K.K-M.v. NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION et al
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 6/25/2018. (rtm, )
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
K.K-M., individually and as Kinship Legal
Guardian of the minor children R.M. and A.W.
Plaintiff,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, et al.,
Defendants.
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Civil No. 17-11579 (RBK/KMW)
OPINION
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This action arises from a complaint (Doc. No. 20) filed by K.K-M. (“Plaintiff”) alleging
violations of numerous federal and state laws on the part of the New Jersey Department of
Education (“NJDOE”), the New Jersey Office of Administrative Law (“NJOAL”), and Ms.
Dominic Rota (collectively “N.J. Defendants”) and the Gloucester City Public Schools (“GCPS,”
collectively with N.J. Defendants, “Defendants”). Because Plaintiff lacks standing to bring her
claim due to the lack of a concrete and particularized harm that is actual or imminent, this Court
lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Therefore, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss (Doc. Nos. 27, 29)
are GRANTED.
I.
BACKGROUND
In 2012, two minor children, R.M. and A.W., moved with their parents to Gloucester City,
New Jersey, where they subsequently enrolled in GCPS. (Compl. at 5.) After several tumultuous
years with their birth parents, R.M. and A.W. were placed with Plaintiff in September 2015. (Id.
at 6.) In May 2017, Plaintiff was granted Kinship Legal Guardianship (KLG) status over the
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children. (Id.) KLG status grants Plaintiff the “same rights, responsibilities and authority relating
to [the children] as a birth parent[].” (Id. at 7.) Among the rights, responsibilities and authority
granted to Plaintiff as the children’s KLG is the “right to arrange and consent to educational plans
for the child[ren].” (Id.) Plaintiff, unlike R.M. and A.W.’s birth parents, resides in Laurel Springs,
New Jersey, which falls outside of GCPS’s district boundaries. (N.J. Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 4.)
R.M. and A.W. each have a disability that qualifies them for special education and related
services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et
seq. (Id. at 2.) Since moving to GCPS in 2012, R.M. and A.W. have each had an Individualized
Educational Program (“IEP”) drafted pursuant to IDEA, designed to accommodate their respective
disabilities and provide the proper educational supplements to ensure that they receive the same
quality of education as a non-disabled child. (Id. at 8.)
On October 24, 2017, Plaintiff received an email from the superintendent of GCPS
informing Plaintiff that the two children should enroll in the Laurel Springs School District, where
they resided. (N.J. Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) The superintendent recommended that the transition
from GCPS to Laurel Springs School District occur at the end of the marking period. (Compl. at
8.) In response to this email notice, Plaintiff filed Requests for Due Process Hearings and Emergent
Relief with the NJDOE Office of Special Education Policy (“OSEP”) on November 12, 2017. (Id.
at 9.) These initial filings were rejected by Ms. Rota, a docket clerk for OSEP, for failing to meet
the substantive statutory requirements. (Compl. at 9.) See also N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:14. On
November 14, 2017, Plaintiff responded by filing a Complaint and a Motion for a Temporary
Restraining Order before this Court (Doc. No. 3), seeking to enjoin New Jersey Defendants from
asserting or adjudicating a sufficiency challenge to Plaintiff’s due process complaint, and enjoining
GCPS from disenrolling, transferring, or removing R.M. or A.W. until the resolution of the due
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process complaints. (N.J. Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 5.) This Court heard arguments and denied the
request for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 12) on November 16, 2017. (Id.) Plaintiff
subsequently amended her Requests and submitted a second set, this time in compliance with the
statutory requirements, on November 19, 2017. (Id.)
On December 13, 2017 GCPS and Plaintiff participated in a mediation session. (Compl. at
9.) No agreement was formed and the session terminated unsuccessfully. (Id.) The same day, the
superintendent of GCPS sent Plaintiff a Preliminary Notice of Ineligibility, which notified Plaintiff
that R.M. and A.W. failed to meet the eligibility requirements for attendance in GCPS because
they were domiciled outside the district boundaries. (Id.) Accompanying the Preliminary Notice
of Ineligibility was an explanation from the superintendent of the appeal process that Plaintiff
could pursue if Plaintiff disagreed with the superintendent’s determination of the children’s
ineligibility. (N.J. Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 6.) As the superintendent’s communication set forth,
Plaintiff could appeal the residency determination of the superintendent multiple times, first to the
district board of education, then to the Commissioner of Education, and finally to the Appellate
Division of the New Jersey state courts. (Id. 6-7.) The superintendent made clear to Plaintiff that
during the appeal process the two children could not be removed from GCPS, pursuant to New
Jersey state law. See N.J. Stat. Ann. § 18A:38-1; N.J. Admin. Code § 6A:22-4.2.
Advised of the protections and appeals process set forth under New Jersey state law, on
December 17, 2017 Plaintiff requested a hearing before the district board of education, thus
preventing GCPS from preemptively disenrolling the students. (N.J. Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 7.)
Plaintiff’s Complaint does not indicate the status of this pending appeal. That same day, Plaintiff
filed another Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. No. 13) to enjoin GCPS from
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removing R.M. and A.W. from GCPS. (Id.) This Court heard arguments and denied Plaintiff’s
Motion on December 21, 2017. (Doc. No. 18.)
On December 18, 2017 Plaintiff filed new requests for emergent relief with OSEP, which
were subsequently transmitted to the NJOAL. (N.J. Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 7.) The administrative
law judge denied emergent relief due to the lack of an imminent harm. (Id. at 8.)
Plaintiff then filed an Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 20) with this Court alleging that New
Jersey Defendants and GCPS violated IDEA, the Fostering Connections Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 67075),1 the Rehabilitation Act (29 U.S.C. § 794), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
(42 U.S.C. § 12101 et. seq.). (Compl. at 2.) Plaintiff is seeking an order enjoining New Jersey
Defendants and GCPS from disenrolling or removing R.M. and A.W. from GCPS and from further
“discriminatory behavior towards Plaintiffs.” (Id. at 31-32.) Motions to Dismiss were filed by New
Jersey Defendants, collectively (Doc. No. 27), and GCPS. (Doc. No. 29.)
II.
STANDARD
Federal courts are limited in power to deciding only “Cases” or “Controversies” arising
under the Constitution or laws passed under the authority of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. III,
§ 2. This limitation is fundamental to America’s system of separated powers. “Without a case-orcontroversy requirement, the judicial power would ‘extend[] to every question under the
constitution,’ and ‘the other departments would be swallowed up by the judiciary.’” Toll Bros.,
Inc. v. Twp. Of Readington, 555 F.3d 131, 137 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting DaimlerChrysler Corp. v.
Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006)). Standing to sue is an aspect of the case-or-controversy
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It is not clear what provision of the Fostering Connections Act Plaintiff is relying on in bringing
suit. Furthermore, whether a private cause of action even exists under the specific provisions of
the Fostering Connections Act that Plaintiff is relying on is equally unclear.
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requirement. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 64 (1997) (citing
Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656,
663-664 (1993)). Article III standing is essential to federal subject-matter jurisdiction and must
therefore be addressed first, before turning to the individual claims in a case. Hartig Drug
Company Inc. v. Senju Pharmaceutical Co. LTD., 836 F.3d 261, 269 (3d Cir. 2016).
The Supreme Court has established a three-pronged approach for determining whether a
party bringing suit has standing. “First, the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact—an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized . . . and (b) actual
or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Second, “there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to
the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the independent action of some
third party not before the court.” Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). Finally, “it must
be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.” Id. at 561. (internal citations and quotations omitted). See also Monsanto Co. v.
Geertson Seed Farm, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010) (“Standing under Article III of the Constitution
requires that an injury be concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the
challenged action; and redressable by a favorable ruling.”) The party seeking to invoke federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these three elements. Id.
If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction it must dismiss
the pending action. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 12(h)(3).
III.
DISCUSSION
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Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that she faces any “concrete and particularized . . . and
actual or imminent,” as opposed to purely “conjectural or hypothetical,” harm. Plaintiff is asking
this Court to interfere with a currently pending state administrative process in order to prevent the
potential, yet entirely speculative, future harm of R.M. and A.W. being forced to move school
districts. For such a harm to actually occur, Plaintiff is asking this Court to assume that (1) the
district board of education affirm GCPS’s finding regarding the students’ district of residence, (2)
that on appeal, the Commissioner of Education and the state court Appellate Division affirm
GCPS’s finding and that of the district board of education, and (3) that when R.M. and A.W. are
disenrolled from GCPS and enrolled in a different district, that the new district will fail to provide
the necessary materials to compensate for their learning disabilities. At this point in time
administrative proceedings are properly taking place through the system set up under New Jersey
law. Plaintiff’s claims that these potential outcomes will materialize is pure speculation and far
from a concrete and imminent harm.
Even supposing that the administrative appeals process results in a ruling that affirms the
finding of ineligibility of residency made by GCPS, thereby requiring R.M. and A.W. to enroll in
a different school district, there is no factual support for Plaintiff’s contention that the new district
will fail to meet the children’s learning needs, thus resulting in a concrete harm. The drafters of
IDEA contemplated the possibility of a child with disabilities moving school districts and
appropriately provided that:
In the case of a child with a disability who transfers school districts
within the same academic year, who enrolls in a new school, and
who had an IEP that was in effect in the same State, the local
educational agency shall provide such child with a free appropriate
public education, including services comparable to those described
in the previously held IEP, in consultation with the parents until such
time as the local educational agency adopts the previously held IEP
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or develops, adopts, and implements a new IEP that is consistent
with Federal and State law.
20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(C)(i)(I). Thus, there is no basis for concluding that R.M. and A.W. will
suffer any harm as a result of a potential (and at this point entirely speculative and hypothetical)
ruling against them during the state administrative proceedings. Additionally, Plaintiff’s
contention that the children will suffer a form of emotional harm simply as a result of having to
move schools, regardless of whether the new district can support the children’s unique educational
needs, is equally speculative. At this point there is simply no way of knowing whether the children
would actually suffer emotionally from transferring districts, and as such, there is presently no
concrete harm.
Plaintiff herself even admits that the harms are not concrete or imminent in her Opposition
to GCPS’s Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 28.) In defending the need for this Court to enjoin GCPS
from any further action, Plaintiff noted that someday soon the harm facing Plaintiff “will change
from potential to immediate.” By her own admission Plaintiff fails to meet the standing
requirement for subject matter jurisdiction, as she does not face an imminent, nor immediate, harm.
Plaintiff also seems to assert a claim that she has already suffered a harm, or that she will
suffer an imminent future harm, in relation to the “substantial resources and money” expended on
this case. (Pl. Opp. to N.J. Def. Mot. to Dismiss at 21.) This Court notes, however, that imminent
harms do not include the entirely optional choice of hiring an attorney. One cannot simply create
a “concrete and particularized . . . actual or imminent” harm by their voluntary action of hiring
counsel—to allow as much would be to open the floodgates and drown the courts in myriad
lawsuits, none of which would otherwise be allowed to proceed due to lack of standing.
The purpose behind the important limitation on Article III courts’ power to decide only
concrete and particularized cases and controversies with imminent and actual harms is twofold:
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first, to “prevent the courts, through the avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling
themselves in abstract disagreements over administrative policies” and secondly, “to protect the
agencies from judicial interference until an administrative decision has been formalized and its
effects felt in a concrete way by the challenging parties.” Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136,
148-49 (1967). Plaintiff, in seeking an order enjoining GCPS and the New Jersey Defendants, is
asking this Court to ignore the very principles that undergird its purposefully limited jurisdiction.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff has failed to show that she has adequate standing
to bring a claim, and as such, she has failed to establish that this Court has jurisdiction. Therefore,
New Jersey Defendants’ and GCPS’s Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) are GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed with prejudice. An appropriate
order shall follow.
Dated: 06/25/2018
/s Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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