FOSTER v. THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 11/20/2018. (tf, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
IVAN D. FOSTER,
Plaintiff,
HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
v.
THE NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANANCY, et al.,
Civil Action No.
17-13572 (JBS/AMD)
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Defendants.
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
Plaintiff pro se Ivan D. Foster (“Plaintiff”) filed this 42
U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging that the New Jersey Division of
Child Protection and Permanency (“NJDCPP”), and others, violated
his constitutional rights by removing his daughter, hereinafter
referred to as “I.S.F.,” from his custody. Since Plaintiff seeks
to bring this action in forma pauperis, the Court has an
obligation to screen the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
The Court finds as follows:
1.
Plaintiff filed the instant Complaint with an
application to proceed in forma paupuris. [Docket Item 1.]
Because Plaintiff’s application disclosed that he was indigent,
the Court permitted the Complaint to be filed without prepayment
of fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, and ordered the Clerk of
Court to file the Complaint. [Docket Item 2.] Plaintiff
subsequently filed a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 for
“[i]nformal catch all relief” from various orders of the New
Jersey Superior Court, Family Part, Burlington Vicinage. [Docket
Item 4.]
2.
Section 1915(e)(2)(B) requires the Court to screen the
Complaint and to dismiss any claim that is frivolous or
malicious, fails to state a claim, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. The Court
also has “a continuing obligation to assess its subject matter
jurisdiction” and may “dismiss a suit sua sponte for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction at any stage in the proceeding.
Zambelli Fireworks Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Wood, 592 F.3d 412, 420 (3d
Cir. 2010). The Court draws the facts of this case from the
Complaint and exhibits attached thereto and, for the purposes of
this screening, accepts the factual allegations as true.
3.
Plaintiff is the father of I.S.F., who was five years
old when the Complaint was filed. [Docket Item 1 (“Compl.”) at ¶
13.] Josephine Parr (“Ms. Parr”) is I.S.F.’s mother. (Id. at ¶
19.)
4.
On September 1, 2016, Ms. Parr filed for a Restraining
Order in the Burlington County Superior Court, Chancery
Division, Family Part against Plaintiff, Docket No. FV-03000423-17, alleging a violation of the New Jersey Prevention of
Domestic Violence Act. [Docket Item 4 at 1.] Thereafter, a
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Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) and Final Restraining Order
(“FRO”) were entered against Plaintiff. [Docket Item 5-1 at 12.] On or around June 22, 2017, the Burlington County Superior
Court entered an Amended Final Restraining Order (“FRO”), which,
among other things, barred Plaintiff from Ms. Parr’s residence
and place of employment, prohibited Plaintiff from having any
communication with Ms. Parr except that he may text Ms. Parr
“only in reference to the health, educa[tion], visitation, &
welfare of [I.S.F.],” ordered Plaintiff to complete a
psychiatric evaluation, and granted temporary custody of I.S.F.
to Ms. Parr. [Docket Item 3-2.]
5.
According to the Complaint, on November 25, 2017,
Plaintiff and I.S.F. “were together peacefully at their motel
room” when “unannounced, Ms. Parr . . . appeared at the front of
the door of the motel room [t]o tell [I.S.F.] good night.” (Id.
at ¶¶ 17, 19) Later that day, Ms. Parr went to the Mount Laurel
police station and reported that Plaintiff “was naked and laying
in the bed with [I.S.F.].” (Id. at ¶ 21.) On November 26, 2017,
Ms. Parr brought I.S.F. back to the motel to stay with
Plaintiff, but Plaintiff told Ms. Parr that I.S.F. could not
stay with him that night because “he saw two [r]oaches in the
room and knew [I.S.F.] would be scared.” (Id. at ¶ 24.)
According to the Complaint, Plaintiff moved to a “better motel”
the next day. (Id. at ¶ 25.) The Mount Laurel Police referred
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the matter to the NJDCPP who opened an investigation on November
27, 2017. (Id. at ¶¶ 22-23.)
6.
On December 15, 2017, the Burlington County Superior
Court entered another Amended FRO, this time granting Plaintiff
visitation with I.S.F. every Tuesday, beginning December 19,
2017, from 3:30 P.M. to 6:30 P.M., as well as parenting time
every other weekend, beginning December 22, 2017, from 3:30 P.M.
to 6:30 P.M. [Docket Item 3-1 at 3.] Three days later, on
December 18, 2017, Ms. Parr obtained an Order from Burlington
County Superior Court Judge Mark Tarantino requiring Plaintiff
to “stop all parenting time and any texting about the wellbeing
of [I.S.F.].” [Docket Item 3 at 1.] Plaintiff asked the
Burlington County Superior Court for visitation on December 19,
2017 “because he did not Committ [sic] a violation of the NJ
title 9 laws or administrative Code N.J.A.C. 10:120-1.3
DEFINITIONS or the 4 prongs needed [t]o be met to start an
investigation.” (Compl. at ¶ 29.) According to the Complaint,
the Burlington County Superior Court denied Plaintiff’s request
“due to an open DCPP investigation.” (Id. at ¶ 32.)
7.
On December 22, 2017, Plaintiff filed the Complaint
[Docket Item 1] and accompanying exhibits [Docket Item 3] in
federal court. Plaintiff alleges that his Fourteenth Amendment
rights “[a]re being violated by the NJ Superior Court and The NJ
DCPP [b]ecause he has not violate[d] any NJ Law or Adminstartive
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[sic] code.” (Compl. at ¶ 33.) As relief, Plaintiff asks the
Court for an injunction against the Burlington County Superior
Court and Mount Laurel Police Department to allow him to see
I.S.F. in a public place “for one hour a day until this matter
is heard by this court,” as well as “33 million dollars against
all defendants.” (Id. at ¶¶ 34-35, 37.)
8.
The Court will dismiss the Complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Although Plaintiff has clothed his
complaint in the garb of a civil rights action, the Complaint
boils down to a dispute over the custody of his child and the
interactions of Plaintiff and Defendants in that custody
process. Indeed, it is clear from the face of the Complaint that
Plaintiff’s primary grievance against the various Defendants is
that their removal decisions, and those of the Burlington County
Superior Court, were simply wrong.
9.
This Court does not have jurisdiction over
determinations of parental rights and child custody, including
those presented in this case, because these are matters within
the longstanding exception to federal jurisdiction in matters
involving domestic relations of husband and wife, and parent and
child. The New Jersey Legislature “adopted comprehensive
legislation for the protection and welfare of the children of
this State,” and child abuse and neglect cases are controlled by
Title 9 of the New Jersey Statutes. See New Jersey Div. of Youth
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and Family Serv. v. M.C. III, 990 A.2d 1097, 1107 (N.J. 2010).
New Jersey law makes clear that “the Superior Court, Chancery
Division, Family Part has exclusive original jurisdiction over
noncriminal proceedings under this act alleging the abuse or
neglect of a child.” N.J.S.A. § 9:6-8.24 (emphasis added). New
Jersey law also mandates that “[a]ll noncriminal cases involving
child abuse” be “transferred to [New Jersey family court] from
other courts . . . .” N.J.S.A. § 9:6-9.22; see also Cesare v.
Cesare, 713 A.2d 390, 399 (N.J. 1998) (noting the “family
courts’ special jurisdiction and expertise in family matters”).
Moreover, appeals from any “final order or decision in a case
involving child abuse” under Title 9 are taken to New Jersey
appellate courts, not to federal court. N.J.S.A. § 9:6-8.70.
Thus, even when a complaint is “drafted in tort, contract, ‘or
even under the federal constitution,’” if the complaint involves
matters of domestic relations, it is generally not within the
federal court’s jurisdiction. New Jersey Div. of Youth and
Family Servs. v. Prown, 2014 WL 284457, at *2 (D.N.J. Jan. 24,
2014) (citation omitted).
10.
These statutory provisions are consistent with the
well-settled general understanding that the “‘whole subject of
the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the
United States.’” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703
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(1992) (quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)). To
the extent that Plaintiff seeks review of any temporary or
permanent child custody or parental rights determinations, his
recourse lies in an appeal within the state court system because
this federal court lacks jurisdiction to entertain these claims.
11.
Even if this Court had federal subject matter
jurisdiction over a child custody dispute, which it does not,
the Younger doctrine of abstention would bar the present action
in federal court, since it appears proceedings are still taking
place in state court.1
12.
In general terms, the Younger abstention doctrine
reflects “a strong federal policy against federal-court
interference with pending state judicial proceedings absent
extraordinary circumstances.” Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v.
Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982). Under Younger,
a federal court should abstain from enjoining “civil proceedings
involving certain orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the
state courts' ability to perform their judicial functions,”
Sprint Comm., Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 73 (2013), and
Plaintiff notes several times in the Complaint that there have
been various proceedings in Burlington County Superior Court
involving the custody dispute, including as recently as three
days before he filed the Complaint. (Compl. at ¶ 29.) More
recently Plaintiff filed additional papers which indicate that
he began supervised visits with I.S.F. on March 17, 2018, and,
as of April 9, 2018, those visits with his daughter have been
“positive and meaningful.” [Docket Item 4 at 2.]
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abstention is warranted when: (1) there are ongoing state
proceedings that are judicial in nature; (2) the state
proceedings implicate important state interests; and (3) the
state proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise
federal claims, see Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass’n of United
Methodist Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 F. App’x 232, 236 (3d
Cir. 2009). All three requirements are satisfied here.
13.
First, Plaintiff’s state proceedings are judicial in
nature, since removal proceedings are ongoing before the New
Jersey Superior Court. See N.J.S.A. § 9:6-8.24.
14.
Second, the Complaint implicates important state
interests. Issues relating to child custody and parental rights
generally fall under the umbrella of “domestic relations,” and
the Supreme Court has long noted state tribunals’ “special
proficiency . . . over the past century and a half in handling
issues that arise” in the area. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 704;
see also Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 307 (2006).
Particularly where the question revolves around the status of a
domestic relationship (in this case, the custody status of a
child), the case implicates “difficult questions of state law
bearing on policy questions of substantial public import whose
importance transcends the result in the case [] at bar,” and is
more appropriate for a state court. Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at
705-06; see also Mayercheck v. Judges of Pa. Sup. Ct., 395 F.
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App’x 839, 942 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that domestic relations
exception divests federal courts of jurisdiction over cases
involving a decree of child custody); Matusow v. Tans-County
Title Agency, LLC, 545 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2008) (stating the
same). The actions of Defendants at issue in the present
Complaint are totally intertwined with, and at issue in, the
Superior Court proceedings.
15.
Third, there is no reason why Plaintiff may not raise
his constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceedings in
Burlington County Superior Court and, if dissatisfied with that
court’s rulings, he may take an appeal within the state court
system and, eventually, to the U.S. Supreme Court, if desired.
Plaintiff cannot, however, use the federal court system to
challenge a state court decision with which he is dissatisfied
because the federal court does not exist as an appellate
tribunal reviewing state court decisions. Thus, the Younger
doctrine additionally counsels this Court to abstain.
16.
Conclusion. In sum, and for the foregoing reasons, the
Complaint will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under the
“domestic relations” exception, and alternatively due to
abstention under Younger. Dismissal of the Complaint will be
without prejudice to Plaintiff’s right to file a complaint in a
State court of competent jurisdiction. Plaintiff’s motion for
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relief pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 will be denied as moot.2 An
accompanying Order shall be entered.
November 20, 2018
s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge
Plaintiff’s Rule 60 motion is “moot,” that is, it does not
present a matter that remains to be adjudicated because this
Court’s finding of lack of jurisdiction also means it lacks the
power to decide any other motions in this case.
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