MERCADO v. COMMISSIONER
Filing
15
OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 11/7/2018. (rtm, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
ALBERTO MERCADO,
HONORABLE JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 17-4250 (JHR)
v.
COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
OPINION
Defendant.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this action, Plaintiff Alberto Mercado (hereinafter,
“Plaintiff”) seeks review of the Commissioner of the Social
Security Administration’s (hereinafter, “Defendant” or “the
Commissioner”) denial of his application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income
(“SSI”) under Title II and Title XVI of the Social Security Act
(“SSA”), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
On September 15, 2015, Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
Karen Shelton issued a 14-page opinion finding that Plaintiff
was not disabled. The ALJ arrived at this decision after taking
testimony from a vocational expert. She found that an individual
with Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) could still perform a significant
number of jobs existing in the national economy.
Plaintiff does not dispute the ALJ’s interpretation of the
medical record, nor does he dispute the ALJ’s residual
functional capacity determination. Rather, Plaintiff argues in
this appeal that even though the ALJ attributed great weight to the
opinions of state agency physicians that Plaintiff was limited to
“sedentary” work, the ALJ used the term “light” work in her RFC
finding. Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ incorrectly applied the
agency’s rules when a claimant’s RFC falls between two exertional
levels. For the reasons explained below, the Court will affirm
the ALJ’s decision denying Plaintiff’s application for Social
Security benefits.
II.
STEPS FOR DETERMINIG DISABILITY
To be eligible for disability insurance benefits, a
claimant must have a “medically determinable physical or mental
impairment” that prevents him from engaging in any “substantial
gainful activity” for a continuous twelve-month period. 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d
Cir. 1999). A claimant lacks the ability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity “only if his physical or mental
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his
age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of
substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.”
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B); Plummer, 186 F.3d at 427-28.
2
The Commissioner reviews disability claims in accordance
with a five-step process set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. In
step one, the Commissioner must determine whether the claimant
is currently engaged in “substantial gainful activity.” 20
C.F.R. § 1520(b). If the answer is yes, the disability claim
will be denied. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987).
In step two, the Commissioner must determine whether the
claimant is suffering from a “severe impairment,” defined as an
impairment “which significantly limits [the claimant’s] physical
or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. §
1520(c). A claimant who cannot claim a “severe” impairment is
ineligible for benefits. Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428.
Step three requires the Commissioner to compare the medical
evidence of the claimant’s impairment to a list of impairments
presumed severe enough to preclude any gainful activity. 20
C.F.R. § 1520(d). If a claimant suffers from a listed impairment
or its equivalent, she is approved for disability benefits and
the analysis stops. If she does not suffer from a listed
impairment or its equivalent, the analysis proceeds to steps
four and five to determine whether the she retains the ability
to engage in substantial gainful activity. Plummer, 186 F.3d at
428.
The Commissioner conducts a residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) assessment at steps four and five. The RFC assessment
3
considers all of the claimant’s medically determinable
impairments and determines the most the claimant can still do
despite his limitations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1)-(2). The RFC
is expressed in terms of physical exertional levels of
sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work. 20 C.F.R. §
416.967 (2002). Based on the claimant’s RFC, the Commissioner
determines, at step four, whether the claimant can perform the
physical exertion requirements of his past relevant work. 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(f). If he is unable to resume his former
occupation, the Commissioner will then proceed to the final step
and decide whether the claimant is capable of performing other
work existing in significant numbers in the national economy,
taking into account her RFC and vocational factors such as age,
education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(g),
404.1560(c).
In the final step, relevant to this case, the ALJ relies on
the Medical-Vocational Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “Grids”) set
forth in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 2, which
establish the types and number of jobs that exist in the
national economy for claimants with certain exertional
impairments. The Guidelines “consist of a matrix of four factors
– physical ability, age, education, and work experience – and
set forth rules that identify whether jobs requiring specific
combinations of these factors exist in significant numbers in
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the national economy.” Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 273 (3d
Cir. 2000).
When a claimant’s combination of factors correspond with
the same combination of factors in the Grid, the Grid will
direct a conclusion as to disability, which the ALJ must follow.
Id.; see also Hall v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 218 F. App’x 212, 216
(3d Cir. 2007) (“When the four factors in a claimant’s case
correspond exactly with the four factors set forth in the grids,
the ALJ must reach the result the grids reach.”) (emphasis in
original). However, where a claimant’s specific profile is not
listed in the Grid, such as when the claimant has certain
limitations to their exertional capacity and can perform
something in between two exertional ranges of work, the Grid
does not mandate a specific finding, and may only be used as a
framework to guide the disability decision. See 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 200.00(d). In such cases, the ALJ must
support his determination by relying on vocational testimony or
similar evidence to decide whether a significant number of jobs
exist for a particular claimant given his specific background
and exertional limitations. See Sykes, 228 F.3d at 264; Hall,
218 F. App’x at 217. If, after considering all the evidence, the
answer is no, a finding of “disabled” is required. However, if
the Commissioner determines that jobs exist in significant
numbers in the national economy for a particular claimant, the
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Commissioner will find the claimant “not disabled.” See Sykes,
228 F.3d at 273.
III. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI benefits on
July 2, 2012, asserting disability since December 1, 2011. (Tr.
235-48.) Having been born in May of 1964, (Tr. 53), Plaintiff
was 47 years old when he allegedly became disabled, a “younger
person” under the Commissioner’s regulations, but became a
person “closely approaching advanced age” by the date of the
ALJ’s decision, (Tr. 39, 119.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c),
(d), 416.963(c), (d). He has a ninth-grade education, which the
ALJ classified as “limited” (Tr. 38, 58.) Due to his
impairments, Plaintiff cannot perform his semi-skilled past,
relevant work (“PRW”) (Tr. 37.) He had no skill transferability
from his past jobs (Tr. 106.)
Plaintiff suffers, in pertinent part, from the following
“severe” impairments, as found by the ALJ: asthma, obstructive
sleep apnea, degenerative disc disease, obesity, and depressive
disorder (Tr. 28.) Based on a review of Plaintiff’s medical
history in connection with his initial application, two State
Agency physicians opined as to Plaintiff’s physical
capabilities. In March 2013, Martin Sheehy, M.D., opined, in
pertinent part, that Plaintiff could lift ten pounds frequently,
twenty pounds occasionally, stand/walk for up to four hours and
6
sit for six hours in an eight-hour work day (Tr. 125.) He
further opined that Plaintiff had the maximum sustained work
capability for sedentary work (Tr. 127.) Similarly, Jose Acuna,
M.D., opined in August of 2013 that Plaintiff had the same
limitations (Tr. 150.) He also characterized this functional
capacity to be at the sedentary exertional level. (Tr. 153.)
After his claims were denied at the administrative levels,
(Tr. 119-76), Plaintiff and a vocational expert (VE) appeared
and testified before an ALJ at a hearing on July 27, 2015. (Tr.
45-114.) At the administrative hearing, Plaintiff’s counsel
stated that she had no objections to the VE’s ability to testify
based on her qualifications (Tr. 101.) The ALJ asked the VE to
assume a person of Plaintiff’s age, education, and work
experience, who could lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally
and ten pounds frequently, stand/walk four hours, and sit six
hours, and would require the option to change positions in an
eight-hour workday (Tr. 107.) The VE testified that such a
person could not perform Plaintiff’s past relevant work, but
that there were three limited light jobs in the national economy
that Plaintiff could perform – accessories assembler, laundry
worker, and weigher. (Tr. 107-08.) The VE testified that her
testimony was consistent with the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles, except for her opinion regarding the option to change
7
positions, which was based on her education and experience
observing the jobs and placing people in the jobs. (Tr. 108-09.)
On September 15, 2015, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. (Tr. 26-39.)
The ALJ evaluated Plaintiff’s case under the five-step
sequential evaluation process set forth in the regulations. (Tr.
18-29.) See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ considered,
in sequence, whether Plaintiff: (1) was working, (2) had a
severe impairment, (3) had an impairment that meets or medically
equals the severity of a listed impairment, (4) could return to
his past relevant work, and (5) if not, whether he could perform
other work in the national economy. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520,
416.920.
The ALJ found that in an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff
could lift and carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds
frequently, stand/walk four hours, and sit six hours, and would
require the option to change positions; she further limited
Plaintiff to performing simple instructions and simple work
decisions. (Tr. 31-32.) Accordingly, in reaching her conclusion,
the ALJ gave the State Agency physicians’ opinions limiting him
to a “sedentary” exertional capacity “great weight.” (Tr. 36.)
However, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff retained the RFC to
perform a limited range of “light” work. (Tr. 31.) The ALJ also
characterized this RFC as being “between exertional range[s].”
8
(Tr. 106.) At step four, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could
not perform his past relevant work. (Tr. 37.) At step five,
after considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience,
and RFC, and relying on the VE’s impartial testimony, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff could perform three light unskilled
jobs in the national economy and was, thus, not disabled. (Tr.
38-39, 106-08.) See Dictionary of Occupational Titles, (Dep’t.
of Labor, 4th ed., 1991) ## 222.387-074, 729.687-010, 302.685010.
Plaintiff sought review from the Appeals Council, which
denied Plaintiff’s request for review without substantive
analysis. (Tr. 2-7.) Having exhausted his administrative
remedies, Plaintiff brought this civil action under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) and as incorporated by 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3). Plaintiff
presents three issues in this appeal, which he characterizes as:
(1) Whether the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) committed
reversible legal error when she attributed great weight to
the State Agency’s physicians’ opinions that Plaintiff was
limited to sedentary work, but mistakenly characterized
their RFC assessments as “light” and relied on this mistake
for her own RFC and dispositive finding that he could
perform light work, despite his significant standing and
walking limitations.
(2) Whether the ALJ erred when she admitted that
Plaintiff’s RFC fell between two exertional rules, yet
failed to explain why she relied on the light medicalvocational rules rather than the sedentary one, in
violation of binding agency policy, particularly since
Plaintiff is deemed disabled as of age 50 if he is limited
to sedentary work.
9
(3) Whether the ALJ further erred when she failed to
consider the erosion of the occupational base before
adducing vocational expert (VE) testimony in further
violation of Agency policy. At a minimum, because
Plaintiff’s RFC fell between two exertional levels the ALJ
had a duty under Agency policy to discuss and address such
erosion of the light occupational base and, in failing to
do so, did not meet the Agency’s burden at Step 5 of the
sequential evaluation process.
IV.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court has jurisdiction to review the final decision
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). When reviewing the denial of
disability benefits, the Court must determine whether
substantial evidence supports the denial. See Brown v. Bowen,
845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988); Johnson v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., 529 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008). The requirement of
substantial evidence, however, constitutes a deferential
standard of review, see Jones v. Barnhart, 364 F.3d 501, 503 (3d
Cir. 2004), and does not require “a large or [even] considerable
amount of evidence.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 564
(1988). Rather, substantial evidence requires “more than a mere
scintilla[,]” Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir.
1999), but generally less than a preponderance. See Jones, 364
F.3d at 503. Consequently, substantial evidence supports the
Commissioner’s determination where a “reasonable mind might
accept the relevant evidence as adequate” to support the
conclusion reached by the Commissioner. Monsour Med. Ctr. v.
10
Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185, 1190 (3d Cir. 1986); Hartranft v. Apfel,
181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999).
In order to facilitate this Court’s review, the ALJ must
set out a specific factual basis for each finding. See Baerga v.
Richardson, 500 F.2d 309 (3d Cir. 1974). Additionally, the ALJ
“must adequately explain in the record [the] reasons for
rejecting or discrediting competent evidence,” Ogden v. Bowen,
677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (citing Brewster v.
Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1986)), and must review all
pertinent medical and nonmedical evidence “and explain his
conciliations and rejections.” Burnett v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.
Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000).
However, the ALJ need
not discuss “every tidbit of evidence included in the record.”
Hur v. Barnhart, 94 F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004). Rather,
the ALJ must set forth sufficient findings to satisfy the
reviewing court that the ALJ arrived at a decision through
application of the proper legal standards, and upon a complete
review of the relevant factual record. See Friedberg v.
Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983).
V. THE ALJ DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DISABLED
There is no dispute that, because of his age, limited
education, and unskilled work experience, Plaintiff is disabled
if he has the physical ability to do only sedentary work. See 20
C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 2, § 201.00(g) (“Individuals
11
approaching advanced age (age 50–54) may be significantly
limited in vocational adaptability if they are restricted to
sedentary work. When such individuals . . . can no longer
perform vocationally relevant past work and have no transferable
skills, a finding of disabled ordinarily obtains.”). Nor is
there a dispute that Plaintiff is not disabled if he can perform
the full range of light work. See id. § 202.00.
Plaintiff argues, however, that his RFC fell in between the
categories for light and sedentary work and that the ALJ was
wrong not to classify Plaintiff at the lower rule for sedentary
occupations. Plaintiff argues first that the ALJ committed
reversible legal error when she attributed great weight to the
State Agency’s physicians’ opinions that Plaintiff was limited
to “sedentary” work, but mistakenly characterized their RFC
assessments as “light” and relied on this mistake for her own
RFC and dispositive finding that he could perform light work,
despite his significant standing and walking limitations.
Although the state agency RFC findings used the word
“sedentary,” the specific findings indicated the same capacity
for the limited range of light work that the ALJ found. (Tr. 31,
135, 137, 164-65, 167.)
According to the Social Security Administration, the
physical exertion requirements of light work
12
involve[] lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with
frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to
10 pounds. . . . [A] job is in this category when it
requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it
involves sitting most of the time with some pushing and
pulling of arm or leg controls.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). Social Security Rule (“SSR”) 1 83-10
further explains that the full range of light work “requires
standing or walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6
hours of an 8-hour workday.” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6;
see also Jesurum v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 48
F.3d 114, 119 (3d Cir. 1995). In contrast, the lower category of
sedentary work is defined as
[L]ifting no more than 10 pounds at a time and
occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket
files, ledgers, and small tools. Although a sedentary
job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain
amount of walking and standing is often necessary in
carrying out job duties. Jobs are sedentary if walking
and standing are required occasionally and other
sedentary criteria are met.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(a).
The ALJ’s RFC lifting and carrying, standing/walking, and
sitting limitations were the same as those of the State Agency’s
physicians: in an eight-hour workday, Plaintiff could lift and
carry twenty pounds occasionally and ten pounds frequently,
stand/walk four hours, and sit six hours, and would require the
1
Social Security Rulings are binding on “all components of the
Social Security Administration.” See 20 C.F.R. § 402.35(b)(1).
13
option to change positions; the ALJ further limited Plaintiff to
performing simple instructions and simple work decisions. (Tr.
31-32, 135, 164-65.) This is closer to what is required to
perform light work, rather than sedentary work. See, e.g.,
Elliot v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 295 Fed. App’x 507, 508 (3d Cir.
2008) (affirming ALJ’s finding that claimant had the RFC to
perform light work with modifications even though claimant was
limited to walking and standing for two hours our of an eighthour workday).
Next, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when she admitted
that Plaintiff’s RFC fell between two exertional rules, yet
failed to explain why she relied on the light medical-vocational
rules rather than the sedentary one, particularly since
Plaintiff is deemed disabled as of age 50 if he is limited to
sedentary work. SSR 83-12 provides guidance for situations where
a claimant’s exertional capacity falls in between two
categories, such as when a claimant can perform less than the
full range of light work but more than the full range of
sedentary work. See SSR 83-12, Pertinent History, 1983 WL 31253,
at *1 (explaining that SSR 83-12 provides guidance in instances
when “an individual’s exertional RFC does not coincide with the
exertional criteria of any one of the exertional ranges, i.e.,
sedentary, light, and medium,” for example when “an individual
14
can do a little more or less than the exertion specified for a
particular range of work.”).
In particular, SSR 83-12(2) provides specific guidance for
when a claimant’s exertional level “falls between two [Grid]
rules which direct opposite conclusions” as to disability, as is
the case here. SSR 83-12(2), 1983 WL 31253, at *2. For an
individual of Plaintiff’s work, age, and education, the Grids
direct a finding of “disabled” at the sedentary exertional
level, and direct a finding of “not disabled” at the light
exertional level. See 202 C.F.R. Pt. 404 Subpt. P, App. 2,
§§ 201.12-13. According to SSR 83-12(2), an exertional capacity
“that is only slightly reduced in terms of the regulatory
criteria could indicate a sufficient remaining occupational base
to satisfy the minimal requirements for a finding of ‘Not
disabled.’” However, “if the exertional capacity is
significantly reduced . . ., it could indicate little more than
the occupational base for the lower rule and could justify a
finding of ‘Disabled.’” SSR 83-12(2) (emphasis added), 1983 WL
31253, at *2. See also Young v. Astrue, 519 F. App’x 769, 771 (3d
Cir. 2013) (upholding ALJ’s conclusion that claimant who was
limited to no more than two hours of standing or walking had
capacity to perform a limited range of light work). If the
claimant’s exertional limitations fall “somewhere ‘in the
middle,’” the Commissioner must make “more difficult judgments”
15
as to the sufficiency of the remaining occupational base, and it
is “advisable” to consult a vocational expert. Id. at *3.
This dovetails into Plaintiff’s final argument, that the
ALJ further erred when she failed to consider the erosion of the
occupational base before adducing vocational expert testimony.
SSR 83–12 directs that if the claimant's residual functional
capacity does not coincide with any of the established
categories, the ALJ “will consider the extent of any erosion of
the occupational base and [assess] its significance.” SSR 83-12,
1983 WL 31253, at *2. Under SSR 83-12, when a claimant falls
between two exertional categories, the ALJ may not rely
exclusively on the Guidelines to determine whether the claimant
is capable of performing other work existing in significant
numbers in the national economy. Instead, the ALJ must examine
Plaintiff’s limitations closely, relying on the assistance of a
vocational expert and the guidance articulated in SSR 83-12 to
determine whether those limitations would effectively preclude
him from most jobs in the higher exertional category. To support
a finding of not disabled, there must be evidence that “other
work exists in significant numbers in the national economy that
[the claimant] can do, given [the claimant’s] residual
functional capacity and vocational factors.” 20 C.F.R. §
404.1560(c)(2).
16
“Work exists in the national economy when there is a
significant number of jobs (in one or more occupations) having
requirements which you are able to meet with your physical or
mental abilities and vocational qualifications.” 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.966(b). The Third Circuit has emphasized that “[t]he
regulations specifically require a finding of a significant
number of jobs, and do not require the existence of multiple
occupations.” Henderson, 87 Fed. App’x at 253 (emphasis in
original). “It does not matter whether . . . [w]ork exists in
the immediate area in which you live” or that “[a] specific job
vacancy exists for you.” Rather, “work exists in the national
economy when it exists in significant numbers either in the
region where you live or in several other regions of the
country.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(a); see also Dickerson v. Colvin,
No. 12-5585, 2014 WL 562981, at *10 (D.N.J. Feb. 11, 2014)
(“‘There is no requirement that there are potential jobs
available in the immediate area where plaintiff lives, as long
as there are jobs available nationally and are not all
concentrated in one region.’” (quoting Wafford v. Comm’r of Soc.
Sec., No. 09-805, 2010 WL 5421303, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 19,
2010))). In other words, a claimant is not disabled if he is
capable of performing only one occupation, and there are a
“significant number” of jobs within that occupation in the
national economy. See Colon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2004 WL
17
1144059, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2004) (“The availability of
only one sedentary occupation . . . although an indicium that
[claimant’]s full range was significantly eroded, did not
mandate a finding that she was disabled,” and such a finding
“would be in contravention of clear statutory language requiring
that a claimant be unable to engage in any kind of gainful
employment, available nationally or regionally.”).
The Court finds no error was committed by the ALJ in
concluding, based on the VE’s testimony, that Plaintiff was not
disabled because the range of jobs he could perform was not
significantly diminished. Because the ALJ concluded that
Plaintiff fell somewhere “in the middle” of two exertional
categories, the ALJ correctly sought testimony from a VE to
determine how Plaintiff’s impairments impact the occupational
base. See SSR 83-12(2)(c); Martin v. Barnhart, 240 Fed. App’x
941, 945 (3d Cir. 2007) (“[I]n the more difficult situation,
where a claimant's impairments are ‘somewhere in the middle,’
testimony of a VE is recommended.”). The ALJ also followed SSR
83-12 and Program Operations Manual System (“POMS”) DI
25025.015D: she procured the live testimony of the VE to assist
her, asked what jobs would be compatible with the specific
limitations she assessed, and explained her ruling in the
decision. (Tr. 38-39, 107-09.)
18
In her decision, the ALJ explained that if a claimant can
perform all or substantially all of the exertional demands at a
particular level of exertion, the grids direct a conclusion of
disabled or not disabled. (Tr. 38.) To determine the extent to
which the additional limitations eroded the light occupational
base, the ALJ explained in her decision that she asked the VE
about the jobs existing in the national economy for an
individual with Plaintiff’s limitations. (Tr. 38.) As the ALJ
noted, the VE identified accessories assembler, laundry worker,
and weigher in response. (Tr. 38, 108.) The ALJ also identified
the VE’s opinion regarding the option to shift positions, which
was based on the VE’s education and professional experience.
(Tr. 38-39, 108-09.) The ALJ concluded that, based on the VE’s
testimony, a finding of “not disabled” was appropriate under the
grids. (Tr. 39.) She did not err in finding Plaintiff not disabled
in reliance on the expert’s input.
VI.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court finds that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s decision to deny Plaintiff benefits,
and that the decision should be affirmed.
An accompanying Order
will be entered.
November 7, 2018
Date
/s/ Joseph H. Rodriguez
JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ
U.S.D.J.
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