BOATWRIGHT v. LEU
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 10/17/2017. (rtm, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
RONALD IAN BOATWRIGHT,
WARDEN D. LEU,
Civ. No. 17-4220 (RMB)
BUMB, United States District Judge
On June 12, 2017, Petitioner, a prisoner confined in FCI
Fairton, in Fairton, New Jersey, filed a Petition for Writ of
Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Pet., ECF No. 1;
Mem. of Law in Supp. of Pet. (“Petr’s Mem.”), ECF No. 1-2.)
Petitioner asserts that jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. §
2241 because 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective to
test the legality of his detention.
(Petr’s Mem., ECF No. 1-2
Petitioner relies on Mathis v. United States, 136
S.Ct. 2243 (2016)1 and Holt v. United States, 843 F.3d 720 (7th
In Mathis, the Supreme Court held that a state
qualify as an ACCA predicate if its elements are
those of a listed generic offense, and there is no
cases where the defendant is convicted under a
Cir. 2016)2, concluding that his prior convictions do not qualify
him as a career offender under the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), and
that he should be resentenced.
(Id. at 2.)
Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254
Cases in the United States District Courts, applicable to § 2241
under Rule 1, the scope of the rules, a district judge must
promptly examine a petition, and “[i]f it plainly appears from
the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is
not entitled to relief in the district court, the judge must
For the reasons discussed below, the Court lacks
jurisdiction under § 2241.
On July 16, 2012, Petitioner entered a guilty plea, in the
United States District Court, Middle District of Pennsylvania,
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846.
(Petr’s Mem., ECF No. 1-2 at 2-
He was sentenced to a 110-month term of imprisonment, a
lists multiple, alternative means of satisfying one or more of
In Holt v. United States, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
retroactively on collateral review under § 2255.
843 F.3d at
However, because the Supreme Court has not held that
Mathis is retroactive to cases on collateral review, the Seventh
Circuit held that a second or successive collateral attack under
§ 2255(h)(2) is not permissible.
Id. at 722.
Circuit did not consider whether Holt could pursue his claim
under § 2241 in the district of confinement. Id. at 724.
three-year term of supervised release, and a fine.
(Id. at 3.)
offense level was 28, and he was considered a career offender
because he was at least 18 years old at the time of the instant
offense, his instant offense was a felony controlled substance
(Id. at 6.)
As a career offender, his adjusted offense level was 32,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b)(3).
Petitioner received a two-level reduction for acceptance
(Petr’s Mem., ECF No. 1-2
Category IV criminal history category, but as a career offender,
he was bumped up to Category VI.
This resulted in a
custody range of 168 to 210 months, and the plea agreement was
for a sentence between 100 to 120 months imprisonment.
Petitioner objected to the PSR, but he did not file a direct
appeal of the sentence, nor did he file a motion to vacate, set
aside or correct sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
(Id. at 6-7);
U.S. v. Boatwright, 11cr252-WWC-1, (M.D. Pa).3
Before the Court can reach the issue of whether Petitioner
is a career offender under the framework of the Mathis decision,
the Court must determine whether § 2241 is the proper vehicle
for Petitioner’s challenge.
“[A] federal prisoner's first (and
most often only) route for collateral review of his conviction
or sentence is under § 2255.”
Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP,
No. 14-4284, 2017 WL 3597705, at *4 (3d Cir. Aug. 22, 2017).
Congress, however, provided a saving clause in § 2255(e):
federal prisoner may resort to § 2241 only if he can establish
Here, Petitioner has never filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §
period to file such a motion, the limitation period does not
begin to run until the latest of certain events, one of which is
“the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized
by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by
the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3).
See PACER case locator, available at
If indeed the Third Circuit Court of Appeals determines
that the Supreme Court in Mathis recognized a new right and that
it is retroactive on collateral review, Petitioner is not barred
by the statute of limitations from bringing his claim under §
Under those conditions, § 2255 would not be an inadequate
and ineffective remedy to bring a Mathis claim.
But even if
under the statute of limitations, § 2255 is not inadequate and
gatekeeping requirements of § 2255.
See Cradle v. Miner, 290
F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Section 2255 is not inadequate or
exception, permitting jurisdiction under § 2241 where § 2255 is
inadequate or ineffective to bring a claim that the conduct for
See Sorrell v. Bledsoe, 437 F. App’x 94, 96 (3d
For these reasons, this Court lacks jurisdiction over the §
2241 petition because § 2255 is not an inadequate or ineffective
remedy for Petitioner’s claim.
Petitioner is not precluded from
bringing this claim in a § 2255 motion in his sentencing court.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: October 17, 2017
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
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