COPELAND v. TOWNSHIP OF BELLMAWR et al

Filing 95

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 8/7/18. n.m.(dd, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MARCIA COPELAND, M.D.,
1:17-cv-12104-NLH-JS
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
TOWNSHIP OF BELLMAWR, STATE
OF NEW JERSEY, ATTORNEY
GENERAL OFFICE OF THE STATE
OF NEW JERSEY, GOVERNOR'S
OFFICE (NJ), JIM BRALEY,
MAYOR OF BELLMAWR, JSC MARY
EVA COLALILLO, JSC DEBORAH
SILVERMAN KATZ, JSC ROBERT
MILLENKY, ROBERT SALDUTTI,
ESQ., ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
JUDICIAL CONDUCT, LISA
SHARKEY, JUDGE ANTHONY
PUGLISI, ANDREW KARCICH,
ESQ., SCOTT LEVINE, ESQ., and
MARTY ABO,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
MARCIA COPELAND, M.D.
2 APPLE RIDGE WAY
EAST BRUNSWICK, NJ 08816
Plaintiff appearing pro se
JEFFREY S. CRAIG
KELLEY, WARDELL, CRAIG, ANNIN & BAXTER, LLP
41 GROVE STREET
HADDONFIELD, NJ 08033
On behalf of the Bellmawr Defendants
MELIHA ARNAUTOVIC
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NJ
25 MARKET ST, 7TH FL, WEST WING

PO BOX 116
TRENTON, NJ 08625
On behalf of Defendants the State of New Jersey, Attorney
General Office, JSC Mary Eva Colalillo, JSC Deborah
Silverman Katz, JSC Robert Millenky, Advisory Committee on
Judicial Conduct, Judge Anthony Puglisi
REBECCA K. MCDOWELL
SALDUTTI LAW GROUP
800 N KINGS HIGHWAY
SUITE 300
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08034
On behalf of Defendant Robert Saldutti, Esquire
MEREDITH KAPLAN STOMA
MORGAN MELHUISH ABRUTYN
651 W. MOUNT PLEASANT AVENUE
LIVINGSTON, NJ 07039-1673
On behalf of Defendants Lisa Sharkey and Marty Abo
FARDENE E. BLANCHARD
LYNCH & KARCHICH LLC
1000 WHITE HORSE ROAD
SUITE 703
VOORHEES, NJ 08043
On behalf of Defendant Andrew Karcich, Esquire
MELISSA J. KANBAYASHI
MARKS, O'NEILL, O'BRIEN, DOHERTY & KELLY, PC
CHERRY TREE CORPORATE CENTER
535 RT. 38 EAST
SUITE 501
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08002
On behalf of Defendant Scott Levine, Esquire
HILLMAN, District Judge
This is the fifth federal court action filed by Plaintiff,
Marcia Copeland, M.D., concerning a state court default judgment
entered against her in February 2012. 1

1

Plaintiff’s fourth

After Plaintiff filed this action, Plaintiff filed a sixth
action regarding the February 2012 default judgment - COPELAND
v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 1:18-cv-10554-NLH-JS (“Copeland VI”).
2

federal court action, filed in May 2015, provides a summary of
Plaintiff’s litigation efforts up until that point:
This case has a long history in state and federal
court. In 2009, Plaintiff Marcia Copeland hired attorney
Scott Levine to pursue a case against GRP Financial
Services Corp. Abo & Co. was hired to provide expert
testimony in that case. Plaintiff was dissatisfied with
Abo & Co.’s services, and felt she had “no business paying
for it.” Abo & Co. then retained attorney Andrew Karcich
and filed a claim for arbitration against Plaintiff with
the American Arbitration Association. Plaintiff chose not
to participate in arbitration. On January 14, 2011, an
arbitration award was entered in favor of Abo & Co. for
$49,777.88. Abo & Co. sought to enforce their award, and
the Superior Court entered a default judgment against
Plaintiff. Plaintiff later attempted to have the default
judgment vacated, but her motion was denied by Judge
Deborah Silverman-Katz. Because of their roles in these
events, Judge Silverman-Katz, Mr. Levine, and Mr. Karcich
are now named defendants in this action, along with Abo &
Co.
Abo & Co. continued to seek payment of the arbitration
award through legal action. They were unsuccessful until
two years later, when Judge Mary Eva Colalillo appointed
Robert Saldutti, Esq. as a receiver to collect rental
income from Plaintiff's rental properties. Plaintiff has
also named Mary Eva Colalillo and Mr. Saldutti as
defendants in the present action.
In 2013, Plaintiff began aggressively pursuing her
legal options to fight the collection of Abo & Co.’s
arbitration award. She filed various motions in response
Plaintiff’s previous actions concerning the same default
judgment are: COPELAND v. ABO & COMPANY, LLC, 1:13-cv-03978-RMBKMW (“Copeland I”); 1:13-cv-03979-RMB-KMW (“Copeland II”); 1:13cv-04232-RMB-AMD (“Copeland III”); and COPELAND v. UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 3:15-cv-07431-AET-TJB (“Copeland IV”).
Plaintiff has filed other actions arising out of different
properties, although Plaintiff’s claims appear to be of a
similar genre. See COPELAND v. TOWNSHIP OF PENNSAUKEN, 1:14-cv02002-RMB-AMD; COPELAND v. NEWFIELD BANK, 1:17-cv-00017-NLH-KMW;
COPELAND v. US BANK, 1:18-cv-00019-NLH-KMW.
3

to Abo & Co.’s enforcement action against her. She
attempted to revive a suit she had filed in 2011 against
Abo & Co., Mr. Levine, Mr. Karcich, and the American
Arbitration Association. She filed a complaint with the
New Jersey Board of Accountancy against Mr. Abo. She filed
three different complaints in the District of New Jersey.
None of these actions were successful.
In 2015, Plaintiff, along with trustee Minta Smith,
filed the present Complaint in the Southern District of New
York. Plaintiff's Complaint alleges violations of a range
of constitutional amendments, criminal statutes, civil
statutes, and jurisdictional statutes, all apparently
stemming from Judge Colallilo's appointing a receiver to
collect rental income from Plaintiff's rental properties.
Many of Plaintiff's claims are identical to her 2013 claims
that were previously dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) in the
District of New Jersey by Judge Renee Marie Bumb. In
addition to a few new claims, there are several new
defendants, including Judge Bumb. Several defendants
previously moved to dismiss this Complaint. On October 5,
2015, Judge Vincent Briccetti held that the Southern
District of New York was not the proper venue for this
case, and transferred it to the District of New Jersey.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
Marcia Copeland v. United States Department of Justice, 3:15-cv07431-AET-TJB, 2015 WL 9294810, at *1–2 (D.N.J. 2015) (Thompson,
J.) (“Copeland IV”).
Judge Thompson dismissed Plaintiff’s case on the bases of

4

judicial immunity, 2 res judicata, 3 New Jersey’s entire

2

Judges are generally “‘immune from a suit for money damages.’”
Figueroa v. Blackburn, 208 F.3d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting
Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Randall v. Brigham, 74
U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 536 (1868) (“This doctrine is as old as the
law, and its maintenance is essential to the impartial
administration of justice.”)). Judicial immunity is not
overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice. Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citing Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547, 553–54 (1967) (“Few doctrines were more solidly established
at common law than the immunity of judges from liability for
damages for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction .
. . This immunity applies even when the judge is accused of
acting maliciously and corruptly, and it is not for the
protection or benefit of a malicious or corrupt judge, but for
the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges
should be at liberty to exercise their functions with
independence and without fear of consequences.” (internal
citations and quotations omitted)). A judge's immunity from
civil liability “is overcome in only two sets of circumstances.
First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial
acts, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity.
Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in
nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id.
(citation and quotations omitted). Judge Thompson determined
that the judicial defendants were entitled to judicial immunity
because all of Plaintiff’s claims against them arose from the
judge’s actions in their judicial capacities. Copeland IV, 2015
WL 9294810, at *4 n.8. Because Plaintiff makes the same
allegations against the judicial defendants in this case as she
did in her prior cases, the judicial immunity doctrine is
similarly applicable here.
3

Res judicata encompasses claim and issue preclusion. U.S. v. 5
Unlabeled Boxes, 572 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Venuto v. Witco Corp., 117 F.3d 754, 758 n.5 (3d Cir. 1997).
(“Collateral estoppel customarily refers to issue preclusion,
while res judicata, when used narrowly, refers to claim
preclusion. This court has previously noted that ‘the preferred
usage’ of the term res judicata ‘encompasses both claim and
issue preclusion.’”). Claim preclusion requires a showing that
there has been (1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior
5

controversy doctrine, 4 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 5 and

suit involving (2) the same claim and (3) the same parties or
their privies. Id. (citation omitted). Collateral estoppel
requires of a previous determination that (1) the identical
issue was previously adjudicated; (2) the issue was actually
litigated; (3) the previous determination was necessary to the
decision; and (4) the party being precluded from relitigating
the issue was fully represented in the prior action. Id.
(citation omitted). Judge Thompson determined that Plaintiff’s
complaint was barred under both claim and issue preclusion
because Plaintiff’s complaint met all the elements of both
doctrines. Copeland IV, 2015 WL 9294810, at *3. Because
Plaintiff’s claims in this case are identical to her prior
cases, the same analysis applies here.
4

New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine “embodies the
principle that the adjudication of a legal controversy should
occur in one litigation in only one court; accordingly, all
parties involved in a litigation should at the very least
present in that proceeding all of their claims and defenses that
are related to the underlying controversy.” Wadeer v. New
Jersey Mfrs. Ins. Co., 110 A.3d 19, 27 (N.J. 2015) (citations
and quotations omitted). The purpose of the entire controversy
doctrine “are threefold: (1) the need for complete and final
disposition through the avoidance of piecemeal decisions; (2)
fairness to parties to the action and those with a material
interest in the action; and (3) efficiency and the avoidance of
waste and the reduction of delay.” Id. (citations and
quotations omitted). Judge Thompson held that the entire
controversy doctrine barred Plaintiff’s claims, including the
claims against new defendants, because Plaintiff did not explain
why the new parties had been added at that late date, other than
the addition of Judge Bumb, which was self-explanatory since
Plaintiff added Judge Bumb after she dismissed Plaintiff's
claims.
Copeland IV, 2015 WL 9294810, at *4. The same holds
true here, where Plaintiff does not explain why her claims
against the Bellmawr Defendants had not been advanced in any of
her prior cases.
5

Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack
subject matter jurisdiction to engage in appellate review of
state court determinations or to evaluate constitutional claims
that are inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
6

Plaintiff’s failure to state any cognizable claims. 6

Id. at 3-5.

Plaintiff appealed that decision, which was affirmed in all
respects by the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Copeland v. United States Department of Justice, 675 F. App’x

decision in a judicial proceeding. Port Authority Police Benev.
Ass'n, Inc. v. Port Authority of New York and New Jersey Police
Dept., 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992); In re Knapper, 407 F.3d
573, 580 (3d Cir. 2005) (“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine prevents
‘inferior’ federal courts from sitting as appellate courts for
state court judgments.”). Judge Thompson found that the RookerFeldman doctrine warranted the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims
because Plaintiff explicitly asked the court to revisit her
state court judgments by finding error in the state court
judges’ decisions. Copeland IV, 2015 WL 9294810, at *3.
Plaintiff has asked for the same relief in this case. Thus, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine is implicated here as well warranting
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims.
6

“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do . . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (first citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc.,
40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); and then citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Judge Thompson found that
the complaint did not make clear which of the nineteen claims
were meant to apply to which of the twenty-four defendants, and
many of Plaintiff's claims cited criminal statutes that private
citizens may not sue under. Copeland IV, 2015 WL 9294810, at *4.
Plaintiff’s complaint here details alleged violations by the
various Defendants, but Plaintiff fails to connect her claims
with the legal bases for their liability. She also claims that
Defendants violated several criminal statutes that provide no
private cause of action.

7

166, 168 (3d Cir. January 13, 2017). 7

Plaintiff filed a petition

for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court, but it was
denied as filed out of time.

Copeland v. Department of Justice,

138 S. Ct. 419 (Mem) (U.S. 2017).
Plaintiff’s current case here is a repeat of her prior
litigation.

The only difference the Court discerns between her

other cases and this one is the addition of the Borough of
Bellmawr, Bellmawr’s mayor, and Bellmawr’s zoning officer as
defendants – Bellmawr is the location of the property for which
the state court appointed a receiver to collect rents to satisfy
the default judgment entered against Plaintiff.

7

In her appeal in Copeland IV, the only substantive argument
Plaintiff made was that the preclusion doctrines relied upon by
Judge Thompson to dismiss her claims “had no application.” The
Third Circuit disagreed, explaining: “The only specific argument
she raises in that regard is that she never previously asserted
a RICO claim. Copeland, however, has made no effort to identify
the basis for her RICO claim or claims or to differentiate them
from the numerous claims of fraud that she asserted numerous
times before. Merely asserting a new theory of recovery does
not by itself save a previously litigated claim from preclusion.
To the extent that Copeland’s RICO claims are based on her claim
that her underlying debt, the state-court judgments and the
receivership are fraudulent (as it appears those claims must
be), they are barred by Copeland's previous actions in both
state and federal court for the reasons that the District Court
explained. To the extent that they are based on anything else,
Copeland has not pleaded any plausible claim to relief.”
Copeland, 675 F. App’x at 172 (citations omitted). This Court
finds that the Third Circuit’s analysis equally applies to
Plaintiff’s current action here, which also attempts to assert
claims under RICO, in addition to the regurgitated claims from
her previous cases.
8

All of the defendants have moved to dismiss her claims.
The Defendants who have been sued before have moved to dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims for the same reasons Plaintiff’s prior claims
were dismissed in the state court and in this court.

The

Bellmawr defendants have moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims on
numerous bases, including being time-barred and non-compliant
with the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, as well as on the basis of
immunity to suit.
Plaintiff has not filed oppositions to the Defendants’
motions to dismiss, except for the motion of Defendant Robert
Saldutti, Esq., the receiver appointed by the state court to
collect rental income from Plaintiff's rental properties to
satisfy the default judgment entered against her in favor of Abo
& Co.

In her opposition to Saldutti’s motion, Plaintiff does

not address the legal basis for the dismissal of her claims as
argued by Saldutti but instead challenges the validity of the
underlying contract with Abo & Co., the agreement she was
previously adjudged to have breached.
Plaintiff has also filed almost a dozen motions of her own.
Most of those motions have already been resolved by Magistrate
Judge Joel Schneider during an in-person hearing with all the
parties.

(See July 11, 2018, Docket No. 88.)

Still pending is

Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and motion for
“miscellaneous relief” she filed contemporaneous with
9

Defendants’ motions to dismiss, as well as two other
miscellaneous motions filed in the past two weeks.
Also pending is the motion for sanctions filed by
Defendants Marty Abo and Lisa Sharkey. (Docket No. 18.)

These

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s repetitive, frivolous and
baseless litigation over many years has harassed and stigmatized
them, and they seek reimbursement of attorneys’ fees and other
appropriate sanctions.

These Defendants argue that sanctions

are particularly important here, where the same claims against
them had been dismissed with prejudice, but undeterred,
Plaintiff filed yet another suit against them. 8
Although they have not filed formal motions for sanctions,
the other Defendants have requested that the Court enjoin
Plaintiff from continuing to pursue these claims in the future.
Plaintiff has not filed an opposition directly in response to
the motion for sanctions, and she has not addressed the other
Defendants’ requests that the Court issue a litigation
preclusion order against her.
Because the viability of Plaintiff’s claims in this case

8

In Plaintiff’s case before Judge Thompson, Abo and Sharkey
requested that the court permanently enjoin Plaintiff from
filing future civil complaints against them. Judge Thompson
declined to do so at that time, but stated, “Plaintiff shall be
on notice that submitting any further filings related to the
same underlying facts may result in an appropriate injunction or
sanctions against her.” Copeland IV, 2015 WL 9294810, at *5.
10

have already been assessed several times in lengthy and
comprehensive opinions in this Court and before the Third
Circuit, and because Plaintiff has not opposed substantively any
of the Defendants’ bases for the dismissal of her claims, the
Court will adopt the decisions in Copeland I-IV, and dismiss
Plaintiff’s claims against all the Defendants – except for the
Bellmawr Defendants – for the same reasons expressed in those
cases. 9
For the newly added Bellmawr Defendants, against whom
Plaintiff alleges a type of conspiracy with the other defendants
to deprive Plaintiff of her property at the time of the
receivership order in February 2013, the Court finds that
Plaintiff’s claims, to the extent that they are not
independently dismissible for insufficient pleading, are time
barred under the entire controversy doctrine, 10 the two-year
statute of limitations for her claims, and for non-compliance
with the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.

See Moore v. Middlesex

County Prosecutors Office, --- F. App’x ---, 2018 WL 2750237, at
*3 (3d Cir. June 7, 2018) (citing Dique v. N.J. State Police,

9

This decision is equally applicable to Plaintiff’s sixth action
regarding the February 2012 default judgment, COPELAND v. STATE
OF NEW JERSEY, 1:18-cv-10554-NLH-JS (“Copeland VI”), which was
filed in June 2018, six months after this case. The Court will
issue a separate Order in that case, where Defendants have
pending motions to dismiss.
10

See, supra, note 4.
11

603 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2010)) (“The statute of limitations
for § 1983 claims arising in New Jersey is two years.”); Caban
v. City of Newark, 2018 WL 2427124, at *4 (D.N.J. May 30, 2018)
(citing Michaels v. State of N.J., 955 F. Supp. 315, 326 (D.N.J.
1996) (holding that “[b]ecause the City of Newark is a public
entity within the meaning of the New Jersey Tort Claims Act . .
. all of plaintiff’s state law claims asserted against it . . .
are subject to the Act’s two-year statute of limitations”)
(quoting N.J.S.A. 59:8–8(b)); Ewing v. Cumberland County, 152 F.
Supp. 3d 269, 296 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing N.J.S.A. 59:8–8)
(explaining that the NJTCA requires notice of a claim of injury
against a public entity to be presented within ninety days of
the accrual of the cause of action, and if the plaintiff fails
to do so, he is barred from recovering damages).
With the dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s claims against all
the Defendants, Plaintiff’s pending summary judgment motion and
other motions for miscellaneous relief are now moot. 11

11

The

Because of the substantive doctrines that strictly bar
Plaintiff’s claims, no amendment can cure her deficient claims,
and therefore it would be futile to permit amendment. See
Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482
F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that even though Third
Circuit precedent “supports the notion that in civil rights
cases district courts must offer amendment--irrespective of
whether it is requested--when dismissing a case for failure to
state a claim,” this Court must only do so unless it would be
“inequitable or futile”).
12

remaining issues are whether the Court should grant Abo and
Sharkey’s motion for sanctions, and whether the Court should
enjoin Plaintiff from filing these same claims against these
defendants in the future without first seeking leave of court to
do so.
The “federal court system is not a playground to be used by
litigants for harassing those they dislike.”

Gilgallon v.

Carroll, 153 F. App’x 853, 855 (3d Cir. 2005).
is not available for “recreational litigation.”

The court system
See Marrakush

Soc. v. New Jersey State Police, 2009 WL 2366132, *36 (D.N.J.
July 30, 2009) (explaining that a “‘recreational litigant’ is
the ‘one who engages in litigation as sport and files numerous
complaints with little regard for substantive law or court
rules.’” (quoting Jones v. Warden of the Stateville Correctional
Ctr., 918 F. Supp. 1142, 1153 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (noting that,
“[w]hen confronted with [a] recreational plaintiff, courts, to
protect themselves and other litigants, have enjoined the filing
of further case without leave of court”) (other citations
omitted)).
It is well within the broad scope of the All Writs Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a), for a district court to issue an order
restricting the filing of meritless cases by a litigant whose
manifold complaints aim to subject defendants to unwarranted
harassment, and raise concern for maintaining order in the
13

court’s dockets.

Telfair v. Office of U.S. Attorney, 443 F.

App’x 674, 677 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing In re Oliver, 682 F.2d
443, 445 (3d Cir. 1982)).

A “district court has authority to

require court permission for all subsequent filings once a
pattern of vexatious litigation transcends a particular
dispute.”

Id. (citation omitted).

Before a court issues a

litigation preclusion order, the court must give notice to the
litigant to show cause why the proposed injunctive relief should
not issue.

Id. (citing Brow v. Farrelly, 994 F.2d 1027, 1038

(3d Cir. 1993)).
In addition to her efforts in state court, Plaintiff has
filed six federal court cases regarding her claims that a 2012
default judgment was erroneously entered against her based on a
faulty contract, and that the state court orders assigning a
receiver to collect rent on Plaintiff’s property to satisfy the
judgment were improper under the law.

For the reasons

summarized above and detailed in prior decisions, all of
Plaintiff’s claims have been unavailing for numerous reasons.
None of these decisions has deterred Plaintiff from continuing
to pursue her unmeritorious claims, however, even after Judge
Thompson’s dismissal of her claims in Copeland IV was “with
prejudice,” and the Third Circuit affirmed that decision.
The Court finds that the history of this case and
Plaintiff’s unrelenting efforts to relitigate a 2012 state court
14

judgment by filing numerous, repetitive, and unmeritorious
lawsuits in both state and federal court against any and all
parties involved appears to warrant the imposition of sanctions
in the form of a litigation preclusion order. 12
Consequently, the Court will direct Plaintiff to show cause
as to why this Court should not enter a preclusion order and
enjoin Plaintiff from filing any claims in this District
regarding the subject matter of this case without prior
permission of the Court.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, Defendants’ motions to
dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint will be granted.

Plaintiff’s

claims against all Defendants will be dismissed with prejudice.
Plaintiff’s pending motions will be denied as moot.

Plaintiff

will be directed to show cause within fifteen days as to why
this Court should not enter a preclusion order enjoining

12

Defendants’ Abo and Sharkey’s motion for sanctions will be
granted in part in that the Court will issue an Order to Show
Cause as to why a preclusion order should not be entered and
denied in part without prejudice as to monetary sanctions. If
the Court were to grant Abo and Sharkey’s request for the
reimbursement of their attorneys’ fees expended to defend
themselves against Plaintiff’s claims against them, the
reasoning for granting such a request would also support, in
equity, the reimbursement of attorneys’ fees for all of the
other Defendants who have been subjected to the same repetitive
litigation. A litigation preclusion order will serve to protect
all Defendants equally from Plaintiff’s continuing attempts to
pursue the same claims against them in the future.
15

Plaintiff from filing any future claims in this District
regarding the subject matter of this case without prior
permission of the Court.

An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date:
August 7, 2018
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

16