KAMDEM-OUAFFO v. CAMPBELL'S SOUP COMPANY et al

Filing 200

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/20/2020. (dmr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

RICKY KAMDEM-OUAFFO,
Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. 18-00298 (NLH/JS)
Civil No. 18-13119 (NLH/JS)

CAMPBELL SOUP COMPANY, et
al.,

OPINION

Defendants.

Appearances
RICKY KAMDEM-OUAFFO
1 RICHMOND STREET #2100
NEW BRUNSWICK, NJ 08901
Plaintiff appearing pro se.
DANIELLE M. DWYER
DUANE MORRIS
30 SOUTH 17TH STREET
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
Attorney for Defendants Campbell’s Soup Company, Denise M.
Morrison, Carlos J. Barroso, Scott Keller, Duane Morris, and
Trevor H. Taniguchi.
DAYNE RASHARD JOHNSON
MCELROY DEUTSCH MULVANEY & CARPENTER
1300 MOUNT KEMBLE AVE
MORRISTOWN, NJ 07962-8100
Attorney for Defendant Task Management Inc.
KATHLEEN N. FENNELLY
MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER LLP
1300 MOUNT KEMBLE AVENUE
PO BOX 2075
MORRISTOWN, NJ 07962-0161
Attorney for Defendants Task Management Inc., Stefan Mohan,

Corie Hess, and Linda Harrison.
JONATHAN D. WETCHLER
Defendant appearing pro se.
MICHAEL RATO
MCELROY DEUTSCH MULVANEY & CARPENTER LLP
1300 MT. KEMBLE AVENUE
P.O. BOX 2075
MORRISTOWN, NJ 07962
Attorney for Defendants McElroy, Deutsch, Mulvaney & Carpenter
LLP, Bernard E. Jacques, and Dayne R. Johnson.

HILLMAN, District Judge
This Opinion and its accompanying Order address two
overlapping matters now pending before this Court: Docket 18-298
and Docket 18-13119.

These cases both arise from Plaintiff

Ricky Kamdem-Ouaffo’s allegation that he lost his job due to
filing various complaints against prior employers.

Between the

two dockets, the Court presently has before it two cross-motions
for summary judgment, a motion to consolidate the actions, two
motions to strike the complaint filed by Plaintiff in the 1813119 action, a motion to dismiss, a motion for default
judgment, a motion for a preliminary injunction, and a motion
for sanctions.
For the reasons expressed below, the Court will grant the
motion to consolidate the actions and consolidate them under the
docket of the 18-298 action.

It will further grant Defendants’

motion to strike the Complaint filed in 18-13119 action, and
2

then dismiss as moot the motion to dismiss, motion for default
judgment, and motion for a preliminary injunction filed in the
18-13119 action.

Finally, the Court will grant Defendant Task

Management Inc.’s motion for summary judgment filed in the 18298 action, deny Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment
and motion for sanctions, and dismiss Plaintiff’s claims with
prejudice.
Background
1. Factual Background
Plaintiff is a scientist with advanced degrees related to
the food industry. 1

Defendant Task Management is a corporation

that specializes in providing corporations with independent
contractors.

On August 1, 2017, Task Management, through its

employee Linda Harrison, contacted Plaintiff to inquire whether
Plaintiff believed he had the skills to take on work with
Campbell Soup Company, a Task Management client.

Plaintiff

agreed, and on August 10, 2017, Plaintiff entered into an
agreement with Task Management, through his wholly owned

1

Plaintiff failed to properly file either a statement of
undisputed material facts in support of his own motion for
summary judgment, or a responsive statement of material facts in
opposition to Defendant Task Management’s motion for summary
judgment, as required by Local Rule 56.1(a). Accordingly, as
the Court will explain in greater detail in its analysis of the
summary judgment motions below, the Court takes its facts from
Defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts and any
additional evidence Plaintiff filed with his motion or cited to
in his supporting brief.
3

corporation, for a role as a consultant in Campbell’s Flavor
Technology Unit.

Plaintiff began working in the role on August

21, 2017.
After being informed by Campbell that Plaintiff was no
longer needed, Harrison contacted Plaintiff by phone on
September 1, informing him that his assignment with Campbell had
been terminated.

A week later, after an extended email

correspondence, Plaintiff sent Harrison an email on September 8,
requesting that Task Management withdraw its representation of
Plaintiff and his corporation; Task Management responded that
same day, terminating its representation.

At some point after

Plaintiff’s termination, employees at Task Management became
aware that Plaintiff had sued previous employers.
2. Procedural Background
While the factual history underlying Plaintiff’s claims may
be brief, the procedural history of this case is extensive and
convoluted.

The Court has previously attempted to detail this

history at greater length in its July 9, 2018 Opinion, (ECF No.
103), and will not attempt to do so here.

Instead, the Court

will provide the procedural history relevant to the present
motions.
On September 25, 2017, only a few short weeks after his
termination, Plaintiff filed his first complaint in this
litigation at Docket 17-7506.

The complaint named Campbell
4

Soup, Task Management, and a handful of employees as defendants,
and over the course of 109 pages raised a series of different
claims related to Plaintiff’s termination.

Over the next

several weeks, Plaintiff, having repeatedly been informed by the
Court that his pleadings were deficient, went on to file three
amended complaints.

After a series of other issues were briefed

and debated by the parties, Plaintiff, without leave or warning,
filed a new action and a fifth, 285-page complaint, alleging
related violations based on the same underlying events, under
Docket 18-298.

Plaintiff then filed a series of motions under

that second docket number, and the parties began to litigate the
case there as well.
Eventually, multiple defendants filed motions to dismiss
the complaint in the 18-298 action.

Instead of responding to

those motions, Plaintiff filed an “Amended Complaint,” his sixth
in this litigation, which came in at 332 pages and 1200
paragraphs.

(Docket 18-298, ECF No. 66).

motions to strike the amended complaint.
73, and 95).

Defendants filed
(Id. at ECF No. 67,

The Court, in a detailed and exhaustive July 9,

2018 opinion, consolidated the two actions sua sponte, as they
raised common questions of law and fact, and addressed the
numerous motions pending before it.

(Id. at ECF No. 103).

The Court first granted the motions to strike Plaintiff’s
amended complaint, finding that, due in large part to its
5

incredible length, its long, unnecessary recitations of
statutory language, and its repetition of details, it violated
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a).

Id. at 17-20.

The Court

went on to grant multiple of Defendants’ motions to dismiss,
dismissing the large majority of Plaintiff’s claims, some with
prejudice and some without.

The only claims that survived the

motions to dismiss were Plaintiffs claims for retaliation
related to his termination under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination
(“NJLAD”).

Id. at 73.

Finally, the Court informed Plaintiff

that he would be permitted to file one more motion for leave to
amend his complaint by August 10, 2018, which must attach a
proposed amended complaint that complied with Rule 8.
19.

Id. at

The Court explicitly warned him that if he filed another

complaint as clearly violative of Rule 8 as his previous one, it
too would be dismissed.

Id.

Plaintiff chose not to file a motion for leave to amend the
complaint.

Instead, a week after his deadline to do that had

passed, on August 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed his seventh
complaint at Docket 18-13119.

(ECF No. 1).

This complaint

alleged substantially the same claims as his six previous
complaints, and was 343 pages and over 1,250 paragraphs long.
On September 13, 2018, Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider
entered an Order in the 18-298 action scheduling an initial
6

conference, prior to which the parties were required to engage
in a Rule 26(f) conference to discuss managing discovery amongst
themselves.

(Docket 18-298 at ECF No. 124).

Plaintiff refused

to engage or participate in any Rule 26(f) conference, and
accordingly Judge Schneider cancelled the initial conference as
well.

(Id. at ECF No. 130).

Then, in October 2018, despite the fact that the Court had
consolidated the original two cases and closed the 17-7506
action, Plaintiff filed and served a series of discovery
requests and requests for admission on Task Management and its
employees in the initial 17-7506 action.
ECF No. 90-105).

(See Docket 17-7506,

Defendants responded by filing a motion for a

protective order in the 18-298 action, arguing that they should
not be required to respond to the requests.
Schneider granted Defendants’ motion.

Magistrate Judge

He found that not only

had Plaintiff knowingly and admittedly filed and served the
requests in a closed action despite this Court’s prior Order,
but also that Plaintiff was not entitled to make such discovery
requests, because he had refused to engage in a Rule 26(f)
conference as required to begin the discovery process.
A number of motions were then filed by the parties in the
18-13119 action over the following months.

However, before any

of those could be decided, Plaintiff appealed certain of the
Court’s decisions in the 18-298 action.
7

Finding that the two

actions were substantially similar, the Court administratively
terminated the 18-13119 action and denied all pending motions
without prejudice, until Plaintiff’s appeal could be completed.
(ECF No. 42).

Plaintiff then appealed the Court’s

administrative termination of the 18-13119 action.
43).

(ECF No.

This series of appeals delayed the litigation until the

beginning of 2020, when the parties began actively litigating it
once more.
Multiple Defendants then filed a renewed motion to
consolidate the 18-298 action and the 18-13119 action, as well
as motions to strike the seventh complaint filed in the 18-13119
action on the same grounds as the Court had previously stricken
Plaintiff’s sixth complaint.

(Docket 18-298 at ECF No. 184 and

185; Docket 18-13119 at ECF No. 51).

Around the same time,

Defendant Task Management filed a motion for summary judgment in
the 18-298 action.

(Docket 18-298 at ECF No. 183).

Plaintiff

then responded by filing a cross-motion for summary judgment,
(Id. at ECF No. 189), which he followed with a motion for
sanctions.

(Id. at ECF No. 191).

While these motions were being filed in the 18-298 action,
the parties were similarly engaging in motion practice in the
third, 18-13119 action.

There, multiple Defendants filed a

motion to dismiss and to strike the complaint in that action.
(Docket 18-13119 at ECF No. 47).

Plaintiff, for his part, filed
8

a motion for default judgment, (Id. at ECF No. 54), and a
separate motion for a preliminary injunction.
60).

(Id. at ECF No.

Presently pending before the Court are each of the motions

described above.
Discussion
I.

Motion to Consolidate
The Court turns first to the motion to consolidate the

actions filed by Defendants Campbell Soup Company, Scott Keller,
Duane Morris LLP, Trevor H. Taniguchi, Denise M. Morrison, and
Carlos J. Barroso.

(Docket 18-298 at ECF No. 184).

This is not

the first time the Court has had to consider consolidation of
separate actions in this litigation; as described above, the
Court previously consolidated sua sponte the 18-298 action with
an earlier action filed by Plaintiff in its July 9, 2018 Opinion
and Order.

(Id. at ECF No. 103 and 105).

Plaintiff, unsurprisingly, filed a letter opposing
consolidation of the actions.

(Id. at ECF No. 186).

He argues

that Defendants’ motion must be dismissed because the moving
Defendants have already been dismissed from the 18-298 action
and therefore have no remaining interest in that case.

However,

even if Plaintiff were correct, his argument has no impact on
the Court’s analysis.

As explained above, this Court has the

power to consolidate actions either on motion of the parties or,
as it did previously in this litigation, sua sponte.

9

Fed. R.

Civ. P. 42(a)(2).

Accordingly, regardless of whether

Defendants’ motion was proper, the Court can and will consider
whether consolidation of these actions is proper under the
circumstances.
The Court finds that consolidation of the actions here is
again appropriate.

Rule 42(a)(2) provides that “[i]f actions

before the court involve a common question of law or fact, the
court may . . . consolidate the actions.”

As the Court noted in

its June 27, 2019 Order denying a series of motions in the 1813119 action due to Plaintiff’s filing of a Notice of Appeal in
the 18-298 action, the two matters “present nearly identical
claims against nearly identical parties based on common facts
and presenting common questions of law.”

(Docket 18-13119, ECF

No. 42 at 4).
The complaint in the 18-13119 action is, at its core,
focused on the exact same underlying claim as each of the first
six complaints filed in the first two actions: that Plaintiff
was terminated from his job due to his filing of various
previous lawsuits.

The Court sees no purpose in allowing

Plaintiff to proceed with his claims in a third separate action.
As the 18-298 action has progressed further, and the Court has
already ruled on the majority of Plaintiff’s claims in that
matter, the actions will be consolidated and proceed in Docket
18-298.
10

II.

Motion to Strike the Complaint in the 18-13119 Action

The Court turns next to the motions to strike the complaint
filed by Plaintiff in the 18-13119 action, brought by the same
defendants as the motion to consolidate above.
at ECF No. 51; Docket 18-298 at ECF No. 185).

(Docket 18-13119
Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 12(f) provides that “[t]he Court may strike from
a pleading . . . any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or
scandalous matter.

The court may act: (1) on its own; or (2) on

motion made by a party either before responding to the pleading,
or if a response is not allowed, within 21 days after being
served with the pleading.”

Similarly, Rule 8(a) provides that a

pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” and that
“[e]ach allegation must be simple, concise, and direct.”
Finding that Plaintiff’s Complaint again fails to comply with
the Rule 8’s pleading requirements, the Court will strike the
complaint in its entirety.
This is, once again, not the first time the Court has been
faced with motions to strike complaints in this litigation.

In

the earlier 18-298 action, Plaintiff, faced with a series of
motions to dismiss his complaint, decided to simply file an
amended complaint rather than oppose the motions or address them
directly.

Four motions to strike that complaint were filed,

11

which the Court addressed and granted in its July 9, 2018
opinion.

(Docket 18-298 at ECF No. 103).

In granting Defendants’ motions to strike that amended
complaint, the Court stated that it “ha[d] no hesitation in
concluding that a 332-page, 1200-pagaraph amended complaint is
objectionable and a blatant violation of both the explicit
mandates and the spirit of the Federal Rules,” and declined to
waste its own time and resources, or those of Defendants, in
trying analyze and respond to such a filing.

Id. at 18.

However, the Court, in its discretion, chose to grant Plaintiff
one last chance to plead his claims and permitted him to file a
motion for leave to amend his complaint by August 10, 2018 if he
so desired.

Importantly, the Court emphasized that

“Any proposed amended complaint must conform to Rule 8 and
must take into account the legal conclusions already made
by this Court in this Opinion and the accompanying Order.
If any proposed amended complaint is found to violate Rule
8, the Court will not hesitate to dismiss that complaint
too, on motion of any defendant or sua sponte.”
Id. at 19.
It is now clear that Plaintiff chose to entirely disregard
the Court’s instructions and Order.

Rather than file a motion

for leave to amend his complaint in the 18-298 action, Plaintiff
instead filed a new complaint under a new docket.

And despite

the Court’s clear instructions regarding proper pleading
practice under Rule 8, which mirrored similar instructions the

12

Court had given to Plaintiff on numerous occasions regarding his
5 prior complaints, the complaint in the 18-13119 action totals
343 pages and more than 1,250 paragraphs — with a separately
filed table of contents that itself runs 11 pages long.
This complaint is even longer than the complaint the Court
had just dismissed as violating Rule 8, and the Court will not
spend its time parsing it to attempt to determine what
amendments Plaintiff has made.

Just as Plaintiff’s 332-page

earlier complaint was clearly in violation of Rule 8’s pleading
standards, so too is his even longer 343-page complaint here.
See Wilcher v. Potter, No. 08-2723, 2009 WL 235497, at *2
(D.N.J. Jan. 29, 2009) (finding that 139-paragraph complaint
“d[id] not provide a ‘short and plain statement’ of the claims”
as required by Rule 8).
Importantly, Plaintiff’s complaint in the 18-13119 action
was not only a clear violation of Rule 8, its very filing is a
violation of the Court’s July 11, 2018 Order.
ECF No. 105).

(Docket 18-298 at

As described above, the Court granted Plaintiff

permission to file a motion for leave to amend his complaint in
that same action, attaching a copy of his proposed amended
complaint.

Presumably aware that the Court would certainly deny

any motion for leave that attached this even longer complaint,
he instead chose to open an entirely new action.

13

The Court here notes that Plaintiff has again filed a
letter opposing the motion to strike.

The central argument in

Plaintiff’s letter is that Defendants’ motion is barred by Rule
12(g), which forbids parties from making another motion under
Rule 12 after they had already done so prior.

However,

Plaintiff’s argument is again inapposite: Defendants’ motion to
strike is not directed at the same complaint that their previous
motion was, as Plaintiff chose to file a new complaint in a new
action.

Plaintiff cannot reasonably think that he can bar

Defendants from raising relevant objections to his filings
simply by re-filing a new complaint in a new action every time a
motion is decided against him — nor can Plaintiff dodge this
Court’s rulings by repeatedly refiling the same claims in new
actions.
Here, given an August 10 deadline to file his seventh
complaint in this matter, clear instructions to plead his
allegations in a manner that followed Rule 8’s requirements, and
an unambiguous warning that failure to do so would result in
dismissal of the complaint, Plaintiff instead waited until
August 17th to file a 343-page complaint in a new action.

It is

clear to the Court that Plaintiff has no intention of following
its instructions, or of following the rules of civil procedure.
Plaintiff will not be granted any more chances, and will not be
permitted leave to file any further amended complaints.
14

Plaintiffs complaint filed in the 18-13119 action will be
stricken, and all claims that the Court previously dismissed
without prejudice will be considered dismissed with prejudice.
The Third Circuit has repeatedly upheld the decisions of
district courts to dismiss claims with prejudice when plaintiffs
repeatedly fail to follow Rule 8 despite Court instructions and
multiple opportunities to correct their pleading deficiencies.
In fact, it is abundantly clear that this Court has granted
Plaintiff significantly more leeway than many others might have.
See, e.g., Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 F.
App’x. 513, 515–16 (2008) (upholding court’s decision to dismiss
claims with prejudice because plaintiff had already failed to
comply with Rule 8 in his first three complaints, and “granting
[] leave to file a third amended complaint would have been
futile”).
With Plaintiff’s complaint in the 18-13119 action stricken,
the Court must then resolve Defendants’ motion to dismiss that
complaint, (Docket 18-13119 at ECF No. 47), and Plaintiff’s
related motions for default judgment (Id. at ECF No. 54) and to
renew his earlier motion for preliminary injunction.
ECF No. 60).

(Id. at

As the complaint that is the basis for these

motions has been stricken, the Court must necessarily deny all
three motions as moot.

15

III. The Parties’ Motions for Summary Judgment
The only remaining claims in this matter that have not been
dismissed with prejudice are therefore Plaintiff’s retaliation
claims against Task Management Inc. under Title VII and the
NJLAD. 2

Presently before the Court are Task Management’s motion

for summary judgment on those claims, and Plaintiff’s opposing
cross-motion for summary judgment.

For the reasons expressed

below, Defendant’s motion for summary judgment will be granted,
and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment will be
denied.
A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is
satisfied that the materials in the record, including
depositions, documents, electronically stored information,
affidavits or declarations, stipulations, admissions, or
interrogatory answers, demonstrate that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Celotex Corp. v.

Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

If

review of cross-motions for summary judgment reveals no genuine

2

Plaintiff repeatedly references the individual employees he had
originally named as defendants in this action, appearing to
treat his remaining claims as also being against them. However,
in its July 9 Opinion and related July 11 Order, the Court
expressly dismissed his retaliation claims against the
individual Defendants. (Docket 18-298, ECF No. 103 at 74).
The only remaining defendant in this action is Task Management.
16

issue of material fact, then judgment may be entered in favor of
the party deserving of judgment in light of the law and
undisputed facts.

See Iberia Foods Corp. v. Romeo Jr., 150 F.3d

298, 302 (3d Cir. 1998) (citation omitted).
An issue is “genuine” if it is supported by evidence such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the nonmoving
party’s favor.
248 (1986).

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

A fact is “material” if, under the governing

substantive law, a dispute about the fact might affect the
outcome of the suit.

Id.

In considering a motion for summary

judgment, a district court may not make credibility
determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence;
instead, the non-moving party's evidence “is to be believed and
all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
Marino v. Industrial Crating Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir.
2004)(quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255).
B. The Parties’ Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment
Before moving to the substance of the parties’ motions, the
Court must address the filing history of these motions, and the
documents and facts it will consider in ruling on them. 3

3

Plaintiff also argues repeatedly throughout his summary judgment
papers that the operative complaint in this matter is the
“Amended Complaint” he filed at ECF No. 66 in the 18-298 action,
and therefore all of Defendant’s summary judgment papers are
invalid and void because they refer to and rely on the original
Complaint filed at Docket 18-298, ECF No. 1. As explained
17

Defendants initiated this round of motion practice and briefing
by re-filing an earlier motion for summary judgment, to which it
had attached its statement of undisputed material facts and
supporting evidence as required by Local Rule 56.1(a).
18-239 at ECF No. 151 and 183).

(Docket

Plaintiff then filed a cross-

motion for summary judgment, which was accompanied only by a
joint brief supporting his own motion and opposing Defendant’s
motion and a series of seven exhibits.

In violation of Rule

56.1(a), Plaintiff submitted neither his own statement of
material undisputed facts supporting his cross-motion, nor a
responsive statement of facts opposing Defendant’s own statement
of facts.

(Id. at ECF No. 189).

Following this, Defendant made two filings: a reply brief
in support of its own motion and a separate brief opposing
Plaintiff’s cross-motion, (Id. at ECF No. 190 and 192), the last
filings it was permitted to make on these motions under the
relevant rules of civil procedure and the local rules.

At this

point, Plaintiff filed a reply brief in support of his own

above, the Court granted the four motions to strike that
“Amended Complaint” due to its violations of Rule 8. That
complaint is not operative in this action. The original
Complaint that opened this action, ECF No. 1, is the operative
complaint, and the only active claims remaining are the two
remaining retaliation claims that the Court did not dismiss in
its July 11, 2018 Order. Plaintiffs arguments to the contrary,
and his assertion that the Court does not have the authority to
make such a determination, are incorrect.
18

motion for summary judgment.

(ECF No. 193). 4

Plaintiff attached

to this brief two other documents: a statement of material facts
he had previously failed to file in support of his own motion,
and a responsive statement of facts opposing Defendant’s motion.
Unsurprisingly, Plaintiff attached no evidence to either of
these filings.
Plaintiff’s actions here are in direct violation of Local
Rule 56.1(a), which outlines the proper practices for summary
judgment motions.

Rule 56.1(a) explicitly states that “[a]

motion for summary judgment unaccompanied by a statement of
material facts not in dispute shall be dismissed,” and that
“[t]he opponent of summary judgment shall furnish, with its
opposition papers, a responsive

statement of material facts . .

. stating each material fact in dispute and citing to the
affidavits and other documents submitted in connection with the
motion; any material fact not disputed shall be deemed
undisputed for purposes of the summary judgment motion.”

4

After Plaintiff filed his reply brief in further support of his
cross-motion on May 25, 2020, he filed an amended version of
that filing three days later on May 28, 2020. Plaintiff did not
request or receive leave to amend his filings from this Court,
and he did not file this amendment until after the May 26
deadline for his reply brief had passed. Accordingly, the Court
will not consider the filings at ECF No. 195 for the purposes of
this motion, and will instead consider the original versions
filed at ECF No. 193.
19

Rather than file his Rule 56.1(a) statements when he was
required to, Plaintiff instead attempted to wait until after
Defendant had filed its last permitted briefing on both motions
before he put forth the factual statements that he intended to
rely upon — and attached his responsive fact statements opposing
Defendants’ motion to a reply brief on an entirely separate
motion.

Plaintiff is effectively trying to circumvent the rules

to grant himself an improper last say and to stop Defendant from
having a chance to respond to or address his statements of fact.
The Court will not permit Plaintiff to benefit in this way
from his continued violations of this district’s rules.

While

the Court will not simply dismiss Plaintiff’s motion or deem
each and every one of Defendant’s facts undisputed at this
stage, neither of these statements of facts will be considered
in assessing the present motions, and the Court will instead
takes its facts only from Defendant’s statements of undisputed
facts, and any evidence submitted in connection with Plaintiff’s
briefing or cited to therein.
The Court notes that this it is, once again, giving
Plaintiff more leeway than it is required to grant him: as
stated above, Rule 56.1(a) explicitly warns that any motions not
accompanied by a statement of facts “shall be dismissed,” and
that any fact not directly disputed in a proper 56.1(a)
responsive statement “shall be deemed undisputed.”
20

However, the

Third Circuit has previously held that “permitting the nonmovant to rely on its briefing and evidentiary submissions to
dispute the movant's 56.1 statement is consistent” with the
intent and spirit of the rules governing summary judgment
practice,

Boswell v. Eoon, 452 F. App’x. 107, 111–12 (3d Cir.

2011), and the Court is cognizant of the preference for
adjudications on the merits rather than dismissal on procedural
grounds.

Given Plaintiff’s repeated violations of the relevant

rules, however, the Court declines to volunteer itself to parse
through the voluminous number of filings Plaintiff has made in
the three consolidated actions he has opened — instead, it will
consider the evidence and statements of fact submitted and
relied on by Defendant in its summary judgment papers, as well
as any evidence Plaintiff has filed with his motion and any
record evidence that Plaintiff has actually cited to in his two
briefs, to the extent they dispute any of the facts from
Defendant’s Rule 56.1(a) statement.
With these initial findings made, the Court now turns to
the parties’ substantive motions.

The Court will begin with

Plaintiff’s motion, which can be handled briefly.

In support of

his motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff presents only one
argument: that because Defendants did not respond to his October
2018 requests for admissions within thirty days, they are deemed
admitted, and accordingly the facts underlying his claims are
21

undisputed and he is entitled to summary judgment.
Unsurprisingly, this argument entirely ignores prior court
orders issued in this very action.
As described above, Plaintiff’s requests for admission were
improperly filed and served in the original 17-7506 action after
it had been consolidated with the 18-298 action and closed.
After a series of communications between the parties, Defendant
filed a motion seeking a protective order.
ECF No. 144).

(Docket 18-298 at

Magistrate Judge Schneider granted the motion and

stayed all discovery, finding not only that Plaintiff had
knowingly and admittedly filed the discovery requests in a
closed action despite this Court’s prior Order, but also that
discovery was improper at that stage because Plaintiff himself
had refused to attend or participate in a Rule 26(f) conference,
and that the requests themselves were duplicative and overly
burdensome.

Id. at 8.

As Plaintiff has made no other arguments

in support of his cross-motion for summary judgment, it will be
denied.
Defendants, alternatively, move for summary judgment on the
basis that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate a prima facie case.
Plaintiffs remaining claims are both for retaliation under Title
VII and the NJLAD.

“All retaliation and discrimination claims

brought under Title VII and the NJLAD . . . are controlled by
the three-step burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
22

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–03, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36
L.Ed.2d 668 (1973).”

Tourtellotte v. Eli Lilly and Co., 636 F.

App’x. 831, 841–42(3d Cir. 2016) (citing Moore v. City of
Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 342 (3d Cir.2006); Viscik v. Fowler Equip.
Co., 800 A.2d 826, 833 (N.J. 2002)).
Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must
first establish a prima facie case.

To establish a prima facie

case of retaliation, Plaintiff must produce evidence that: (1)
he engaged in protected activity; (2) the employer took an
adverse employment action against him; and (3) there was a
causal connection between his participation in the protected
activity and the adverse employment action.

Id. at 852; see

also Nuness v. Simon & Schuster, Inc, 221 F. Supp. 3d 596, 605
(D.N.J. 2016).

Here, there is no argument that Plaintiff

suffered an adverse employment action, and Defendant appears to
concede that Plaintiff engaged in protected activity when he
sued prior employers for discrimination covered by Title VII and
the NJLAD.

Instead, Defendant argues that Plaintiff has put

forth no evidence to demonstrate any causal connection between
his litigation against previous employers and the termination of
his services.
The Court finds that Defendant is correct.

Defendant

supports its motion with declarations stating that Plaintiff was
not terminated due to his prior lawsuits, and that nobody at
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Task Management was aware of those lawsuits until after he had
been terminated, when they researched him in response to his
repeated, harassing emails and phone calls.

The section of

Plaintiff’s joint brief that opposed Defendant’s motion,
however, makes no attempt to dispute these facts.

Instead, it

is entirely dedicated to the argument that the declarations and
evidence relied upon by Defendant in its motion for summary
judgment violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(1), which
requires the parties to make certain initial disclosures
regarding individuals who are likely to have discoverable
information relevant to the action, and therefore should not be
considered by the Court in its analysis of their motion.
This argument, again, ignores the history of this
litigation and Plaintiff’s own prior choices: as Judge Schneider
explained in granting Defendant’s motion for a protective order,
Plaintiff himself repeatedly refused to participate in any Rule
26(f) conference.

Id. at 7-8.

As Rule 26(a)(1)(C) calculates

the deadlines for providing initial disclosures based on the
date of the parties’ Rule 26(f) conference, no such deadline
could have yet passed.

Plaintiffs’ own refusal to participate

in this aspect of the discovery process cannot serve as a basis
for excluding Defendant’s evidence – particularly where
Plaintiff himself has filed a motion for summary judgment,

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signaling that he does not view further discovery as necessary
in this action.
Plaintiff’s brief in opposition to summary judgment makes
no other arguments.

At no point does it dispute Defendant’s

argument that he has not demonstrated the existence of a prima
facie case of retaliation.

Similarly, the evidence he has

submitted in connection with his brief is entirely unrelated to
this issue, and nowhere in his opposition brief does he refer
the Court to any evidence that would contradict Defendant’s
evidence, claims, or statements of fact.

Simply put, Defendant

chose not to respond to or even acknowledge any of Defendant’s
arguments, nor to attach any relevant evidence to his opposition
brief.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not demonstrated the

existence of any genuine disputes of material fact regarding the
casual connection between his termination and his previous
lawsuits.

For this reason, Defendant’s motion for summary

judgment will be granted.
IV.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Sanctions
Plaintiff has also filed a motion for sanctions in the 18-

239 action.

(ECF No. 191).

Plaintiff’s argument in favor of

sanctions is essentially identical to those raised above in his
brief opposing Defendant’s motion for summary judgment: that
Defendant violated Rule 26(a)(1) because it did not provide
initial discovery disclosures.

As sanction for these alleged
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violations, Plaintiff demands a series of orders from this
Court, most prominently requesting that the Court enter final
judgment against Defendant on all claims.
The Court has already addressed Plaintiff’s argument above
in its analysis of the parties’ respective motions for summary
judgment.

Plaintiff himself repeatedly refused to take part in

a Rule 26(f) conference; accordingly, no deadline was ever set
for Defendant to provide initial disclosures.

The lack of

disclosures exchanged under Rule 26 in this action is entirely
the fault of Plaintiff, and his motion for sanctions will be
denied.
V.

Defendant’s Requests for Attorney’s Fees
Finally, the Court recognizes that multiple Defendants have

requested that the Court grant them attorneys’ fees for their
efforts in defending this litigation.

However, no formal

motions to sanction Plaintiff have been filed, and the Court, in
its discretion, will decline to order Plaintiff to pay
attorneys’ fees.

The Court does not, in any way, mean to

condone the behavior of Plaintiff in this litigation.

He has

repeatedly ignored Court Orders, extended this litigation
needlessly, and his filings and communications with the parties
and the Court have often been inappropriate.
However, “any sanctions and the prospect for further
proceedings related to those sanctions will only serve to
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perpetuate a forum” for Plaintiff to continue his behavior and
to extend this action even further.

Dinnerstein v. Burlington

County College, No. 1:13–cv–5598 (NLH/KMW), 2017 WL 5593776, at
*8 (D.N.J. Nov. 21, 2017).

The Court finds that the proper

remedy at this stage is to finally end this litigation.

As the

Court has already determined that Task Management’s motion for
summary judgment is to be granted, and ruled above that the
remainder of Plaintiff’s claims are now fully dismissed with
prejudice, that end has finally come.

However, the Court does

warn Plaintiff that if he continues to disregard Court orders
and the rules of civil procedure, and further extends this
litigation through frivolous and unmeritorious filings, the
Court will be forced to reconsider its decision not to impose
sanctions.
Conclusion
Through its analysis above, the Court has now addressed
each of the remaining motions pending in both the 18-298 and 1813119 actions.

Defendants’ motion to consolidate the actions,

(Docket 18-298 at ECF No. 184), will be granted, and the actions
will be consolidated under Docket 18-298.

Defendants’ motions

to strike the complaint in the 18-13119 action (Docket 18-298 at
ECF No. 185; Docket 18-13119 at ECF No. 51) will also be
granted, and Plaintiffs’ claims that were previously dismissed
without prejudice will be considered dismissed with prejudice.
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Accordingly, the motion to dismiss that complaint, (Docket 1813119 at ECF No. 47), as well as the motion for default judgment
(Docket 18-13119 at ECF No. 54), and motion for a preliminary
injunction (Docket 18-13119 at ECF No. 60) also filed in the 1813119 action, will be denied as moot.

Finally, Defendant Task

Management’s motion for summary judgment in the 18-298 action
(ECF No. 183) will be granted, and Plaintiff’s cross-motion for
summary judgment (ECF No. 189) and his motion for sanctions (ECF
No. 191) will be denied.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: October 20, 2020
At Camden, New Jersey

/s Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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