ROBERTS-LEARCH v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 23

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 1/31/2019. (dmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HEATHER C. ROBERTS-LERCH,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil Action
No. 17-3881 (JBS)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Adrienne Freya Jarvis, Esq.
800 North Kings Highway, Suite 304
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034
Attorney for Plaintiff
Eda Giusti, Special Assistant U.S. Attorney
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
300 Spring Garden Street, 6th Floor
Philadelphia, PA 19123
Attorney for Defendant
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to 42 U.S.C §

405(g) for review of the final decision of the Commissioner of the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denying the application of
Plaintiff

Heather

C.

Roberts-Lerch

(“Plaintiff”)

for

Social

Security Disability Insurance (“SSDI”) benefits under Title II of
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401 et seq. Plaintiff, who
suffers from reflex sympathetic dystrophy (“RSD”)/chronic regional

pain syndrome (“CRPS”) on the right side, rheumatoid arthritis,
and other conditions,
disability

from

disability,

to

March

was denied benefits for the
11,

November

2011,
3,

the

2015,

alleged

the

date

period

onset
on

of

date

of

which

the

Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued a written decision.
In the pending appeal, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s
decision must be reversed and remanded on four grounds. To that
end, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) selectively
rejecting the opinions of certain medical sources of record; (2)
crafting a Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) that was not
supported

by

substantial

evidence;

(3)

finding

Plaintiff’s

allegations not entirely credible; and (4) failing to establish
that there is other work in the national economy that Plaintiff
could perform. For the reasons that follow, the Court will affirm
the ALJ’s decision.
II.

BACKGROUND
A.

Procedural History

Plaintiff protectively filed an application for SSDI benefits
on February 5, 2013, alleging a disability as of March 11, 2011.
(R. at 80, 107, 166-72, 184, 188.) The SSA denied Plaintiff’s claim
on June 14, 2013. (R. at 109-13.) Plaintiff’s claim was again
denied upon reconsideration on September 12, 2013. (R. at 115-20.)
A hearing was held before ALJ Marguerite Toland on May 12, 2015.
(R. at 36-79.) ALJ Toland issued her opinion on November 3, 2015,
2

denying benefits. (R. at 13-29.) On April 6, 2017, the Appeals
Counsel denied Plaintiff’s request for review. (R. at 1-5.) This
appeal timely follows.
B.

Personal and Medical History

Plaintiff was 37 years old on the alleged disability onset
date and 41 years old at the time of her hearing before the ALJ.1
(R. at 43, 80.) She graduated from college and earned a master’s
degree in Elementary Education. (R. at 45, 189.) Between 1996 and
March 11, 2011, Plaintiff primarily worked as a kindergarten and
elementary school teacher for the Willingboro Board of Education.
(R. at 189, 195.) After leaving her job in March 2011, Plaintiff
has never tried to go back to work as a teacher. (R. at 43.) Since
2008, Plaintiff has also been the joint owner of a consulting
business with her husband, for which her duties include tracking
emails and writing/depositing checks.2 (R. at 47.) She was insured
for purposes of SSDI benefits through September of 2017. (R. at
179.)
Plaintiff

was

diagnosed

with

descending

Guillain-Barre

syndrome in February 2008. (R. at 259.) On June 15, 2008, Plaintiff

Accordingly, Plaintiff was a “younger person” under the relevant
SSA regulations during the alleged period of disability. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1563(c), 416.963(c).
1

The ALJ determined that between March 11, 2011 and the date of
the ALJ’s decision, Plaintiff’s self-employment earnings from her
joint-ownership in the consulting business were below substantial
gainful activity levels. (R. at 18.)
3
2

treated

with

Dr.

Robert

J.

Schwartzman,

M.D.,

at

Hahnemann

University Hospital for “pain in my right arm.” (Id.) Plaintiff
also complained of reduced visual activity, numbness and tingling
in the face and body, and pain in her left arm and both legs. (Id.)
Dr.

Schwartzman

observed

that

Plaintiff

“responded

well

to

plasmapheresis,” but noted clinical signs of right facial drop,
reduced strength of the right upper extremity of 3-4/5, positive
Tinel points on the right, positive allodynia3 in the right arm
and leg, mechanical and static allodynia, dynamic allodynia, and
some mild neurogenic edema in the right hand, livedo reticularis,4
and low hemoglobin. (R. at 260.)

Plaintiff was treated with

intravenous immunoglobulin infusions and cortisone. (R. at 25961.)
For the next few years, Plaintiff continued to treat with Dr.
Schwartzman for her pain-related symptoms. (R. at 263-64, 293-95.)
On July 23, 2010, Dr. Schwartzman recommended “Botox injection[s]
as needed” due to Plaintiff’s “severe chronic pains and inability
to function daily.” (R. at 292.)

“Allodynia” is commonly understood as “pain produced by a
non-noxious stimulus to normal skin.” Dorland’s Illustrated
Medical Dictionary 50 (Elsevier Saunders 32nd ed. 2012).
3

“Livedo reticularis” is understood as “a vascular response to
any of various disorders, caused by dilation of the subpapillary
venous plexus as a result of both increased blood viscosity and
blood vessel changes that delay flow away from the skin.” Dorland’s
Illustrated Medical Dictionary 1067 (Elsevier Saunders 32nd ed.
2012).
4
4

Plaintiff left her job as a teacher on March 11, 2011. (R. at
18.) At the time, Plaintiff was pregnant and unable to take any
medicines for her RSD, including ketamine. (R. at 269.) Medical
records indicate that, as of March 21, 2011, she was “on disability
for pregnancy and plans add[itional] year of disability after
pregnancy from Neuro.” (R. at 270.)
On March 14, 2011, Plaintiff reported “[s]evere pain in right
brachial plexus distributions,” which “radiates across trapezius
ridge, down the medial scapular border and primarily into middle
trunk posterior cord distributions. This encompasses the triceps,
dorsal forearm, [and] dorsal portion of her hand.” (R. at 290.)
Plaintiff also had “some pain in upper thigh, hip and buttocks,”
which she described as “occasionally sharp, mostly constant dull
pain with some burning.” (Id.) Dr. Schwartzman noted that Plaintiff
“[j]ust finished teaching for this year and should be on disability
for the next year while being treated and taking care of . . . her
child at the same time.” (R. at 290.) Among other things, he
diagnosed Plaintiff with RSD/CRPS on the right side. (R. at 289,
291.)
In April 2011, Plaintiff unfortunately had a miscarriage. (R.
at 272-74.) Thereafter, Plaintiff resumed ketamine infusions every
three months (R. at R. at 272-73, 464-516), although there is “a
gap in the record from May 2011 to February 2013” during which

5

time Plaintiff did not receive ketamine infusions, as the ALJ
noted. (R. at 24.)
On

April

3,

2012,

Dr.

Schwartzman

completed

a

Capacity

Questionnaire in conjunction with Plaintiff’s application for
private disability benefits to Prudential, in which he opined that
Plaintiff did not have the capacity to work an eight-hour workday
and that he was unable to determine when she could return to fulltime work. (R. at 577-78.)
On June 18, 2012, Dr. Schwartzman reexamined Plaintiff for
complaints of severe right arm pain. (R. at 284.) Upon examination,
he noted that Plaintiff was undergoing treatment for her thyroid
and

“[w]hen

this

is

complete

reassessed.”

(R.

at

286.)

her
Dr.

pain

situation

Schwartzman

will

be

subsequently

administered a right cervical plexus block. (R. at 495-96.)
On

December

Plaintiff’s

claim

4,

2012,

for

Dr.

Joshua

disability

Alpers,

benefits

at

M.D.,
the

reviewed

request

Prudential, and opined as follows:
The diagnosis of CRPS is adequately supported as
detailed in the following recommendations. Individuals
with CRPS are in constant pain though are only
incapacitated during periods of severe pain. As such,
she is capable of maintaining employment in a sedentary
capacity between these periods of severe pain. However,
given the unpredictable nature of her pain and the
widespread distribution of symptoms, it appears likely
that this would result in a significant reduction in her
work hours and would likely prevent her from maintaining
gainful
employment.
Quantification
of
functional
impairment in association with pain is challenging due
to the inherent self[-]reported nature of pain. However,
as evidenced by her apparent compliance with treatment
6

of

plans (as reported by Dr. Schwartzman) to include
ketamine infusions, she appears to have made appropriate
efforts to improve her level of functioning. The
recommendations by Dr. Schwartzman in April 2012 are
appropriate, effectively restricting [Plaintiff] to a
sedentary occupation on a part-time capacity. This would
include only occasional standing/walking with sitting up
to four hours per day. Occasional reaching at desk level
and handling are supported although activities including
balance should be avoided as well as a lift/carry
restriction of no more than 10 pounds.
(R. at 432-33.)
On

April

23,

2013,

Dr.

Schwartzman

completed

a

Medical

Examination by Treating Physician form for the State of New Jersey,
wherein he opined that Plaintiff was “totally and permanently
disabled and no longer able to perform his or her job duties and/or
any other job” because she was “unable to use right hand to write
on board, unable to stand for long periods of time. Needs to take
breaks and being a teacher she is unable to.” (R. at 581-82.) He
also checked boxes indicating that Plaintiff’s disability was
progressive and that there was not a possibility her disability
might improve. (R. at 582.)
On May 27, 2013, Dr. Francky Merlin, M.D., examined Plaintiff.
(R.

at

327-29.)

On

physical

examination,

Plaintiff’s

motor

function was 4/5 in the right leg and 5/5 in her other extremities.
(R. at 328.) Dr. Merlin diagnosed Plaintiff with RSD and a history
of rheumatoid arthritis, and opined that Plaintiff “is able to
sit, stand, walk, crouch, hear, and speak.” (R. at 329.)

7

On

September

23,

2013,

Plaintiff

was

examined

by

Dr.

Schwartzman’s colleague, Dr. Enrique Aradillas, M.D., who noted
that Plaintiff had been treating with gabapentin (Neurontin) and
had positive Tinel’s, Wright’s, and Roo’s signs. (R. at 505.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff followed up with Dr. Ardillas several times.
(R. at 543, 606.) On December 12, 2013, Dr. Aradillas performed a
stellate ganglion block at C6, which reduced Plaintiff’s plain
levels from 8/10 to 3/10. (R. 535-36.) The following February, Dr.
Aradillas performed another stellate ganglion block at C6, which
again reduced Plaintiff’s pain levels from 8/10 to 3/10. (R. at
549-50.) On June 19, 2014, Dr. Aradillas administered a trigger
point

injection

at

the

right

shoulder/scapula,

which

reduced

Plaintiff’s pain level from 8/10 to 2/10. (R. at 612.) At a followup appointment on April 6, 2015, Dr. Aradillas noted that Plaintiff
“does well” with ketamine treatments, and that the stellate and
trigger

point

injection

“seems

to

improve

the

response

to

ketamine.” (R. at 613.)
On April 30, 2015, Dr. Aradillas completed an Attending
Physician’s

Statement

for

Prudential,

wherein

he

noted

that

Plaintiff had pain throughout the entire right side of her body
and experienced “frequent pain flares” from her “severe CRPS,”
which “require rest.” (R. at 604-05.) Dr. Aradillas opined that
Plaintiff could perform “no work.” (R. at 605.)

8

C.

State Agency Consultants

Dr. Elliot Goytia, M.D., a State agency medical consultant,
reviewed Plaintiff’s medical records and assessed her physical
residual functional capacity. (R. at 85-87.) Dr. Goytia opined
that Plaintiff could occasionally lift and carry 25 pounds, stand
and/or walk (with normal breaks) for six hours in an eight-hour
workday, could sit (with normal breaks) for six hours in an eighthour workday, could frequently climb, balance, stoop, kneel, and
crouch, and could occasionally climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds and
crawl. (Id.) Dr. Andrew Przybyla, M.D., another State agency
medical consultant, reviewed Plaintiff’s medical record and opined
that Plaintiff could lift and carry 10 pounds frequently and 20
pounds occasionally, could stand four of eight hours, could sit
six of eight hours, and could perform occasional pushing, pulling,
and reaching with the right upper and lower extremities. (R. at
98-100, 343-44.)
D.

Plaintiff’s Statements and Activities

In a Group Disability Insurance form that Plaintiff completed
for

disability

benefits

with

Prudential

on

August

16,

2011,

Plaintiff reported she prepared her own meals and was able to drive
a car. (R. at 562.) According to Plaintiff, her activities and
hobbies varied based on her pain level, but included dusting,
gardening, weekly shopping for three hours, reading one to four
hours daily, watching television about six hours daily, listening
9

to the radio about an hour daily, and participating in cards/art
crafts. (R. at 563-64.) At that time, she was involved in four
community organizations and support groups, for a total of five
days per month plus one-hour daily, and visited with friends twice
per week for three hours at a time. (R. at 564.) Plaintiff stated
that she “hope[d] to be able to return to work.” (R. at 566.)
In another form that Plaintiff completed for Prudential on
April 30, 2014, Plaintiff reported she still prepared her own meals
and was able to drive a car. (R. at 570.) Again, Plaintiff stated
that her household activities and hobbies varied with her pain
level, and included dusting, gardening, washing dishes, and taking
out the trash. (R. at 570-71.) She specified that she needed
assistance with heavy items when shopping. (R. at 572.) Her other
activities remained the same, with the addition of “restorative
yoga with modifications” up to twice weekly and reading seven hours
daily. (R. at 572-73.)
During a hearing held by the ALJ on May 12, 2015, Plaintiff
testified that she stopped working on March 11, 2011 because her
RSD symptoms had worsened due to her pregnancy. (R. at 47.)
According to Plaintiff, her RSD “mostly affects my right side[,]
. . . but it does affect my whole body” and is “usually a deep
constant pain.” (Id.) Regarding treatment, Plaintiff testified
that she receives ketamine every three months, which temporarily
helps with the pain, and that she expected the ketamine treatments
10

to

continue

indefinitely.

(R.

at

49-50,

52-53.)

Plaintiff

confirmed she also took gabapentin (Neurontin) three times daily
for her pain symptoms and has received stellate ganglion nerve
blocks. (R. at 50.)
Regarding her daily activities, Plaintiff testified at the
May 2015 hearing that she cooked “semi-easy things,” rinsed dishes,
and loaded the dishwasher and laundry machine. (R. at 55.) She
also went grocery shopping two to four times a month, watched
movies at home, gardened if her husband did the digging, made craft
cards, and kept in touch with people on the computer by email and
Facebook. (R. at 55-57.)
E.

Vocational Expert Testimony

During Plaintiff’s hearing in front of the ALJ, the ALJ also
heard testimony from Beth Kelley, a vocational expert. (R. at 7077.)

Based

on

Plaintiff’s

testimony,

the

vocational

expert

described Plaintiff’s past work as a Teacher, Elementary School
(DOT 092.227-010), and Teacher, Kindergarten (DOT 092.227-014),
which are both classified as “light” and “skilled” work. (R. at
74.)

The

vocational

expert

opined

that

a

person

limited

to

sedentary work and with Plaintiff’s RFC could not perform work
Plaintiff’s past work as a teacher. (R. at 74-75.) The vocational
expert further opined that a person with Plaintiff’s RFC could
perform

the

work

of

a

final

assembler,

of

which

there

are

approximately 120,000 jobs in the national economy and 2,500 in
11

New Jersey, a table worker, of which there are approximately 30,000
jobs in the national economy and 400 jobs in New Jersey, and suture
sorter, of

which there are approximately 20,000 jobs in the

national economy and 400 jobs in New Jersey. (R. at 75.) The
vocational expert explained that her testimony was based on over
35 years as a vocational rehab counselor in the field. (R. at 77.)
F.

ALJ Decision

In a written decision dated November 3, 2015, the ALJ found
that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social
Security

Act

at

any

time

between

the

alleged

onset

date

of

disability and the date of the ALJ’s written decision because,
consistent with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and
RFC, she was capable of performing work as a final assembler, table
worker, or suture sorter. (R. at 28.)
At the first stage of the five-step sequential evaluation
process, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in
substantial gainful activity since March 11, 2011, which was the
date she stopped working as a teacher for the Willingboro Board of
Education. (R. at 18.) The ALJ noted that Plaintiff received some
self-employment

earnings

in

2011,

2012,

2013,

and

2014,

but

determined that these earnings were below substantial gainful
activity levels. (Id.)
Next, at step two, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the
following

“severe”

impairments:
12

RSD/CRPS;

autoimmune

induced

brachial plexopathy; history of rheumatoid arthritis; myofascial
pain syndrome; and status post Guillain-Barre syndrome. (Id.) The
ALJ found Plaintiff’s alleged anemia, history of cervical cancer,
hyperthyroidism, status post left avulsion fracture, irritable
bowel syndrome, and diarrhea to be “non-severe” because “there is
no evidence that such impairments caused more than a minimal
limitation

in

[Plaintiff’s]

ability

to

perform

basic

work

activities for 12 consecutive months.” (R. at 18-19.) The ALJ also
found that Plaintiff’s medically determinable mental impairments
of major depressive disorder and situational anxiety, “do not cause
more than minimal limitation in [Plaintiff’s] ability to perform
basic mental work activities and are therefore non-severe.” (R. at
19.) The ALJ considered the four broad functional areas set out in
the disability regulations for evaluating mental disorders and in
section

12.00C

of

the

Listing

of

Impairments

known

as

the

“paragraph B” criteria, examined Plaintiff’s medical records and
other relevant evidence, in detail, and described the reasons she
found Plaintiff’s mental health impairments to be “non-severe,”
including that, “in April 2011 following the miscarriage of a lateterm child [Plaintiff] was treated with Citalopram, but appeared
fully oriented and had appropriate mood and affect,” that there is
“no evidence of outpatient psychiatric care,” and that Plaintiff
specifically denied any depression or anxiety during RSD/CRPS
treatment in 2015.” (R. at 19-20.)
13

At step three, the ALJ concluded that none of Plaintiff’s
impairments or combination of impairments met or medically equaled
the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part
404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, including those set forth in Listings
1.02 and 14.09. (R. at 20-22.)
Between

steps

three

and

four,

the

ALJ

determined

that

Plaintiff possessed the RFC to perform “sedentary work,” as defined
in C.F.R. § 404.1567(a), except that:
[S]he can lift no more than 10 pounds and sit up to 6
hours per day, but no more than 1 hour at a time and
then would need to stand or shift positions for up to 5
minutes per hour while remaining on task; she can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs and stoop; she
cannot perform overhead lifting or reaching; she can
perform no more than frequent handling; and she would be
off task 5% of the workday in addition to normal breaks.
(R. at 31.)
In

determining

Plaintiff’s

RFC,

the

ALJ

considered

“all

symptoms and the extent to which these symptoms can reasonably be
accepted as consistent with the objective medical evidence and
other

evidence.”

(R.

at

22.)

Although

the

ALJ

found

that

Plaintiff’s impairments “could reasonably be expected to cause the
alleged

symptoms,”

she

concluded

that

Plaintiff’s

statements

“concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of
these symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons explained
in this decision.” (R. at 23.) In doing so, the ALJ analyzed the
medical evidence in the record with respect to each of Plaintiff’s

14

impairments, as well as the opinions of various treating physicians
and State agency medical consultants. (R. at 22-27.)
In crafting the RFC, the ALJ assigned “little weight” to the
opinions of Dr. Schwartzman and Dr. Aradillas that Plaintiff could
not work in any capacity and had a permanent disability. (R. 26.)
Moreover, the ALJ gave “weight” to the opinions of Dr. Schwartzman
and Dr. Alpers that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work, but
did not give “weight” to the conclusion that Plaintiff could only
perform part-time work due to exacerbations of pain. (Id.) Next,
the ALJ gave “some weight” to the opinions of the State agency
medical consultants, who found that Plaintiff could perform a range
of sedentary work, because their findings “are generally supported
by [Plaintiff’s] repeated reports of pain and limitations and by
the opinions of Dr. Schwartzman limiting [Plaintiff] to sedentary
work.” (Id.) The ALJ stated that “[m]ore weight is not given . .
. as the undersigned finds that [Plaintiff] is more limited than
found by the State agency due to [Plaintiff’s] subjective reports
of pain and limitations.” (Id.) Finally, the ALJ assigned “little”
weight to Dr. Merlin’s opinion “as it is overly vague, does not
provide specific functional limitations for consideration, and
does not provide any objective medical findings to support the
conclusions.” (Id.)
Based

on

Plaintiff’s

RFC

and

the

vocational

expert’s

testimony from the May 2015 hearing, the ALJ found, at step four,
15

that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work as an
elementary school and kindergarten teacher. (R. at 27.) At step
five, however, the ALJ found that there exists a significant number
of jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform,
including those of final assembler (120,000 jobs in the national
economy), table worker (30,000 jobs in the national economy), and
suture sorter (20,000 jobs in the national economy). (R. at 2728.) Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not under a
disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from March 20,
2013 through the date of the decision. (R. 28.)
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews the Commissioner's decision pursuant to 42
U.S.C.

§

405(g).

Commissioner’s
Commissioner’s

The

Court’s

decision,
factual

review

and

the

findings

is

deferential

Court

where

they

to

must

uphold

are

supported

the
the
by

“substantial evidence.” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); see also Fargnoli v.
Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001); Cunningham v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec., 507 F. App’x 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2012). Substantial
evidence is defined as “more than a mere scintilla,” meaning “such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 400
(1971); see also Hagans v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 292
(3d Cir. 2012) (using the same language as Richardson). Therefore,
if

the

ALJ’s

findings

of

fact
16

are

supported

by

substantial

evidence, those findings bind the reviewing court, whether or not
it would have made the same determination. Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at
38. The Court may not weigh the evidence or substitute its own
conclusions for those of the ALJ. Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011). Remand is not required where it
would not affect the outcome of the case. Rutherford v. Barnhart,
399 F.3d 546, 553 (3d Cir. 2005).
IV.

DISCUSSION
A.
In

Legal Standard for Determination of Disability
order

disability

to

establish

insurance

a

benefits,

disability
a

claimant

for

the

must

purpose

demonstrate

of
a

“medically determinable basis for an impairment that prevents him
from engaging in any ‘substantial gainful activity’ for a statutory
twelve-month period.” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 426 (3d Cir.
1999); 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1). A claimant lacks the ability to
engage in any substantial activity “only if his physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only
unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age,
education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”
Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427–428; 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).
The Commissioner reviews claims of disability in accordance
with the sequential five-step process set forth in 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520. In step one, the Commissioner determines whether the
17

claimant currently engages in “substantial gainful activity.” 20
C.F.R.

§

1520(b).

Present

engagement

in

substantial

activity

precludes an award of disability benefits. See Bowen v. Yuckert,
482

U.S.

137,

140

(1987).

In

step

two,

the

claimant

must

demonstrate that the claimant suffers from a “severe impairment.”
20

C.F.R.

§

1520(c).

Impairments

lacking

sufficient

severity

render the claimant ineligible for disability benefits.

See

Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. Step three requires the Commissioner to
compare medical evidence of the claimant’s impairment(s) to the
list of impairments presumptively severe enough to preclude any
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(d). If a claimant does not
suffer from a listed impairment or its equivalent, the analysis
proceeds to steps four and five. Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428. Between
steps three and four, the ALJ determines the claimant’s RFC. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1545. Step four requires the ALJ to consider whether,
based on his or her RFC, the claimant retains the ability to
perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(e). If the claimant’s
impairments render the claimant unable to return to the claimant’s
prior occupation, at step five the ALJ will consider whether the
claimant possesses the capability to perform other work existing
in

significant

numbers

in

the

national

economy,

given

the

claimant’s residual functional capacity, age, education, and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 1520(g), 404.1560(c).

18

B.

Analysis

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred by: (1) selectively
rejecting the opinions of certain medical sources of record; (2)
crafting an RFC that was not supported by substantial evidence;
(3) finding Plaintiff’s allegations not entirely credible; and (4)
failing to establish there is other work in the national economy
Plaintiff could perform. The Court addresses each argument in turn.
1.

The ALJ assigned appropriate weight to the medical
opinions of record

Plaintiff first avers that the ALJ erred in selectively
rejecting the opinions of certain medical sources when crafting
Plaintiff’s RFC. (Pl.’s Br. at 21-26.) Specifically, Plaintiff
argues that the ALJ

improperly

weighted the opinions of Dr.

Schwartzman and Dr. Alpers, and erred by finding Plaintiff less
limited than did Dr. Przybyla, a State agency medical consultant.
(Id. at 22-26.) For the reasons explained below, the Court finds
that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s treatment of these
medical opinions.
“[T]he ALJ — not treating or examining physicians or State
agency consultants — must make the ultimate disability and RFC
determinations.” Chandler, 667 F.3d at 361; see also 20 C.F.R §§
404.1527(e)(1). The ALJ is entitled to weigh all the evidence in
making his or her finding. Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d
Cir. 2011). It is established that, “[a]lthough treating and
examining physician opinions often deserve more weight . . . [t]he
19

law is clear . . . that the opinion of a treating physician does
not bind the ALJ on the issue of functional capacity.” Chandler,
667 F.3d at 361 (citing Brown, 649 F.3d at 197 n.2). Where
inconsistency in evidence exists, the ALJ retains significant
discretion in deciding whom to credit. Plummer, 186 F.3d at 429.
However, the ALJ “cannot reject evidence for no reason or for the
wrong reason.” Id. (quoting Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1066
(3d Cir. 1993)); see also Cotter, 642 F.2d at 704-05.
The ALJ

assigned “little weight” to the opinion of Dr.

Schwartzman (and Dr. Aradillas) that Plaintiff could not work in
any

capacity

and

had

a

permanent

disability

because

“Dr.

Schwartzman’s findings of the same are contradicted by his separate
finding

that

[Plaintiff]

could

perform

sedentary

work,”

and

“[n]either doctor offered any specific objective medical findings
to support such a broad-based conclusion other than [Plaintiff’s]
diagnosis of RSD/CRPS.” (R. at 26.) The ALJ further noted that
“treating notes with both physicians indicate that [Plaintiff] had
improvement in pain with ketamine infusions and Gabapentin,” and
that “their treatment with [Plaintiff] appears to taper off in
2014, as they indicated that trigger point and stellate infections
further improved [Plaintiff’s] response to ketamine injections.”
(Id.) Moreover, the ALJ gave “weight” to the opinions of Dr.
Schwartzman and Dr. Alpers that Plaintiff could perform sedentary
work, but did not give “weight” to the conclusion that Plaintiff
20

could only perform part-time work due to exacerbations of pain
because

“[s]uch

a

finding

is

contradicted

by

[Plaintiff’s]

positive response to ketamine and injections, and by [Plaintiff’s]
admitted daily activities, her self-employment, and her various
volunteer work.” (Id.)
Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s treatment of these
opinions. For example, Dr. Schwartzman’s conclusion that Plaintiff
could not work in any capacity and had a permanent disability is
inconsistent with his own finding that Plaintiff could perform
sedentary work (albeit on a part-time basis). (R. at 577-78.) Dr.
Alpers,

meanwhile,

agreed

with

Schwartzman’s

assessment

that

Plaintiff could perform sedentary work on a part-time basis. (R.
at 432) (“The restrictions recommended by Dr. Schwartzman in April
2012 are appropriate, effectively restricting [Plaintiff] to a
sedentary occupation on a part-time basis.”). Moreover, as the ALJ
noted, Plaintiff consistently had positive responses to ketamine
and injections every three months (R. at 26, 272-73, 288, 464-516,
613), and her written submissions to Prudential and testimony
before the ALJ indicated she was independent in many daily tasks,
including cooking, dusting, and gardening. (R. at 55-57, 562-73.)
On this record, the ALJ did not err.5

Moreover, the Court does not find that the ALJ erred by
finding Plaintiff less limited than Dr. Przybyla, as Plaintiff
argues. (Pl.’s Br. at 22-23.) To the contrary, the ALJ concluded
that Plaintiff was restricted to sedentary work (R. at 22), while
Dr. Przybyla opined that Plaintiff could perform light work,
21
5

2.

Substantial evidence
determination

supports

the

ALJ’s

RFC

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in crafting her RFC.
(Pl.’s Br. at 26-27.) To that end, Plaintiff cursorily suggests
that

the

ALJ

“failed

to

properly

consider

the

uncontested,

substantial evidence of record relating to [Plaintiff’s] CRPS over
the course of four years and despite aggressive treatment.” (Id.
at 27.) To the contrary, the Court finds that substantial evidence
supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.
SSR 96-8p dictates that the RFC assessment be a “functionby-function assessment based upon all of the relevant evidence of
an individual's ability to do work-related activities.” In order
to meet the requirements of SSR 96-8p, the ALJ “must specify the
evidence that he relied upon to support his conclusion.” Sullivan
v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 12-7668, 2013 WL 5973799, at *8 (D.N.J.
Nov.

8,

2013).

Moreover,

the

ALJ's

finding

of

RFC

must

be

“accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explanation of the basis
on which it rests.” Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 41 (quoting Cotter v.
Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981)).

including lifting and carrying 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds
occasionally, standing four of eight hours, and sitting six of
eight hours. (R. at 98-100, 343-44.) Moreover, where Dr. Przybyla
determined that Plaintiff had “unlimited” handling ability (R. at
99), the ALJ found that Plaintiff could only handle “frequently.”
(R. at 22.) Finally, while Dr. Przybyla opined that Plaintiff could
“occasionally” push, pull, and reach with the right upper and lower
extremities (R. at 99), the ALJ restricted Plaintiff to no overhead
lifting or reaching. (R. at 22.) Clearly, then, the ALJ found
Plaintiff to be more limited than did Dr. Przybyla.
22

In determining Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ carefully considered
and thoroughly discussed all available medical records and the
opinions of several doctors who examined Plaintiff. (R. at 22-27.)
Ultimately, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform sedentary
work except that:
[S]he can lift no more than 10 pounds and sit up to 6
hours per day, but no more than 1 hour at a time and
then would need to stand or shift positions for up to 5
minutes per hour while remaining on task; she can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs and stoop; she
cannot perform overhead lifting or reaching; she can
perform no more than frequent handling; and she would be
off task 5% of the workday in addition to normal breaks.
(R. at 22.) Having reviewed the lengthy administrative record,
including the ALJ’s comprehensive decision, and for the reasons
discussed

supra

and

infra,

the

Court

finds

that

substantial

evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC determination.
3.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s credibility
determinations

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated her
complaints of disabling pain. (Pl.’s Br. at 28-34.) Plaintiff
rightly cites to Schaudeck, which states that “[a]n ALJ must give
great weight to a claimant’s subjective testimony of the inability
to perform even light or sedentary work when this testimony is
supported by competent medical evidence.” (Pl.’s Br. at 28) (citing
Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 181 F.3d 429, 433 (3d
Cir. 1999)). However, “the ALJ may reject these complaints when
they are inconsistent with objective medical evidence in the
23

record.” Morel v. Colvin, 2016 WL 1270758, at *4 (D.N.J. Apr. 1,
2016) (citing Ferguson v. Schweiker, 765 F.2d 31, 37 (3d Cir.
1985)). Moreover, “[t]he substantial evidence standard entitles an
ALJ

to

considerable

deference,

especially

in

credibility

findings.” Volage v. Astrue, 2012 WL 4742373, at *7 (D.N.J. Oct.
1, 2012) (citing Smith v. Califano, 637 F.2d 968, 969 (3d Cir.
1981)). The Court finds that substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s credibility determinations vis-à-vis Plaintiff.
Assessing the degree of pain and its resulting functional
impairments from a chronic condition is one of the most challenging
determinations to be made by an ALJ; accordingly, in this case,
the ALJ devoted substantial care and discernment in her decisions
about pain. (R. at 22-27.) The ALJ found that “[Plaintiff’s]
statements concerning the intensity, persistence and limiting
effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely credible for the reasons
explained in this decision.” (R. at 23.) The ALJ adequately set
forth

her

rationale

for

discounting

Plaintiff’s

subjective

allegations of pain and other symptoms, and summarized her RFC
determination as follows:
The undersigned recognizes [Plaintiff’s] long history of
RSD/CRPS following her hospitalization for GuillainBarre syndrome. Although the record shows several
instances of what appear to be exacerbations of pain,
such episodes are sporadic. Further, the record is
replete with comments from both [Plaintiff] and her
physicians that she had improvement in her pain with
ketamine and injections. [Plaintiff] admitted in her
testimony that she was not even taking any medications
and was relying on infusions, which occur only every 3
24

months. There is no evidence of physical therapy,
hospitalizations, or severe exacerbations since the
alleged
onset
date.
Additionally,
[Plaintiff’s]
extensive daily activities both at home and in the
community contradict her reports of recurrent pain, the
need for naps, and inability to function on a daily
basis. There is also a question of [Plaintiff’s]
cessation of work activity, as she stopped working
during her pregnancy and planned to stay out of work for
an additional year thereafter. Further, although
[Plaintiff] was not receiving ketamine during her
pregnancy, she did not report any severe exacerbations
of pain. Although [Plaintiff’s] treating physicians
offered blanket opinions of disability, they offered no
objective medical findings to support such conclusions
and simultaneously indicated that [Plaintiff] had
improvement in pain with ketamine and infusions. In
noting that [Plaintiff] has had some positive medical
findings, such as restricted strength of 4/5 and
tenderness on the right side, and in finding her
subjective reports of symptoms partially credible, the
undersigned finds that [Plaintiff] retains the [RFC] for
sedentary work outlined above.
(R. at 26-27.) The Court finds that the ALJ gave enough weight to
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints of pain by limiting her RFC to
a reduced range of sedentary work, and the ALJ’s decision derives
strong support from the record and it shall not be reversed on
this basis.
4.

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s step-five
determination

Finally, Plaintiff argues that, because the ALJ failed to
properly determine Plaintiff’s RFC,6 she erred in interpreting and
applying the vocational expert’s responses to the hypothetical

For the reasons discussed supra, the Court finds that the RFC
was based on substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court will not
address this argument a second time.
25
6

questions that were posed during the hearing and, therefore, erred
at step five. The Court finds that the ALJ did not so err.
In assessing a claimant’s application for benefits, the ALJ
is required to: (1) ask, on the record, whether a vocational
expert’s

testimony

is

consistent

with

the

Dictionary

of

Occupational Titles; (2) elicit a reasonable explanation where an
inconsistency appears, and (3) explain in its decision how the
conflict is resolved. Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607 (3d Cir.
2014). If there is a conflict, an explanation must be made on the
record and the ALJ must explain in his or her decision how the
conflict was resolved. See Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113,117 (3d
Cir. 2002). The Third Circuit has emphasized that the presence of
inconsistencies does not mandate remand, so long as “substantial
evidence exists in other portions of the record that can form an
appropriate basis to support the result.” Zirnsak, 777 F.3d at
617.
At the hearing, the ALJ asked the vocational expert whether
any unskilled jobs exist in the national economy for an individual
with Plaintiff’s age, education, and RFC. (R. at
described

supra,

the

ALJ

determined

Plaintiff

74-75).

could

perform

sedentary work except that:
[S]he can lift no more than 10 pounds and sit up to 6
hours per day, but no more than 1 hour at a time and
then would need to stand or shift positions for up to 5
minutes per hour while remaining on task; she can
occasionally climb ramps and stairs and stoop; she
cannot perform overhead lifting or reaching; she can
26

As

perform no more than frequent handling; and she would be
off task 5% of the workday in addition to normal breaks.
(R. at 22.) This is consistent with the relevant interrogatory
the ALJ posed to the vocational expert. (R. at 74-75.)
In response to the ALJ’s interrogatory, the vocational expert
listed

three

unskilled

positions

that

an

individual

with

Plaintiff’s RFC could perform - final assembler, table worker, and
suture sorter - and the number of jobs that existed in the national
economy for each. (R. at 75.) Additionally, the vocational expert
confirmed that her testimony was consistent with the information
contained in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles and based on
her

more-than-35

years

of

experience

as

a

vocational

rehab

counselor in the field. (R. at 77.) Thus, the first Zirnsak factor
was satisfied.
The

ALJ’s

hypothetical

impairments

supported

by

established

limitations.

the
See

question
record

must
and,

Rutherford,

include

thus,
399

convey

F.3d

at

those
the
555;

Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987). The ALJ
complied with this requirement and her findings were supported by
substantial evidence. Accordingly, the ALJ did not err at step
five.

27

V.

CONCLUSION
For

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

ALJ’s

decision

affirmed. An accompanying order will be entered.

January 31, 2019
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

28

will

be