HANNAH v. ADMINISTRATOR ALBERT C. WAGNER YOUTH CORRECTIONAL FACILITY et al
Filing
38
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 3/25/2019. (rtm, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
______________________________
:
KARON HANNAH,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
Civ. No. 17-8066 (NLH)(JS)
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
ADMINISTRATOR, ALBERT C.
:
WAGNER YOUTH CORRECTIONAL
:
FACLITY, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
______________________________:
APPEARANCES:
Karon Hannah, No. 777077/863299D
South Woods State Prison
215 South Burlington Road
Bridgeton, NJ 08302
Plaintiff Pro Se
Kathryn Margaret Hansen, Esq.
Office of the Attorney General
25 Market Street
Trenton, NJ 08625
Counsel for Moving Defendant Craig LaFontaine
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Karon Hannah filed a Complaint pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against, inter alia, Moving Defendant SCO Craig
LaFontaine for alleged excessive force used against him while he
resided at the A.C. Wagner Youth Correctional Facility in
Chesterfield, New Jersey.
ECF No. 1.
Presently before the
Court is Moving Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, which is ripe for
adjudication.
ECF No. 18.
Plaintiff has filed no opposition to
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the Motion.
For the reasons that follow, the Court will deny
the Motion.
I.
Factual Background
On October 4, 2017, pro se plaintiff Karon Hannah filed a
Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants
Sergeant Mark Goodman, SCO Matthew Smith, SCO Craig LaFontaine,
SCO Gregory McLaughlin, Sergeant Marisol Velazquez, SCO
Ruggerio, SCO Joseph Guicheteau, and APRN Carol Gallagher, as
well as John Doe defendants, alleging claims of cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
ECF No. 1.
Plaintiff is an inmate currently incarcerated at the South Woods
State Prison in Bridgeton, New Jersey.
Id. at 2.
In the Complaint, Plaintiff describes an alleged incident
that occurred at the Albert C. Wagner Youth Correctional
Facility on November 28, 2016.
See ECF No. 1 at 6–8.
Plaintiff
alleges that on this date, he was being escorted while in
handcuffs from the yard by Defendant McLaughlin, when, on the
stairs, Defendant Corrections Officer Ruggerio stated, “Why is
this n----- so close to me?”
Id. at 6.
Plaintiff alleges that
he told Defendant Ruggerio to “watch his mouth,” and tried to
end the confrontation, but Defendant Ruggerio continued to
antagonize him, and then grabbed him aggressively and slammed
him face first into the steel fence with force.
Id.
Plaintiff
states that Moving Defendant Corrections Officer LaFontaine
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observed the confrontation and use of force, and called a “Code
33.” 1
Id.
Plaintiff next alleges that while Defendant LaFontaine
called a Code 33, Defendant Ruggerio struck him with a closed
fist, and then several other officers began to attack him.
Id.
Plaintiff alleges that these other officers include Defendants
McLaughlin, Guicheteau, and Goodman, as well as John Doe
officers.
Id.
Plaintiff further alleges that Defendant
Velazquez witnessed the other officers’ actions and failed to
take corrective action, thereby “encouraging the continuation of
the misconduct.” Id.
Plaintiff alleges that after this incident
occurred, Defendants Guicheteau and Smith continued to shove him
forcefully as they escorted him to the infirmary to receive
medical attention.
Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that he was
found innocent of the assault on the officers because the
incident was captured on video.
II.
Id.
Standard of Review
In a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6), the defendant bears the burden of showing
that no claim has been presented.
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Rule 8 of the Federal Rules
In his brief in support of dismissal, Defendant LaFontaine
explains that “[a] code 33 ‘signals an emergency situation and
alerts other corrections officers to respond and provide
assistance.’” ECF No. 18-3 at 5 n.3 (quoting Rogers v. N.J.
Dep’t of Corrs., NO. A-4210-15T1, 2017 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS
2255, at *2 n.1 (N.J. App. Div. Sept. 12, 2017).
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of Civil Procedure provides that a pleading must set forth a
claim for relief which contains a short and plain statement of
the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; the
complaint must provide the defendant with fair notice of the
claim.
(2007).
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the
court must accept as true all factual allegations.
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (per curiam).
See Erickson
The issue in a motion
to dismiss is whether the plaintiff should be entitled to offer
evidence to support the claim, not whether the plaintiff will
ultimately prevail.
See Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008) (the Rule 8 pleading standard
“‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of’ the
necessary element.”); Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir.
1996).
The onus is on the plaintiff to provide a well-drafted
complaint that alleges factual support for its claims.
“While a
complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not
need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to
provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (alteration in original and internal citations
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omitted).
The court need not accept unsupported inferences,
Cal. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. The Chubb Corp., 394 F.3d 126,
143 (3d Cir. 2004), nor legal conclusions cast as factual
allegations, Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
Legal conclusions
without factual support are not entitled to the assumption of
truth. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(“Threadbare recitals of elements of a cause of action,
supported by mere conclusory statements, do not” satisfy the
requirements of Rule 8).
Once the court winnows the conclusory allegations from
those allegations supported by fact, which it accepts as true,
the court must engage in a common sense review of the claim to
determine whether it is plausible.
This is a context-specific
task, for which the court should be guided by its judicial
experience.
The court must dismiss the complaint if it fails to
allege enough facts “to state a claim for relief that is
plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570).
A “claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw a
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The complaint that
shows that the pleader is entitled to relief--or put another
way, facially plausible--will survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.
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See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2); Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223,
229 (3d Cir. 2010).
III. Discussion
Section 1983 provides “private citizens with a means to
redress violations of federal law committed by state
individuals.”
(3d Cir. 2013).
Woodyard v. Cty. of Essex, 514 F. App'x 177, 180
In order to state a claim for relief under §
1983, a plaintiff must show two elements: (1) that a person
deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or
laws of the United States, and (2) that the deprivation was done
by a person acting under color of state law.
487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
West v. Atkins,
“The first step in evaluating a section
1983 claim is to ‘identify the exact contours of the underlying
right said to have been violated’ and to determine ‘whether the
plaintiff has alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at
all.’” Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000)
(quoting County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5
(1998)).
The Eighth Amendment prohibits prison officials from
unnecessarily and wantonly inflicting pain in a manner that
offends contemporary standards of decency.
McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 8 (1992).
See Hudson v.
When reviewing Eighth
Amendment excessive force claims, the court must determine
whether the “force was applied in a good-faith effort to
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maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically
to cause harm.” Id. at 7.
Whether the force applied was
excessive requires the examination of several factors including:
(1) the need for the application of force; (2) the
relationship between the need and the amount of force
that was used; (3) the extent of injury inflicted; (4)
the extent of the threat to the safety of staff and
inmates, as reasonably perceived by responsible
officials on the basis of the facts known to them; and
(5) any efforts made to temper the severity of a
forceful response.
Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 106 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321 (1986)).
The Moving Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannot state an
excessive force claim against him because there is no allegation
that he used force against Plaintiff.
Although that may be
true, courts have found a claim of excessive force when a
defendant’s actions incited a third party to use force against
the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d
1518, 1525 (10th Cir. 1992) (allegation that guard intended harm
to prisoner by inciting other prisoners to beat him by labelling
him a snitch states a claim under the Eighth Amendment); Watson
v. McGinnis, 964 F. Supp. 127, 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that
guard's intentionally calling a prisoner a snitch in order to
cause him harm by other inmates states an Eighth
Amendment excessive force claim).
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In the Complaint, Plaintiff specifically alleges that after
Defendant SCO Ruggerio initiated the alleged excessive force,
“Defendant SCO LaFontaine[e] called a code on the East Compound
even though he notice[d] Ruggerio[’s] actions.”
ECF No. 1 at 6.
Plaintiff goes on to allege that “during this time I was
bouncing off the steel fence due to impact of Ruggerio’s force
and the steel fence, at that moment the officer grabbed me while
striking me with closed fist.”
Id. at 7.
Plaintiff summarizes
the harm of the Moving Defendant’s actions as follows:
“Officer
LaFontain[e] falsely called a Code 33 (fighting) even though I
did nothing (see tape of incident) placing my life in jeopardy
and causing others (officers) to respond to the code in punching
and kicking me though I was already on the ground and in
handcuffs.”
Id. at 3.
Viewing the allegations in the light
most favorable to Plaintiff and also in light of his pro se
status, the Court finds that Plaintiff has stated a plausible
claim for excessive force and will deny the Motion.
Although not addressed by the Moving Defendant in the
Motion, the corrections officer defendants were also responsible
for Plaintiff's safety and had a duty to protect him from
violence.
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834–36 (1994).
“[A]
corrections officer's failure to intervene in a beating can be
the basis of liability for an Eighth Amendment violation under §
1983 if the corrections officer had a reasonable opportunity to
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intervene and simply refused to do so.”
Smith v. Mensinger, 293
F.3d 641 (3d Cir. 2002).
The Court can also reasonably infer from the aforementioned
allegations a plausible claim for failure to intervene because
Plaintiff alleges that the Moving Defendant was physically
present and witnessed at least part of the alleged use of force
and did not intervene.
See Smith v. Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641,
650–51 (3d Cir. 2002) (holding that correctional officer who
ignored a realistic opportunity to intervene in another
officer's use of excessive force is liable under the Eighth
Amendment) (citing Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491, 495 (7th Cir.
2000)); Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1301 (11th Cir.
2002) (holding that correctional officer present at the scene
“and who fails to take reasonable steps to protect the victim of
another officer's use of excessive force can be held personally
liable for his nonfeasance.”); Ewing v. Cumberland County, 152
F. Supp. 3d 269, 294 (D.N.J. 2015) (denying summary judgment as
to corrections officer who was present during an allegedly
excessive force beating of inmate under a theory of failure to
intervene).
The Court makes no finding as to the propriety of
the Moving Defendant’s decision to call a code, which Plaintiff
alleges worsened the force, however at this early stage and
given Plaintiff’s allegations and pro se status, dismissal would
be inappropriate.
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IV.
Conclusion
The Court will deny the Motion to Dismiss.
In doing so,
the Court expresses no view as to the ultimate merits of
Plaintiff’s claims, only that he has alleged enough facts to
states plausible claims.
An appropriate order follows.
Dated: March 25, 2019
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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