GACHAU v. RLS COLD STORAGE et al

Filing 25

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/22/2018. (dmr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

EMMANUEL W. GACHAU,
Plaintiff,

No. 1:17-cv-6595 (NLH/JS)
OPINION

v.
RLS COLD STORAGE and CHOPTANK
TRANSPORT,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
EMMANUEL W. GACHAU
1691 GRANDFLORA AVE
CLERMONT, FL 34711
Appearing pro se
HARRIS NEAL FELDMAN
KATHRYN A. SOMERSET
PARKER MCCAY P.A.
9000 MIDLANTIC DRIVE
SUITE 300
P.O. BOX 5044
MOUNT LAUREL, NJ 08054
On behalf of Defendant RLS Cold Storage
ERIC SCOTT THOMPSON
FRANKLIN & PROKOPIK
300 DELAWARE AVENUE
SUITE 1200
WILMINGTON, DE 19801
On behalf of Defendant Choptank Transport

HILLMAN, District Judge
Pro se Plaintiff Emmanuel Gachau brings this Motion to
Reopen following the Court’s dismissal of his case.

For the

reasons that follow, the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion, as the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
The Court takes its facts from its April 24, 2018 Opinion.
On September 18, 2015, Plaintiff was hired by Choptank Transport
to transport frozen strawberries from Texas to New Jersey.

On

September 21, 2015, Plaintiff arrived as scheduled at the New
Jersey location at 7:00 AM to deliver the load at the RLS Cold
Storage facility.

Plaintiff checked in and was instructed to

unload at door sixteen.

Before Plaintiff backed the trailer in,

an RLS Cold Storage employee took a picture of the temperature
of the refrigerated unit at 3.4 degrees Fahrenheit, of the seal
before opening the trailer doors, and of the cargo after opening
the cargo doors.

The employee then instructed Plaintiff to back

the trailer in to be unloaded.
After waiting 1-1.5 hours, the employee told Plaintiff that
the shipment was being rejected due to the high temperature of
the product.

According to Plaintiff, door sixteen was not a

refrigerated part of the warehouse.

Plaintiff pleads he later

discovered that this part of the building was where RLS Cold
Storage stored cardboard boxes and was maintained at room
temperature.

Plaintiff alleges that, after he complained,

[t]he same RLS staff member who rejected the load then
grabbed the bill of lading out of [his] hand and hand
wrote with an ink pen “quality” but the original
rejection due to high temperature was a photocopy.
[T]his was another deliberate act when she realized she
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got exposed to what she had done.
Now she wanted to
blame the claim on quality but forgot the bill she handed
me was a photocopy.
Plaintiff pleads that an inspection later occurred, in
which Defendants failed to provide necessary evidence to the
inspection company.

Plaintiff argues: “[C]hoptank Transport

vice president and legal affairs boss consealed [sic] and
colluded with RLS to holding all the evidence I provided.”
Plaintiff further alleges that after filing a claim with
his insurance company over this incident, his insurance was
cancelled and him had to obtain more expensive insurance.
Plaintiff further claims this incident required him “to start
all over as a new company,” resulting in “all brokerage
companies view[ing him] as new.”

He then pleads that he could

not pass a Department of Transportation inspection, that he was
unable to maintain his equipment, and that, on May 8, 2017, he
lost his insurance and his operating authority was revoked by
the Department of Transportation.

Plaintiff argues this

resulted in two months of no income.
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this matter on August 31,
2017.

On October 12, 2017, Choptank Transport filed a Motion to

Dismiss.

On October 30, 2017, RLS Cold Storage also filed a

Motion to Dismiss.

On April 24, 2018, the Court granted

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss.
In the Court’s April 24, 2018 Opinion, the Court concluded
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that Plaintiff failed to plead federal question or diversity
subject matter jurisdiction.

In particular, while Plaintiff

attempted to plead federal question jurisdiction under the
Federal Trade Commission Act, the Court concluded there was no
private right of action under the Act.

Plaintiff did not plead

any other federal cause of action or other substantial federal
issue that could be the basis for federal question jurisdiction.
Plaintiff further did not plead diversity, and the Court noted
its serious doubts regarding the $2,500,000 amount in
controversy asserted by Plaintiff.

The Court granted

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss, dismissed the complaint without
prejudice, and allowed Plaintiff an opportunity to move to
reopen his case.

Plaintiff was instructed to attach a proposed

amended complaint to such motion.

Plaintiff thereafter filed a

Motion to Reopen.
The Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen.

The

Court begins by noting Plaintiff did not attach a proposed
amended complaint to his motion, as instructed by this Court.
The Court will not deny the motion for this procedural defect
alone.

However, Plaintiff’s arguments to reopen his case fail

to show that Plaintiff would be able to sufficiently plead
subject matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiff argues this Court has

subject matter jurisdiction under federal question jurisdiction,
28 U.S.C. § 1331, and diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
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The Court begins with federal question jurisdiction.
Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen argues this Court has federal
question jurisdiction based on his claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
However, 18 U.S.C. § 1346 does not support a private cause of
action.

See Kaul v. Christie, No. 16-2364, 2017 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 102007, at *49 n.29 (D.N.J. June 30, 2017); McCann v.
Falato, No. 14-4896, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144526, at *7 (D.N.J.
Oct. 23, 2015); Hooten v. Greggo & Ferrara Co., No. 10-776, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143118, at *16-17 (D. Del. Oct. 3, 2012).
Plaintiff has not shown this Court has federal question
jurisdiction.
Plaintiff also attempts to argue diversity jurisdiction,
stating “RLS COLD STORAGE operates its business in the state of
NEW JERSEY, CHOPTANK TRANSPORT INC in the state of MARYLAND, and
Emmanuel W Gachau PSALMS TRANSPORTATION LLC in the state of
FLORIDA.”

Plaintiff also asks the Court to construe his

requested relief of $2,500,000 as a good faith claim for
damages.
The Court’s April 2018 Opinion, recognizing Plaintiff was
proceeding pro se, specifically outlined the minimum
requirements of pleading the citizenship of the parties. 1

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The Court’s Opinion specifically instructed:
In the event Plaintiff decides to file a motion to reopen
attaching an amended complaint pleading diversity
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Plaintiff has failed to plead the citizenship of all three
parties. 2

While courts have an obligation “to be flexible when

jurisdiction, Plaintiff is reminded of the federal
standards in pleading diversity. See McCann v. Newman
Irrevocable Tr., 458 F.3d 281, 286 (3d Cir. 2006)
(“Citizenship is synonymous with domicile, and ‘the
domicile of an individual is his true, fixed and
permanent home and place of habitation. It is the place
to which, whenever he is absent, he has the intention of
returning.’” (quoting Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441,
454 (1973))); Vanz, LLC v. Mattia & Assocs., No. 131392, 2016 WL 3148400, at *3 (D.N.J. May 17, 2016) (“The
citizenship of a natural person is determined by their
domicile, not their residence(s).
That is because a
natural person may have many residences, but only one
domicile. Domicile is the location of a person’s ‘true
fixed home . . . to which, whenever he is absent, he has
the intention of returning.’” (alterations in original)
(footnote omitted) (first citing Zambelli Fireworks Mfg.
Co., 592 F.3d at 419; and then quoting Palazzo ex rel.
Delmage v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000))),
adopted by Vanz, LLC v. Mattia & Assocs., No. 13-1392,
2016 WL 3148386 (D.N.J. June 1, 2016); Witasick v.
Hambrecht, No. 12-3755, 2013 WL 1222680, at *2 (D.N.J.
Mar. 25, 2013) (“[A]n individual may only have one
domicile, and thus may only be a citizen of one state
for diversity jurisdiction purposes.
Residence and
domicile are not the same for legal purposes, as
residency alone does not establish citizenship.”
(citation omitted) (citing Williamson v. Osenton, 232
U.S. 604, 614 (1914))); see also S. Freedman & Co. v.
Raab, 180 F. App’x 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2006) (explaining
that, “[i]n order to adequately establish diversity
jurisdiction,
a
complaint
must
set
forth
with
specificity a corporate party’s state of incorporation
and its principal place of business,” and affirming
dismissal of complaint alleging that corporation
maintained “a principal place of business,” rather than
“its principal place of business”).
2

While Plaintiff attempts to plead the citizenship of Psalms
Transportation, Psalms Transportation is not a plaintiff in this
action. Plaintiff does not attempt to plead his own
citizenship.
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applying procedural rules to pro se litigants, especially when
interpreting their pleadings,” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc.,
704 F.3d 239 (3d Cir. 2013), Plaintiff has not only failed to
provide a proposed amended complaint for the Court’s review, but
Plaintiff has, for the second time, failed to provide a basis
for this Court’s subject matter jurisdiction.

Subject matter

jurisdiction is an ironbound prerequisite for litigation in
federal court and cannot be waived.
Finding subject matter jurisdiction lacking, the Court will
deny Plaintiff’s Motion to Reopen.

An appropriate Order will be

entered.

Date: August 22, 2018
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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