP in publications
mainly in New York and northern New Jersey such as the New York
Times.

Defendant submitted newspaper reviews and advertisements

for PIP in Philadelphia-based publications, but did not submit
any such exhibits for BIP.

The selected advertisements and

reviews submitted by the parties show no overlap in channels of
trade and media and appear to target two distinct geographical
markets, Plaintiff focusing on the New York and northern New
Jersey market and Defendant focusing its efforts historically in
the Philadelphia region.
While the parties did not directly address the channels of
advertisement for TIP, PIP, or BIP, on the record before this
Court this factor weighs against a finding of likelihood of
confusion.

20

(h)

Overlap of Sales Efforts (Lapp Factor 8)

If the parties’ sales efforts target the same consumers,
there is a stronger likelihood of confusion.

See Checkpoint

Sys. Inc., 269 F.3d at 289-90.
As discussed above, the parties submitted selected
advertisements and reviews as exhibits.
further address their sales efforts.

The parties did not

For the same reasons this

factor weighs against a finding of likelihood of confusion under
Lapp factor 7 it is given the same weight under this factor.
(i)

Relationship of the Goods in the Minds of
Consumers (Lapp Factor 9)

For this factor, the question is whether the goods or
services are “similar enough that a consumer could assume they
were offered by the same source.”

Kos Pharms, Inc. v. Andrx

Corp., 369 F.3d 700, 723 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Fisons
Horticulture, Inc., 30 F.3d at 481).

This factor is “intensely

factual” and allows courts to consider “whether buyers and users
of each parties’ goods are likely to encounter the goods of the
other, creating an assumption of common source[,] affiliation or
sponsorship.”

Checkpoint Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d at 286-88.

“Goods may fall under the same general product category, but
operate in distinct niches.

When two products are part of

distinct sectors of a broad product category, they can be

21

sufficiently unrelated that consumers are not likely to assume
the products originate from the same mark.”

Id. at 288.

In this case, TIP and BIP are both Italian fine dining
restaurants, suggesting that they may be similar enough that a
customer could assume they were offered by the same source.
However, it is unlikely that buyers and users of TIP and BIP
will encounter the other’s goods.

Plaintiff acknowledged that

both that Tappan and Burlington may be “separate trading areas”
and that customers do not typically drive from Burlington to
Tappan for dinner or vice versa.

Defendant similarly testified

that most of BIP’s customers are local.

Because customers are

unlikely to travel between the two restaurants, BIP and TIP
operate in separate niches.
Though the parties appear to offer very similar products,
TIP and BIP operate in distinct niches that are unlikely to be
related in a customer’s mind.

This factor weighs against a

finding of likelihood of confusion.
(j)

Other Factors (Lapp Factor 10)

The parties did not identify or discuss any other factors
that suggest that the consuming public might expect the prior
owner, here Plaintiff, would likely expand into the Defendant’s
market.

While Defendant did move his restaurants, both Tiramasu

and Il Portico, north and west of Center City Philadelphia the
moves were not far and not part of an expansion of operations.
22

Plaintiff, for its part is a single location and always has
been.

As noted above under Lapp Factor 3 both restaurants,

while operating under corporate names, are essentially sole
proprietorships tied to their reputations as chefs and the
personal attention they pay to customers.
to become franchise operations.

These are not likely

This factor weighs neither in

favor nor against a finding of likelihood of confusion.
In sum, Lapp factors 1 and 2 weigh in favor of finding a
likelihood of confusion.

Factors 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 weigh

against a finding of likelihood of confusion.
neutral.

Factor 10 is

On the record as a whole and after consideration of

all relevant Lapp factors, the Court concludes that Plaintiff
has failed to meet its burden of establishing a likelihood of
confusion between TIP and BIP.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s trademark

infringement claim fails.
2. Laches
Defendant argues that even if it has infringed on
Plaintiff’s mark, laches bars injunctive relief.

There are two

classes of cases involving laches: (1) cases where the
“plaintiff’s delay has been so unreasonable, outrageous, and
inexcusable that it can be said that the mark has been virtually
abandoned, the remedy under the general rule, barring of all
relief, will be granted” and (2) cases where “less flagrant
delay will serve to bar a plaintiff’s claim for an accounting
23

for past infringement but not for prospective injunctive
relief.”

Three Degrees Enterprises, Inc. v. Three Degrees

Worldwide, Inc., 1989 WL 119697 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing Univ. of
Pittsburgh v. Champion Prods., 686 F.2d 1040, 1044 (3d Cir.
2013)).

Because Plaintiff only seeks injunctive relief and has

waived all claims for costs, attorneys’ fees, or profits, only
the standard for the first class of cases will be discussed
below.
In order to raise laches as an affirmative defense, a party
must prove two essential elements: “(1) inexcusable delay in
instituting suit, and (2) prejudice resulting to the defendant
from such a delay.”
(a)

Id.

Plaintiff’s Delay in Instituting Suit

“‘[I]nexcusable delay’ is measured by reference to ‘the
most analogous’ state statute of limitations, which, in the case
of trademark infringement, is New Jersey’s six-year fraud
statute.”

New Reflections Plastic Surgery, LLC v. Reflections

Ctr. for Skin and Body, PC, 2018 WL 6716105 (D.N.J. 2018)
(citing D’Agostino v. Appliances Buy Phone, Inc., 633 Fed. Appx.
88, 91 n. 3 (3d Cir. 2015)).

The statute of limitations begins

to run when “the right to institute and maintain the suit
arises.”

Beauty Time, Inc. v. VU Skin Sys., 118 F.3d 140, 144

(3d Cir. 1997) (citations and quotations omitted).
24

Therefore, “aggrieved parties must . . . bring their claim
within [the applicable statute of limitations] when they learned
or should have learned, through the exercise of due diligence,
that they have a cause of action.”

Id. at 148.

Plaintiffs are

“expected to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to
ascertain the cause of any injury.”

Id.

Reasonable diligence

has been defined by the Third Circuit as “[a] fair, proper and
due degree of care and acting, measured with reference to the
particular circumstances; such as diligence, care, or attention
as might be expected from a man of ordinary prudence and
activity.”
1991)).

Id. (citing Black’s Law Dictionary 457 (6th ed.

The Third Circuit further found that “there are few

facts which diligence cannot discover, but there must be some
reason to awaken inquiry and suggest investigation.”

Id.

(citing Urland By and Through Urland v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., 822
F.2d 1268, 1273-74 (3d Cir. 1987)).
Where a plaintiff “‘sleeps on his rights for a period of
time greater than the applicable statute of limitations,’ the
burden of proof shifts to the plaintiff to prove the absence of
such prejudice to the defendant as would bar all relief.”
Champion Prods., 686 F.2d at 1045 (citing Gruca v. United States
Steel Corp., 495 F.2d 1252, 1258-59 (3d Cir. 1974) and Burke v.
Gateway Clipper, Inc., 441 F.2d 946, 949 (3d Cir. 1971)).

25

Plaintiff had a right to institute and maintain a suit some
time in 1995 when PIP opened in Philadelphia using the name “Il
Portico.”

Therefore, any suit initiated after 2002 would be an

inexcusable delay.

The current suit was initiated in January

2017. 12
In this instance, Plaintiff did not exercise reasonable
diligence in attempting to ascertain any instances of trademark
infringement.

Despite maintaining a website for TIP since 1998,

Plaintiff did not begin using the Internet to search for
potential trademark infringement for another 16 to 18 years.
Plaintiff either missed or disregarded several reasons to
“awaken inquiry and suggest investigation” into a suit against
PIP within the statute of limitations: Defendant maintained a
digital presence for PIP both on OpenTable and at ilportico.com;
Defendant promoted PIP on local, national, and international
television; dining publications and newspapers reviewed and
advertised PIP.

Tellingly, by 1998, three years after PIP had

opened in Philadelphia, Plaintiff had already identified and

12

The Court recognizes that it would have been difficult, if not
impossible, for Plaintiff to anticipate the reincarnation of PIP
as BIP during the 2012-2016 period of dormancy when Defendant
did not use the mark openly and actively in conjunction with
restaurant services. But this does not excuse Plaintiff’s lack
of action from 1995 to 2012, a 17-year span far longer than the
statute of limitations and over a course of time when the
internet and GPS navigation became ubiquitous.
26

successfully sued two other competing restaurants in New Jersey
using the same Mark.
The fact that none of TIP’s customers mentioned PIP to
Plaintiff does not excuse Plaintiff’s delay or indicate that
Plaintiff acted with reasonable ordinary prudence.

Having shown

inexcusable delay, the burden then shifts to Plaintiff to prove
the absence of prejudice to Defendant.
(b)

Prejudice to the Defendant

The distinction between cases of mere delay and cases which
allow for the affirmative defense of laches lies in the
defendant’s detrimental reliance.

See Champion Prods., 686 F.2d

at 1045 (citing Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514, 52324 (1888)).
Laches becomes relevant where a senior trademark user “delays in
asserting its rights for so long that the junior user has
developed sufficient demand and goodwill through its own efforts
that it would be inequitable to enforce the senior’s rights.”
Champion Prods., 686 F.2d at 1047.

“So long as the junior user

adopted the mark in ‘good faith,’ a senior user ‘may not be able
to obtain relief against the junior user in an area where [the
senior user] has no established trade, and hence no reputation
and no good will.’”

SMJ & J, Inc. v. NRG Heat & Power, LLC, 912

F.Supp.2d 189, 20203 (M.D. Pa. 2012) (internal citations

27

omitted) (citing Natural Footwear Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner &
Marx, 760F.2d 1383, 1394 (3d Cir.1985)).
Defendant has detrimentally relied on Plaintiff’s delay in
bringing a trademark infringement suit for use of the mark “Il
Portico.”

After operating PIP successfully from 1995 to 2012,

Defendant purchased and renovated a new location for his
restaurant in Burlington, New Jersey.

Defendant purchased a new

domain name for BIP in August 2016.
Furthermore, Defendant has expended significant effort in
building and maintaining demand and goodwill for his
restaurants, PIP and BIP.

Defendant’s efforts include doing TV

appearances to promote PIP; advertising in various publications;
purchasing and maintaining a domain name for both PIP and BIP;
purchasing and renovating property in Burlington; creating
several New Jersey corporations to obtain a liquor license; and
operating his restaurants as head chef and owner.

Defendant

testified that his customers from BIP and PIP have goodwill for
the name “Il Portico” and have come to associate the name with
his reputation as a chef.

Defendant further testified that

former customers of PIP have also visited BIP.

During

Plaintiff’s delay in asserting its rights, DelBello, PIP, and
BIP have developed a sufficient demand and goodwill through
their own efforts.

28

As discussed above, Plaintiff has not provided any facts
related to Defendant’s intent when using the mark “Il Portico”
that would suggest Defendant did not act in good faith.

Looking

at the facts in the record, Plaintiff has no established trade
in Burlington, New Jersey, and hence no reputation or goodwill
in this area.

To conclude, Plaintiff’s delay has caused

prejudice to Defendant.
Based on the foregoing analysis, Defendant has established
that Plaintiff is barred from the only relief it seeks here injunctive relief - by the equitable doctrine of laches.
(c)

Progressive Encroachment

Plaintiff argues that under the doctrine of progressive
encroachment, it was not obligated to bring a suit until BIP
opened in 2016.

Accordingly, Plaintiff asserts that laches

should not bar injunctive relief.
The Third Circuit has not directly adopted the doctrine of
progressive encroachment.

Urban Outfitters, Inc. v. BCBG Max

Azria Grp., Inc., 511 F.Supp.2d 482, 509 (E.D. Pa. 2007).

It

has, however, recognized the reasoning behind the doctrine.

Id.

The Third Circuit has held that laches does not bar an
injunction where the defendant changed from modest local sales
to a program of national sales.
at 1046.

See Champion Prods., 686 F.2d

“Changes in the quality and quantity of the alleged
29

infringing use can excuse delay in suing, for purposes of laches
defense asserted by alleged infringer.”

Guardian Life Ins. Co.

of America v. American Guardian Life Assur. Co., 943 F. Supp.
509, 520 (E.D. Pa. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by A&H
Sportswear Inc., 237 F.3d at 220-21.

“[I]t is only when ‘the

accused use moves closer or increases in quantity that the
doctrine of progressive encroachment requires the trademark to
remain alert and to promptly challenge the new and significant
acts of infringement.’”

Urban Outfitters Inc., 511 F.Supp.2d at

509 (citing 4 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §
31:20 (4th ed 2006)).
The First Circuit has adopted an element based test for
progressive encroachment which requires proof that “(1) during
the period of the delay the plaintiff could reasonably conclude
that it should not bring suit to challenge the allegedly
infringing activity; (2) the defendant materially altered its
infringing activities; and (3) suit was not reasonably delayed
after the alteration in infringing activity.”

Oriental

Financial Grp., Inc. v. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito
Oriental, 698 F.3d 9, 21 (1st Cir. 2012).

The Sixth Circuit

uses a similar analysis for progressive encroachment.

See

Kellogg Co. v. Exxon Corp., 209 F.3d 562, 568-75 (6th Cir.
2000).

Under either the Third Circuit approach or the First

30

Circuit test, Defendant is not barred from asserting the laches
defense under the facts of this case.
Applying the Third Circuit articulation of the doctrine
first, Plaintiff did not show that Defendant has changed from
modest local sales at PIP to national sales at BIP.

Nor did

Plaintiff introduce any evidence to suggest that Defendant’s
quantity or quality of use had changed between operating PIP and
BIP.

Defendant testified that BIP has the same decorations,

furniture, and menus, suggesting that the quantity and quality
of use of the mark “Il Portico” has remained the same since PIP
opened in 1995.

Accepting Plaintiff’s assertion that BIP is 93

miles away from TIP and accepting Defendant’s assertion that TIP
was 115 miles away from PIP, Defendant has moved 22 miles closer
to Plaintiff’s restaurant.
Application of the First Circuit test results in the same
outcome.

The second requirement for progressive encroachment in

the First Circuit test echoes the Third Circuit gloss on the
doctrine and addresses “the likelihood of confusion resulting
from the defendant’s moving into the same or similar market area
and placing itself more squarely in competition with the
plaintiff.” Oriental Financial Grp., 698 F.3d at 22 (citing
Kellogg Co., 209 F.3d 571 (emphasis in original)).

The second

requirement examines whether the defendant “after beginning its

31

use of the mark, redirected its business so that it more
squarely competed with the plaintiff and thereby increased the
likelihood of public confusion of the marks.”

Id. (emphasis in

original)(citing ProFitness Physical Therapy Ctr. v. Pro-Fit
Orthopedic and Sports Physical Therapy P.C., 314 F.3d 62, 70 (2d
Cir. 2002)); see also Tillamook Country Smoker, Inc. v. Tilamook
County Creamery Ass’n, 465 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (“To
establish progressive encroachment, [Plaintiff] would have had
to show that [Defendant] expanded its business into different
regions or into different markets.” (internal quotations
omitted) (emphasis in original)).
During the trial, Plaintiff conceded that “there is no
question that there are perhaps separate trading areas,” but
instead argued that Plaintiff’s reputation expanded beyond its
trading area.

Plaintiff had the burden of showing that

Defendant expanded its business into different regions or
different markets.

Plaintiff did not argue that after beginning

its use of the mark “Il Portico” in 1995, that Defendant
redirected its business so that it more squarely competed with
Plaintiff.

Plaintiff has not made a showing that by moving to

Burlington from Philadelphia, Defendant moved to a different
region or market.

The geography suggests otherwise.

32

Plaintiff has also failed to meet the first element of the
First Circuit test.

First, Plaintiff offered no evidence to

support a finding that Plaintiff could have reasonably concluded
that it should not bring a suit to challenge the allegedly
infringing activity during the period of delay.

As noted above,

during the period of delay, between 1995 when PIP opened and
2017 when Plaintiff brought this suit, Plaintiff succeeded in
asserting its trademark rights against two other “Il Portico”
restaurants.

Plaintiff did not offer an explanation for why it

did not pursue PIP for trademark infringement other than it was
not aware of PIP’s existence until 2017.
Based on its failure to meet the Third Circuit standard and
two of the three First Circuit elements, 13 a test this Court
adopts as persuasive authority, Plaintiff has not established
that progressive encroachment excuses its delay in bringing a
suit against Defendant for trademark infringement.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court denies
Plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief.

13

Plaintiff did not

It appears that Plaintiff could meet the third element. While
the Court finds that Defendant’s alteration in use of the Mark
was not material, Plaintiff did not unreasonably delay suit
after BIP opened sometime in 2016. Plaintiff filed this suit in
May 2017 after contacting BIP in October 2016 about the alleged
infringement of Plaintiff’s mark.
33

prove that Defendant infringed on its trademark.

Even if

Plaintiff was able to prove its claim of trademark infringement,
injunctive relief would be barred by laches.
An accompanying Order will be entered directing Judgment in
Defendant’s favor and dismissing the action in full.

Dated: November 1, 2019
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

At Camden, New Jersey

34