SATTERHWAITE v. SATTERTHWAITE et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM, OPINION, ORDER Defendants IFP is Granted, Directing Clerk to file the Complaint. Ordered the Complaint is Dismissed for failure to state a claim. Directing Clerk to mark this case as closed. nm 1/18. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 1/17/18. (jbk, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RYMIR SATTERTHWAITE,
1:18-cv-00287-NLH-JS
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
OPINION & ORDER

v.
WANDA SATTERTHWAITE and SHAWN
CARTER,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
RYMIR SATTERTHWAITE
630 ERIAL ROAD
BLACKWOOD, NJ 08701
Plaintiff appearing pro se
WANDA SATTERTHWAITE
3850 N. MAIN STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19140
Defendant appearing pro se
SHAWN CARTER
318 WALKER ROAD
WEST ORANGE, NJ 07052
Defendant appearing pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
WHEREAS, Defendant, Wanda Satterhwaite, appearing pro se,
has filed a “notice of petition; verified petition for warrant
of removal” of a matter that appears to be related to state
court actions concerning the paternity of Defendant’s now adult
son; and
WHEREAS, it appears that Defendant’s family law case, which

started in Pennsylvania family court, progressed through the
trial and appellate levels in New Jersey state court, with the
New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately denying a petition for
certification on December 5, 2017 1; and
WHEREAS, Defendant has filed an application to proceed
without prepayment of fees (“in forma pauperis” or “IFP”
application), and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), a court
may allow a litigant to proceed without prepayment of fees if
she submits a proper IFP application; and
WHEREAS, although § 1915 refers to “prisoners,” federal
courts apply § 1915 to non-prisoner IFP applications, Hickson v.
Mauro, 2011 WL 6001088, *1 (D.N.J.2011) (citing Lister v. Dept.
of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Section
1915(a) applies to all persons applying for IFP status, and not
just to prisoners.”) (other citations omitted); and
WHEREAS, the screening provisions of the IFP statute
require a federal court to dismiss an action sua sponte if,
among other things, the action is frivolous or malicious, or if

1

Defendant has asked that this case be consolidated with Lillie
Coley v. Shawn Carter and Wanda Satterthwaite, Civil Action 1711751-NLH-JS. That action is closed, but there is a pending
motion to seal in that case that concerns the same and similar
exhibits accompanying Defendant’s notice of removal in this
action, which are also currently under seal. A hearing has been
set by the Magistrate Judge in 17-11751 on the motion to seal,
and the Magistrate Judge is directed to assess at the same time
the sealed documents in this case.
2

it fails to comply with the proper pleading standards, see 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448,
452 (3d Cir. 2013); Martin v. U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2017 WL 3783702, at *1 (D.N.J. August 30, 2017)
(“Federal law requires this Court to screen Plaintiff's
Complaint for sua sponte dismissal prior to service, and to
dismiss any claim if that claim fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
and/or to dismiss any defendant who is immune from suit.”); and
WHEREAS, pro se complaints and notices of removal must be
construed liberally, and all reasonable latitude must be
afforded the pro se litigant, Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97,
107 (1976), but pro se litigants “must still plead the essential
elements of [their] claim and [are] not excused from conforming
to the standard rules of civil procedure,” McNeil v. United
States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“[W]e have never suggested
that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be
interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed
without counsel.”); Sykes v. Blockbuster Video, 205 F. App’x
961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that pro se parties are
expected to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure);
and
WHEREAS, the Court has reviewed Defendant’s IFP
application, and has determined that she has made a sufficient
3

showing of indigence; but
WHEREAS, the Court finds that Defendant’s “notice of
petition; verified petition for warrant of removal” is
substantively improper because there does not appear to be a
pending state court matter to remove, which is a fundamental
requirement for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (for removal,
the state court action must be “pending”) and § 1446(a) (same);
see also City of Newark v. Lawson, 346 F. App’x 761, 762 (3d
Cir. 2009) (finding that because the state court proceedings had
already concluded by the time the appellant filed his notice of
appeal, removal was not appropriate); and
WHEREAS, to the extent that Defendant’s filing can be
construed as an originally filed action, rather than as a
removal of a state court action, and asserts claims for
violations of her federal civil rights, thus averring subject
matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, her filing warrants
a sua sponte dismissal because she does not specifically name
any defendant, and instead generally alleges that the
Pennsylvania and New Jersey courts violated her civil rights, 2
which is fatal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 and Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 684 (2009), see Lawson, 346 F. App’x at 761 (finding

2

Subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, i.e.,
diversity jurisdiction, would be lacking for the same reason.
4

“no error in the District Court's decision to construe Lawson's
pro se notice of removal as a complaint initiating a new federal
action” and dismiss the action for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, rather than ordering remand, because there was no
pending state court action capable of remand);
THEREFORE,
IT IS on this

17th

day of

January

, 2018

ORDERED that Defendant’s IFP application (Docket No. 1-2)
be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED, and the Clerk is directed
to file Defendant’s submission; and it is further
ORDERED that when the Court construes Defendant’s
submission as an original complaint, it is hereby DISMISSED for
failure to state a cognizable claim, and the Clerk is directed
to mark the matter as CLOSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge is directed to, in
conjunction with the pending motion to seal in Civil Action 1711751, determine whether the documents filed under seal in this
action should remain sealed.

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

At Camden, New Jersey

5