BRIDGES v. TORRES, JR.
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 3/18/2019. (rss, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
MARY BRIDGES,
Plaintiff,
v.
DETECTIVE JOSE M. TORRES, JR.
Defendant.
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Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez
Civil Action No. 17-7107
OPINION
Presently before the Court is the Defendant Jose M. Torres, Jr.’s Motion to
Dismiss Plaintiff Mary Bridges' Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). The Court has considered the written submission of the parties, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 78 (b) and for the reasons that follow, grants the motion.
Background
Plaintiff Mary Bridges (“Bridges”) is the owner and sole resident of her home
located at 12 Spruce Street, Bridgeton, New Jersey. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 6. She complains that
the Cumberland County Prosecutor’s Office targeted and searched her residence in
connection to a drug task force investigation against a target named Wayne A. McClain
(“McClain”). Id. at ¶¶ 7-12. McClain has no connection whatsoever to Bridges’ home. Id.
at ¶¶ 17-19.
On November 16, 2015, Defendant, Detective Jose M. Torres, Jr. (“Torres”)
successfully applied for a warrant to permit entry and search of Bridges’ home. Id. at ¶¶
10- 12. At the time, Torres was temporarily assigned to the Cumberland County
Prosecutor’s Office. The warrant was executed by the Bridgeton Police Department
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Tactical Entry Team on November 24, 2015, at approximately 12:24 in the afternoon,
while Bridges was home. Id. at ¶¶ 13-17. Despite the warrant, Plaintiff claims entry was
made into her home without her permission and that the Team determined that none of
the evidence used to justify the warrant was found. She challenges the veracity of the
information Torres proffered to obtain the warrant and claims that Torres failed to “take
reasonable professional measures to ensure there was probable cause to search” her
residence. Id. at ¶¶ 18-22.
Plaintiff alleges that her rights under the Fourth Amendment and New Jersey
State law were violated when members of the City of Bridgeton Police Department
Tactical Entry Team mistakenly entered her home based upon an error in a search
warrant/Affidavit prepared by City of Vineland Police Officer Jose M. Torres, Jr. in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2, the New Jersey Civil Rights Act
("NJCRA") and N.J.S.A. 59:1-1, et seq., the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.
Defendant Torres moves for dismissal pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) on
grounds that the search warrant was valid and/or that Torres’ actions, at best, constitute
negligence. In the alternative, Torres asserts he is entitled to qualified immunity. For
the reasons that follow the motion to dismiss is granted.
II. Standards of Review
A. Motion to Dismiss
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a party to move for dismissal of a
claim based on “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 12(b)(6). A complaint should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) if the alleged
facts, taken as true, fail to state a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When deciding a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), ordinarily only the allegations in the
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complaint, matters of public record, orders, and exhibits attached to the complaint, are
taken into consideration. 1 See Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Pa. Blue Shield, 896
F.2d 808, 812 (3d Cir. 1990). It is not necessary for the plaintiff to plead evidence.
Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977). The question before the
Court is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Watson v. Abington Twp., 478
F.3d 144, 150 (2007). Instead, the Court simply asks whether the plaintiff has
articulated “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
“A claim has facial plausibility 2 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550
U.S. at 556). “Where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume
their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to
relief.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Thus, a motion to dismiss should be granted unless the plaintiff’s factual
allegations are “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the
assumption that all of the complaint’s allegations are true (even if doubtful in fact).”
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“Although a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the pleadings, a document
integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be considered without converting the motion to
dismiss into one for summary judgment.” U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388 (3d Cir.
2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis deleted). Accord Lum v. Bank of Am.,
361 F.3d 217, 221 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint includes several
references to exhibits attached to the Complaint and the Court will consider these documents without
converting the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion. In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props., Inc. Sec.
Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999).
2This plausibility standard requires more than a mere possibility that unlawful conduct has
occurred. “When a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant’s liability, it ‘stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.’’” Id.
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Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556 (internal citations omitted). “[W]here the well-pleaded facts
do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the
complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘shown’-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
B. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Qualified Immunity
Plaintiff’s constitutional claims are governed by Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which
provides a civil remedy against any person who, under color of state law, deprives
another of rights protected by the United States Constitution. See Collins v. City of
Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992). Any analysis of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should begin
with the language of the statute:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. As the above language makes clear, Section 1983 is a remedial statute
designed to redress deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and its
subordinate federal laws. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979). By its
own words, therefore, Section 1983 “does not . . . create substantive rights.” Kaucher v.
County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Baker, 443 U.S. at 145, n.3).
To state a cognizable claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege a
“deprivation of a constitutional right and that the constitutional deprivation was caused
by a person acting under the color of state law.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Kneipp v. Tedder, 95 F.3d 1199, 1204 (3d Cir.
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1996)). Thus, a plaintiff must demonstrate two essential elements to maintain a claim
under § 1983: (1) that the plaintiff was deprived of a “right or privileges secured by the
Constitution or the laws of the United States” and (2) that the plaintiff was deprived of
his rights by a person acting under the color of state law. Williams v. Borough of West
Chester, Pa., 891 F.2d 458, 464 (3d Cir. 1989).
The doctrine of qualified immunity provides that “government officials
performing discretionary functions . . . are shielded from liability for civil damages
insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person should have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 818 (1982). Thus, government officials are immune from suit in their individual
capacities unless, “taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, . . .
the facts alleged show the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right” and “the right
was clearly established” at the time of the objectionable conduct. Saucier v. Katz, 533
U.S. 194, 201 (2001). Courts may exercise discretion in deciding which of the two
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the
circumstances in the particular case at hand. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236
(2009).
This doctrine “balances two important interests—the need to hold public officials
accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the need to shield officials from
harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their duties reasonably” and it
“applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is a mistake of law, a
mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and fact.” Id. (internal
quotation omitted). Properly applied, qualified immunity “protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct.
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2074, 2085 (2011) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
For a right to be clearly established, “[t]he contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing
violates that right.” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987)). That is, “[t]he relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a
right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483,
492 (2006). “If the officer’s mistake as to what the law requires is reasonable,” the
officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Couden, 446 F.3d at 492 (internal citations
omitted). Further, “[i]f officers of reasonable competence could disagree on th[e] issue,
immunity should be recognized.” Malley, 475 U.S. at 341 (1986). See also Brosseau v.
Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (The general touchstone is whether the conduct of the
official was reasonable at the time it occurred.) Finally, because qualified immunity is
an affirmative defense, the burden of proving its applicability rests with the defendant.
See Beers-Capital v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 142, n.15 (3d Cir. 2001).
III. Analysis
Plaintiff alleges violations of her civil rights under the Fourth Amendment, the
New Jersey Civil Rights Act, § 10:6-2, and the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, 59:1-1. The
Court finds that Plaintiff’s claims fail to set forth a constitutional violation of her civil
rights because the allegations sound in negligence. In addition, to the extent a
cognizable constitutional violation can be inferred from the Complaint, Defendant
Torres is entitled to qualified immunity.
Plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of the search warrant centers on her claim that
Torres submitted erroneous information in his affidavit to the magistrate judge in
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violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, inter alia. To succeed on her claim, Plaintiff
must satisfy the two-part test developed by the Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware,
438 U.S. 154, 155-56, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 2676-77, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978). See Lippay v.
Christos, 996 F.2d 1490, 1502, 1504 (3d Cir. 1993). Plaintiff must prove “by a
preponderance of the evidence, (1) that the affiant knowingly and deliberately, or with a
reckless disregard for the truth, made false statements or omissions that create a
falsehood in applying for a warrant; and (2) that such statements or omissions are
material, or necessary, to the finding of probable cause.” Sherwood v. Mulvihill, 113 F.3d
396, 399 (3d Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
On a motion to dismiss the Court must accept the allegations in the Complaint as
true in considering whether the facts demonstrating the right to relief rise above the
speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Using this standard, Plaintiff complains
that Torres failed to take sufficient actions in determining that her home was used in the
facilitation of McClain’s drug trafficking scheme and that this failure constitutes a
breach of "a duty to discover and disclose information he knew and information he
should have known to the issuing magistrate." (Id. at ¶ 20).
Torres, the Complaint avers, leapt to the conclusion that Plaintiff’s home was the
site of McClain’s activity without observing McClain or anyone else enter the home
and/or without taking any steps to investigate who owned and/or occupied the home.
Specifically, the Complaint alleges that “neither the confidential informant nor the
surveillance team observed the suspect go in through the door of 12 Spruce Street or
come out through the door of 12 Spruce Street” and that “the surveillance team did not
observe the confidential informant go into or come out of 12 Spruce Street to purchase
narcotics." (Compl. at ¶ 19). Torres also failed “to take reasonable professional
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measures to ensure there was probable cause to search the dwelling at 12 Spruce Street
named in the warrant, includ[e:] checking with the local utility to identify who was
receiving service at 12 Spruce Street; checking the deed for 12 Spruce Street to
determine ownership; finding that they matched, checking with the local police to
determine if the individual had a police record; finding that they matched and she did
not, conducting additional surveillance on 12 Spruce Street to determine who was going
in and out. Id. at 21.
Finally, Plaintiff alleges Detective Torres "had a duty to discover and disclose
information he knew and information he should have known to the issuing magistrate."
(Id. at ¶ 20). "The error of identifying a mistaken street address for the residence to be
searched, by the Defendant, Detective Jose M. Torres, Jr., as described, supra, directly
and proximately led to the execution of the search pursuant to a warrant at the 12
Spruce Street address on November 24, 2015 by the Bridgeton Police Department
Tactical Entry Team." (Id. at ¶ 24)
Plaintiff does not claim that Torres acted with the requisite disregard for the
truth when he gave the magistrate judge the information to secure the warrant.
Ordinarily, an officer can presume a warrant is supported by probable cause and thus
valid if such a belief is objectively reasonable. Berg v. County of Allegheny, 219 F.3d 261,
273 (3d Cir. 2000). To succeed on a claim against the affiant and/or to impugn the
validity of the warrant, a plaintiff must have evidence “that a false statement knowingly
and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in
the warrant affidavit, and [that] the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding
of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that ... the fruits of the search [must
be] excluded to the same extent as if probable cause was lacking on the face of the
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affidavit.” Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S. Ct. at2676–77; United States v. Frost, 999
F.2d 737, 742–43 (3d Cir. 1993).
Here, Torres’ warrant application derived from information that McClain, while
under surveillance by law enforcement, purchased illegal substances from confidential
informants on two occasions and then went back to the address of 12 Spruce Street,
which is Plaintiff’s home. 1 Affidavit of Jose M. Torres, Jr., pp. 5-7, Ex. B. The
Complaint’s characterization of Torres’ presentation of information to the magistrate
judge as mistaken, careless, and incomplete does not rise to the level of a constitutional
violation. “There must be allegations of deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth, and allegations of negligence or innocent mistake are insufficient[.]” Herring
v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009).
Torres’ alleged “mistake” or error in identifying Plaintiff’s home address as the
target of the warrant is grounded in the information supplied to Torres by other law
enforcement officials who observed the target of the warrant near and around Plaintiff’s
home. Plaintiff’s assertion that Torres should have done more to assure himself of the
veracity of the police officers assertion finds no basis in law. The facts plead do not
undermine the reasonableness of Torres’ reliance on the information provided to him or
Because Torres’ Affidavit is integral to and relied upon in in the Complaint, the
Court may consider its contents. U.S. Express Lines, Ltd. v. Higgins, 281 F.3d 383, 388
(3d Cir. 2002) (“Although a district court may not consider matters extraneous to the
pleadings, a document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint may be
considered without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment.”);
Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000) (When reviewing a
factual attack, the court may weigh and consider evidence outside the pleadings.)
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the warrant application itself. Viewing the Complaint in a light most favorable to
Plaintiff, there are no facts which suggest that Torres operated in bad faith or in reckless
indifference to Plaintiff’s constitutional rights. At best, the complaint espouses common
law negligence, which is “not encompassed within § 1983.” Davidson v. O’Love, 752 F.2d
817, 825 (3d Cir. 1984).
In addition, even if Torres’ conduct rose to the level of a constitutional violation,
he is entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity “gives ample room for
mistaken judgments” by protecting “all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229, 112 S. Ct. 534, (1991)
(quoting Malley, 475 U.S. at 343). Here, there is no allegation that Torres knowingly
violated the law and the facts set forth in his affidavit demonstrate that his reliance on
the information provided by other law enforcement officers is objectively reasonable.
Orsatti v. NJ State Police, 71 F.3d 480, 483 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding officers only lose
qualified immunity where there is clear indicia that the existence of probable cause is
unreasonable). The Court finds that a reasonable officer could have believed that there
was probable cause to search Plaintiff’s home and that Plaintiff’s claim of mistake does
not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Because Torres is entitled to qualified
immunity, Plaintiff’s claims under §1983, the NJCRA, and the NJTCA are dismissed.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons states above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to
state a claim for which relief can be granted. An appropriate Order shall issue.
Dated: March 18, 2019
s/ Joseph H. Rodriguez
HON. JOSEPH H. RODRIGUEZ
United States District Judge
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