STELZER v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Filing
20
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 2/27/2019. (dmr)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DANIEL RAYMOND STELZER,
1:18-cv-00015-NLH
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
MARYJEAN ELLIS
LAW OFFICE OF MARYJEAN ELLIS LLC
93 MAIN STREET #6
NEWTON, NJ 07860
KARL E. OSTERHOUT
OSTERHOUT BERGER DISABILITY LAW, LLC
521 CEDAR WAY, SUITE 200
OAKMONT, PA 15139
On behalf of Plaintiff
DAVID LEACH
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
300 SPRING GARDEN STREET, 6TH FLOOR
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19123
On behalf of Defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter comes before the Court pursuant to Section
205(g) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
405(g), regarding Plaintiff’s application for Disability
1
Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) 1 under Title II of the Social Security
Act.
42 U.S.C. § 423, et seq.
The issue before the Court is
whether the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) erred in finding
that there was “substantial evidence” that Plaintiff was not
disabled at any time since his alleged onset date of disability,
July 8, 2013.
For the reasons stated below, this Court will
affirm that decision.
I.
BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 8, 2014, Plaintiff, Daniel Raymond Stelzer,
protectively filed an application for DIB, 2 alleging that he
became disabled on July 8, 2013.
Plaintiff claims that he can
no longer work as a janitor due to his pulmonary disease, among
other impairments.
Plaintiff’s claim was initially denied and then again upon
reconsideration.
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ,
which was held on October 6, 2016.
On January 6, 2017, the ALJ
1
DIB is a program under the Social Security Act to provide
disability benefits when a claimant with a sufficient number of
quarters of insured employment has suffered such a mental or
physical impairment that the claimant cannot perform substantial
gainful employment for at least twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423
et seq.
2
A protective filing date marks the time when a disability
applicant made a written statement of his or her intent to file
for benefits. That date may be earlier than the date of the
formal application and may provide additional benefits to the
claimant. See SSA Handbook 1507; SSR 72-8.
2
issued an unfavorable decision.
Plaintiff’s Request for Review
of Hearing Decision was denied by the Appeals Council on
November 7, 2017, making the ALJ’s January 6, 2017 decision
final.
Plaintiff brings this civil action for review of the
Commissioner’s decision.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Standard of Review
Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Congress provided for judicial
review of the Commissioner’s decision to deny a complainant’s
application for social security benefits.
55 F.3d 900, 901 (3d Cir. 1995).
Ventura v. Shalala,
A reviewing court must uphold
the Commissioner’s factual decisions where they are supported by
“substantial evidence.”
42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3);
Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 38 (3d Cir. 2001); Sykes v.
Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000); Williams v. Sullivan,
970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992).
more than “a mere scintilla.”
Substantial evidence means
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 401 (1971)(quoting Consolidated Edison Co. V. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
It means “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”
Id.
The inquiry is not whether the reviewing
court would have made the same determination, but whether the
Commissioner’s conclusion was reasonable.
845 F.2d 1211, 1213 (3d Cir. 1988).
3
See Brown v. Bowen,
A reviewing court has a duty to review the evidence in its
totality.
1984).
See Daring v. Heckler, 727 F.2d 64, 70 (3d Cir.
“[A] court must ‘take into account whatever in the
record fairly detracts from its weight.’” Schonewolf v.
Callahan, 972 F. Supp. 277, 284 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Willbanks
v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 847 F.2d 301, 303 (6th
Cir. 1988) (quoting Universal Camera Corp. V. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488 (1951)).
The Commissioner “must adequately explain in the record his
reasons for rejecting or discrediting competent evidence.”
Ogden v. Bowen, 677 F. Supp. 273, 278 (M.D. Pa. 1987) (citing
Brewster v. Heckler, 786 F.2d 581 (3d Cir. 1986)).
The Third
Circuit has held that an “ALJ must review all pertinent medical
evidence and explain his conciliations and rejections.”
Burnett
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 220 F.3d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 2000).
Similarly, an ALJ must also consider and weigh all of the nonmedical evidence before him.
Id. (citing Van Horn v. Schweiker,
717 F.2d 871, 873 (3d Cir. 1983)); Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d
700, 707 (3d Cir. 1981).
The Third Circuit has held that access to the
Commissioner’s reasoning is indeed essential to a meaningful
court review:
Unless the [Commissioner] has analyzed all
evidence and has sufficiently explained the
weight he has given to obviously probative
4
exhibits, to say that his decision is
supported by substantial evidence approaches
an abdication of the court’s duty to
scrutinize the record as a whole to
determine whether the conclusions reached
are rational.
Gober v. Matthews, 574 F.2d 772, 776 (3d Cir. 1978).
Although
an ALJ, as the fact finder, must consider and evaluate the
medical evidence presented, Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 42, “[t]here
is no requirement that the ALJ discuss in its opinion every
tidbit of evidence included in the record,” Hur v. Barnhart, 94
F. App’x 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2004).
In terms of judicial review,
a district court is not “empowered to weigh the evidence or
substitute its conclusions for those of the fact-finder.”
Williams, 970 F.2d at 1182.
However, apart from the substantial
evidence inquiry, a reviewing court is entitled to satisfy
itself that the Commissioner arrived at his decision by
application of the proper legal standards.
Sykes, 228 F.3d at
262; Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir. 1983);
Curtin v. Harris, 508 F. Supp. 791, 793 (D.N.J. 1981).
B.
Standard for DIB
The Social Security Act defines “disability” for purposes
of an entitlement to a period of disability and disability
insurance benefits as the inability to engage in any substantial
gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable
physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
5
death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a
continuous period of not less than 12 months.
1382c(a)(3)(A).
See 42 U.S.C. §
Under this definition, a Plaintiff qualifies as
disabled only if her physical or mental impairments are of such
severity that she is not only unable to perform her past
relevant work, but cannot, given her age, education, and work
experience, engage in any other type of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such
work exists in the immediate area in which she lives, or whether
a specific job vacancy exists for her, or whether she would be
hired if she applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B)
(emphasis added).
The Commissioner has promulgated regulations 3 for
determining disability that require application of a five-step
sequential analysis.
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520.
This five-step
process is summarized as follows:
1.
If the claimant currently is engaged in substantial
gainful employment, she will be found “not disabled.”
2.
If the claimant does not suffer from a “severe
impairment,” she will be found “not disabled.”
3.
If the severe impairment meets or equals a listed
impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix
1 and has lasted or is expected to last for a
continuous period of at least twelve months, the
3
The regulations were amended effective March 27, 2017. See 82
F.R. 5844. Because the ALJ issued her decision prior to that
effective date, the Court must employ the standards in effect at
the time of her decision.
6
claimant will be found “disabled.”
4.
If the claimant can still perform work she has done in
the past (“past relevant work”) despite the severe
impairment, she will be found “not disabled.”
5.
Finally, the Commissioner will consider the claimant’s
ability to perform work (“residual functional
capacity”), age, education, and past work experience
to determine whether or not she is capable of
performing other work which exists in the national
economy. If she is incapable, she will be found
“disabled.” If she is capable, she will be found “not
disabled.”
20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f).
Entitlement to benefits is
therefore dependent upon a finding that the claimant is
incapable of performing work in the national economy.
This five-step process involves a shifting burden of proof.
See Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d
1150, 1153 (3d Cir. 1983).
In the first four steps of the
analysis, the burden is on the claimant to prove every element
of her claim by a preponderance of the evidence.
See id.
In
the final step, the Commissioner bears the burden of proving
that work is available for the Plaintiff: “Once a claimant has
proved that he is unable to perform his former job, the burden
shifts to the Commissioner to prove that there is some other
kind of substantial gainful employment he is able to perform.”
Kangas v. Bowen, 823 F.2d 775, 777 (3d Cir. 1987); see Olsen v.
Schweiker, 703 F.2d 751, 753 (3d Cir. 1983).
7
C.
Analysis
At step one, the ALJ found that even though Plaintiff had
worked since his alleged onset date of July 8, 2013, Plaintiff’s
work did not qualify as substantial gainful activity (“SGA”).
At step two, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s impairments of
restrictive ventilatory defect with a paralyzed left
hemidiaphragm and obesity were severe.
At step three, the ALJ
determined that Plaintiff’s severe impairments or his severe
impairments in combination with his other impairments did not
equal the severity of one of the listed impairments.
For step
four, the ALJ then determined that Plaintiff’s residual
functional capacity (“RFC”) rendered him capable of performing
unskilled work at the light exertional level, 4 which encompassed
his previous work as a janitor. 5
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in considering the
4
See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1568 (“[O]ccupations are classified as
unskilled, semi-skilled, and skilled.”); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567
(“Physical exertion requirements. To determine the physical
exertion requirements of work in the national economy, we
classify jobs as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very
heavy.”).
5
Because the ALJ determined at step four that Plaintiff was
capable of performing his past relevant work, the
ALJ did not reach step five in the sequential step
analysis. Benjamin v. Commissioner of Social Security, 2019 WL
351897, at *4 n.9 (D.N.J. 2019) (citing Valenti v. Commissioner
of Social Sec., 373 F. App’x 255, 258 n.1 (3d Cir. 2010); 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(b)-(f)).
8
opinion of his treating physician, pulmonologist Dr. Stuart Mest
M.D., FCCP, FACP, in making the RFC assessment and reaching the
ultimate conclusion that Plaintiff was capable of performing his
past work as a janitor.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ also
erred when she considered Plaintiff’s part-time work, performed
after the claimed disability onset date, as a factor against
finding Plaintiff disabled, rather than as a factor in favor of
Plaintiff’s credibility.
The Court does not find that the ALJ
erred in her assessment of these issues.
In making the RFC determination, the ALJ is required to do
the following:
In determining whether you are disabled, we consider all
your symptoms, including pain, and the extent to which your
symptoms can reasonably be accepted as consistent with the
objective medical evidence and other evidence. By
objective medical evidence, we mean medical signs and
laboratory findings . . . . By other evidence, we mean . .
. statements or reports from you, your treating or
nontreating source, and others about your medical history,
diagnosis, prescribed treatment, daily activities, efforts
to work, and any other evidence showing how your
impairment(s) and any related symptoms affect your ability
to work. . . .
20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
The RFC reflects “what [the claimant] can
still do despite [his or her] limitations.”
416.945(a).
20 C.F.R. §
The controlling regulations are clear that the RFC
finding is a determination expressly reserved to the
Commissioner, not medical providers.
404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c).
9
20 C.F.R. §§
In this case, the ALJ determined:
[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to
perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except
that he could occasionally climb ramps and stairs;
occasionally climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds;
occasionally stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl; and have only
occasional exposure to extreme cold, heat, humidity, or
pulmonary irritants such as excessive dust or chemical
fumes.
(R. at 15.)
The ALJ then found, based on the testimony of a vocational
expert, that Plaintiff’s previous relevant work as a
janitor/cleaner fell into this category as it was performed
generally in the national economy.
(R. at 22-23.)
In making this assessment, the ALJ detailed the medical
evidence, including the findings and opinions of Plaintiff’s
treating pulminologist, Dr. Mest.
On October 2, 2014, Dr. Mest
completed a medical source questionnaire, in which Dr. Mest
found the following:
Dr. Mest concluded that the claimant was incapable of low
stress jobs (Exhibit 14F). He could stand or walk for less
than 2 hours in an 8 hour work day and sit for 6 hours in
an 8 hour work day. He needed to take unscheduled breaks
every 30 to 60 minutes for 15 to 20 minutes to sit. He
could occasionally lift less than 10 pounds and rarely lift
10 pounds. He could occasionally twist, rarely stoop and
crouch and never climb. He was to avoid even moderate
exposure to extreme cold and heat, high humidity and
wetness and all exposure to smoke, perfume, soldering
fluxes, solvents, cleaners, fumes, odors, gases, dust, and
chemicals. He concluded that the claimant was disabled
from pulmonary disease.
(R. at 22, 419-22.)
10
The ALJ explained her assessment of Dr. Mest’s opinion.
(R. at 23.)
The ALJ afforded great weight to Dr. Mest’s opinion
that Plaintiff could sit for 6 hours in an 8-hour work day and
occasionally crouch because she found this opinion was
consistent with the medical record as a whole.
As for the
remainder of Dr. Mest’s answers on the questionnaire, the ALJ
assigned little weight to his opinions:
The claimant continued to work during 2013 and 2014 and in
2014 at an exertional level requiring more standing and
walking than Dr. Mest's opinion, and his income was within
$300.00 of the substantial gainful activity threshold
(Exhibits 6D and 8D). He could perform six minute walk
tests without desaturating and his pulse oximetry testing
never reached below 90 percent.
(R. at 23.)
With regard to Plaintiff’s medical treatment notes, the ALJ
related:
The claimant underwent treatment in 2015 through July 2015
(Exhibits 25F and 26F). The claimant complained about
fatigue in June 2015 but it was noted that he was holding
fluid in his legs. The claimant's FEVl level improved in
July 2015 from its 2014 level and he continued to perform a
six minute walk test without de-saturating to the point of
needing oxygen. The claimant underwent treatment with his
pulmonologist, Dr. Mest, only twice a year and after
February 2014, he did not return to Dr. Desai for further
treatment suggesting that he was stable. The claimant
engaged in work related activities into 2015 (Exhibit 8D).
Based upon objective findings, I find that the claimant's
functioning was not negatively affected from the cardiac
component of his cardiopulmonary functioning based upon the
evidence before me (Exhibits 9F and 25F).
(R. at 21.)
In sum, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff’s ability to
11
perform the activities necessary to continue his janitor
position, although at a level slightly below the SGA threshold,
was not consistent with Dr. Mest’s opinions as to the disabling
nature of Plaintiff’s pulmonary impairment.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have fully credited
Plaintiff’s treating physician, who is also a specialist in
Plaintiff’s condition, and by failing to do so, the ALJ violated
SSA regulations and Third Circuit precedent.
Plaintiff further
argues that instead of using his work ethic as a factor against
Plaintiff’s claims of disability, the ALJ should have weighed
his continued efforts to work as a mark in favor of Plaintiff’s
credibility as to how his severe impairments render him
incapable working at an SGA level.
While it is true that a “cardinal principle guiding
disability eligibility determinations is that the ALJ accord
treating physicians' reports great weight, especially when their
opinions reflect expert judgment based on a continuing
observation of the patient's condition over a prolonged period
of time,” Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(citations and quotations omitted), an ALJ may reduce her
reliance upon a treating physician’s opinions if those opinions
are inconsistent with other medical evidence, and if she
explains her reasoning.
Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 439 (3d
Cir. 1999) (“[A]n ALJ is permitted to accept or reject all or
12
part of any medical source’s opinion, as long as the ALJ
supports his assessment with substantial evidence.”), cited by
Brownawell v. Commissioner, 554 F.3d 352, 355 (3d Cir. 2008));
Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 705 (3d Cir. 1981) (“We are also
cognizant that when the medical testimony or conclusions are
conflicting, the ALJ is not only entitled but required to choose
between them.... [W]e need from the ALJ not only an expression
of the evidence s/he considered which supports the result, but
also some indication of the evidence which was rejected.”).
This is exactly what the ALJ did here.
At the same time
Dr. Mest concluded that Plaintiff was “disabled from pulmonary
disease,” Plaintiff continued to perform activities that
exceeded Dr. Mest’s opinions as to Plaintiff’s limitations.
The
ALJ properly explained this inconsistency and how that affected
her assessment of Dr. Mest’s opinion and Plaintiff’s RFC.
See
Wilkinson v. Commissioner Social Sec., 558 F. App’x 254, 256 (3d
Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) (explaining that “no rule or
regulation compels an ALJ to incorporate into an RFC every
finding made by a medical source simply because the ALJ gives
the source's opinion as a whole ‘significant’ weight,” and that
the ALJ was not required to adopt all of a treating source’s
opinion solely because she found the opinion as a whole
persuasive, as it is not a court’s role to “re-weigh the
evidence of record and substitute [our] judgment as to whether
13
[the claimant] is disabled under the Act for that of the ALJ”).
Moreover, two additional points of law support the ALJ’s
assessment of Dr. Mest’s opinions.
One, as noted by the ALJ (R.
at 23), the RFC finding is a determination expressly reserved to
the Commissioner of Social Security – a claimant’s medical
provider’s opinion on that issue is not controlling.
§§ 404.1527(d)(2), 404.1546(c).
20 C.F.R.
Two, Dr. Mest’s opinion was
provided on a form, which is considered “weak evidence.”
Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1065 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Form
reports in which a physician’s obligation is only to check a box
or fill in a blank are weak evidence at best.”); Zonak
v.
Commissioner of Social Sec., 290 F. App’x 493, 497 (3d Cir.
2008) (affirming the ALJ's rejection of the plaintiff's treating
physician's opinion because it was provided on a check-box form
and no reasons were given in support of the doctor's conclusion
on that form).
Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ’s assessment
of Plaintiff’s treating physician’s medical records and opinions
was proper. 6
6
Plaintiff also takes issue with the ALJ’s assessment of the
consultative examiners’ opinions, arguing that they were not
pulmonary specialists, and their opinions were issued in 2014
without the benefit of more recent examinations. Plaintiff
argues that it is unclear what those consultative examiners’
reports would have said if they had been updated. The Court
rejects this argument for three reasons: (1) the ALJ properly
explained why she accepted and rejected those opinions (R. at
22); (2) Plaintiff does not point to updated medical records to
show how the consultative examiners’ reports could have been
14
With regard to Plaintiff’s arguments concerning how the ALJ
viewed Plaintiff’s part-time employment after his alleged
disability onset date, the Court is not persuaded that the ALJ
erred.
Plaintiff testified that even though he did work, it was
for only four hours a night, and under special accommodations.
Plaintiff also testified that when his employer asked him to
work eight hours a shift, Plaintiff declined because he felt he
would not be physically able.
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
improperly failed to address those special accommodations, and
in the RFC assessment the ALJ was not permitted to consider work
a claimant performs with accommodations.
Plaintiff further
argues that the ALJ should have credited the fact that he
endeavored to work while he suffered from severe disabilities as
a sign of his credibility as to the disabling nature of his
impairments, and not as a factor against his disability claim.
Although the ability to work under special conditions, such
as by receiving accommodations from an employer, does not equate
to the ability to perform substantial gainful activity, 20
C.F.R. § 404.1573(c), that analysis is applied at step one to
determine whether Plaintiff engaged in SGA, which if he did,
impacted; and (3) it is Plaintiff’s burden to prove his
disability. Wallace, 722 F.2d at 1153 (explaining the five-step
burden shifting analysis); Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428 (“The
claimant bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to
return to her past relevant work.”).
15
would preclude from the start Plaintiff’s disability claim.
See, e.g., Beeks v. Commissioner of Social Security, 363 F.
App’x 895, 897 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that the “special
considerations” provision in § 404.1573(c) is applied to the
step one analysis).
In this case, the ALJ properly did not
consider Plaintiff’s part-time employment to be SGA.
Instead, the ALJ referred to Plaintiff’s continued work as
a janitor as evidence, just like the medical evidence and
Plaintiff’s testimony, to support the RFC assessment.
20 C.F.R
§ 404.1571 (“Even if the work you have done was not substantial
gainful activity, it may show that you are able to do more work
than you actually did.”).
Plaintiff testified that he was
responsible for cleaning the cafeteria, for which he “always had
help,” but when his employer asked him to clean the entire first
floor and work an eight-hour shift, he went “above their heads”
to complain, and was fired as a result.
65.)
(R. at 16; 48-50; 62-
He further testified, “It would have been great if they
left me alone doing what I was doing.”
(R. at 62.)
The ALJ considered this testimony (R. at 16), which
supports the ALJ’s assessment that Plaintiff was capable of
performing light, unskilled work with certain accommodations,
which matched the very job he was doing (R. at 15, 23-24).
Additionally, the record evidence does not show that his
accommodations were not simply self-imposed, and it is
16
Plaintiff’s burden to establish the special conditions which
rendered him capable of performing that job.
See Gonzalez v.
Commissioner of Social Security, 2016 WL 1306012, at *9 (D.N.J.
2016) (citing Jackson v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 36 F. App'x 498,
499 (3d Cir. 2002)) (“The ALJ does not bear the burden of
establishing that [the plaintiff's] past relevant work is
substantial gainful activity, or that the work was performed
under special conditions taking into account the plaintiff's
impairments.”).
In short, while efforts of a disability claimant to work,
or a long work history demonstrating a strong work ethic, are
indeed relevant to a claimant’s credibility, Dobrowolsky v.
Califano, 606 F.2d 403, 409 (3d Cir. 1979) (“[W]hen the claimant
has a work record like Dobrowolsky's twenty-nine years of
continuous work, fifteen with the same employer his testimony as
to his capabilities is entitled to substantial credibility.”),
the ALJ’s credibility assessment is entitled to great deference. 7
7
Effective March 26, 2016, the SSA issued Social Security Ruling
16-3p, which superseded SSR 96-7p, to eliminate the use of the
term “credibility.” SSR 16-3p explains, “We solicited a study
and recommendations from the Administrative Conference of the
United States (ACUS) on the topic of symptom evaluation. Based
on ACUS's recommendations and our adjudicative experience, we
are eliminating the use of the term ‘credibility’ from our subregulatory policy, as our regulations do not use this term. In
doing so, we clarify that subjective symptom evaluation is not
an examination of an individual's character. Instead, we will
more closely follow our regulatory language regarding symptom
evaluation. . . . In evaluating an individual’s symptoms, our
17
Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 612 (3d Cir. 2014) (“[T]his
Court defers to the ALJ's assessment of credibility.”); Metz v.
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Com’n, 532 F. App’x 309,
312 (3d Cir. 2013) (“Overturning an ALJ’s credibility
determination is an ‘extraordinary step,’ as credibility
determinations are entitled to a great deal of deference.”); 20
C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(4) (“We will consider whether there are any
inconsistencies in the evidence and the extent to which there
are any conflicts between your statements and the rest of the
evidence . . . .”).
The ALJ properly considered all the record
evidence, including Plaintiff’s treating physician’s records and
opinions, Plaintiff’s testimony, and his part-time employment
after the alleged disability onset date, in formulating
Plaintiff’s RFC, and concluding that Plaintiff retained the
ability to perform the janitor/cleaner job at the SGA level.
adjudicators will not assess an individual’s overall character
or truthfulness in the manner typically used during an
adversarial court litigation.” SSR 16-3p. This Court employs
the term “credibility” here in the context of whether
Plaintiff’s statements are supported by other record evidence,
rather than with regard to Plaintiff’s overall character or
truthfulness, which the Court has no reason whatsoever to
question. See, e.g., Levyash v. Colvin, 2018 WL 1559769, at *8
(D.N.J. 2018) (explaining that SSR 16–3P announced a policy
against evaluating claimant’s truthfulness in determining
whether individuals are disabled, but even though SSR 16–3p
clarifies that adjudicators should not make statements about an
individual’s truthfulness, the overarching task of assessing
whether an individual’s statements are consistent with other
record evidence remains the same).
18
The Court finds no reason to overturn that assessment.
III. Conclusion
This Court may not second guess the ALJ’s conclusions, but
may only determine whether substantial evidence supports the
ALJ’s determinations.
Hartzell v. Astrue, 741 F. Supp. 2d 645,
647 (D.N.J. 2010) (citing Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178,
1182 (3d Cir. 1992)) (explaining that the pinnacle legal
principal that applies to the assessment of all of the other
standards:
A district court is not empowered to weigh the
evidence or substitute its conclusions for those of the ALJ).
The Court finds in this case the ALJ’s determination that
Plaintiff was not totally disabled as of July 8, 2013 is
supported by substantial evidence.
The decision of the ALJ is
therefore affirmed.
An accompanying Order will be issued.
Date: February 27, 2019
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
19
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