DIPIETRO v. SESSIONS et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER that Plaintiff's application to proceed without prepayment of fees is DENIED; Plaintiff's complaint must be stricken; Clerk shall mark this matter as CLOSED. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 11/28/2017. (tf, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
PETER DIPIETRO,
1:17-cv-05072-NLH
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER
v.
JEFFREY SESSIONS
United States Attorney
General, JUDGE NOEL HILLMAN,
CHIEF JUDGE LINARES, UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURT, and
OTHER DEFENDANTS IN PREVIOUS
SUITS,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
PETER DIPIETRO
4321 BRIGANTINE BLVD
BRIGANTINE, NJ 08203
Appearing pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
WHEREAS, Plaintiff, Peter DiPietro, who is appearing pro
se, filed a complaint styled “Criminal and Civil
Complaint/Claim, Writ of Mandamus, Investigate Judge Noel
Hillman and Re-instate or Re-open cases based on Fraud Upon the
Court, Replevin: Claim and Delivery, Writ of Replevin,” along
with an application to proceed without prepayment of fees (“IFP
application”) 1; and

1

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), a court may allow a
litigant to proceed without prepayment of fees if he submits a
proper IFP application. Although § 1915 refers to “prisoners,”

WHEREAS, Plaintiff seeks to invalidate this Court’s January
3, 2013 Order in Civil Action 1:12-2338, DiPietro v. Morisky, et
al., Docket No. 28, where this Court Ordered that Plaintiff was
enjoined from filing any claims in this District relating to his
2000 New Jersey state court divorce and child custody case
without prior permission of the Court (“Preclusion Order”); and
WHEREAS, the Court found in the Preclusion Order:
(1) Plaintiff has filed several law suits in this
District and in New Jersey Superior Court against what
appears to be every individual who has ever been involved,
either directly or tangentially, in his family court case
that began in 2000, see, e.g., DIPIETRO v. NEW JERSEY
FAMILY SUPPORT PAYMENT CENTER ET AL, 3:08-CV-04761
(D.N.J.); DIPIETRO v. NJ FAMILY SUPPORT PAYMENT CTR, ET AL,
09-CV-3022 (3d Cir.); DIPIETRO v. GLOUCESTER COUNTY
SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT ET AL, 1:11-CV-0587 (D.N.J.); DIPIETRO
v. LANDIS TITLE COMPANY ET AL, 1:11-CV-05110 (D.N.J.);
DIPIETRO v. MORISKY ET AL, 1:12-CV-02338 (D.N.J.); DIPIETRO
v. SENULA, 1:12-CV-00189 (D.N.J.); DIPIETRO v. NEWFIELD
federal courts apply § 1915 to non-prisoner IFP applications.
Hickson v. Mauro, 2011 WL 6001088, *1 (D.N.J. 2011) (citing
Lister v. Dept. of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir.
2005) (“Section 1915(a) applies to all persons applying for IFP
status, and not just to prisoners.”) (other citations omitted).
The screening provisions of the IFP statute require a federal
court to dismiss an action sua sponte if, among other things,
the action is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to comply
with the proper pleading standards. See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d
Cir. 2013); Martin v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2017
WL 3783702, at *1 (D.N.J. August 30, 2017) (“Federal law
requires this Court to screen Plaintiff's Complaint for sua
sponte dismissal prior to service, and to dismiss any claim if
that claim fails to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and/or to dismiss any
defendant who is immune from suit.”).
2

NATIONAL BANK, L-001651-10 (N.J. Super.); DIPIETRO v.
VASSALLO, ET AL, L-1583-09/A-5207-09T1 (N.J. Super.);
(2) All of plaintiff’s cases against these various
individuals and entities have ultimately been dismissed or
resolved in the defendants’ favor;
(3) Several of the defendants in this case argued that
plaintiff’s repeated suits and complaints against them have
become repetitive, vexatious, and personally threatening;
(4) The “federal court system is not a playground to
be used by litigants for harassing those they dislike,”
Gilgallon v. Carroll, 153 Fed. Appx. 853, 855 (3d Cir.
2005), and that the court system is not available for
“recreational litigation,” see Marrakush Soc. v. New Jersey
State Police, 2009 WL 2366132, *36 (D.N.J. July 30, 2009)
(explaining that a “‘recreational litigant’ is the ‘one who
engages in litigation as sport and files numerous
complaints with little regard for substantive law or court
rules.’” (quoting Jones v. Warden of the Stateville
Correctional Ctr., 918 F. Supp. 1142, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
(noting that, “[w]hen confronted with [a] recreational
plaintiff, courts, to protect themselves and other
litigants, have enjoined the filing of further case without
leave of court”) (other citations omitted));
(5) It is well within the broad scope of the All Writs
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), for a district court to issue an
order restricting the filing of meritless cases by a
litigant whose manifold complaints aim to subject
defendants to unwarranted harassment, and raise concern for
maintaining order in the court’s dockets, see id. (citing
In Re Oliver, 682 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating
that “in appropriate circumstances, courts have gone beyond
prohibitions against relitigation and enjoined persons from
filing any further claims of any sort without the
permission of the court”)); and
(6) Plaintiff’s numerous lawsuits and other conduct
have risen to the level that may require the restriction of
plaintiff’s access to this Court as it relates to the
claims raised in this case, see Docket No. 27 at 10-12
(Docket No. 28 at 3-4); and
3

WHEREAS, in this action, Plaintiff argues that all of his
cases had merit, they must be reinstated, and he is entitled to
default judgment in his favor in the amount of $500,000,000.00
for each of those cases; but
WHEREAS, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s instant suit
directly implicates the Preclusion Order, and Plaintiff has
failed to comply with the mandate in the Preclusion Order to
obtain prior permission from the Court before filing this type
of complaint; and
WHEREAS, the Court further finds that Plaintiff’s instant
suit otherwise constitutes an impermissible omnibus challenge of
this Court’s prior Orders in all of his various cases relating
to his 2000 state court divorce and custody matter;
THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY on this

28th

day of

November

, 2017

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s application to proceed without
prepayment of fees [Docket No. 1-5] be, and the same hereby is,
DENIED 2; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint must be stricken and
Plaintiff shall not be provided the opportunity to pay the

2

Plaintiff’s IFP application answers every question with “not a
person.” (Docket No. 1-5.)
4

appropriate filing fee for his complaint to be filed because it
violates the Court’s Preclusion Order; and it is further
ORDERED that Clerk shall mark this matter as CLOSED.

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

At Camden, New Jersey

5