GORMLEY v. GORMLEY et al
Filing
56
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 5/18/18. n.m.(dd, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
JOSEPH J GORMLEY, III,
Plaintiff,
1:17-cv-07874-NLH-AMD
OPINION
v.
SUSAN CANNAVO GORMLEY,
MICHAEL A. WEINBERG
ESQ., AMY C. GOLDSTEIN
ESQ., DR. GREGORY W. JOSEPH,
DR. MIRIAM HORN, FRANK
CANNAVO, CAROLYN CANNAVO,
MONICA SHORE, HON. KENNETH S.
DOMZALSKI,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
JOSEPH J GORMLEY, III
11 O'ROURKE DRIVE
ROBBINSVILLE, NJ 08691
Appearing pro se
GARY M. MAREK
LAW OFFICES OF GARY M. MAREK
7008 NORMANDY DRIVE
MOUNT LAUREL, NJ 08054
GIACOMO FRANCESCO GATTUSO
SWEENEY & SHEEHAN
216 HADDON AVENUE, SUITE 500
WESTMONT, NJ 08108
On behalf of Defendants Susan Cannavo Gormley, Frank
Cannavo, and Carolyn Cannavo
ELLIS I. MEDOWAY
KERRI E. CHEWNING
ARCHER & GREINER, PC
ONE CENTENNIAL SQUARE
HADDONFIELD, NJ 08033
On behalf of Defendant Michael A. Weinberg, Esq.
MATTHEW NICHOLAS FIOROVANTI
GIORDANO HALLERAN & CIESLA PC
125 HALF MILE, SUITE 300
RED BANK, NJ 07701
On behalf of Defendant Amy C. Goldstein, Esq.
JOHN L. SLIMM
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN, PC
15000 MIDLANTIC DRIVE, SUITE 200
P.O. BOX 5429
MT. LAUREL, NJ 08054
On behalf of Defendant Dr. Gregory W. Joseph
THOMAS M. WALSH
PARKER, MCCAY, PA
9000 MIDLANTIC DRIVE
SUITE 300
PO BOX 5054
MOUNT LAUREL, NJ 08054
On behalf of Defendant Dr. Miriam Horn
MELISSA J. KANBAYASHI
MARKS, O'NEILL, O'BRIEN, DOHERTY & KELLY, PC
CHERRY TREE CORPORATE CENTER
535 RT. 38 EAST
SUITE 501
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08002
On behalf of Defendant Monica Shore
MELIHA ARNAUTOVIC
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NJ
25 MARKET ST, 7TH FL, WEST WING
PO BOX 116
TRENTON, NJ 08625
On behalf of Defendant Hon. Kenneth S. Domzalski
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter concerns claims by pro se Plaintiff, Joseph J.
Gormley, III, arising out of a pending state court divorce and
child custody proceeding.
Each of the nine defendants has moved
to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.
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For the reasons expressed
below, Defendants’ motions will be granted.
BACKGROUND
The “Introduction” section of Plaintiff’s complaint
summarizes the content of his 84-paragraph complaint, which he
lodges against his spouse and her parents, his spouse’s former
and current counsel, three licensed therapists, and a state
court judge, all of whom are involved in a divorce and custody
case currently pending in state court.
1. In this action, Plaintiff JOSEPH J. GORMLEY, III
seeks damages from Defendants SUSAN CANNAVO GORMLEY;
MICHAEL A. WEINBERG, ESQ.; AMY C. GOLDSTEIN, ESQ.; DR.
GREGORY W. JOSEPH; DR. MIRIAM HORN; FRANK CANNAVO; CAROLYN
CANNAVO; MONICA SHORE; HON. KENNETH S. DOMZALSKI JOHN and
JANE DOES 1-100.
2. Defendants have acted in a callous and malicious
manner with the intent to prevent the Plaintiff from being
an active parent for his minor daughter.
3. The rights of both the parent and the child have
been, and are continuing to be, violated. The Court has
violated the very essence of the intent of the land's
highest Court by not allowing me to enjoy the sanctity of
my parental rights. The Defendant, SUSAN CANNAVO GORMLEY,
is conspiring to do this, with the aid of her parents FRANK
CANNAVO and CAROLYN CANNAVO, and her counsels MICHAEL A.
WEINBERG, ESQ. and AMY C. GOLDSTEIN are perpetuating it;
while the Court, the HON. KENNETH S. DOMZALSKI, has ignored
the laws and stood in the way of my ability and privilege
to have unfettered parenting time with my daughter.
4. The United States Constitution, and rulings from
the highest Court in the land, have lawful devices to
protect families from such horrors.
5. Defendants' actions have caused the Plaintiff to
suffer both physically and emotionally. Plaintiff alleges
a violation of his constitutional rights,
misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional
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distress.
6. The Plaintiff has suffered severe emotional
distress as a result of the harm brought on by the
Defendants' recklessness and is entitled to damages. The
Defendant, SUSAN CANNAVO GORMLEY, has acted intentionally
and recklessly; in an extreme and outrageous manner; and
her conduct is the cause of severe emotional distress.
Similarly, the emotional distress that has been suffered by
the Plaintiff is palpable, severe, and enduring as a result
of Defendant's reckless and malicious behaviors - that have
robbed me of valuable and precious time with my daughter,
and which will adversely affect my emotional and physical
well-being for the rest of my life.
7. The Defendants, MICHAEL A. WEINBERG, ESQ. and AMY
C. GOLDSTEIN, have breached the attorney ethics standards
and Rules of Professional Conduct by encouraging the
Defendant, SUSAN CANNAVO GORMLEY, to make false statements,
file frivolous pleadings, and interfere with my parenting
time, thereby contributing to the violation of my 14th
Amendment rights.
8. The Defendant, the HON. KENNETH S. DOMZALSKI, has
ignored all the laws, refused to permit me to have
unfettered parenting time with my daughter, without cause,
and has thereby violated my 14th Amendment rights.
(Docket No. 1 at 1-3).
With regard to the licensed therapists involved in the
family court matter, Plaintiff alleges:
The Defendants DR. GREGORY W. JOSEPH; DR. MIRIAM HORN;
and MONICA SHORE provided reports based merely on unfounded
speculation and unquantified possibilities, aligning
themselves with the Defendant SUSAN CANNAVO GORMLEY and
simply regurgitated information spewed from her, empowering
her to prevent me from being a parent to my daughter.
(Docket No. 1 at 9.)
Plaintiff has asserted three counts against all defendants:
Count One – Violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; Count Two –
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Misrepresentation; and Count Three – Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress.
Defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on
numerous grounds.
Plaintiff has opposed Defendants’ motions.
The Court has reviewed all the parties’ submissions, including
the letters Plaintiff has submitted to the Court.
DISCUSSION
A.
Subject matter jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s federal claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiff’s state law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
B.
Analysis
All of Plaintiff’s claims arise out of a currently pending
state court divorce and custody case, which involves each of the
Defendants.
Plaintiff’s claims are dismissible for numerous
reasons, but the primary bases for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims are two fundamental doctrines – the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine and the Younger abstention doctrine. 1
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Defendants present arguments for the dismissal of Plaintiff’s
claims based on sovereign immunity, absolute judicial immunity,
litigation privilege immunity, and not being a state actor or
person under § 1983, as well as Plaintiff’s failure to state
cognizable claims under the proper pleading standards. Even
though these arguments might independently warrant the dismissal
of Plaintiff’s claims, it is unnecessary to examine them because
the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under RookerFeldman, and Plaintiff’s claims are otherwise barred under
Younger.
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The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, derived from the two Supreme
Court cases District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923), provides that lower federal courts lack subject
matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of state-court
determinations or to evaluate constitutional claims that are
inextricably intertwined with the state court’s decision in a
judicial proceeding. 2
Port Authority Police Benev. Ass'n, Inc.
v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police Dept., 973
F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992).
A plaintiff’s claim for relief in
a federal action is “inextricably intertwined” with an issue
adjudicated by a state court under two circumstances: (1) when
in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the
federal court must determine that the state court judgment was
erroneously entered, and (2) when the federal court must take
action that would render the state court's judgment ineffectual.
Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 421
(3d Cir. 2003) (quotations, citations, and internal edits
2
Several Defendants raised the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in their
motions, but even if they did not, this Court has a continuing
obligation to sua sponte raise the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction, which includes the determination of whether the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies. Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of
Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 420 (3d Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted). The Court therefore proceeds under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(1).
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omitted).
The abstention doctrine announced in Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971) counsels against a federal court exercising
jurisdiction over a matter seeking review of a pending state
court proceeding.
Three requirements must be met before Younger
abstention is appropriate: (1) there are ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the
state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise
federal claims.
Marran v. Marran, 376 F.3d 143, 154 (3d Cir.
2004) (citations omitted).
The required elements of both doctrines are readily met
here.
Plaintiff claims that the participants in his pending
state court divorce and custody case – his spouse, her parents,
her lawyers, the court-appointed psychologists, and the judge
presiding over the matter – have all caused Plaintiff to lose
time with his daughter, which has caused him severe emotional
and physical distress.
Plaintiff seeks money damages, as well
as injunctive relief, presumably to modify the state court
orders and grant him “unfettered” time with his daughter.
In order for Plaintiff to prevail on his claims, and to
obtain his requested relief, this Court would have to find that
the state court judge’s decisions, based on the testimony of
Plaintiff’s spouse and her parents and the family therapists as
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proffered by his spouse’s counsel, were erroneous.
Such a
finding would then render ineffectual the state court judge’s
orders.
This Court is precluded from making such determinations
and acting as an appellate court reviewing the state court’s
decisions.
See In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005)
(“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents ‘inferior’ federal courts
from sitting as appellate courts for state court judgments.”);
Marran, 376 F.3d at 151 (finding that the Roooker-Feldman
doctrine barred a mother’s claims for money damages and
injunctive relief against her child’s father because to prevail
on her claims would require the court to determine that the
state court erred in finding that the abuse allegations were
unfounded); Romanova v. Epp, 2017 WL 1907868 at *2 (D.N.J. 2017)
(finding that because the plaintiff sought an order from the
court reversing various orders of the state court regarding
domestic violence and child custody, the court was without
jurisdiction to entertain this matter pursuant to the Rooker–
Feldman doctrine).
Even if subject matter jurisdiction were not lacking under
Rooker-Feldman, the Court would also be compelled to abstain
from hearing Plaintiff’s case under Younger.
prongs are clearly met.
The first two
The currently pending state court
divorce and custody case is precisely the type of proceeding
that implicates important interests of the state.
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“[I]t is
beyond question that matters of domestic relations and child
custody are quintessentially of state importance.”
Romanova,
2017 WL 1907868, at *2 (citing Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S.
689, 702–04 (1992) (recognizing an exception to federal
diversity jurisdiction for cases involving divorce, alimony, and
child custody)); see also
Brunetta v. Testa, 2010 WL 1491413,
at *3 (D.N.J. 2010) (“The heart of Plaintiff's matter involves
his divorce and child custody dispute.
All of Plaintiff's
dissatisfaction with Defendant arose from the way the judge
handled his divorce and child custody proceeding. . . .
Federal
courts in the United States generally refrain from intervening
in domestic relations cases because domestic relations are
preeminently matters of state law.
The proclivity of federal
courts to abstain from interference in domestic relations cases
shows the important state interest in keeping domestic disputes
in state courts.”) (citing Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 587
(1989)); Dixon v. Kuhn, 257 F. App’x 553, 555 (3d Cir. 2007)
(barring appeal to federal court in child support proceeding
under Younger abstention); Harbour v. Grahm, 2009 WL 2488145, at
*4 (D.N.J. 2009) (holding that, under Younger, plaintiff must
raise constitutional challenges regarding his child custody case
in state court where proceedings are ongoing)); Anthony v.
Council, 316 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting that Younger
has been applied to civil enforcement proceedings and to other
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civil proceedings involving certain orders that are uniquely in
furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their
judicial functions, and that New Jersey has an overriding
interest in ordering, monitoring, enforcing and modifying child
support obligations).
With regard to the third element of the Younger abstention
doctrine, there is no indication that Plaintiff does not have
the ability to challenge the decisions of the judge presiding
over the divorce and custody case in the state court, or advance
his claims against the other defendants in state court.
See,
e.g., Anthony, 316 F.3d at 422 (“Plaintiffs have the opportunity
to raise their claims in any child support hearing and to appeal
adverse decisions through the state appellate system and
eventually to the United States Supreme Court.”); Romanova, 2017
WL 1907868 at *2 (finding that to the extent the plaintiff
contended that her constitutional rights were violated by the
state court, the plaintiff certainly had the opportunity to
raise those issues on appeal); Brunetta, 2010 WL 1491413 at *3
(citing Pennzoil v. Texaco, 481 U.S. 1, 17 (1987)) (providing
that there is a general presumption that a plaintiff can present
his federal claims in the related state court proceeding unless
he argues otherwise).
The Court recognizes that Plaintiff’s state court divorce
and child custody case has not progressed as he has wished, he
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feels unjustly alienated from his daughter, and he seeks this
Court’s intervention to provide him compensation and ultimately
the ability to have parenting time with his daughter.
Plaintiff
has every opportunity to seek such relief in the state court and
to pursue appellate review of any adverse rulings.
It is in
that forum and through that process that Plaintiff’s claims may
be heard without unwarranted interference from this Court.
This
Court is precluded, therefore, from providing Plaintiff with any
of his requested relief.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint
must be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Defendants’ motions to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint will be granted.
An appropriate
Order will be entered.
Date: May 18, 2018
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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