DAVIS v. CAMDEN COUNTY CORRECTIONAL FACILITY
Filing
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OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 4/23/18. (jbk, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
ANTOINE RAHIM DAVIS,
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 17-cv-11843 (JBS-AMD)
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY,
OPINION
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
Antoine Rahim Davis, Plaintiff Pro Se
P.O. Box 156
Lawnside, NJ 08028
SIMANDLE, United States District Judge:
1.
Plaintiff Antoine Rahim Davis seeks to bring a civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Camden
County Correctional Facility (“CCCF”) for allegedly
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. Complaint, Docket
Entry 1.
2.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) requires courts to review
complaints prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is
proceeding in forma pauperis. Courts must sua sponte dismiss any
claim that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from
a defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is
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subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
3.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will: (a)
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as to claims made against
CCCF; and (b) dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for
failure to state a claim. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
Claims Against CCCF: Dismissed With Prejudice
4.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831 for alleged violations of Plaintiff’s constitutional
rights. In order to set forth a prima facie case under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show: “(1) a person deprived him of a federal
right; and (2) the person who deprived him of that right acted
under color of state or territorial law.” Groman v. Twp. of
Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gomez v.
Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980)).
5.
CCCF is not a “person” for purposes of actions under
42 U.S.C. § 1983; that is, CCCF is not a “state actor” within
the meaning of § 1983. See Crawford v. McMillian, 660 F. App'x
113, 116 (3d Cir. 2016) (“[T]he prison is not an entity subject
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Section 1983 provides: “Every person who, under color of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to
the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”) (citing Fischer v. Cahill, 474
F.2d 991, 992 (3d Cir. 1973)); Grabow v. Southern State Corr.
Facility, 726 F. Supp. 537, 538–39 (D.N.J. 1989) (correctional
facility is not a “person” under § 1983)
6.
Therefore, the Complaint does not allege that a
“person” within the meaning of § 1983 deprived Plaintiff of a
federal right and does not meet the standards necessary to set
forth a prima facie case under § 1983. Accordingly, the claims
against the CCCF must be dismissed with prejudice.
7.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to name a
person or persons who were personally involved in the alleged
unconstitutional conditions of confinement. The Court therefore
grants Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint within 30 days of
the date that this Opinion and Order are entered on the docket.
Conditions Of Confinement Claims:
Dismissed Without Prejudice
8.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court will
dismiss the Complaint without prejudice for failure to state a
claim as to alleged overcrowded conditions of confinement at
CCCF. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(ii).
9.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim2, the Complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
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“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
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show that the claim is facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
Accord Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014).
While pro se pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se
litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints
to support a claim.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d
239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). In
short, a complaint must plead sufficient facts to support a
reasonable inference that a constitutional violation has
occurred in order to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
10.
Here, however, the Complaint states only that
Plaintiff slept “on the floor with four other inmates in a room
that was unsanitary and uncomfortable . . . [CCCF] officers
placed me in rooms with four other inmates which was
uncomfortable.” Complaint § III(C).
11.
Plaintiff states that these events occurred “3-18-
2004, 2-26-2010, 8-12-2010, 6-21-2013, 8-23-2014, [and] 1-302016.” Id. § III(B).
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Samuels v. Health Dep’t, No. 161289, 2017 WL 26884, slip op. at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 3, 2017)
(citing Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App’x 120, 122 (3d Cir.
2012)).
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12.
Plaintiff does not identify any injuries sustained in
connection with these events. Id. § IV.
13.
Plaintiff seeks “whatever the Court feel[s] is
reasonable for me.” Id. § V.
14.
Even construing the Complaint as seeking to bring a
civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged
prison overcrowding, any such purported claims must be
dismissed. Even accepting the statements in Plaintiff’s
Complaint as true for screening purposes only, the Complaint
does not allege sufficient facts to support a reasonable
inference that a constitutional violation has occurred in order
to survive this Court’s review under § 1915.
15.
The mere fact that an individual is lodged temporarily
in a cell with more persons than its intended design does not
rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348–50 (1981) (holding double-celling by
itself did not violate Eighth Amendment); Carson v. Mulvihill,
488 F. App'x 554, 560 (3d Cir. 2012) (“[M]ere double-bunking
does not constitute punishment, because there is no ‘one man,
one cell principle lurking in the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.’” (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542
(1979))). More is needed to demonstrate that such crowded
conditions, for a pretrial detainee, shocks the conscience and
thus violates due process rights. See Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
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F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting due process analysis
requires courts to consider whether the totality of the
conditions “cause[s] inmates to endure such genuine privations
and hardship over an extended period of time, that the adverse
conditions become excessive in relation to the purposes assigned
to them.”).
16.
Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to
particularly identify adverse conditions that were caused by
specific state actors, that caused Plaintiff to endure genuine
privations and hardship over an extended period of time, and
that were excessive in relation to their purposes. For this
purpose, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint
within 30 days of the date that this Opinion and Order are
entered on the docket.3
17.
To survive review under § 1915, any amended complaint
must plead specific conditions of confinement facts supporting a
reasonable inference a constitutional violation occurred.4
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The amended complaint shall be subject to screening prior to
service.
4 To the extent the Complaint seeks relief for conditions
Plaintiff encountered prior to November 20, 2015, those claims
are barred by the statute of limitations. Claims brought under §
1983 are governed by New Jersey's two-year limitations period
for personal injury. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276
(1985); Dique v. N.J. State Police, 603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir.
2010). “Under federal law, a cause of action accrues when the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury upon which the
action is based.” Montanez v. Sec'y Pa. Dep't of Corr., 773 F.3d
472, 480 (3d Cir. 2014). Allegedly unconstitutional conditions
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18.
When an amended complaint is filed, the original
complaint no longer performs any function in the case and cannot
be used to cure defects in the amended complaint, unless the
relevant portion is specifically incorporated in the new
complaint. 6 Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and
Procedure 1476 (2d ed. 1990). An amended complaint may adopt
some or all of the allegations in the original complaint, but
the identification of the particular allegations to be adopted
must be clear and explicit. Id. To avoid confusion, the safer
course is to file an amended complaint that is complete in
itself. Id. The amended complaint may not adopt or repeat claims
that have been dismissed with prejudice by the Court.
19.
For the reasons stated above, the Complaint is: (a)
dismissed with prejudice as to the CCCF; and (b) dismissed
without prejudice for failure to state a claim as to allegations
of unconstitutionally overcrowded conditions of confinement.
20.
An appropriate order follows.
April 23, 2018
Date
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
United States District Judge
of confinement would have been immediately apparent to
Plaintiff; therefore, the statute of limitations on some of
Plaintiff’s claims expired two years after release from
incarceration. In the event Plaintiff elects to file an amended
complaint, it should be limited to confinements in which
Plaintiff was released after November 20, 2015.
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