O'BRYANT et al v. THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANANCY et al

Filing 73

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/11/2022. (alb, n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

KINDRA O’BRYANT, BRIAN
FLANDERS, and ARTIE PEOPLES,
Plaintiffs,

1:17-cv-7752-NLH-AMD
OPINION

v.
THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANENCY, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
KINDRA O’BRYANT
1320 CHASE STREET
CAMDEN, NJ 08104
BRIAN FLANDERS
1320 CHASE STREET
CAMDEN, NJ 08104
ARTIE PEOPLES
1214 N. 33RD STREET
CAMDEN, NJ 08105
Plaintiffs appearing pro se 1
As previously noted in the Court’s February 22, 2021 Opinion
[Dkt. No. 68], it has been represented to the Court that even
though O’Bryant and Flanders resided together when this matter
was filed, they no longer live in the same home. Thus, based on
the certificate of service filed by Camden County Sheriff
Defendants, it appears that O’Bryant now resides with her
father, her co-Plaintiff Peoples, and that Flanders now resides
in Wildwood, New Jersey. See Certificate of Service [Dkt. No.
70-3]. As was the case in the Court’s prior opinion, it appears
that O’Bryant and Flanders have failed to update the Court with
their correct address. See L. Civ. R. 10.1(a) (directing that
1

HOWARD LANE GOLDBERG
KRISTA SCHMID
OFFICE OF CAMDEN COUNTY COUNSEL
520 MARKET STREET
COURTHOUSE, 14TH FLOOR
CAMDEN, NJ 08102
On behalf of Defendants Camden County Sheriff Gilbert
“Whip” Wilson, Sheriff Deputy T. Nichols, and Sheriff
Deputy Gurkin
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter is before the Court on Defendants Camden County
Sheriff Gilbert “Whip” Wilson, Sheriff Deputy T. Nichols, and
Sheriff Deputy Gurkin’s (collectively the “Camden County Sheriff
Defendants” or “Defendants”) renewed motion to dismiss
Plaintiff’s Complaint, [Docket Number 70], pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs Kindra O’Bryant, Brian Flanders,

and Artie Peoples (collectively “Plaintiffs”) oppose the motion.
The Court has considered the parties’ submissions and
decides this matter without oral argument pursuant to Rule 78 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Local Civil Rule 78.1.
For the reasons expressed below, Defendants’ motion will be
granted.
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court provided a detailed outline of the factual and

litigants have an affirmative
current address and to inform
seven days, and if a litigant
subject to being stuck by the

duty to inform the Court of their
the Court of any changes within
fails to do so, the complaint is
Clerk).
2

procedural history of this case in its September 5, 2018
Memorandum Opinion and Order [Dkt. Nos. 44 and 45 respectively],
originally dismissing the case with prejudice, and its February
22, 2021 Opinion and Order [Dkt. Nos. 68 and 67 respectively],
dismissing with prejudice Defendants (1) the New Jersey Division
of Child Protection & Permanency (“DCPP”), (2) Allison Blake,
the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families
(“DCF”), (3) Lisa Von Pier, the Assistant Commissioner of DCPP,
(4) Lisa Capone, a DCPP Supervisor, (5) Conchita Varga, a DCPP
employee, (6) Bryant Rolls, a DCPP employee, (7) Alicia Ash, a
DCPP employee, and (8) Jonathan Garrett, a DCPP employee
(collectively the “State Defendants”).

The Court assumes the

parties’ familiarity with these opinions and the relevant
history; accordingly, the Court will restate only the salient
facts relevant to the instant motion for dismissal.
This case concerns claims by Plaintiffs arising from a
state court child welfare case and the temporary removal of two
of O’Bryant’s children from her custody.

O’Bryant is the mother

of three children, Flanders is the father of the youngest of
O’Bryant’s children, and Peoples is O’Bryant’s father and the
grandfather of all three children.

Plaintiffs allege that, on

June 6, 2017, DCPP received a call that Flanders seemed upset
and agitated when he dropped off two of O’Bryant’s children at
school.

DCPP later learned that Flanders had an “endangering
3

the welfare of [a] child charge, [a] weapons charge, [an]
aggravated assault on a police officer charge, [and] warrants
out for his arrest.”

Complaint [Dkt. No. 1.], at ¶132.

That

same day, at a time when she was pregnant with Flanders’ child,
O’Bryant was hospitalized for injuries sustained during an
attempted suicide by self-mutilation (cutting herself).

Prior

to being discharged from the hospital, O’Bryant signed a Family
Agreement (the “Family Agreement”), in which she agreed that
Flanders would only be permitted around the children after
completing a twelve-week parenting and domestic violence
program.
On August 15, 2017, O’Bryant gave birth to Flanders’ child
at Cooper Hospital in Camden, New Jersey.

The next day, DCPP

caseworkers arrived at the hospital to discuss the Family
Agreement with O’Bryant.

Also present at the hospital were

Peoples, Flanders, and the two older children.

While at the

hospital, one of the caseworkers asked to interview O’Bryant’s
two older children.

Peoples refused to permit the interview and

attempted to leave the hospital with the two older children.
A DCPP caseworker then summoned hospital security and
Defendant Nichols, a Camden County Deputy Sheriff.

The

caseworker informed Nichols of the situation, including the fact
there were charges against Flanders and warrants for his arrest.
Id. at ¶¶131-132.

Peoples affirmed that the caseworker wanted
4

to speak with the two children and that he was refusing to
cooperate without a warrant.

Id. at ¶134.

Plaintiffs then

allege that Nichols called over to another deputy (presumably
Defendant Gurkin), asking for a warrant check on Flanders, which
supposedly came up negative, as a result of which Nichols told
Flanders there were no outstanding warrants for his arrest.

Id.

at ¶133.
Peoples eventually relented and agreed to allow the
caseworker to speak with the children on the condition that a
Cooper Hospital security officer and Nichols would be present
for the interview.

Id. at ¶¶136-37.

The caseworker then showed

Nichols Dodd removal papers, 2 which, according to the Complaint,
Nicholas showed to Peoples, informing Peoples that DCPP had the
right to speak with the children and that DCPP would speak with
the children across the street at the DCPP building.

Nichols,

Peoples, Flanders, and the caseworkers then walked the children
to the DCPP building.

Id. at ¶142.

While the children are

escorted into the DCPP building by Nichols and the caseworkers,
Peoples and Flanders waited outside.

Id. at ¶143.

Flanders was

As described by the Supreme Court of New Jersey, “[a] ‘Dodd
removal’ refers to the emergency removal of a child from the
home [or custody of a parent] without a court order, pursuant to
the Dodd Act, which, as amended, is found at N.J.S.A. 9:6-88.21
to -8.82. The Act was authored by former Senate President Frank
J. ‘Pat’ Dodd in 1974.” N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v.
P.W.R., 11 A.3d 844, 849 n.11, 205 N.J. 17, 26 n.11 (2011)
(citation omitted).
2

5

later arrested by Nichols, who emerged from the building with a
warrant for Flanders’ arrest.

Id. at ¶145.

After waiting several hours, Peoples was told by a DCPP
employee that the children would not be released to him as the
children were being kept in DCPP custody.

Id. at ¶147.

Plaintiffs aver this DCPP employee or security guard told
Peoples that paperwork regarding the children was left with
O’Bryant back at the hospital.

Id. at ¶148.

Peoples returned

to O’Bryant’s hospital room where she said there was no
paperwork regarding DCPP’s seizure of the children.

Id. at

¶149.
Peoples then returned to the DCPP building to again ask
about paperwork regarding the children.

Id. at ¶150.

Failing

to obtain paperwork or a satisfactory response, Peoples called
the Camden County Police Department to report that his
grandchildren were seized by DCPP without any documentation for
the seizure.

Id. at ¶¶150-51.

The responding officers entered

the DCPP building and spoke with DCPP’s security staff.
¶¶151-53.

Id. at

The unnamed officers (again, possibly Gurkin, as he

is otherwise not mentioned in the Complaint) informed Peoples
that “there is nothing they can do” and provided him with an
incident report number.
On August 18, 2017, Plaintiffs filed the instinct action
seeking $10,000,000 in compensatory damages, $50,000,000 in
6

punitive damages, and an injunction requiring explicit
instruction and policy be enacted requiring the Camden County
Sheriff Defendants to refrain from abuse of process.

While the

Complaint asserts six counts, the first five counts expressly
concern claims against Defendants who were previously dismissed
from the case.

Thus, only the sixth count is relevant here.

Specifically, the sixth count alleges the Camden County
Sheriff Defendants are liable for violations of Plaintiffs’
constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

As concerns

Nichols, the Complaint appears to center on whether his decision
to escort the children from the hospital to the DCPP building
(based on the information provided by the DCPP caseworker and
the Dodd removal papers) violated the Plaintiffs’ right to be
free from “unlawful investigations” in connection with the
temporary removal of the children.
Plaintiffs also claim Wilson failed to promulgate adequate
rules and regulations regarding the seizure of children and
further failed to instruct, discipline, and train deputies in
the appropriate methods for handling and investigating
allegations of child abuse in cases of exigent circumstances
resulting in threats and abuse of power.

Id. at ¶224.

Plaintiffs seek to hold the Defendants liable in their official
and individual capacities.
On September 6, 2018, the Court dismissed the case with
7

prejudice for lack of jurisdiction under the domestic relations
exception and alternatively due to abstention under Younger.
The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of all claims for
monetary damages against DCPP and the other individual State
Defendants in their official capacities on the grounds of
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.

On November 4, 2020, the

case was reinstated for the remaining claims.

On February 22,

2021, the Court issued an Opinion and Order dismissing the State
Defendants with prejudice, finding them entitled to qualified
immunity.

On June 12, 2021, the Camden County Sheriff

Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss.
II.

DISCUSSION

A.

Jurisdiction
As Plaintiffs’ claims are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §

1983, the Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over
this matter because it arises under the laws of the United
States, raising a federal question.
B.

28 U.S.C. § 1331.

Legal Standard
It is well settled that a pleading must be “a short and

plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

This Rule

“requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.
Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief
8

above the speculative level[.]”

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,

550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citations omitted).
In addition, when considering a motion to dismiss a
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, a court must accept all well-pleaded allegations as
true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).

It is well

settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do . . . .”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555

(alteration in original) (citations omitted) (first citing
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of
Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994);
and then citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court must
take three steps: (1) the court must take note of the elements a
plaintiff must plead to state a claim; (2) the court should
identify allegations that, because they are no more than
9

conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth; and
(3) when there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.

Malleus v.

George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 664, 675, 679 (2009) (alterations,
quotations, and other citations omitted)).
“[W]hen a complaint adequately states a claim, it may not
be dismissed based on a district court’s assessment that the
plaintiff will fail to find evidentiary support for his
allegations or prove his claim to the satisfaction of the
factfinder.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer v.

Rhoades, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974)).

Thus, a court asks “not

whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.”
Id. (quoting Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 236).
“A motion to dismiss should be granted if the plaintiff is
unable to plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’”

Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570); see also Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal . . . provide[d] the
final nail in the coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard that
applied to federal complaints before Twombly.”).

“The

plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability
10

requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that
a [party] has acted unlawfully.”

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable
inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged.”

Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

It is

ultimately the defendant, however, that bears the burden of
showing that no claim has been presented.

Hedges v. United

States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing Kehr Packages,
Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir. 1991)).
In addition, the Court must be mindful towards pro se
pleadings.

In particular, pro se complaints must be construed

liberally, and all reasonable latitude must be afforded to the
pro se litigant, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), but
pro se litigants “must still plead the essential elements of
[their] claim and [are] not excused from conforming to the
standard rules of civil procedure.”

McNeil v. United States,

508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested that
procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel.”); see also Sykes v. Blockbuster Video, 205 F.
App’x 961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that pro se plaintiffs
are expected to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure).
11

C.

Analysis
As noted above, Plaintiff’s only remaining claim is against

the Camden County Sheriff Defendants, asserting a cause of
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for assisting the DCPP caseworkers
in removing the children to the DCPP building for interviews.
Defendants claim the Complaint fails to state a claim as they
are entitled to qualified immunity, just as the Court previously
found for the State Defendants.
Not surprisingly, the Court’s analysis of this last
remaining claim largely turns on the same reasoning as the
Court’s February 22, 2021 Opinion, which dismissed Plaintiff’s
claims against the State Defendants after finding qualified
immunity barred most of Plaintiffs’ claims.

Substantially, for

the reasons expressed in that Opinion, which the Court
incorporates here, the Court finds that the Camden County
Sheriff Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity and the
claims against them in their individual capacities must be
dismissed.
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part, “[e]very person
who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
12

and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.”
“By its terms, of course, [§ 1983] creates no substantive
rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations of rights
established elsewhere.” City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 816 (1985).
“To establish a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff]
must demonstrate a violation of a right secured by the
Constitution and the laws of the United States [and] that the
alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color
9 of state law.”
1993).

Moore v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir.

For claims asserted against persons acting under the

color of state law, such as the Defendants here, the qualified
immunity doctrine governs the analysis.

“Qualified immunity

shields government officials from civil damages liability unless
the official violated a statutory or constitutional right that
was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.”
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012).

“When properly

applied, it protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those
who knowingly violate the law.’”
731, 735 (2011) (quoting

Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S.

, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).

To

overcome a defendant’s qualified immunity shield, a plaintiff
must plead facts showing (1) that the official violated a
statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was
13

“clearly established” at the time of the challenged conduct.
al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 735 (citation omitted).

Lower courts have

discretion to decide which of the two prongs of qualified
immunity analysis to tackle first.

Id. (citing Pearson v.

Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009)).
“The dispositive point in determining whether a right is
clearly established is whether a reasonable officer in the same
situation clearly would understand that his actions were
unlawful.”

Morillo v. Torres, 222 N.J. 104, 118, 117 A.3d 1206,

1214 (2015); Reiche v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012)
(holding that a right is clearly established when the law is
“sufficiently clear that every reasonable official would have
understood that what he [or she] is doing violates that
right.”).

“In other words, ‘existing precedent must have placed

the statutory or constitutional question’ confronted by the
official ‘beyond debate.’”

Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731,

741 (2011)); see also White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 137 S. Ct.
548, 551 (2017) (“While this Court's case law do[es] not require
a case directly on point for a right to be clearly established,
existing precedent must have placed the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.”) (internal quotations
omitted) (citation omitted).
Qualified immunity “shields an officer from suit when [he
or she] makes a decision that, even if constitutionally
14

deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the
circumstances [he or she] confronted.”

Brosseau v. Haugen, 543

U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (citing Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206
(2001) (stating that qualified immunity operates “to protect
officers from the sometimes ‘hazy border between excessive and
acceptable force’”)).

There is a “longstanding principle that

‘clearly established law’ should not be defined “‘at a high
level of generality.’”

White, 137 S. Ct. at 552 (quoting al–

Kidd, 563 U.S. at 742).

Rather, “the clearly established law

must be ‘particularized’ to the facts of the case.”
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).

Id. (citing
“Otherwise,

[p]laintiffs would be able to convert the rule of qualified
immunity ... into a rule of virtually unqualified liability
simply by alleging violation of extremely abstract rights.”
(alterations in original) (citation omitted).

Id.

One final caveat

regarding qualified immunity is that the defense only protects
against claims against officers and other public officials in
their individual capacities and not their official capacities.
Stanziale v. Cnty. of Monmouth, 884 F. Supp. 140, 144-45 (D.N.J.
1995).
Here, Defendants argue the temporary removal of the
children under the circumstances alleged in the Complaint
entitles Defendants to qualified immunity.
two bases for their argument.

Defendants present

First, Defendants contend that
15

Plaintiffs’ allegations do not state a case for violations of a
“clearly established” right.

And second, Defendants claim there

are no allegations to show that any constitutional or statutory
right was violated.

As for the arguments presented, the Court

need only address the first line of reasoning, as it alone
sufficiently supports dismissal under qualified immunity.
In evaluating the same allegations that give rise to count
six, the Court’s February 22, 2021 Opinion plainly found
Plaintiffs are unable to demonstrate a “clearly established”
right was violated.

The Court’s prior ruling centered on the

Third Circuit’s analysis in Mammaro v. New Jersey Div. of Child
Protection and Permancy, 814 F.3d 164, 166-71 (3d Cir. 2016),
which found that, although “the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents
to make decisions concerning the case, custody, and control of
their children,” and from this fundamental right flows certain
procedural due process rights for parents when a government
entity seeks to deprive them permanently of custody, “no Supreme
Court precedent clearly establishes that [the child]’s temporary
removal from her mother’s custody violated substantive due
process.”

Id. at 170.

As this Court noted, “the allegations in Mammaro and those
asserted by Plaintiffs in this case are analogous,” thus the
Complaint fails to allege the violation of a clearly established
16

right and the Camden County Sheriff Defendants are entitled to
qualified immunity just as were the State Defendants.

February

22, 2021 Opinion [Dkt. No. 68] at 18 (“The DCPP defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity for their actions alleged by
Plaintiffs.

As the Third Circuit found in Mammaro, there is no

Supreme Court precedent that clearly establishes O’Bryant’s
children’s temporary removal from her custody violates
substantive due process.

Moreover, as directly evidenced by the

facts in Mammaro, there is no consensus in the case law that
temporarily removing O’Bryant’s children was an unconstitutional
interference with the parent-child relationship under the
circumstances alleged in Plaintiffs’ complaint.”).
Plaintiffs argue that children cannot be removed from their
parents absent exigent circumstances.

However, the record

demonstrates such circumstances were present to justify the
Defendants’ actions.

As set forth in the Court’s prior Opinion,

the record shows that: (1) Flanders was upset and agitated when
dropping O’Bryant’s children off at school; (2) DCPP discovered
that Flanders, who lived with O’Bryant and her two children, had
a documented history of child abuse and a violent criminal
record, which included endangering the welfare of a child,
weapons, and aggravated assault on a police officer; (3) DCPP
discovered O’Bryant had attempted suicide while pregnant; (4)
O’Bryant willingly entered into a contract, the Family
17

Agreement, whereby she agreed that in order to keep custody of
her children, Flanders would not live with her children until
after he completed parenting and domestic violence programs; (5)
DCPP learned that O’Bryant’s children were living with her and
Flanders, and the two Plaintiffs were at the hospital together
with the children when O’Bryant gave birth to Flanders’ child;
and (6) the DCPP caseworkers provided Nichols with a Dodd report
concerning such details and discussed the situation with Nichols
informing him of DCPP’s entitlement to interview and protect the
children.
Thus, in consideration of all these facts and
circumstances, it is evident that Nichols’ actions (and the
other Camden County Sheriff Defendants) did not constitute “an
arbitrary abuse of government power that shocks the conscience.”
Mammaro, 814 F.3d 170-71.

There is nothing suggested by

Plaintiffs that Nichols, Wilson, or Gurkin had any reason to be
put on notice that their conduct and policies violated
substantive due process.

Accordingly, the Court finds that

qualified immunity bars Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants in
their individual capacities.
In addition to qualified immunity, the Court also finds
that dismissal is appropriate for Plaintiffs’ claims against
Gurkin, Nichols, and Wilson in their official capacities because
the Complaint fails to comply with Federal Rule of Civil
18

Procedure 8 and ultimately fails to state a claim against them.
As noted above, Rule 8 requires Plaintiffs’ Complaint to
contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).

Even liberally construing the Complaint, Plaintiffs fail to
provide fair notice of the grounds on which they intend to rest
their claims against Gurkin, who, beyond the case caption, is
not even mentioned or identified in the Complaint.

Although the

Complaint provides an overview of events that occurred on August
16, 2017, it contains no factual allegations specific to Gurkin.
As a result, the Court and Gurkin are unable to discern which
allegations apply to him individually.
Similarly and perhaps relatedly, the Complaint notes that
Nichols called a deputy and that Camden County Police responded
to Peoples’ call, but the Complaint does not define who these
individuals are.
pleading.

This is a form of impermissible group

Szemple v. Rutgers Univ., No. 19-13300, 2021 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 32899, at *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 22, 2021) (“This group
pleading is prohibited”) (citing Galicki v. New Jersey, No. 14169, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84365, at *8 (D.N.J. June 29, 2015)).
It is a basic pleading requirement that “[a] plaintiff must
allege facts that ‘establish each individual [d]efendant’s
liability for misconduct alleged.’”
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 32899, at *8.
19

Id. (quoting Galicki, 2015

Furthermore, Plaintiffs have failed to identify any policy
to support their Monell claims against Defendants in their
official capacities.

Claims against officers in their official

capacities are the functional equivalent of a claim against the
municipality or public entity that employs them, as the claim is
truly against the city or municipality.
473 U.S. 159, 167 (1985).

See Kentucky v. Graham,

Government entities or municipalities

may be liable for their agents’ actions upon a demonstration
that a policy or custom of the municipality caused, or was a
“moving force” behind, the alleged violation of the Plaintiffs’
rights.

Id. at 166 (citation omitted.

To demonstrate a Monell

claim, “[a] plaintiff must identify the challenged policy,
attributed to the city itself, and show a causal link between
execution of the policy and the injury suffered.”

Losch v.

Parkesburg, 736 F.2d 903, 910 (3d Cir. 1984).
Therefore, under the present circumstances, Plaintiffs may
sue the Camden County Sheriff Defendants in their official
capacities under § 1983 theory of liability only for acts
implementing an official policy, practice, or
custom.

See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-

94 (1978).

Again, to plausibly plead Monell liability, a

plaintiff must identify the challenged policy or custom,
attribute it to the municipality itself, or in this case, a
policy established or implemented by Wilson, and show a causal
20

link between execution of the policy and the injury
suffered.

Harley v. City of New Jersey City, No. 16-5135, 2017

WL 2774966, at *7–8 (D.N.J. June 27, 2017).
In addition, where the identified “policy concerns a
failure to train or supervise municipal employees,” as is
alleged in the instant case, “liability under § 1983 requires a
showing that the failure amounts to ‘deliberate indifference’ to
the rights of persons with whom those employees will come into
contact.”
Cir. 2014).

Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d
Deliberate indifference is a “stringent standard of

fault, requiring proof that a municipal actor disregarded a
known or obvious consequence of his action.”

Id. at 223.

Ordinarily, “[a] pattern of similar constitutional violations by
untrained employees” is necessary “to demonstrate deliberate
indifference for purposes of failure to train.” Id.
“Additionally, ‘the identified deficiency in a city's training
program must be closely related to the ultimate injury;’ or in
other words, ‘the deficiency in training [must have] actually
caused’ the constitutional violation.” Id. at 222 (quoting City
of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 391 (1989)).
Here, the Complaint identifies Wilson and the Camden County
Sheriff’s Department (which is not named as a Defendant) as
responsible for promulgating and enforcing rules, policies, and
regulations regarding child abuse investigations, but the
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Complaint fails to note any specific policy, procedure, or rule
that undergirds the action as a violation of Plaintiffs’ rights.
The Complaint vaguely claims the existence of a policy or custom
allowing deputies to commit “abuse of process,” yet there is
nothing further plead to substantiate this bald assertion.
Accordingly, a thorough review of the Complaint shows Count Six
is merely a collection of bare conclusions against Wilson and
the Camden County Sheriff’s Department (and by extension Gurkin
and Nichols for supposedly following this unnamed policy), which
is insufficient to state a claim for relief.

Id. (citing Kaplan

v. Holder, No. 14-1740, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33376, 2015 WL
1268203, at *4 (D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2015) (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678)).
More particularly, beyond these blank averments, there is
nothing tying Defendants, and particularly Wilson and Gurkin to
the action.

See Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir.

2005) (holding that dismissal was appropriate because pro se
plaintiff’s Complaint failed to allege the individual defendant
was personally involved in the alleged unlawful act, nor did the
Complaint include “even a remote suggestion that [the individual
defendant] had contemporaneous, personal knowledge of the
[alleged unlawful act] and acquiesced in it.”).

Thus,

Plaintiffs provide no reasonable basis to support a finding that
a Camden County Sheriff’s Department policy, practice, or custom
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led to a deprivation of Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights.

The

Complaint is absent of facts establishing the existence of an
unconstitutional policy; the execution of that policy caused
Plaintiffs’ deprivation of rights; and a connection between that
conduct and the deputies’ actions in aiding the DCPP
caseworkers’ removal of O’Bryant’s children.
For these reasons, the Complaint in its current form “would
not provide any meaningful opportunity to [Defendants] to
decipher or answer the vague allegations levied against them.”
Johnson v. Koehler, No. 18-807, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42006, at
*8 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 15, 2019); see Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Consequently, even if the Court were not to grant dismissal
under qualified immunity, the Court is compelled to disregard
the Complaint’s “naked assertions devoid of further factual
enhancement,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and dismiss the Complaint
against the Defendants for failure to state a claim and for
failure to comply with Rule 8.

See Szemple, 2021 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 32899, at *9 (dismissing pro se Plaintiff’s complaint for
failure to comply with Rule 8 and failure to state a claim where
Plaintiff failed to refer to Defendants individually and provide
them fair notice of the grounds on which he intends to rest his
claims).
In sum, Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants in their
individual capacities will be dismissed with prejudice.
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Dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims against Defendants in their
official capacities will be without prejudice.

Plaintiff will

be granted leave to file an Amended Complaint within thirty (30)
days of this Opinion and accompanying Order that cures the
aforementioned pleading deficiencies if they are able to do
consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.

See Denton

v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992) (holding that a pro se
plaintiff should receive leave to amend to address the
inadequacies of his/her complaint unless such amendment would be
futile or inequitable); see also LaGuardia v. Ross Twp., 705 F.
App’x 130, 132 n.6 (3d Cir. 2017) (holding that “leave to amend
pleadings should be freely granted unless the curative amendment
would be ‘inequitable, futile, or untimely’”) (quoting Alston v.
Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235-36 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that “even
when a plaintiff does not seek leave to amend, if a complaint is
vulnerable to 12(b)(6) dismissal, a District Court must permit a
curative amendment, unless an amendment would be inequitable or
futile”)).
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Rule 12(b)(6) motion
will be granted.

An appropriate Order will follow.

Date: August 11, 2022
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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