KARTERON v. ONE STOP CAREER CENTER et al
Filing
27
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/7/18. (dd, )n.m.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
BIANCA MADELANE KARTERON,
1:17-cv-08904-NLH-JS
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
ANTHONY CHIESA,
manager of One Stop Center,
et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
BIANCA MADELANE KARTERON
57 NIXON AVE
BRIDGETON, NJ 08302
Appearing pro se
AIMEE BLENNER
STATE OF NEW JERSEY
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
25 MARKET STREET
POX BOX 112
TRENTON, NJ 08625
On behalf of Defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff, Bianca Madelane Karteron, appearing pro se,
filed a complaint against One Stop Career Center, the New Jersey
Department of Labor and Workforce Development, and Anthony
Chiesa, the manager of One Stop Career Center, alleging that her
various constitutional and state law rights were violated.
Plaintiff complains that after she lost her job, she utilized
Defendants’ vocational assistance programs and could not secure
new employment.
Presently before the Court is Defendants’
motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint.
For the reasons
expressed below, Defendants’ motion will be granted.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff claims that when she was fired from her
employer, Sodat, she was unable to find new employment for three
years, despite using the state of New Jersey’s unemployment
resources.
Plaintiff claims that she was blacklisted after her
termination, and the state unemployment assistance program did
not inform her of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee
Protection Act relating to her claims of illegal conduct by
Sodat.
Plaintiff also claims that she was unable to obtain
legal counsel “without title one resources and sitting in the
unemployment office.”
Plaintiff claims that as a result, she
has suffered from depression and her reputation has been ruined.
Previously in March 2015, Plaintiff filed a New Jersey
state court complaint against the same Defendants alleging the
same claims.
That case was dismissed at the trial level,
affirmed by the appellate division, and the N.J. Supreme Court
denied Plaintiff’s petition for certification on May 11, 2017.
See Karteron v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, Office
of Licensing, 2017 WL 1955190, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2017); Karteron v. New Jersey Department of Human Services, 170
2
A.3d 342, 343 (N.J. 2017).
Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s complaint here must be
dismissed in its entirety because Plaintiff has failed to
properly serve them with her complaint.
Defendants also argue
that they are entitled to sovereign immunity, Plaintiff’s claims
are barred by res judicata, and Plaintiff otherwise fails to
state any cognizable claims against them.
Plaintiff has opposed
Defendants’ motion, mainly arguing that her complaint in this
Court is the “next step” in her efforts to vindicate her rights
and expose Defendants’ alleged improper conduct.
DISCUSSION
A.
Subject matter jurisdiction
Plaintiff’s asserted basis for this Court’s jurisdiction is
28 U.S.C. § 1331.
As discussed below, this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s case under the RookerFeldman doctrine.
B.
Analysis
Plaintiff’s complaint is dismissible on several bases,
including lack of proper service, 1 failure to properly plead her
1
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m), if a plaintiff fails to timely
serve the defendants, the Court may (1) dismiss the action on
the motion of a defendant, (2) dismiss the action on its own
after notice to the plaintiff, or (3) order that service be made
within a specified time. There is no indication on the docket
that Defendants have been properly served. Plaintiff’s service
3
claims, 2 and res judicata. 3
The primary reasons Plaintiff’s
complaint must be dismissed, however, are based on the bedrock
principles of sovereign immunity and the Rooker-Feldman
of Defendants in the state court action is immaterial to the
requirement that Plaintiff serve Defendants in this action.
2
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (first citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc.,
40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); and then citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Plaintiff has not pleaded
sufficient facts against the Defendants to comply with the
proper pleading standards.
3
Res judicata encompasses claim and issue preclusion. U.S. v. 5
Unlabeled Boxes, 572 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 758 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997).
(“Collateral estoppel customarily refers to issue preclusion,
while res judicata, when used narrowly, refers to claim
preclusion. This court has previously noted that ‘the preferred
usage’ of the term res judicata ‘encompasses both claim and
issue preclusion.’”). Claim preclusion requires a showing that
there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior
suit involving (2) the same claim and (3) the same parties or
their privies. Id. (citation omitted). Collateral estoppel
requires of a previous determination that (1) the identical
issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually
litigated; (3) the previous determination was necessary to the
decision; and (4) the party being precluded from relitigating
the issue was fully represented in the prior action. Id.
(citation omitted). From a comparison of Plaintiff’s claims in
her state court action with this case, it appears that
Plaintiff’s case here presents identical parties, issues, and
claims to her state court case. Plaintiff’s case therefore
appears to be precluded under res judicata principles.
4
doctrine, which, unlike the other bases for dismissal, are
defects that cannot be cured.
1.
Sovereign immunity
Plaintiff has brought constitutional claims 4 pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 5 against the One Stop Career Center, the New Jersey
Department of Labor and Workforce Development, and Anthony
Chiesa, in his official capacity as the manager of One Stop
Career Center.
These claims are barred by the Eleventh
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United states shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
4
Plaintiff asserts claims for violations of the 7th Amendment
(right to a jury trial) and the 9th Amendment (“The enumeration
in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”).
5
Section 1983 provides in pertinent part, “Every person who,
under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any state or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United states or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at
law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.” 42
U.S.C. § 1983. “By its terms, of course, [§ 1983] creates no
substantive rights; it merely provides remedies for deprivations
of rights established elsewhere.” City of Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). Thus, “[t]o establish a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [a plaintiff] must demonstrate a
violation of a right secured by the Constitution and the laws of
the United states [and] that the alleged deprivation was
committed by a person acting under color of state law.” Moore
v. Tartler, 986 F.2d 682, 685 (3d Cir. 1993).
5
or prosecuted against one of the United states by Citizens
of another state, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
state.
U.S. Const. amend. XI.
“‘That a state may not be sued without
its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence having so
important a bearing upon the construction of the Constitution of
the United States that it has become established by repeated
decisions of this court that the entire judicial power granted
by the Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a
suit brought by private parties against a state without consent
given.’”
Pennhurst state Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 98 (1984) (quoting Ex parte state of New York No. 1, 256
U.S. 490, 497 (1921)).
The Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1 (1890), “extended the Eleventh Amendment’s reach to
suits by in-state plaintiffs, thereby barring all private suits
against non-consenting states in federal court.”
Lombardo v.
Pa. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 540 F.3d 190, 194 (3d Cir. 2008).
“The state of New Jersey has not waived its sovereign immunity
with respect to § 1983 claims in federal court.”
Mierzwa v.
United states, 282 F. App’x 973, 976 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Ritchie v. Cahall, 386 F. Supp. 1207, 1209–10 (D.N.J. 1974)).
Thus, constitutional claims in federal court may only be
asserted against a “person” and not the state, which includes
state agencies and state actors sued in their official
capacities.
Beightler v. Office of Essex County Prosecutor, 342
6
F. App’x 829, 832 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Fitchik v. New Jersey
Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655, 658 (3d Cir. 1989) (en
banc)) (providing that the Eleventh Amendment protects state
agencies when “‘the state is the real party in interest’”);
Will v. Michigan Dept. of state Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)
(holding that neither a state nor its officials acting in their
official capacities are “persons” under § 1983); Grohs v.
Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 280 (D.N.J. 2013) (citing Will,
491 U.S. at 65–66) (“The state’s sovereign immunity [] is
preserved under Section 1983; a state is therefore not a
‘person’ who may be sued under Section 1983.”).
Plaintiff has sued two state agencies and a state employee
in his official capacity for their alleged constitutional
violations.
Those claims are barred under the Eleventh
Amendment, and the Court must therefore dismiss Plaintiff’s
claims against the state Defendants because of sovereign
immunity.
2.
Rooker-Feldman doctrine
Although not explicitly pleaded in her complaint,
Plaintiff’s opposition brief makes it clear that she is seeking
two forms of relief:
(1) this Court’s review of the state court
decisions in her state court case in order to find that the
state courts erred, and (2) this Court’s independent review of
the same claims she advanced in her state court case.
7
Neither
request for relief is proper under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. 6
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 7 which is derived from
the two Supreme Court cases District of Columbia Court of
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity
Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), lower federal courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of
state court determinations or to evaluate constitutional claims
that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
decision in a judicial proceeding.
Port Authority Police Benev.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police
Dept., 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Knapper, 407 F.3d
573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents
‘inferior’ federal courts from sitting as appellate courts for
state court judgments.”).
6
Although conceptually similar in some respects, the RookerFeldman doctrine “is not simply preclusion by another name.”
Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006); Parkview Associates
Partnership v. City of Lebanon, 225 F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir.
2000) (explaining that the res judicata and Rooker-Feldman
doctrines “may overlap and even be blurred,” but “they are not
coextensive,” and the “distinction between Rooker–Feldman and
preclusion is important because Rooker–Feldman, as a
jurisdictional doctrine, must override preclusion doctrines
where it applies.”).
7
A court has a continuing obligation to sua sponte raise the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction, which includes the
determination of whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies.
Desi's Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre 321 F.3d 411, 420 (3d
Cir. 2003).
8
“[T]here are four requirements that must be met for the
Rooker–Feldman doctrine to apply: (1) the federal plaintiff lost
in state court; (2) the plaintiff complain[s] of injuries caused
by [the] state-court judgments; (3) those judgments were
rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the
plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject
the state judgments.”
Great Western Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox
Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (quotations
omitted) (discussing Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)).
If these requirements are
met, the Rooker–Feldman doctrine prohibits the district court
from exercising jurisdiction.
Id.
Plaintiff’s request that this Court reexamine the same
claims the state court did, and separately assess the propriety
of the state courts’ decisions, plainly implicates the RookerFeldman doctrine. 8
Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s complaint, and it must also be
dismissed on this basis.
8
Plaintiff contends that filing her case in this Court is her
“next step” to “find justice.” That is incorrect. Because
Plaintiff’s claims were subject to final judgment by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, Plaintiff’s “next step” is the United
States Supreme Court. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463
(2006) (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court is vested, under
28 U.S.C. § 1257, with exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from
final state-court judgments).
9
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are barred by the
Eleventh Amendment, and even if sovereign immunity did not
apply, 9 the Court is precluded under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine
from sitting as an appellate court over her final state court
judgment.
dismissed.
Consequently, Plaintiff’s complaint must be
An appropriate Order will be entered.
Date:
August 7, 2018
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
9
See, e.g., Grohs v. Yatauro, 984 F. Supp. 2d 273, 281 (D.N.J.
2013) (“A claim for damages against a state official in his or
her individual capacity is a different matter. In that
individual capacity, he or she does not partake of the state's
Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, and is a suable ‘person’
within the meaning of Section 1983.”).
10
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