GODOY v. TD BANK, N.A. et al
Filing
21
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 8/31/2018. (rtm, )
[Dkt. Nos. 5, 13, 15]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
ARTHUR-ALEXANDER GODOY,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 17-13149(RMB/KMW)
v.
TD BANK, N.A., et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of a
motion to dismiss by Defendants TD Bank, N.A. (“TD”) and the
Toronto-Dominion Bank (“Toronto-Dominion,” and collectively with
TD the “Defendants”). [Dkt. No. 5]. 1 In their motion, Defendants
1
On March 6, 2018, Plaintiff submitted a Request for Default
against all Defendants. [Dkt. No. 12]. TD was served on January
8, 2018. [Dkt. No. 8]. Assuming this service was proper, this
would give Defendants until January 29, 2018 to answer or
otherwise respond to Plaintiff’s Complaint. The Defendants filed
their motion to dismiss on January 30, 2018. Fed. R. Civ. P.
55(a) provides that “When a party against whom a judgment for
affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise
defend, and that failure is shown by affidavit or otherwise, the
clerk must enter the party's default.” Here, not only had
Defendants responded over one month before Plaintiff filed his
request for default, but the parties had fully briefed a
contested motion to dismiss. [See Dkt. Nos. 5, 9, 10].
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for default will be denied, and
Defendants’ motions regarding Plaintiff’s request, [Dkt. Nos.
13, 15], will be denied as moot.
seek the dismissal of pro se Plaintiff Arthur-Alexander Godoy’s
Complaint in its entirety. For the following reasons,
Defendants’ motion will be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint
will be DISMISSED, without prejudice.
Plaintiff is an individual who resides at 3001 Cambie
Street, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada. (Compl. 3:7). TD is
a bank which, according to Plaintiff, is “a citizen of New
Jersey because it is a national bank with its designated main
office in the State of New Jersey,” and is a subsidiary of
Toronto-Dominion, a Canadian chartered bank. (Id. at 3:8-9).
Plaintiff alleges that, beginning in May 2017 and continuing
through November 2017, the Defendants—or at least one of them—
sent him several letters and made several phone calls to him in
an attempt to collect a debt. (Id. at 5:7-6:13; Ex. A-J).
Plaintiff alleges that when he disputed the debt, Defendants—
without validating the debt—reported “inaccurate derogatory
information about Plaintiff to one or more consumer reporting
agencies.” (Id. 6:12, 15-21). Plaintiff attempted to dispute the
accuracy of the information reported, but the Defendants failed
to timely respond and failed to inform the consumer reporting
agencies of the dispute.
On December 19, 2017, Plaintiff filed a four count
Complaint alleging: (1) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting
Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq.; (2) violation of the
2
Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), Section 227, 47
U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(A); (3) breach of contract; and (4)
negligence. Defendants’ motion to dismiss was filed on January
30, 2018. In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s
Complaint should be dismissed because, among other things,
the
Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Toronto-Dominion, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, and venue is improper. 2
The thrust of these arguments is that Plaintiff is a Canadian
citizen suing a Canadian defendant for conduct that took place
in Canada in relation to a Canadian credit card.
“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Moreover, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)
requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of
the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
2
The Defendants also challenge the Complaint for failure to
state a claim.
3
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1), (2). Each averment must be
“simple, concise, and direct.” Id. at 8(d)(1).
On a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), the plaintiff
bears the burden of establishing the court’s jurisdiction over
the defendant. Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93,
97 (3d Cir. 2004). Although the plaintiff must ultimately prove
personal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence, such a
showing is unnecessary at the early stages of litigation. Mellon
Bank (E.) PSFS, Nat. Ass’n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1223 (3d
Cir. 1992). Instead, the plaintiff must “present[ ] a prima
facie case for the exercise of personal jurisdiction by
establishing with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts
between the defendant and the forum state.” Id. at 1223
(citations omitted). Because a Rule 12(b)(2) motion “is
inherently a matter which requires resolution of factual issues
outside the pleadings,” the jurisdictional allegations may be
supported with sworn affidavits or other documents. Metcalfe v.
Renaissance Marine, Inc., 566 F.3d 324, 330 (3d Cir. 2009). Once
the plaintiff meets his or her burden, the burden shifts to the
defendant to establish the presence of other considerations that
would render the exercise of personal jurisdiction unreasonable.
Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 150 (3d Cir.
1992) (citation omitted).
4
Because Plaintiff is pro se, his pleadings must be
interpreted liberally. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see
also Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (“[H]owever
inartfully pleaded,” the “allegations of a pro se complaint [are
held] to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted
by lawyers[.]”). This does not, however, absolve Plaintiff of
the need to adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See,
e.g., Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2015), as
amended (Mar. 24, 2015)(“a pro se complaint . . .
must be held
to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by
lawyers;’ . . . but we nonetheless review the pleading to ensure
that it has ‘sufficient factual matter; accepted as true; to
state a claim to relief that is plausible on [its] face.’”).
Even construing Plaintiff’s Complaint liberally, it suffers
from several fatal flaws. Plaintiff’s Complaint is thirty-two
pages, half of which consist of difficult to comprehend legal
arguments. Moreover, Plaintiff names two Defendants: TD and
Toronto-Dominion, yet throughout his Complaint he refers only to
“Defendant” without distinguishing between the two. This makes
it unclear who Plaintiff has alleged has taken what action. 3 This
3
The Court notes, however, that based on the exhibits appended
to Plaintiff’s Complaint, it appears that this is a dispute
between a Canadian citizen and a Canadian company about a credit
card issued in Canada. In his amended complaint, Plaintiff
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also prevents the Court from determining whether personal
jurisdiction over Toronto-Dominion is proper, 4 whether this is
should specific which Defendant he alleges engages in what
allegedly unlawful conduct.
4 “[A] federal district court may assert personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident of the state in which the court sits to the
extent authorized by the law of that state.” Marten v. Godwin,
499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank
v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir.
1987)). In New Jersey, “courts may exercise jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant to the uttermost limits permitted by the
United States Constitution.” Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am.,
Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 589 (2010), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.,
J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
“Accordingly, in determining whether personal jurisdiction
exists, we ask whether, under the Due Process Clause, the
defendant has certain minimum contacts with [New Jersey] such
that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.” O’Connor v. Sandy
Lane Hotel Co., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d Cir. 2007).
There are two types of personal jurisdiction: general and
specific. Specific jurisdiction enables a court to hear claims
that arise from a defendant's contacts with the forum where the
court sits. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall, 466
U.S. 408, 414 n. 8 (1984). In contrast, a court exercising
general jurisdiction may hear any claim against a defendant that
possesses systematic and continuous contacts with the forum
regardless of whether the claim resulted from the defendant's
forum-related activities. Id. at 415 n. 9. Plaintiff does not
appear to have alleged that his suit arises from TorontoDominion’s contacts with New Jersey. He appears to be arguing,
rather, that because TD, a subsidiary of Toronto-Dominion, is a
New Jersey Corporation, Toronto-Dominion is subject to general
jurisdiction in New Jersey. The parent-subsidiary relationship
alone, however, is not enough to confer general jurisdiction.
See Horowitz v. AT&T Inc., No. 3:17-CV-4827-BRM-LHG, 2018 WL
1942525, at *8-9(D.N.J. Apr. 25, 2018)(evaluating necessary
relationship between parent and subsidiary for exercise of
general jurisdiction of parent in subsidiary’s domicile). If
this is the theory under which Plaintiff intends to proceed, he
should thoroughly evaluate whether TD’s presence in New Jersey
subjects Toronto-Dominion to suit here for actions that took
place elsewhere.
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the proper venue for this suit, and whether the Court has
subject matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to provide the “short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” and
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief” required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
will be GRANTED, and Plaintiff’s Complaint will be DISMISSED,
without prejudice. Plaintiff will be granted leave to file an
amended complaint consistent with this Opinion. An Order
accompanying this Opinion shall issue on this date.
s/ Renee Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
DATED: August 31, 2018
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