ROSE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
14
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 11/26/2018. (tf, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
WILLIAM J. ROSE,
1:17-cv-04603-NLH
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
RICHARD LOWELL FRANKEL
BROSS & FRANKEL, PA
725 KENILWORTH AVE
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08002
On behalf of Plaintiff
EVELYN ROSE MARIE PROTANO
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
300 SPRING GARDEN STREET, 6TH FLOOR
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19123
On behalf of Defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), regarding Plaintiff’s application for Disability
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) 1 under Title II of the Social Security
1
DIB is a program under the Social Security Act to provide
disability benefits when a claimant with a sufficient number of
quarters of insured employment has suffered such a mental or
physical impairment that the claimant cannot perform substantial
gainful employment for at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423
Act.
42 U.S.C. § 423, et seq.
The issue before the Court is
whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding
that there was “substantial evidence” that Plaintiff was not
disabled at any time since his alleged onset date of disability,
May 17, 2013.
For the reasons stated below, this Court will
reverse that decision and remand the matter for further
proceedings.
I.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On July 30, 2013, Plaintiff, William J. Rose, protectively
filed an application for DIB, 2 alleging that he became disabled
on May 17, 2013.
Plaintiff claims that he can no longer work at
his previous job as a truck driver because of his monocular
vision due to diabetic retinopathy, diabetes mellitus type 2,
degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, degenerative
joint disease of the knees, and spondylosis (degeneration of the
spine).
Plaintiff’s initial claim was denied on October 22, 2013,
et seq.
2
A protective filing date marks the time when a disability
applicant made a written statement of his or her intent to file
for benefits. That date may be earlier than the date of the
formal application and may provide additional benefits to the
claimant. See SSA Handbook 1507; SSR 72-8.
2
and upon reconsideration on February 20, 2014.
Plaintiff
requested a hearing before an ALJ, which was held on August 15,
2016.
On September 16, 2016, the ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision.
Plaintiff’s Request for Review of Hearing Decision
was denied by the Appeals Council on April 19, 2017, making the
ALJ’s September 16, 2016 decision final.
Plaintiff brings this
civil action for review of the Commissioner’s decision.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress provided for judicial
review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny a complainant’s
application for social security benefits.
55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995).
Ventura v. Shalala,
A reviewing court must uphold
the Commissioner’s factual decisions where they are supported by
“substantial evidence.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3);
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001); Sykes v.
Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000); Williams v. Sullivan,
970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992).
more than “a mere scintilla.”
Substantial evidence means
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. V. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
It means “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
3
conclusion.”
Id.
The inquiry is not whether the reviewing
court would have made the same determination, but whether the
Commissioner’s conclusion was reasonable.
See Brown v. Bowen,
845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
A reviewing court has a duty to review the evidence in its
totality.
1984).
See Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir.
“[A] court must ‘take into account whatever in the
record fairly detracts from its weight.’” Schonewolf v.
Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Willbanks
v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. V. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (1951)).
The Commissioner “must adequately explain in the record his
reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence.”
Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (citing
Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1986)).
The Third
Circuit has held that an “ALJ must review all pertinent medical
evidence and explain his conciliations and rejections.”
Burnett
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000).
Similarly, an ALJ must also consider and weigh all of the nonmedical evidence before him.
Id. (citing Van Horn v. Schweiker,
717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983)); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d
4
700, 707 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Third Circuit has held that access to the
Commissioner’s reasoning is indeed essential to a meaningful
court review:
Unless the [Commissioner] has analyzed all
evidence and has sufficiently explained the
weight he has given to obviously probative
exhibits, to say that his decision is
supported by substantial evidence approaches
an abdication of the court’s duty to
scrutinize the record as a whole to
determine whether the conclusions reached
are rational.
Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978).
Although
an ALJ, as the fact finder, must consider and evaluate the
medical evidence presented, Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42, “[t]here
is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every
tidbit of evidence included in the record,” Hur v. Barnhart, 94
F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004).
In terms of judicial review,
a district court is not “empowered to weigh the evidence or
substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.”
Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182.
However, apart from the substantial
evidence inquiry, a reviewing court is entitled to satisfy
itself that the Commissioner arrived at his decision by
application of the proper legal standards.
Sykes, 228 F.3d at
262; Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983);
5
Curtin v. Harris, 508 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D.N.J. 1981).
B.
Standard for DIB
The Social Security Act defines “disability” for purposes
of an entitlement to a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits as the inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.
1382c(a)(3)(A).
See 42 U.S.C. §
Under this definition, a Plaintiff qualifies as
disabled only if his physical or mental impairments are of such
severity that he is not only unable to perform his past relevant
work, but cannot, given his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other type of substantial gainful work which
exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work
exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a
specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be
hired if he applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B)
(emphasis added).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations 3 for
3
The regulations were amended for various provisions effective
March 27, 2017. See 82 F.R. 5844. Because the ALJ issued his
decision prior to that effective date, the Court must employ the
6
determining disability that require application of a five-step
sequential analysis.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
This five-step
process is summarized as follows:
1.
If the claimant currently is engaged in substantial
gainful employment, he will be found “not disabled.”
2.
If the claimant does not suffer from a “severe
impairment,” he will be found “not disabled.”
3.
If the severe impairment meets or equals a listed
impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1 and has lasted or is expected to last for a
continuous period of at least twelve months, the
claimant will be found “disabled.”
4.
If the claimant can still perform work he has done in
the past (“past relevant work”) despite the severe
impairment, he will be found “not disabled.”
5.
Finally, the Commissioner will consider the claimant’s
ability to perform work (“residual functional
capacity”), age, education, and past work experience
to determine whether or not he is capable of
performing other work which exists in the national
economy. If he is incapable, he will be found
“disabled.” If he is capable, he will be found “not
disabled.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f).
Entitlement to benefits is
therefore dependent upon a finding that the claimant is
incapable of performing work in the national economy.
This five-step process involves a shifting burden of proof.
See Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d
standards in effect at the time of his decision.
7
1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983).
In the first four steps of the
analysis, the burden is on the claimant to prove every element
of his claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
See id.
In
the final step, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving
that work is available for the Plaintiff: “Once a claimant has
proved that he is unable to perform his former job, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is some other
kind of substantial gainful employment he is able to perform.”
Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987); see Olsen v.
Schweiker, 703 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir. 1983).
C.
Analysis
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged
in substantial gainful activity since the alleged onset of
disability.
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s
impairments of monocular vision due to diabetic retinopathy and
diabetes mellitus type 2 were severe.
At step three, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff’s severe impairments or his severe
impairments in combination with his other impairments did not
equal the severity of one of the listed impairments.
The ALJ
then determined that Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity
(“RFC”) precluded him from performing his past work as a truck
driver, but his RFC rendered him capable of performing work at
8
all exertional and skill levels, 4 with the only limitation of
avoidance of concentrated exposures to hazards, such as moving
machinery and unprotected heights (steps four and five).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in his decision because
he did not properly consider his “severe” impairments in
combination with his other “not severe” exertional and nonexertional impairments when making the RFC determination.
Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to properly assess
Plaintiff’s limitations due to his increasing and irreversible
vision loss as a stand-alone basis for disability, or in
combination with his other impairments in the RFC analysis.
A claimant’s RFC reflects “what [the claimant] can still do
despite [his or her] limitations.”
20 C.F.R. § 416.945(a). 5
In
making a RFC determination, an ALJ is required to do the
following:
In determining whether you are disabled, we consider all
your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your
symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
objective medical evidence and other evidence. By objective
4
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568 (“[O]ccupations are classified as
unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567
(“Physical exertion requirements. To determine the physical
exertion requirements of work in the national economy, we
classify jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very
heavy.”).
5
The RFC finding is a determination expressly reserved to the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(d)(2), 416.946(c).
9
medical evidence, we mean medical signs and laboratory
findings . . . . By other evidence, we mean . . .
statements or reports from you, your treating or nontreating
source, and others about your medical history, diagnosis,
prescribed treatment, daily activities, efforts to work, and
any other evidence showing how your impairment(s) and any
related symptoms affect your ability to work. . . .
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
The ALJ is also required to “consider
limitations and restrictions imposed by all of an individual's
impairments, even those that are not ‘severe.’”
SSR 96-8p.
“While a ‘not severe’ impairment(s) standing alone may not
significantly limit an individual's ability to do basic work
activities, it may--when considered with limitations or
restrictions due to other impairments--be critical to the outcome
of a claim.
For example, in combination with limitations imposed
by an individual's other impairments, the limitations due to such
a ‘not severe’ impairment may prevent an individual from
performing past relevant work or may narrow the range of other
work that the individual may still be able to do.”
Id.
The ALJ's finding of RFC must “‘be accompanied by a clear
and satisfactory explication of the basis on which it rests.’”
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 41 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir. 1981)).
“‘[A]n
examiner’s findings should be as comprehensive and analytical as
feasible and, where appropriate, should include a statement of
10
subordinate factual foundations on which ultimate factual
conclusions are based, so that a reviewing court may know the
basis for the decision.’”
Id. (quoting Cotter, 642 F.2d at 705)
(further explaining that that this “is necessary so that the
court may properly exercise its responsibility under 42 U.S.C. §
405(g) to determine if the Secretary's decision is supported by
substantial evidence”).
The Court finds that the ALJ failed to
meet these standards in this case.
The following is indisputable from the record evidence, and
referenced by the ALJ in his decision:
(1) Plaintiff suffers
from diabetes mellitus with monocular vision (loss of vision in
one eye) as a result of diabetic retinopathy (a disorder of the
retina caused by diabetes); (2) By April 2016, the corrected
visual activity in Plaintiff’s “good” right eye was 20/200, and
the corrected visual activity in his “bad” left eye was “finger
counting at two feet”; (3) Plaintiff has degenerative disc
disease of his lumbar spine; (4) Plaintiff has degenerative
joint disease of his knees; (5) Plaintiff has neuropathy
(permanent nerve damage); (6) Plaintiff uses a medically
prescribed cane; (7) Plaintiff wears a medically prescribed back
brace; (8) Plaintiff relates difficulties with his memory caused
by fluctuating blood sugar; (9) Plaintiff reports significant
11
pain; and (10) Plaintiff was 55 years old at the time of his
alleged onset date, and he was 58 years old at the time the ALJ
issued his decision.
Despite noting all of these impairments and limitations,
including Plaintiff’s advanced age, 6 the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff retained the RFC to perform work at all exertional and
skill levels.
That finding therefore meant that the ALJ
believed Plaintiff was capable of performing “very heavy work,”
which “involves lifting objects weighing more than 100 pounds at
a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing 50
pounds or more.” 7
20 C.F.R. § 404.1567.
It also meant that
Plaintiff could perform “skilled work,” which requires a person
to use judgment, laying out work, estimating quality,
determining the suitability and needed quantities of materials,
making precise measurements, reading blueprints or other
specifications, making necessary computations or mechanical
adjustments to control or regulate the work, or deal with
6
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(e) (“We consider that at advanced age
(age 55 or older), age significantly affects a person's ability
to adjust to other work. We have special rules for persons of
advanced age and for persons in this category who are closely
approaching retirement age (age 60 or older).”).
7
If someone can do very heavy work, that means that he or she
can also do heavy, medium, light and sedentary work. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1567.
12
people, facts, or figures or abstract ideas at a high level of
complexity.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1568.
The only limitation placed
on Plaintiff’s RFC was that Plaintiff needed to avoid
concentrated exposures to hazards, such as moving machinery and
unprotected heights.
The ALJ’s RFC determination would not be disturbed if
substantial evidence supported that finding, but the Court is
unconvinced the evidence cited by the ALJ in his decision
supports the conclusion that Plaintiff is capable of frequently
lifting 100 pounds and making precise measurements or reading
blueprints, among other higher level physical, mental, and
visual activities.
Even accepting that Plaintiff’s only
“severe” ailments are his diabetes and monocular vision, the ALJ
appears to have glossed over the effects of Plaintiff’s nonsevere impairments in combination with his vision loss.
The ALJ
relates that certain medications and physical therapy treatments
have helped with Plaintiff’s back and knee pain, but the record
evidence does not support that those conditions are wholly
without any exertional limitations.
This is especially true
when those impairments are considered in combination with his
low blood sugar-induced memory loss, neuropathy, and advanced
age, all of which the ALJ is required to consider in combination
13
with Plaintiff’s vision impairment when assessing Plaintiff’s
RFC.
Considering Plaintiff’s significant vision loss by itself
also calls into doubt the ALJ’s RFC determination.
The record
contains numerous notes from treating medical providers and nontreating consultant medical sources stating that Plaintiff is
incapable of driving a motor vehicle.
The ALJ’s RFC assessment,
however, fails to acknowledge this obvious limitation in
Plaintiff’s functional capacity.
Moreover, the jobs suggested
by the Vocational Expert based on the ALJ’s RFC determination do
not appear to account for Plaintiff’s vision impairments.
The
VE suggested that the RFC ascribed to Plaintiff by the ALJ
rendered him capable of being a motor vehicle parts assembler, 8
8
CODE: 806.684-010 : ASSEMBLER, MOTOR VEHICLE (auto. mfg.)
alternate titles: quality worker; team member
Assembles motor vehicles, such as automobiles, trucks, buses, or
limousines, at assigned work stations on moving assembly line,
performing any combination of following repetitive tasks
according to specifications and using handtools, power tools,
welding equipment, and production fixtures: Loads stamped metal
body components into automated welding equipment that welds
together components to form body subassemblies. Positions and
fastens together body subassemblies, such as side frames,
underbodies, doors, hoods, and trunk lids, to assemble vehicle
bodies and truck cabs preparatory to body welding process.
Bolts, screws, clips, or otherwise fastens together parts to
form subassemblies, such as doors, seats, instrument control
panels, steering columns, and axle units. Installs mechanical
and electrical components and systems, such as engine,
14
kitchen helper, 9 and cleaner/housekeeping 10.
It is evident from
transmission, and axle units; pumps; wire harnesses; instrument
control panels; and exhaust, brake, and air-conditioning
systems. Fits and adjusts doors, hoods, and trunk lids. Seals
joints and seams, using caulking gun. Fastens seats, door
paneling, headliners, carpeting, molding, and other trim into
position. Fills vehicle systems with brake and transmission
fluids, engine coolant, and oil. May apply precut and adhesive
coated vinyl tops and pads to vehicle roofs. May verify quality
of own work and write description of defects observed on
documents attached to vehicle bodies. May enter and retrieve
production data, using computer terminals. . . . .
9
CODE: 318.687-010: KITCHEN HELPER (hotel & rest.) alternate
titles: cookee; cook helper; kitchen hand;
kitchen porter; kitchen runner
Performs any combination of following duties to maintain kitchen
work areas and restaurant equipment and utensils in clean and
orderly condition: Sweeps and mops floors. Washes worktables,
walls, refrigerators, and meat blocks. Segregates and removes
trash and garbage and places it in designated containers. Steamcleans or hoses-out garbage cans. Sorts bottles, and breaks
disposable ones in bottle-crushing machine. Washes pots, pans,
and trays by hand. Scrapes food from dirty dishes and washes
them by hand or places them in racks or on conveyor to
dishwashing machine. Polishes silver, using burnishing-machine
tumbler, chemical dip, buffing wheel, and hand cloth. Holds
inverted glasses over revolving brushes to clean inside
surfaces. Transfers supplies and equipment between storage and
work areas by hand or by use of handtruck. Sets up banquet
tables. Washes and peels vegetables, using knife or peeling
machine. Loads or unloads trucks picking up or delivering
supplies and food.
10
CODE: 323.687-014: CLEANER, HOUSEKEEPING (any industry)
alternate titles: maid
Cleans rooms and halls in commercial establishments, such as
hotels, restaurants, clubs, beauty parlors, and dormitories,
performing any combination of following duties: Sorts, counts,
folds, marks, or carries linens. Makes beds. Replenishes
15
even the most cursory review of the job descriptions that
Plaintiff would be incapable of preforming the required tasks of
these jobs due to his vision impairments.
In sum, on this
record, the ALJ’s Step 4 RFC determination of ability at all
exertional levels is not supported by substantial evidence and
led directly to the Step 5 error of relying on jobs Plaintiff is
clearly incapable of performing.
See Kangas, 823 F.2d at 777
(at Step 5 burden shifts to the Commissioner to prove there is
some other kind of substantial gainful employment claimant is
able to perform).
Additionally, under Social Security Administration
Regulations, a claimant may qualify for disability benefits for
blindness if his vision cannot be corrected to better than
20/200 in the better eye, or if his visual field is 20 degrees
or less in the better eye, for a period that lasted or is
expected to last at least 12 months.
Even if a claimant’s
vision does not meet the SSA’s definition of blindness, a
supplies, such as drinking glasses and writing supplies. Checks
wraps and renders personal assistance to patrons. Moves
furniture, hangs drapes, and rolls carpets. Performs other
duties as described under CLEANER (any industry) I Master Title.
May be designated according to type of establishment cleaned as
Beauty Parlor Cleaner (personal ser.); Motel Cleaner (hotel &
rest.); or according to area cleaned as Sleeping Room Cleaner
(hotel & rest.).
16
claimant may still qualify for disability benefits if his vision
problems alone, or combined with other health problems, prevent
him from working.
Additionally, the SSA Regulations are more
generous for claimants aged 55 or older who have vision
impairments.
See Social Security Administration Publication No.
05-10052, “If You’re Blind Or Have Low Vision — How We Can Help”
(January 2018); see also SSR 18-02p (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1381a
(“every aged, blind, or disabled individual who is determined .
. . to be eligible on the basis of his income and resources
shall, in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this
title, be paid benefits by the Commissioner of Social
Security”); 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a) (defining an eligible
individual); 20 C.F.R. § 416.912 (providing that, in general, a
claimant must prove to us that he or she is blind), § 416.981
(defining blindness), § 416.982 (explaining when we will
consider an individual to be blind based on a State plan)).
These considerations all seem to apply to this claimant.
It appears to the Court that underlying the ALJ’s ultimate
conclusion that Plaintiff is not disabled is how Plaintiff’s
diet contributed to the exacerbation of his diabetes.
The ALJ
repeatedly references medical records that advise Plaintiff to
improve his diet to better regulate his blood sugar levels.
17
Putting aside the evidence which shows that Plaintiff’s limited
finances affected his ability to eat the best foods for his
condition, as well as his efforts to comply with the physicians’
advice to eat healthier foods, 11 Plaintiff’s difficulty in
following a treatment plan is not a basis for the denial of
benefits, particularly when perfect compliance with his doctor’s
orders would not restore Plaintiff’s vision or nerve damage.
While diet and type 2 diabetes are clearly related, an element
of causation is missing here.
See SSR 82-59 (explaining that a
claimant’s failure to follow a treatment plan prescribed by a
treating source may be the basis for a denial of benefits only
if, inter alia, the treatment “is clearly expected to restore
capacity to engage in any SGA,” or the “record discloses that
there has been refusal to follow prescribed treatment”).
Moreover, contrary to the ALJ’s perception of Plaintiff’s
11
The Social Security Regulations instruct that “the if the
individual fails to follow prescribed treatment that might
improve symptoms, we may find the alleged intensity and
persistence of an individual's symptoms are inconsistent with
the overall evidence of record. We will not find an
individual's symptoms inconsistent with the evidence in the
record on this basis without considering possible reasons he or
she may not comply with treatment or seek treatment consistent
with the degree of his or her complaints. . . . When we consider
the individual's treatment history, we may consider (but are not
limited to) one or more of the following: . . . An individual
may not be able to afford treatment and may not have access to
free or low-cost medical services.” SSR 16-3p.
18
non-compliance with his physicians’ orders, the record shows
that Plaintiff regularly visited medical professionals to treat
and manage his diabetes and diabetes-related impairments, as
well as his pain and limitations due to back and knee problems.
Plaintiff attended physical therapy as directed and continued
exercises at home.
He also endeavored to eat healthier, despite
his difficulties in affording the best food options.
Nevertheless, Plaintiff’s vision further deteriorated, and the
effects of Plaintiff’s degenerative disc and joint diseases, as
well as the other impairments related to his diabetes, continued
to decline.
Overall, it is clear that substantial evidence does not
support the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff has the RFC to
perform work at all exertional and skill levels.
When an ALJ
has failed to apply the correct legal standards and his
conclusions are not supported by substantial evidence, the Court
must decide whether to remand the case for rehearing or to
reverse and order an award of benefits.
Melkonyan v. Sullivan,
501 U.S. 89, 99 (1991) (providing that under Sentence Four of 42
U.S.C. § 405(g), a court has authority to affirm, modify, or
reverse the Commissioner's decision “with or without remanding
the cause for rehearing”).
19
The ALJ’s current RFC determination is not supported by the
record evidence, but the SSA is in a better position than this
Court to determine Plaintiff’s proper RFC and thereafter
undertake a renewed Step 5 analysis.
The Court will therefore
reverse the ALJ’s decision and remand the matter so that the SSA
may properly consider Plaintiff’s vision impairments, singularly
and in combination with his other impairments, in determining
Plaintiff’s disability claim.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, the ALJ's determination
that Plaintiff is not totally disabled as of May 17, 2013 will
be reversed and remanded for further consideration consistent
with this Opinion.
An accompanying Order will be issued.
Date: November 26, 2018
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
20
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