HALL v. CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 9/6/17. (jbk, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
LAMONT MARCEL HALL, Jr.,
Plaintiff,
v.

CAMDEN COUNTY JAIL,
Defendant.

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Civ. Action No. 17-5789 (RMB)

OPINION

BUMB, District Judge:
Plaintiff Lamont Marcel Hall, Jr., a pretrial detainee held
in Camden County Jail, in Camden, New Jersey, filed a civil
rights

complaint

on

August

7,

2017.

(Compl.,

ECF

No.

1.)

Plaintiff seeks to proceed without prepayment of fees (“in forma
pauperis” or “IFP”), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).
App., ECF No. 1-3.)

(IFP

Plaintiff, however, did not file a properly

completed IFP application because he did not submit “a certified
copy of the trust fund account statement . . . for the prisoner
for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the
complaint . . . , obtained from the appropriate official of each
prison at which the prisoner is or was confined,” required by 28
U.S.C.

§

1915(a)(2).

Thus,

the

Court

will

administratively

terminate this action, subject to reopening if Petitioner files
a complete IFP application or pays the filing fee.
Plaintiff should be aware, however, that if he is granted
in forma pauperis status, he must pay the full amount of the
$350 filing fee in installments.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

In

each month that the amount in the prisoner’s account exceeds
$10.00, until the $350.00 filing fee is paid, the agency having
custody of the prisoner shall assess, deduct from the prisoner’s
account, and forward to the Clerk of the Court, payment equal to
20% of the preceding month’s income credited to the prisoner’s
account.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

Even if the full filing fee, or any part of it, has been
paid, the Court must dismiss the case if it finds that the
action is: (1) frivolous or malicious; (2) fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (3) seeks monetary
relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

28

If the Court dismisses the case for any

of these reasons, the Act does not permit the prisoner to get
his filing fee back.
After Plaintiff completes his IFP application by submitting
his inmate trust fund account statement for the six-month period
immediately preceding the filing of his complaint, if he chooses
to do so, the Court must review the complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C.

§

1915(e)(2)(B)

to

determine
2 

whether

it

should

be

dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.1
I. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
A pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Fed. R.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state

a

Ashcroft

claim
v.

to

relief

Iqbal,

556

that

U.S.

is

662,

plausible
678

on

(2009)

its

(quoting

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
has

facial

plausibility

when

the

plaintiff

face.’”

pleads

Bell

“A claim
factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

Id.

(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.)
“[A]

court

must

accept

contained in a complaint.”
conclusions

as

true.

Id.

as

Id.

true

all

of

the

allegations

A court need not accept legal

Legal

conclusions,

together

with

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, do not
suffice to state a claim.

Id.

Thus, “a court considering a

1

This Court’s conclusive screening of Plaintiff’s claims is
reserved until he obtains in forma pauperis status. See
Izquierdo v. New Jersey, 532 F. App’x 71, 72-73 (3d Cir. July
25, 2013) (district court may decide whether to dismiss the
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) after leave to proceed
IFP is granted).
3 

motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings
that,

because

they

are

no

more

than

conclusions,

entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679.

are

not

“While legal

conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must
be supported by factual allegations.”

Id.

If a complaint can

be remedied by an amendment, a district court may not dismiss
the complaint with prejudice, but must permit the amendment.
Grayson v. Mayview State Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.
2002).
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

The Complaint

Plaintiff alleges he was “locked up for child support” and
strip searched at Camden County Jail, even though he was not
arrested for a criminal offense.
Plaintiff

seeks

money

damages

(Compl., ECF No. 1, ¶III(c)).
for

violation

of

his

privacy.

(Id., ¶¶IV, V.)
B.

Section 1983 claims

A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983

for

certain

violations

of

his

constitutional

Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory ...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any
citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
4 

rights.

immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.

Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law.

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48

(1988); Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d
Cir. 1994).
1.

A Jail Is Not a Proper Defendant in a § 1983

Action
The only defendant to this action is the Camden County
Jail.

The Camden County Jail is not a “state actor” within the

meaning of § 1983.

See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App’x

113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“the prison is not an entity subject to
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474
F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)).

Therefore, the claim against

Camden County Jail fails to state a claim upon which relief may
be

granted,

and

is

required

to

be

dismissed

pursuant

to

28

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
2.

The Fourth Amendment Applies to Bodily Searches
in Prison

5 

The Fourth Amendment, which protects against unreasonable
search and seizure, applies to bodily searches in the prison
context.

Parkell v. Danberg, 833 F.3d 313, 326 (3d Cir. 2013)

(citing

Florence

v.

Bd.

of

Chosen

Freeholders

of

Cty.

of

Burlington, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1510, 1516, 182 L.Ed.2d 566
(2012) (“Florence II”).
The test of reasonableness under the Fourth
Amendment ... requires a balancing of the
need for the particular search against the
invasion of personal rights that the search
entails. Courts must consider the scope of
the particular intrusion, the manner in
which it is conducted, the justification for
initiating it, and the place in which it is
conducted.”
Inmate
search
policies
are
constitutional if they str[ike] a reasonable
balance between inmate privacy and the needs
of the institutions.
Parkell,

833

F.3d

at

326

(internal

II,

the

Supreme

quotations

and

citations

omitted).
“In

Florence

Court

declined

to

require

jails to adopt a policy of exempting new detainees ‘who ha[d]
not

been

arrested

for

a

serious

crime

or

for

any

offense

involving a weapon or drugs’ from the blanket strip searches
conducted

before

population.”
1520.)

Id.

detainees
at

329

were

(quoting

committed
Florence

to
II,

the
132

general
S.Ct.

at

The detainee, in Florence II, was arrested on a bench

warrant for failure to appear at a hearing to enforce a fine.
132

S.Ct.

at

323.

The

Supreme

6 

Court

held

that,

where

the

detainee

was

to

be

admitted

to

the

general

population,

and

although there was no individualized suspicion that he possessed
contraband, his strip search during the intake process did not
violate the Fourth Amendment.
Here,

Plaintiff

has

Id. at 334-38.

alleged

only

that

he

was

stripped

searched upon admission to Camden County Jail, and that he was
not arrested for a criminal offense.

Plaintiff has not set

forth any facts that would distinguish his case from Florence
II, where the Supreme Court found no constitutional violation.
Therefore, the present Complaint fails to state a claim upon
which

relief

may

be

granted,

screening pursuant to

and

would

be

dismissed

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2(B).

upon

If Plaintiff

can allege additional circumstances surrounding his strip search
that

would

render

the

search

unreasonable

under

the

Fourth

Amendment, Plaintiff may wish to file an Amended Complaint.
III. CONCLUSION
The

Court

will

administratively

terminate

this

matter

without prejudice because Plaintiff failed submit a complete IFP
application under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2).

Plaintiff is advised

that if he cures the deficiencies in his IFP application and
reopens

this

action,

his

civil

rights

complaint

would

be

dismissed without prejudice upon screening pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B).

7 

An appropriate order follows.
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
Dated: September 6, 2017

8