KLINGBERG et al v. HATCHER et al
Filing
34
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 7/13/2018. (tf, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CHARLES V. KLINGBERG, JR. and
BRENDA KLINGBERG,
1:17-cv-05563-NLH-AMD
OPINION
Plaintiff,
v.
LISA HATCHER, RON MIDDLETON,
SCOTT OBERMEIER, DAVE
WALLACE, and GLOUCESTER
TOWNSHIP,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
PETER M. KOBER
1864 RT 70 EAST
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08003
On behalf of Plaintiff
RICHARD L. GOLDSTEIN
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN, PA
15000 MIDLANTIC DRIVE
SUITE 200
P.O. BOX 5429
MOUNT LAUREL, NJ 08054
On behalf of Defendants Lisa Hatcher, Ron Middleton, Scott
Obermeier, and Gloucester Township
JESSICA ANN JANNETTI
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NJ
25 MARKET ST, 7TH FL, WEST WING
PO BOX 116
TRENTON, NJ 08625
On behalf of Defendant Dave Wallace
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter concerns constitutional claims by Plaintiffs
arising out of their fifteen-hour detention at a police station.
The police were investigating a fire at Plaintiff’s apartment.
After the investigation, no charges were filed.
Presently
before the Court is the motion of Defendant Dave Wallace, one of
the investigators, to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against him.
For the reasons expressed below, Defendant’s motion will be
granted with leave granted to amend.
BACKGROUND 1
At 8:00 a.m. on January 27, 2016, Plaintiff Charles V.
Klingberg, Jr., received a call at work that his apartment was
on fire.
He called his wife, Plaintiff Brenda Klingberg, who
was also at work.
Both Plaintiffs immediately left work and
drove to their home in Gloucester Township, New Jersey.
When
they got to their apartment, they identified themselves to the
Gloucester Township police officers at the scene.
An officer
directed Plaintiffs to get into a patrol car in order to be
driven to the station to give a statement.
Plaintiffs claim
that they felt they had no choice but to follow that command.
Once at the police station at 9:30 a.m., Plaintiffs were
placed in separate interrogation rooms.
1
Plaintiffs claim that
The facts recited here are taken from the Complaint. As noted
below, when considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, a
court must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint
as true and view them in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
2
Defendants Lisa Hatcher, Ron Middleton, Scott Obermeier,
Gloucester Township police officers, did not permit them to
speak to each other, make a phone call, or leave the station,
despite being told they were not under arrest.
According to Plaintiffs’ amended complaint, at 4:30 p.m.,
Hatcher, Middleton, Obermeier, and Defendant Dave Wallace, an
investigator with the Camden County Prosecutor’s Office, 2 “or
some of them,” interrogated Brenda Klingberg.
At 7:00 p.m.,
Obermeier met with Charles Klingberg and took his statement.
At
10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m., Middleton and Wallace interrogated
Charles Klingberg, described as “rough.”
At 11:00 p.m., Charles
Klingberg was administered a polygraph test.
Plaintiffs claim that during their detention, they did not
receive any food or drink until 11:00 p.m., and they were only
allowed to use a jail cell toilet.
At 1:00 a.m., they were
permitted to leave the police station, and were never arrested.
Plaintiffs claim that they were unreasonably seized and
detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
2
Under New Jersey law, when a county prosecutor investigator
performs law enforcement functions, he acts as an agent of the
State, and the State must indemnify a judgment arising from his
conduct. Watkins v. City of Newark Police Department, 2018 WL
1306267, at *3 (D.N.J. 2018) (citing Hyatt v. Cty. of Passaic,
340 F. App’x 833, 836 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Wright v. State,
778 A.2d 443, 461–62, 464 (N.J. 2001)).
3
Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act.
Wallace has
moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against him because he is
entitled to qualified immunity, and because Plaintiffs have
failed to meet the proper pleading standard to state a viable
Plaintiff has opposed Wallace’s motion. 3
claim against him.
DISCUSSION
A.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ federal claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ state law claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
B.
Standard for Motion to Dismiss
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court
must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
It is well
settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
3
While Wallace’s motion has been pending, defense counsel took
the depositions of Plaintiffs, and on June 14, 2018, Plaintiffs
settled their claims against the other Defendants. (Docket No.
30.) Counsel for Wallace relates that if Wallace’s motion to
dismiss is denied, Wallace intends to file a motion for summary
judgment based on Plaintiffs’ depositions. (Id.)
4
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do . . . .”
Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (first citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc.,
40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); and then citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a
court must take three steps.
First, the court must
“tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim.”
Second, the court should identify
allegations that, “because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Third, “whe[n] there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.”
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (alterations
in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 664, 675, 679 (2009)).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416
5
U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (“Our
decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all
civil actions’ . . . .”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail in
the coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to
federal complaints before Twombly.”).
“A motion to dismiss
should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’”
Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570).
C.
Analysis
Plaintiffs have brought their claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, as well as the NJCRA, which was modeled after § 1983 and
is interpreted analogously with § 1983. 4
Section 1983 provides
in pertinent part, “Every person who, under color of any
4
“By its terms, of course, [§ 1983] creates no substantive
rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights
established elsewhere.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 816 (1985). Thus, “[t]o establish a claim under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate a violation of a
right secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United
States [and] that the alleged deprivation was committed by a
person acting under color of state law.” Moore v. Tartler, 986
F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993). Like § 1983, NJCRA is a means of
vindicating substantive rights and is not a source of rights
itself. Gormley v. Wood–El, 93 A.3d 344, 358 (N.J. 2014).
Because the NJCRA was modeled after § 1983, and creates a
private cause of action for violations of civil rights secured
under either the United States or New Jersey Constitutions, the
NJCRA is interpreted analogously to § 1983. See Norman v.
Haddon Township, 2017 WL 2812876, at *4 (D.N.J. 2017).
6
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable
to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.”
For claims asserted under § 1983 and the NJCRA, a state
actor may be afforded qualified immunity. 5
“Qualified immunity
shields government officials from civil damages liability unless
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012).
In order to
determine whether a government official is entitled to qualified
immunity, two questions are to be asked: (1) has the plaintiff
alleged or shown a violation of a constitutional right, and (2)
is the right at issue “clearly established” at the time of the
defendant's alleged misconduct?
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S.
5
Plaintiffs have only sued Wallace in this individual capacity,
which is proper because any § 1983 or NJCRA claims against
Wallace in his official capacity could not be maintained. Will
v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(holding that neither a State nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are “persons” under § 1983); Roberts v. New
Jersey Turnpike Authority, 2016 WL 6407276, at *5 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2016) (citations omitted) (“We affirm neither the
State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are
‘persons’ under the [NJCRA].”).
7
223, 236 (2009).
Under the Fourth Amendment, “[t]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,”
U.S. Const. amend. IV, and it is binding on the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, Holland v. Rosen, --- F.3d ---, 2018
WL 3340930, at *18 (July 9, 2018) (citing Maryland v. King, 569
U.S. 435, 446 (2013)).
Not all seizures run afoul of the Fourth
Amendment, and the touchstone is reasonableness.
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991)).
Id. (quoting
To determine
whether a seizure is reasonable, a court examines the totality
of circumstances and balances “the nature and quality of the
intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against
the importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify
the intrusion.”
Id. (citation omitted).
Wallace argues that Plaintiffs’ claims against him must be
dismissed because he is entitled to qualified immunity.
Wallace
argues that Plaintiffs have failed to articulate how he violated
their Fourth Amendment rights since most of Plaintiffs’
allegations are directed at the Gloucester Township police
officer defendants, and Plaintiffs’ only allegation against him
is that he, along with Middleton, conducted a “rough”
interrogation of Charles Klingberg.
Wallace argues that the
dearth of facts in Plaintiffs’ complaint as to how his conduct
8
constituted an unreasonable seizure and detention, and how his
participation in the questioning of Charles Klingberg resulted
in a constitutional violation that is clearly established, is
fatal to Plaintiffs’ claims against him.
For those same
reasons, Wallace argues that Plaintiffs’ complaint fails to
satisfy the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards to state a viable
claim against him.
In response, Plaintiffs argue that they have stated
actionable constitutional claims against Wallace because the
illegality of going ahead with the interrogation absent probable
cause, judicial intervention, or consent of the suspects to
interrogation should have been obvious to him.
Plaintiffs
further argue that Wallace should have inquired of Plaintiffs if
they would subject themselves to the interrogation by consent,
and if he did so and learned that they did not consent, Wallace
should have declined to participate in the interrogation, and
should have told the Gloucester Township police officers to
release them immediately.
Because Wallace failed to do any of
these things, and continued to participate in the interrogation,
Wallace violated their constitutional rights.
The Court agrees with Wallace that Plaintiffs’ complaint
does not comply with Rule 8(a) or Twombly/Iqbal.
The only
allegations in the complaint against Wallace are that he arrived
at the police station around 4:30 p.m., he and Middleton
9
interrogated Charles Klingberg from 10:00 p.m. to 11:00 p.m.,
and the interrogation itself was “rough.”
A constitutional
claim brought pursuant to § 1983 requires Plaintiffs to show
that Wallace was a legal cause of their unreasonable detention.
Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 327 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing
Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 284–85 (1980); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 431) (other citations omitted) (explaining
that “in tort law a person's action is a legal cause of
another's injury if his conduct is a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm,” and “‘[l]urk[ing]’ in this
understanding of causation is ‘the idea of responsibility’; the
real question is whether an ordinary person would regard the act
in question as having caused the harm, ‘in the popular
sense’”)).
The three allegations regarding Wallace in
Plaintiffs’ complaint provide little information as to Wallace’s
role in the detention itself or how his questioning of Charles
Klingberg was unreasonable under the circumstances.
Moreover, Plaintiffs’ elaboration on their claims against
Wallace in their opposition brief have no effect on the
sufficiency of their complaint as currently pleaded.
A
plaintiff may not amend his complaint through arguments in a
brief.
Hall v. Revolt Media & TV, LLC, 2018 WL 3201795, at *3
(D.N.J. June 29, 2018) (citing Com. Of Pa. ex rel. Zimmerman v.
PepsiCo, Inc., 836 F.2d 173, 181 (3d Cir. 1988)).
10
Plaintiffs do not seek leave to add their allegations from
their brief to their complaint, but the Third Circuit has
directed that in civil rights cases district courts must offer
amendment - irrespective of whether it is requested - when
dismissing a case for failure to state a claim unless doing so
would be inequitable or futile.
Mullin v. Balicki, 875 F.3d
140, 151 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote
Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007)).
In the current procedural posture of the case, see supra note 2,
the Court cannot determine whether permitting such an amendment
would be inequitable or futile. 6
Thus, the Court will grant
Wallace’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against him, and
afford Plaintiffs thirty days to file a second amended
complaint, to which Wallace may respond as he deems appropriate
6
Even though Wallace argues that he is entitled to qualified
immunity, such a determination is not typically appropriate at
the motion to dismiss stage because the only facts upon which a
court can properly rely in determining the objective
reasonableness of a defendant’s actions are those factual
allegations which are contained in the complaint. Garlanger v.
Verbeke, 223 F. Supp. 2d 596, 608 (D.N.J. 2002). However,
because the amended complaint fails to allege sufficient facts
to make out a plausible claim of a constitutional violation by
Wallace, it could be held that Wallace is entitled to qualified
immunity because Plaintiffs have failed to state a plausible
claim that Wallace acted unreasonably in his detention and
interrogation of Plaintiffs. In this context, the qualified
immunity analysis overlaps with the Rule 8 and Twombly/Iqbal
analysis. Nonetheless, the Court declines to dismiss on that
basis in light of the possibility that an amendment would cure
the deficiencies noted in the amended complaint.
11
and as the Rules allow.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs’ claims against Wallace will be dismissed
without prejudice, and the Court will provide Plaintiffs with
thirty days to file a second amended complaint to address the
deficiencies noted in this Opinion if they are able to do so.
Date:
July 13, 2018
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?