BARAN v. MISSION SOLUTIONS LLC
Filing
15
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 6/20/2018. (dmr)
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[Dkt. No. 13]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
ANNA BARAN,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 17-7425(RMB/JS)
v.
ASRC FEDERAL MISSION
SOLUTIONS, ROSE WELLS, FRANCES
McKENNA, SUE GOLDBERG, and ABC
BUSINESS ENTITIES 1-100,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Latonya N. Bland-Tull, Esq.
HAGERTY & BLAND-TULL LAW, LLC
Moorestown Times Square
523 Haddon Avenue
Collingswood, NJ 08108
Counsel for Plaintiff
Alexa Joy Laborda Nelson, Esq.
LITTLER MENDELSON PC
Three Parkway
1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19102
-andWilliam J. Leahy, Esq.
LITTLER MENDELSON, PC
Three Parkway
1601 Cherry Street, Suite 1400
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Defendants
OPINION
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BUMB, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of a
motion to remand this matter to the Superior Court of New
Jersey, Camden County and for payment of costs and attorney's
fees, by Plaintiff Anna Baran (the “Plaintiff”). For the reasons
stated below, Plaintiff’s motion will be DENIED.1
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff Anna Baran is a former employee of Defendant
Mission Solutions, LLC (“MSE”)(incorrectly pled as ASRC Federal
Mission Solutions), a defense contractor that supplies systems
engineering, software engineering, integration services and
products for mission-critical defense systems. Am. Compl. ¶ 3,
Notice of Removal, Ex. C. This action arises from Plaintiff’s
termination from MSE in 2013 as the result of threatening
comments Plaintiff allegedly made to Rose Wells, a software
engineer manager at MSE. Wells reported both to the police and
to Francis McKenna, a member of MSE security, that Plaintiff had
threatened to bring a gun to work and shoot certain MSE
employees. In addition to her unlawful termination, Plaintiff
alleges, McKenna continued to disparage Plaintiff to potential
employers, preventing her from finding new full-time employment
1
Because the Court denies Plaintiff’s motion to remand on the
merits, it will also deny, without addressing, Plaintiff’s
motion for costs and attorneys fees.
2
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by indicating to such employers that a “false report” placed on
Plaintiff’s “clearance record was true, that it was bad, and
that [P]laintiff . . . [would] not be able to obtain clearance
based on that report.” Am. Compl. ¶ 43. As it turns out, the
“report” which McKenna was discussing was entered into the
United States Department of Defense’s (“DOD”) Joint Personnel
Adjudication System (“JPAS”), which functions as the DOD’s
system of record for security clearance processing.
This case comes to the Court under somewhat unusual
procedural circumstances. It had been pending in state court for
almost three years and was set for a trial when MSE removed it
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (the “Federal Officer Removal
Statute”). At issue is whether MSE is entitled to the benefit of
that statute and, if so, at what point in the state court
proceedings it could ascertain that the statute applied.
Specifically, the resolution of this motion turns on the date
that MSE could first have ascertained that Plaintiff was
bringing a defamation claim against it not only on the basis of
comments made by McKenna or other unnamed MSE employees, but
based on the report entered into JPAS.
On January 6, 2015, Plaintiff initiated this action by
filing a pro se Complaint against MSE and Wells in the Superior
Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County (Docket No.
L-53-15). Plaintiff’s initial pro se Complaint was vague and the
3
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details included therein were sparse, but it appears that
Plaintiff alleged that Wells had made false statements
concerning Plaintiff’s intention to “harm others” with firearms,
costing Plaintiff her job. See Jan. 6, 2015 Compl., Notice of
Removal Ex. A.
Plaintiff brought claims for (1) negligence; (2)
malicious prosecution; (3) intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress; (4) defamation and slander; (5) tortious
interference; and (6) retaliation. See id.
Plaintiff’s pro se Complaint was dismissed, without
prejudice, on April 24, 2015, subject to three conditions: (1)
Plaintiff was required to obtain counsel by July 1, 2015, “with
the understanding that she may have a claim for unlawful
termination”; (2) MSE was required to “issue a neutral
employment reference”; and (3) MSE was required to “use best
efforts to assist Plaintiff in obtaining a security clearance,
to the extent possible.” Notice of Removal ¶ 3, Ex. B.
On June 27, 2015, while the case was still dismissed,
Plaintiff sent a letter to the state court informing the court
that Plaintiff was having a difficult time obtaining counsel.
June 27, 2015 Letter, Certification of LaTonya Bland-Tull, Ex.
C. In her letter, Plaintiff also indicated that she had
“objective evidence that . . . [MSE] continue[d] to slander”
her. Id. Specifically, she claimed that she lost two job
opportunities because the company “verbally slander[ed]” her and
4
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“put false information on . . . [her] career record.” Id. She
claimed to have spoken to McKenna, who told her that “he would
correct the statement but then backed out of the system because
he realized that it would make the company legally liable.” Id.
The state court treated Plaintiff’s pro se letter as a
motion to enforce the conditions in the court’s April 24, 2015
dismissal order. On August 12, 2015, it granted Plaintiff’s
request and ordered MSE’s HR Department to issue Plaintiff a
“neutral employment reference,” without editorialization;
provide neutral information if contacted about Plaintiff’s
future attempts to obtain a security clearance; and provide
Plaintiff with a copy of her “entire personnel file.” Order
Granting Plaintiff’s Motion to Enforce, Certification of LaTonya
Bland-Tull, Ex. D.
On October 6, 2016, the state court reinstated Plaintiff’s
Complaint and granted her leave to file an amended complaint.
October 18, 2016, having obtained counsel, Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint against MSE, Wells, McKenna, Sue Goldberg, who
at one time was Plaintiff’s supervisor at MSE, and “ABC Business
Entities 1-100.” See Notice of Removal, Ex. C. Two of the four
counts in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint are relevant to this
motion: (1) Count One for defamation, libel, and slander, and
(2) Count Two for defamation, libel, and slander per se. In
5
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these Counts, Plaintiff alleges that McKenna2, or another unnamed
MSE employee, made slanderous statements about Plaintiff and
about the nature of reports filed on Plaintiff’s “record.”
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that McKenna or another MSE
employee spoke by phone with employees from L-3 Communications,
and that as a result of statements made about Plaintiff during
those conversations, L-3 refused to hire Plaintiff.
On February 10, 2017, Defendants sent their first set of
interrogatories to Plaintiff. Interrogatory number 10 asked
Plaintiff to identify “each communication that . . . [she]
contend[ed] support[ed] . . . [her] claim(s) for defamation.”
For each of these communications, interrogatory 10 asked
Plaintiff to identify (1) who made the statement; (2) when the
statement was made; (3) to whom the statement was communicated;
and (4) any witnesses to the communication. On March 6, 2017,
however, the state court dismissed Plaintiff’s defamation,
libel, and slander (including defamation, libel, and slander per
se) claims as untimely. The state court’s dismissal was without
prejudice, and the court granted Plaintiff leave to amend.
Plaintiff did not, however, amend her Amended Complaint.
2
It does not appear that Plaintiff ever served McKenna with
process.
6
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On April 28, 2017, Plaintiff submitted her responses to
Defendant’s first set of interrogatories. In response to
interrogatory number 10, Plaintiff provided:
McKenna admitted that in August 2014, he represented
to employees of L3 Communications that Plaintiff had
threatened someone at work. McKenna admitted that he
discussed a report that he created in JPAS database
with L3 Communications. This report alleged that
Plaintiff owns firearms.
See Pl.’s Answer to Interrogatories, Interr. 10, Cert. of
LaTonya Bland-Tull, Esq., Ex. H. By this time, all of
Plaintiff’s defamation claims had been dismissed and the
matter appeared to be moving forward as one for retaliation
under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A.
10:5-12(d) (“NJLAD”).
On September 8, 2017, the state court held oral argument on
a motion for summary judgment filed by Wells seeking the
dismissal of the NJLAD claim against her and a motion filed by
Plaintiff seeking reconsideration of the dismissal of her
defamation claims. At oral argument, the court granted Wells’
motion for summary judgment, dismissing Wells from the case.
More relevant here, the court also granted Plaintiff’s
motion for reconsideration, restoring her defamation claims. As
the state court’s dismissal was based on the timeliness of those
claims, the court inquired into the dates of the communications
on which Plaintiff’s defamation allegations are based. In
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response to a question from the court, MSE’s counsel indicated
that it was MSE’s belief that Plaintiff’s defamation claims were
premised entirely on McKenna’s communication with Plaintiff’s
prospective employer, L3. Tr. Of Sep. 8, 2017 Oral Arg. 12:2024, Notice of Removal Ex. E.
Notably, Plaintiff’s counsel
disputed that characterization, arguing that Plaintiff’s
defamation claims were based, in part, on McKenna’s conversation
with L3, but were also based on two JPAS entries related to
Plaintiff; one in January of 2013 and one in May of 2014.
Plaintiff further argued that she did not discover these JPAS
entries until being alerted to them by L3 in August of 2014. The
state court granted Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and
ruled that Plaintiff’s defamation claims could proceed to trial.
Because Defendant had prepared only for a NJLAD trial, however,
the court granted it additional time to conduct depositions of
witnesses concerning Plaintiff’s defamation claims.
On September 25, 2017, MSE removed the action to this Court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442. After the parties submitted premotion letters in accordance with this Court’s Individual Rules
and Procedures, Plaintiff timely filed the presently pending
motion for remand on November 8, 2017, arguing that removal was
improper and untimely.
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II.
Discussion
The Court will first address whether Defendant’s removal of
this case was proper, before turning to the issue of whether
that removal was timely.
A. Defendant’s Removal of this Action was Proper
As noted above, MSE removed this case to federal court
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442, the “Federal Officer Removal
Statute,” which provides in relevant part:
(a) A civil action or criminal prosecution that is
commenced in a State court and that is against or
directed to any of the following may be removed by
them to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place wherein
it is pending:
(1) The United States or any agency thereof or any
officer (or any person acting under that officer) of
the United States or of any agency thereof, in an
official or individual capacity, for or relating to
any act under color of such office . . . .
28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1).
This statute exists to “protect[] officers of the federal
government,” and those acting under them, “from interference by
litigation in state court while those officers [and those under
their charge] are trying to carry out their duties.” Papp v.
Fore-Kast Sales Co., 842 F.3d 805, 811 (3d Cir. 2016)(citing
Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405–06 (1969)); see also
Watson v. Philip Morris Companies, Inc., 551 U.S. 142, 152
(2007) (citations omitted)(describing purpose of Federal Officer
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Removal Statute as including providing a federal forum in which
to hear federal immunity defenses). “Section 1442(a) is an
exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule, under which
(absent diversity) a defendant may not remove a case to federal
court unless the plaintiff's complaint establishes that the case
arises under federal law.” Id. (quoting Kircher v. Putnam Funds
Trust, 547 U.S. 633, 644 n.12 (2006) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted)). In accordance with the important
purposes it serves, “[u]nlike the general removal statute, the
federal officer removal statute is to be ‘broadly construed’ in
favor of a federal forum.” Id. at 811-12 (citations omitted).
The party removing an action to federal court bears the
burden of proving that subject matter jurisdiction exists and
that removal is proper. See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913
F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990). In order to remove a case under §
1442(a)(1), a defendant must meet four requirements:
(1) [the defendant] is a “person” within the meaning
of the statute; (2) the [plaintiff's] claims are based
upon the [defendant's] conduct “acting under” the
United States, its agencies, or its officers; (3) the
[plaintiff's] claims against [the defendant] are “for,
or relating to” an act under color of federal office;
and (4) [the defendant] raises a colorable federal
defense to the [plaintiff's] claims.
Id. at 812 (quoting In re Commonwealth's Motion to Appoint
Counsel Against or Directed to Def. Ass'n of Philadelphia, 790
10
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F.3d 457, 467 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (June 16, 2015)); Feidt
v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., 153 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir.
1998)( (citing Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 129 (1989)).
Plaintiff argues only that Defendants cannot prove their
federal defense. Despite Plaintiff’s apparent concession of
three of the four factors required for the Federal Officer
Removal Statute to apply, this Court has an obligation to
satisfy itself of its subject matter jurisdiction. See Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ward Trucking Corp., 48 F.3d 742, 750 (3d
Cir.1995); see also FED R. CIV. P. 12(h); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).
As such, the Court will address each of the four factors.
i.
MSE is a “Person” Within the Meaning of the
Federal Officer Removal Statute
Plaintiff has not disputed that MSE is a “person” as that
term applies to the Federal Officer Removal Statute. §
1442(a)(1) does not itself define the term “person.” As such,
courts, including the Third Circuit, have looked to § 1 of Title
I of the United States Code, which defines “person” to “include
corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships,
societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”
See, e.g., Papp, 842 F.3d at 812. As an LLC, MSE falls within
this definition.
ii.
MSE was “Acting Under” a Federal Officer or
Agency
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Plaintiff does not dispute that MSE was “acting under” a
federal officer or agency. “The ‘acting under’ requirement, like
the federal removal statute overall, is to be ‘liberally
construe[d]’ to cover actions that involve “an effort to assist,
or to help carry out,” a federal officer or agency’s duties or
tasks. Papp, 842 F. 3d at 812 (quoting Ruppel v. CBS Corp., 701
F.3d 1176, 1181 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting Watson 551 U.S. 142,
152, (2007)); see also Defender Ass'n,790 F.3d at 468
(construing “acting under” liberally). Although liberally
construed, “acting under” a federal officer or agency requires
more than simply complying with the terms of a law or
regulation. Watson, 551 U.S. at 152.
In other words, where a private actor seeks the benefit of
the Federal Officer removal statute, there must be some
relationship between the government and the private actor beyond
that of “regulator/regulated.” Id. at 157. One example of such a
relationship is where “the federal government uses a private
corporation”—a contractor—“to achieve an end it would have
otherwise used its own agents to complete.” Papp, 842 F.3d at
812 (citations omitted); see also Defender Ass'n, 790 F.3d at
468–70 (discussing different ways in which an entity might “act
under” a federal officer).
MSE “acted under” the Secretary of Defense when it filed
reports in JPAS about Plaintiff, an employee with security
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clearance. See Stephenson v. Nassif, 160 F. Supp. 3d 884, 887-89
(E.D. Va. 2015). The National Industrial Security Program
Operating Manual (“NISPOM”), issued by the Secretary of Defense
pursuant to Executive Order3, requires contractors with access to
classified information to report in JPAS “adverse information
coming to their attention concerning any of their cleared
employees.” See NISPOM §1-302(a). Adverse information that
defense contractors are required to report includes “any
information that negatively reflects on the integrity or
character of a cleared employee.” This regime requires defense
contractors to do more than simply behave in accordance with the
law. “The plain language of NISPOM § 1-302(a) is mandatory, and
by defining “adverse information” broadly the Department of
Defense create[d] a mandatory duty to report broadly.”
Stephenson, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 889.4
3
Exec. Order No. 12,829, 58 Fed. Reg. 3,479 (Jan. 6, 1993).
Plaintiff argues that this reporting duty excludes “reports
based on rumor or innuendo,” and that accordingly MSE could not
have been “acting under” the DOD because the reports about her
were not true. This type of on the merits attack “illustrates
precisely why federal officer jurisdiction is appropriate here.”
Stephenson, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 889.
4
If the basis for a federal contractor's decision to
make a mandatory report under NISPOM § 1-302(a) is
going to be open to attack on state tort law grounds,
then in the absence of a federal forum the contractors
subject to NISPOM might elect not to report in the
first instance, which would ‘disable federal
officials from taking necessary action’ to safeguard c
lassified information . . . Accordingly, application
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This reporting structure is the means through which the DOD
requires defense contractors to “assist” it in, or help it to
“carry out,” its duty to protect classified information.
Watson, 551 U.S. at 152. Without some mandatory reporting duty
such as that created by NISPOM, the DOD would not be able to
contract out classified work, and “would need to carry out all
activities relating to the protection of classified information
internally.” Stephenson, 160 F. Supp. 3d at 889. This type of
relationship falls squarely within the bounds of the “acting
under” requirement of the Federal Officer Removal Statute.
iii. Plaintiff’s Defamation Claim Rests on Acts
Done “For of Relating to” a Federal Officer
or Agency
“[I]n order to meet the ‘for or relating to’ requirement,
‘it is sufficient for there to be a connection or association
between the act in question and the federal office.’” Papp, 842
F.3d at 813 (quoting Defender Ass'n, 790 F.3d at 471 (internal
of federal officer jurisdiction to the dispute at hand
is consistent with the congressional policy underlying
§ 1442(a)(1), namely protecting the execution of
federal functions in the states by ensuring that
persons engaged in federal functions will have access
to a federal forum in which to raise federal defenses.
Plaintiff's argument essentially creates a defamation
exception to federal officer removal by requiring a
defendant to prove the truth of his statements before
removal is appropriate. There is no basis to conclude
that § 1442(a)(1) contemplates or allows such an
exception.
Id. at 889 (internal citations omitted).
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quotation marks omitted)). This requirement is met here.
Plaintiff’s defamation claims are based, at least in part, on
reports Defendant or its employees entered into JPAS; actions
which, as noted above, are required of defense contractors under
NISPOM.
iv.
MSE Raises a “Colorable” Federal Defense
Finally, MSE must raise a “colorable” federal defense to
Plaintiff’s defamation claims. A “colorable” defense is one that
is “legitimate and [could] reasonably be asserted, given the
facts presented and the current law.” Papp, 842 F.3d at 815
(quoting Colorable Claim, Black's Law Dictionary (10th ed.
2014)); see also Hagen v. Benjamin Foster Co., 739 F.Supp. 2d
770, 782–83 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (“[A] defense is colorable for
purposes of determining jurisdiction under Section 1442(a)(1) if
the defendant asserting it identifies facts which, viewed in the
light most favorable to the defendant, would establish a
complete defense at trial.”). MSE asserts that any report
submited by it to JPAS is absolutely privileged, citing
Mission1st Group, Inc. v. Filak, Civil Action No. 09-3758, 2010
WL 4974549, *2 (D.N.J. Dec. 2, 2010).
The court in Filak recognized the principle, set forth in
Becker v. Philco Corp., 372 F.2d 771, 775-76 (4th Cir.1967),
that a government contractor is not liable for defamation of an
employee because of reports made to the government pursuant to a
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governmentally imposed duty. Filak, 2010 WL 4974549, at *2. In
its notice of removal, MSE avers that (1) it is a government
contractor that (2) made a report to the government (3) pursuant
to a duty, and that Plaintiff now seeks to hold it liable for
that report. See Notice of Removal ¶ 10-17. Viewed in the light
most favorable to Defendant, this is enough to raise a colorable
defense.
Having been satisfied that Defendant has made a sufficient
showing that it is entitled to the benefit of the Federal
Officer Removal Statute, the Court now turns to the issue of
timeliness.
B. Defendant’s Removal of this Action was Timely
As the parties agree, nothing in Plaintiff’s initial
Complaint indicated that this case was removable on the basis of
the Federal Officer Removal Statute. Thus, the timeliness of
removal is determined pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(3),
which provides that
[e]xcept as provided in subsection (c)[governing
removal based upon diversity jurisdiction], if the
case stated by the initial pleading is not removable,
a notice of removal may be filed within 30 days after
receipt by the defendant, through service or
otherwise, of a copy of an amended pleading, motion,
order or other paper from which it may first be
ascertained that the case is one which is or has
become removable.
(emphasis added). Accordingly, in order to trigger the thirty
day clock for removal, MSE must have received, “through service
16
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or otherwise,” an amended pleading, motion, order, or “other
paper,” indicating that the case is removable. Moreover, with
regard to written documents submitted to the court or “court
related documents,” the “relevant test is not what the
defendants purportedly knew, but what the[] documents said.”
Foster v. Mut. Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 986 F.2d 48, 54
(3d Cir. 1993), rev'd on other grounds, Murphy Bros., Inc. v.
Michetti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344 (1999) (noting that
we look only to the “four corners of the pleading” to see if it
“informs the reader, to a substantial degree of specificity,
that all elements of federal jurisdiction are present,” and ask
“not what the defendant knew, but what the relevant document
said.”))
MSE argues that the clock for removal started running on
September 8, 2017, at an oral argument before the state court on
motions for summary judgment and reconsideration, and that as
such its September 25, 2017 removal was timely. Plaintiff
contends that there were at least four triggering events prior
to September 8, 2017: (1) June 25, 2015 when Plaintiff, then
proceeding pro se, sent a letter to the state court, a copy of
which was sent to MSE; (2) October 6, 2016, the date the matter
was reinstated to the state court’s active docket; (3) October
18, 2016, the date on which the Amended Complaint was filed; or
(4) May 15, 2017, the latest date on which MSE may have received
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Plaintiff’s responses to interrogatories, specifically its
response to interrogatory 10, which mentions JPAS. The Court is
persuaded that September 8, 2017 was the first occasion on which
MSE could ascertain that it was being sued for entering a report
into JPAS.
Plaintiff’s arguments fail for two reasons. First,
Plaintiff’s defamation claims were dismissed both when she sent
the June 25, 2015 letter5, and when MSE received Plaintiff’s
responses to interrogatories. On June 25, 2015, Plaintiff’s
entire pro se Complaint had been dismissed subject to certain
conditions and she was instructed by the state court to retain
counsel “with the understanding that she may have a claim for
unlawful termination.” April 24, 2015 Order Granting Dismissal,
Notice of Removal Ex. B. Likewise, when MSE received Plaintiff’s
responses to interrogatories, the defamation claims in
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint had been dismissed, and the
parties were proceeding on an NJLAD claim. Plaintiff’s counsel
acknowledged as much on the record at the September 8, 2017 oral
argument. In response to the Judge asking “we have a . . . tort
case and an [sic] LAD case, isn’t that true?,” counsel responded
5
For the purposes of this discussion, the Court assumes that
Plaintiff’s letter was the sort of “other paper” recognized by §
1446. Because the Court finds that the letter did not provide
sufficient information to put Plaintiff on notice of its federal
defense, however, the Court need not decide this issue.
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that “[c]urrently, the only issue in this case is retaliation,
discrimination.” It is difficult to—and this Court will not—say
that Defendant should have ascertained that it may have had a
federal defense to a defamation claim that had been dismissed in
a case that was proceeding, and appeared set to proceed, under
an employment discrimination theory only, and that Plaintiff
should have been required to remove on that basis.
Second, while it could be ascertained from the June 25,
2017 letter, the Amended Complaint, and Plaintiff’s response to
interrogatory 10 that Plaintiff was complaining of McKenna’s
statements to Plaintiff’s prospective employers about the status
and merits of a JPAS report, it was not clear that Plaintiff was
bringing defamation claims against MSE or anyone else for the
entry of the report itself. This is an important distinction, as
MSE argues that the JPAS reports themselves, as opposed to
statements made about the reports to non-government entities,
are privileged. It was not until the September 8, 2017 oral
argument that it became ascertainable that Plaintiff was
alleging defamation against MSE for the entry of JPAS reports.
This is the allegedly privileged conduct for which MSE raises a
colorable federal defense, and this is the basis on which the
Federal Officer Removal Statute applies. Accordingly, removal on
September 25, 2017 was timely.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s motion to remand is
DENIED. An Order consistent with this Opinion shall issue on
this date.
_s/_Renee Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
DATED: June 20, 2018
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