THE ESTATE OF LAURA CHRISTINE SEMPREVIVO et al v. ATLANTIC COUNTY et al
Filing
83
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 11/27/2020. (tf, )
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 1 of 24 PageID: 739
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
THE ESTATE OF LAURA SEMPREVIVO
et al.,
Civ. No. 18-1953(RMB-JS)
Plaintiffs,
v.
OPINION
ATLANTIC COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Conrad J. Benedetto, Esq.
The Law Offices of Conrad Benedetto
1233 Haddonfield-Berlin Road, Suite 1
Voorhees, N.J. 08043
On behalf of Plaintiffs
James T. Dugan, Esq.
Atlantic County Department of Law
1333 Atlantic Avenue, 8th Floor
Atlantic City, N.J. 08401
On behalf of Defendants Atlantic County
and Warden Geraldine Cohen
BUMB, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the motion for summary
judgment by Defendants Atlantic County and Warden Geraldine Cohen
(“Atlantic County Defs”) (Atlantic County Defs’ Mot. for Summ. J.,
Dkt. No. 68; Atlantic County Defs’ Brief, Dkt. No. 68-2); and
Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Atlantic County Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment. (“Pl’s Opp. Brief,” Dkt. No. 82.) For
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 2 of 24 PageID: 740
the reasons discussed below, the Court will grant summary judgment
to Defendants on Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the
New
Jersey
Civil
Rights
Act
(“NJCRA”),
dismiss
the
John
Doe
Defendants without prejudice, and decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On March 29, 2017, in Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-02050-RMB/JS
(D.N.J.),
Semprevivo
Plaintiffs,
and
the
Patricia
Estate
of
Semprevivo
Laura
Semprevivo,
(“Plaintiffs”),
Ronald
filed
a
complaint arising out of the September 16, 2016 suicide of Laura
Christine
Semprevivo
at
the
Atlantic
County
Justice
Facility
(“ACJF”). Defendant CFG Health Systems, LLC (“CFG”) filed a motion
for summary judgment on August 21, 2017. (Id., Dkt. No. 25.) On
December 5, 2017, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ claims against
CFG with prejudice. (Id., Dkt. No. 43.) Plaintiffs voluntarily
dismissed the remainder of their claims without prejudice. (Id.,
Dkt. Nos. 41 and 44.)
On February 9, 2018, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this new
action against Defendants CFG, Warden Geraldine Cohen, Corrections
Officer
(“C/O”)
Louis
King,
Atlantic
County,
and
John
Does.
(Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) On September 4, 2019, the Court granted CFG’s
motion for summary judgment. (Order, Dkt. No. 49.) The parties’
filed a stipulation of dismissal as to Defendant Louis King on
April 2, 2019. (Stipulation, Dkt. No. 37.) On April 7, 2020, the
2
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 3 of 24 PageID: 741
Atlantic County Defendants filed the instant motion for summary
judgment. (Atlantic County Defs’ Mot. for. Summ. J., Dkt. No. 68.)
After extensions of time to respond were granted, Plaintiffs filed
their brief in opposition to summary judgment on November 20, 2020.
(Pl’s Opp. Brief, Dkt. No. 82.)
The
complaint
contains
the
following
claims
against
the
Atlantic County Defendants 1: Count I, federal constitutional claim
for failure to prevent suicide by failing to train and supervise;
Count III, supervisory liability of Warden Geraldine Cohen under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to prevent suicide by failing to
adequately screen, monitor, and house pretrial detainees in a safe
environment; Count IV, violation of the NJCRA, NJSA 10:6-1 et seq.
for failure to prevent suicide by failing to adequately train and
supervise staff; Count V, wrongful death under the applicable laws
of
New
Jersey;
Count
VI,
Survival
Action;
and
Count
VII,
negligence. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.)
II. UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS
The following material facts are undisputed by the parties.
(Atlantic County Defs’ SOMF, Dkt. No. 68-1; Pls’ SOMF, Dkt. No. 82
at 9-16.)
1
Count II, violation of Laura Semprevivo’s Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendment rights to health care and safety, is pled only against
Corrections Officer Louis King, who has been dismissed by
stipulation, and John Doe Corrections Officers, John Does CFG
employees, and CFG.
3
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 4 of 24 PageID: 742
•
Laura Semprevivo (hereafter, “Laura”) was incarcerated
an estimated three or four times between 2011 and 2016.
(Pls’ Ex. 3, T20:18-21, Dkt. No. 82-3.) 2 Her arrests were
all drug related. (Pls’ Ex. 2, T29:7-9, Dkt. No. 82-2);
(Pls’ Ex. 3, T21:2-3.) She was incarcerated in the
Atlantic County Justice Facility on September 9, 2016.
(Atlantic County Defs’ Ex. A, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 1.)
•
In her classification questionnaire upon admission to
ACJF, Laura stated that she had no prior psychiatric
hospitalizations, no prior suicide attempts, and she was
not currently thinking of suicide. (Atlantic County
Defs’ Ex. A, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 1.)
•
On September 9, 2016, Laura underwent a health
evaluation,
which
revealed
she
used
heroin
and
benzodiazapines. (Atlantic County Defs’ Ex. B, Dkt. No.
68-4 at 2.)
•
An intake Mental Health Screening and Assessment was
also performed upon Laura’s intake at ACJF. The
assessment showed that the arresting or transporting
officers did not believe that Laura was a suicide risk,
she had no prior psychiatric history, she did not express
thoughts of suicide, she had never previously attempted
suicide, and she was not showing signs of depression. It
was determined that Laura had no mental health problems
and she was approved for general population. (Atlantic
County Defs’ Ex. C., Dkt. No. 68-4 at 3.)
•
Laura was placed on an opiate withdrawal protocol.
(Atlantic County Defs’ Ex. D., Dkt. No. 68-4 at 4.)
•
On September 14, 2016, Laura was found on the floor of
her cell after suffering from a seizure. (Atlantic
County Defs’ Ex. E., Dkt. No. 68-4 at 5.) Although she
was cleared for general population (id.,) at the time of
her suicide, she was housed in the “medical right” unit
at ACJF. (Defs’ Ex. G, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 9.)
•
On
September
16,
2016
2
at
approximately
9:56
P.M.,
Unless otherwise indicated, page citations are to the original
document. When following the Docket Entry number, page numbers are
those assigned by the Court’s electronic case management and
electronic filing system, CM/ECF.
4
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 5 of 24 PageID: 743
Medical Officer Richard Andrews was conducting lock down
in medical right. He found Laura Semprevivo with a sheet
tied around her neck. He called a medical emergency and
staff attempted to render lifesaving treatment, and she
was taken to a hospital by ambulance. (Atlantic County
Defs’ Ex. F., Dkt. No. 68-4 at 6.)
•
C/O Jeffrey [last name] at ACJF told Laura’s brother
Robert, who was an acquaintance, that there was a new
C/O on duty the night of Laura’s suicide. (Pls’ Ex. 3,
T31-32, Dkt. No. 82-3.)
•
According to the deposition of C/O Ryan Nelson, a newly
hired officer found Laura hanging in her cell. (Pls’ Ex.
6, T25:4-12, Dkt. No. 82-6.)
•
C/O Nelson stated that the new officer would have gone
to two weeks of in-service training before he started at
ACJF. (Pls’ Ex. 6, T25:22-23.) C/O Nelson did not know
whether the new officer would have been trained in
suicide prevention, drug and alcohol abuse issues or
other mental health issues. (Pls’ Ex. 6, T24:25-T26:17.)
•
Warden Geraldine Cohen ordered an internal affairs
investigation to be conducted regarding the suicide. The
internal affairs investigation was overseen by Sgt.
Patrick Robinson. As part of the internal affairs
investigation, Laura's classification, medical and
criminal files were reviewed, her phone records were
reviewed, video was examined, and interviews were
conducted. (Atlantic County Defs’ Ex. G, Dkt. No. 68-4
at 7-45.)
•
Inmate Belinda Tavaras was interviewed on September 17,
2016 at ACJF, the day after the suicide. She was housed
in medical right with Laura. Tavaras thought Laura was
funny and friendly, but stressed out. She did not think
Laura was depressed and never heard her say that she
wanted to hurt herself. (Atlantic County Defs’ Ex. G,
Dkt. No. 68-4 at 10-13.)
•
Inmate Tamia Kelley was interviewed on September 17,
2016 at ACJF. She said that Laura was watching movies
with her on the night of the suicide and everything was
“good,” Laura was playing around. Laura had a discussion
with Inmate Kimberly Renart in Renart's cell. Inmate
5
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 6 of 24 PageID: 744
Amanda Santiago also went to the cell. Santiago thought
Renart wanted to harm herself so she reported it to the
pod officer. Renart was taken out of the pod. Laura then
came out to watch television with the other inmates.
Laura must have fallen asleep while watching television
and decided to go back to her cell for bed. (Atlantic
County Defs’ Ex. G, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 13-18.)
•
Inmate Deborah Dodel was interviewed on September 17,
2016 at ACJF. She said Laura seemed "alright" and that
Laura didn't complain about anything. She saw Laura
"kidding around" with the guards earlier. (Atlantic
County Defs’ Ex. G, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 18-22.)
•
Inmate Amanda Santiago was interviewed on September 17,
2016 at ACJF. She described Laura as her girlfriend and
thought she was acting “perfectly fine.” She said that
Inmate Renart was really depressed and asking her about
how to commit suicide. Santiago went to a C/O and told
the C/O about Renart’s suicidal ideation. The C/O took
Renart out of the unit. Santiago believed that Laura was
acting normal because she was talking and laughing like
everything was fine. Laura had asked Santiago about
Santiago’s own suicide attempt over the course of two
days but Santiago did not at all think Laura was thinking
about her own suicide. After watching TV together, Laura
returned to her cell to go to sleep. (Atlantic County
Defs’ Ex. G, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 22-27.)
•
Inmate Kimberly Renart was interviewed on September 17,
2016 at ACJF. Renart acknowledged that she was taken to
the transfer station after she became depressed and was
talking about hanging herself. (Atlantic County Defs’
Ex. G, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 27-33.)
•
Kimberly Renart testified in her subsequent deposition
that Laura had spoken to her about her drug use and her
boyfriend, whom she was worried about losing. (Pl’s Ex.
7, T10:8-15, Dkt. No. 82-7.) Laura became sadder the
more she spoke about her problems. (T10:25-T11:3.)
Although she had no idea Laura was going to commit
suicide, Renart tried to get an officer's attention to
send somebody to talk to Laura over the course of two or
three days. (T11:6-18.) Renart said mental health staff
would come in and only speak with them for two minutes.
(T11:17-21.) When Renart asked an officer if there was
somebody that they could talk to because some of the
6
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 7 of 24 PageID: 745
girls in her cell were depressed, the officer told her
to pick up the phone and call the hotline number that
was on the wall. (T12:4-23.) At some point, the phones
in the medical unit were not working for a couple of
days. (T14:4-7.) Laura was upset that the phones were
not working because she could not speak to her boyfriend
or to members of her family. (T14:10-24.)
•
On September 16, 2016, in cell 4, Kimberly Renart had a
conversation with Laura about ways to commit suicide in
jail. (Pls’ Ex. 7, T14:25-T15:3.) Renart had said that
some people take other people's medication or they hang
themselves. Laura was upset. She had a lot of questions
about death. (T15:12-T16:2-9.) When Renart told Amanda
Santiago what they were talking about, Santiago reported
it to an officer. (T17:5-7.) Renart told the officer
that she was feeling down and she wanted to get someone
for Laura to speak to also. (T17:1-18:3.) Renart was
handcuffed and taken away. (T17:13-23.)
•
Patricia Semprevivo (“Patricia”) is Laura’s mother.
(Defs’ Ex. J, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 113.) In her deposition,
she acknowledged that Laura was never hospitalized for
any type of mental health problem. She believed that
Laura loved life and she was not aware of any reason why
Laura would want to commit suicide. (T51:l-25; T52:l17.) To her knowledge, Laura was never diagnosed with
depression, bipolar disorder, schizophrenia, or selfmutilation. (T88:7-23.) Laura was incarcerated in ACJF
on occasions prior to September 2016, but Patricia was
never informed of any concerns about Laura committing
suicide. (T90:7-11.) Patricia said she did not speak to
any doctor, nurse, or anybody in the medical unit of
ACJF in September 2016. (T98:9-13.) She did not have any
phone conversations with Laura between her date of
arrest on September 9, 2016 through the date of her death
on September 16, 2016. (T138:23-25; Tl39:l-8.) Patricia
never visited Laura in the jail during that time.
(Tl39:l3-19.) If she had thought that Laura was
potentially suicidal, she would have alerted the jail.
(Tl42:3-6.) Patricia was not sure whether any Atlantic
County employee could have known that Laura was
suicidal. (T152:22-25; T153:l-5.)
•
Ronald Semprevivo (“Ronald”) is Laura’s father. (Defs.
Ex. K, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 121.) Prior to September 2016,
Laura never seemed suicidal. Her suicide came as a
7
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 8 of 24 PageID: 746
complete surprise to him and his entire family. (T27:4T:28-2.) He had no knowledge of any involvement Warden
Geraldine Cohen may have had with regard to Laura’s
custody, nor of any employee of the ACJF who knew or
suspected that Laura was suicidal in September 2016.
(T34.)
•
Robert Semprevivo (“Robert”) is Laura’s brother. He was
never concerned about Laura being suicidal because she
was tough. (Defs’ Ex. L, T27:7-9.) He never visited Laura
at ACJF and never received any phone calls from her when
she was there. (T50:6-11.) To his knowledge, she had
never attempted suicide, had never talked about suicide,
and had never shown signs of being suicidal. (T53:1521.) He had no knowledge of Warden Geraldine Cohen’s
involvement in Laura’s supervision and was unaware of
any facts that would indicate Laura was at risk,
physically, mentally, or emotionally while in custody at
ACJF. (T56:2-23.)
•
The ACJF had Policies & Procedures relating to suicide
prevention. (Atlantic County Defs’ Ex. G., Dkt. No. 684 at 46-111.) This included training in the “Basic Course
for County Corrections Officers, Instructional Unit
Chapter 3.3 Suicide Prevention.” (Pls’ Ex. 8, Dkt. No.
82-6.) A relevant policy (IV) states “that all staff are
trained in suicide prevention awareness and departmental
policy. All suicidal gestures, attempts, or voicing of
suicide intention will be taken seriously and will be
responded to immediately” and the requisite training for
new staff and annual training for corrections officers
is described in detail. (Defs’ Ex. H, Dkt. No. 68-4 at
81-85.)
•
Upon performing an internal affairs investigation, Sgt.
Patrick Robinson concluded that “there were no Policy
and Procedure, Rules and Regulations violated by any
Custody staff” with regard to Laura’s suicide. (Atlantic
County Defs’ Ex. G, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 45.)
•
According to C/O Nelson, after attending the police
academy,
corrections
officers
receive
in-service
training once each year for sixteen hours over two days.
(Pls’ Ex. 6, T14:2-T15:1, Dkt. No. 82-6.) Nonetheless,
C/O Nelson could not answer whether he received suicide
prevention training each year. (Pls’ Ex. 6, T15:13-25,
T16:11-13.)
8
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 9 of 24 PageID: 747
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Summary Judgment Standard of Review
Summary Judgment is proper where the moving party “shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact,” and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a); Daubert v. NRA Group, LLC, 861 F.3d 382, 388 (3d
Cir. 2017). The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to show, beyond
the pleadings, “‘that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at
391 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 447 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)
(emphasis in Daubert)). “At the summary judgment stage, facts must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only
if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (citing Fed. Rule Civ. Proc.
56(c)). “‘[A] dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the
evidence is sufficient to permit a reasonable jury to return a
verdict for the non-moving party.’” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv.,
850 F.3d 526, 534 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Lamont v. New Jersey,
637 F.3d 177, 181 (3d Cir. 2011)).
B.
Plaintiffs’ Claims Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Plaintiffs assert, in Counts I and III, that the Atlantic
County
Defendants
violated
Laura
Semprevivo's
Eighth
and
Fourteenth Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Because
Laura
Semprevivo
was
a
9
pretrial
detainee
during
the
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 10 of 24 PageID: 748
relevant time period, Plaintiffs’ claims fall under the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the Eighth Amendment’s
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause. See Natale v. Camden Cty.
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 581 (3d Cir. 2003) (“the Fourteenth
Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections “at least as
great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted
prisoner[.]”)
The Third Circuit has set out several distinct constitutional
claims that may be raised when a pretrial detainee commits suicide,
including
failure
to
prevent
the
suicide
and
deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need. Palakovic v. Wetzel, 854
F.3d 209, 224-27 (3d Cir. 2017). The elements of a Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Claim seeking to hold a prison official
liable for failing to prevent a detainee's suicide are:
(1) that the individual had a particular
vulnerability to suicide, meaning that there
was a “strong likelihood, rather than a mere
possibility,”
that
a
suicide
would
be
attempted; (2) that the prison official knew
or should have known of the individual's
particular vulnerability; and (3) that the
official acted with reckless or deliberate
indifference, meaning something beyond mere
negligence, to the individual's particular
vulnerability.
Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 223–24. “The ‘strong likelihood’ of suicide
must be ‘so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the
necessity for’ preventative action.” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp.,
946
F.2d
1017,
1025
(3d
Cir.
1991)
10
(quoting
Monmouth
County
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 11 of 24 PageID: 749
Correctional Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347
(3d Cir. 1987.) In other words, the risk of suicide must be
“sufficiently
apparent
that
a
lay
custodian's
failure
to
appreciate it evidences an absence of any concern for the welfare
of his or her charges.” Colburn, 946 F.2d at 1025.
1.
Elements of a Monell Claim
“When a suit against a municipality is based on § 1983, the
municipality can only be liable when the alleged constitutional
transgression
implements
or
executes
a
policy,
regulation
or
decision officially adopted by the governing body or informally
adopted by custom.” Beck v. City of Pittsburgh, 89 F.3d 966, 971
(3d Cir. 1996) (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social
Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)). “Thus, although the municipality
may not be held liable for a constitutional tort under § 1983 on
the theory of vicarious liability, it can be held responsible as
an entity when the injury inflicted is permitted under its adopted
policy or custom.” Beck, 89 F.3d at 971 (citing Monell, 436 U.S.
at 694). A custom is a course of conduct, though not authorized by
law, is so well-settled that it virtually constitutes law. Id.
“Liability is imposed ‘when the policy or custom itself violates
the
Constitution
unconstitutional
or
when
itself,
the
is
policy
the
or
‘moving
custom,
force’
while
not
behind
the
constitutional tort of one of its employees.’” Thomas v. Cumberland
11
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 12 of 24 PageID: 750
Cty., 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Colburn, 946 F.2d
at 1027) (quoting Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326 (1981)).
“Where the policy [or custom] ‘concerns a failure to train or
supervise
requires
municipal
a
showing
employees,
that
the
liability
failure
under
amounts
section
to
1983
‘deliberate
indifference’ to the rights of persons with whom those employees
will come into contact.’” Id. (quoting Carter v. City of Phila.,
181 F.3d 339, 357 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting City of Canton, Ohio v.
Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989) (“Canton”). “[T]he deficiency in
training
[must
have]
actually
caused”
the
constitutional
violation. Id. (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.) “To demonstrate
‘deliberate indifference’ for purposes of failure to
train, ‘a
pattern of similar violations by untrained employees’ is usually
required.” Id. at 223 (quoting Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51,
62 (2011)). “Without notice that a course of training is deficient
in a particular respect, decisionmakers can hardly be said to have
deliberately chosen a training program that will cause violations
of constitutional rights.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 62.
“[I]n certain situations, the need for training ‘can be said
to be ‘so obvious,’ that failure to do so could properly be
characterized
as
‘deliberate
indifference’
to
constitutional
rights’ even without a pattern of constitutional violations.”
Thomas, 749 F.3d at 223 (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 390 n. 10.))
A plaintiff must also establish causation by demonstrating “a
12
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 13 of 24 PageID: 751
causal
nexus”
between
the
failure
to
train
and
the
specific
constitutional injury at issue. Id. at 226 (quoting Colburn, 946
F.2d at 1030). “[T]he causation inquiry focuses on whether ‘the
injury [could] have been avoided had the employee been trained
under a program that was not deficient in the identified respect.’”
Id. (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at 391.)
2.
Analysis of Failure to
against Atlantic County
a.
Prevent
Suicide
Claim
There is no disputed material fact as to
whether Laura Semprevivo had a particular
vulnerability to suicide
To establish Laura Semprevivo’s vulnerability to suicide,
Plaintiffs point to her heroin addiction, her seizure disorder,
her prior arrests, and her conversations with Kimberly Renart
around the time of her suicide on September 16, 2016. In Renart’s
deposition, she stated that Laura was worried about losing her
boyfriend, she became sadder as she talked about her circumstances,
and they had discussed ways of committing suicide in jail.
The Atlantic County Defendants rely on evidence that Laura’s
mother, father, and brother each stated in their depositions that
they had no reason to believe Laura was suicidal. Furthermore,
upon her admission to ACJF in September 2016, Laura completed a
classification
questionnaire,
stating
that
she
had
no
prior
suicide attempts and was not thinking of suicide. Additionally,
her mental health screening did not suggest any mental health
13
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 14 of 24 PageID: 752
problems, suicidal ideation, or thoughts about self-harm. Amanda
Santiago, who described Laura as her girlfriend, thought Laura
appeared to be fine on the days leading up to and the evening
before her suicide. It was Renart who was believed to be suicidal,
and ACJF
staff
took
measures
to
protect
Renart
from
harming
herself.
“A particular individual's vulnerability to suicide must be
assessed based on the totality of the facts presented.” Palakovic,
854 F.3d at 230. Based on the totality of the evidence submitted
by the parties here, a reasonable jury could not conclude that
Laura Semprevivo’s risk of suicide was so apparent that a lay
person who had any concern for an inmate’s welfare would have
appreciated the risk. While a lay person might appreciate that
heroin addiction, medical problems like seizures, and a history of
arrests are potential factors that could cause suicidal thoughts,
Laura did not acknowledge any such thoughts, her family had no
reason to think she had ever been suicidal, and most of the
pretrial detainees around Laura believed she was feeling well.
Only Renart’s conversation with Laura about how to commit
suicide and Renart’s belief that Laura was depressed may have
suggested a risk of suicide. The deposition testimony of other
inmates believed that it was Renart not Laura who was at risk for
suicide. The facts concerning Laura’s vulnerability to suicide
simply do not rise to the level required to hold a prison official
14
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 15 of 24 PageID: 753
liable for failing to prevent an inmate’s suicide. Cf. Palakovic,
854 F.3d at 230 (noting pretrial detainee had previous suicide
attempts and was nicknamed “Suicide.”)
Even if the Court were to assume that there exists a disputed
fact over whether Laura Semprevivo had a particular vulnerability
to
suicide,
Plaintiffs
must
show
that
Atlantic
County
was
deliberately indifferent to her risk of suicide. Therefore, the
Court turns to the elements of a Monell Claim.
b.
Plaintiffs
There is no issue of disputed fact as to
whether Atlantic County was deliberately
indifferent to a training deficiency that
caused
the
failure
to
prevent
Laura
Semprevivo’s suicide
acknowledge
that
Atlantic
County
trained
its
corrections officers with certain protocols to identify symptoms
of an inmate contemplating suicide and provided guidance on how to
react in those situations. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 8 is the “Basic
Course for County Corrections Officers, Instructional Unit Chapter
3.3 Suicide Prevention.” (Pls’ Ex. 8, Dkt. No. 82-8.) This training
program
includes
recognizing
symptoms
of
suicide
risk
and
responding to a display of symptoms. Plaintiffs further recognize
that Atlantic County created a protocol “Assessment of Suicidal
Inmates,” which included a mandatory annual training component as
well as a training requirement for all new custody staff. (Pls’
Ex. 9, Part C. Training, Dkt. No. 82-9.)
15
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 16 of 24 PageID: 754
Plaintiffs do not identify a deficiency in Atlantic County’s
suicide prevention training program, but rather, relying on the
deposition testimony of C/O Nelson, they contend that the training
program may not have been provided for a new employee who was on
duty when Laura committed suicide, and the training may not have
been provided on an annual basis, as required by ACJF policy. To
the contrary, their claims are meritless. Defendants submit that
ACJF had policies and procedures relating to suicide prevention in
full force and effect in 2016 (Defs’ Ex. H, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 46111), and Sergeant Robinson found no violations of those policies
and procedures when he conducted an internal affairs investigation
of Laura’s suicide. (Defs’ Ex. G, Dkt. No. 68-4 at 7-45.)
In his deposition, C/O Nelson testified that the new officer
on duty when Laura committed suicide would have had two weeks of
inservice training before he started at ACJF. (Pls’ Ex. 6, T25:2233, Dkt. No. 82-6.) Nelson, however, said he could not answer
whether the in-service training included suicide prevention or
recognizing mental health issues. (Pls’ Ex. 6, T25:25-T26:17, Dkt.
No. 82-6.) Similarly, Nelson testified that all ACJF corrections
officers received in-service training once a year, and that the
training
suicide
testified
included
learning
prevention.
that
he
about
mental
(T14:15-T15:1-15.)
did
not
know
whether
health
Although
problems
and
Nelson
also
corrections
officers
received suicide prevention training every year (T15:20-25), in
16
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 17 of 24 PageID: 755
the face of the policies and procedures and training programs in
force at ACJF in 2016, and the internal affairs investigation
revealing
no
violation
of
policies
and
procedures
in
Laura
Semprevivo’s suicide death, evidence that C/O Nelson was unsure
whether the training program was implemented is not sufficient to
establish
Atlantic
County’s
deliberate
indifference
that
a
training deficiency caused the failure to prevent a detainee’s
suicide.
3.
Analysis of Failure to Prevent
against Warden Geraldine Cohen
Suicide
Claim
Although the Court has concluded that a reasonable juror could
not find that Laura Semprevivo had a particular vulnerability to
suicide,
see
supra
Section
III(B)(2)(a),
for
the
sake
of
completeness, the Court will address whether Plaintiffs raised a
disputed issue of material fact as to whether Warden Geraldine
Cohen is liable for a supervisory deficiency that led to Laura
Semprevivo’s
suicide.
“[T]he
mental
state
necessary
for
supervisory liability tracks with the mental state required for
the underlying tort.” Barkes v. First Corr. Med., Inc., 766 F.3d
307, 319 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. granted, judgment rev'd sub nom.
Taylor v. Barkes, 575 U.S. 822 (2015). Deliberate indifference is
the mental state required for a failure to prevent suicide claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Woloszyn v. Cty. of Lawrence,
396 F.3d 314, 321 (3d Cir. 2005) (“because our § 1983 jurisprudence
17
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 18 of 24 PageID: 756
in custodial suicides borrows the term “deliberate indifference”
from Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, “deliberate indifference” may
be equivalent to the “should have known” element required for §
1983 liability under the Fourteenth Amendment”); Palakovic, 854
F.3d at 223 (the same deliberate indifference standard applies to
Eighth
and
Fourteenth
Amendment
failure
to
prevent
suicide
claims).
State officials are only liable for their own actions. Barkes,
766 F.3d at 320. Therefore, a plaintiff must
identify a supervisory policy or practice that
the supervisor failed to employ, and then
prove that: (1) the policy or procedures in
effect at the time of the alleged injury
created
an
unreasonable
risk
of
a
constitutional violation; (2) the defendantofficial was aware that the policy created an
unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was
indifferent to that risk; and (4) the
constitutional injury was caused by the
failure to implement the supervisory practice
or procedure. Sample [v. Diecks], 885 F.2d
[1099,] 1118 [3d Cir. 1989]; Brown v.
Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205 (3d Cir.2001).
Barkes, 766 F.3d at 317. A supervisor may also be liable under §
1983 if she participated in violating the plaintiff's rights,
directed others to violate them, or had knowledge of and acquiesced
in her subordinates' violations. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629
F.3d 121, 129 n. 5 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing A.M. ex rel. J.M.K. v.
Luzerne Cnty. Juvenile Det. Ctr., 372 F.3d 572, 586 (3d Cir.2004)
(second alteration in original).
18
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 19 of 24 PageID: 757
Plaintiffs’ failure to train claim against Warden Cohen fails
for the same reasons the failure to train claim fails against
Atlantic County, no reasonable juror could find on this record
that a known or obvious training deficiency caused Warden Cohen’s
failure to prevent Laura Semprevivo’s suicide. Plaintiffs also
assert that Warden Cohen had knowledge of and acquiesced in a
subordinate’s constitutional violation. Plaintiffs, however, have
not established that any subordinate could have prevented the
suicide.
At
most,
Plaintiffs
speculate
that
if
corrections
officers had responded to Renart’s requests for someone to talk to
Laura
about
her
depression,
Laura’s
suicide
might
have
been
prevented. Plaintiffs offer no evidence that Warden Cohen knew
about Renart’s requests for corrections officers to find someone
to talk to Laura. Plaintiffs have not established Warden Cohen’s
deliberate
indifference
by
knowledge
and
acquiescence.
Warden
Cohen is entitled to summary judgment on the supervisory liability
claim for the failure to prevent Laura Semprevivo’s suicide.
4.
The
need
Analysis of Deliberate Indifference to a Detainee’s
Serious Medical Need Claims Against Atlantic County
and Warden Geraldine Cohen
for
mental
healthcare
to
address
an
inmate’s
particular vulnerability to suicide may provide the basis for an
inmate’s
constitutional
claim
under
the
Eighth
Amendment.
Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 227. The same standard for Eighth Amendment
claims applies to medical care claims brought under the Fourteenth
19
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 20 of 24 PageID: 758
Amendment by pretrial detainees. See Natale, 318 F.3d at 581 (“the
Fourteenth Amendment affords pretrial detainees protections “at
least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a
convicted prisoner[.]”)
[P]rison officials may not, with deliberate
indifference to the serious medical needs of
the inmate, opt for “an easier and less
efficacious
treatment”
of
the
inmate's
condition. West v. Keve, 571 F.2d 158, 162 (3d
Cir. 1978) (quoting Williams v. Vincent, 508
F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1974)). Nor may “prison
authorities deny reasonable requests for
medical treatment ... [when] such denial
exposes the inmate ‘to undue suffering or the
threat of tangible residual injury.’” Monmouth
County Corr. Inst. Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346
(quoting Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860
(6th Cir. 1976)). And, “knowledge of the need
for medical care [may not be accompanied by
the] ... intentional refusal to provide that
care.” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700,
704 (11th Cir. 1985)).
Palakovic, 854 F.3d at 228.
In opposition to summary judgment for the Atlantic County
Defendants on this claim, Plaintiffs state,
[h]ere, the Defendants completely failed in
their obligation to ensure that the Deceased
received adequate medical care on September
16, 2016. They should have realized that there
was a serious medical need and that the
Deceased was depressed and suicidal. Upon
entering
the
Atlantic
County
Correction
Facility on September 9, 2016, the Deceased
was at risk for seizures and was on a
withdrawal protocol for opiates. Exhibit "l0".
Moreover, Laura manifested depression and a
desire to commit suicide as illustrated from
her conversation with Kimberly Renart. This
20
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 21 of 24 PageID: 759
expression of a desire was so strong that
Kimberly Renart sought help from corrections
officer
for
Laura
this
help
never
materialized. As such, the Atlantic County
employees were deliberately indifferent to
Laura
Semprevivo's
serious
physical
and
psychological medical needs. Finally, the
officer who was in charge of Med Right on the
September 16, 2016 at the time that Laura
Semprevivo
committed
suicide
was
inexperienced.
(Pls’ Opp. Brief, Dkt. No. 82 at 30.)
Plaintiffs have failed to address any policy or custom of
Atlantic County or Warden Cohen that resulted in a failure to treat
a serious medical need of Laura Semprevivo. Plaintiffs acknowledge
that Laura was receiving medical evaluation for seizures and
treatment for opiate withdrawal. Moreover, the record indicates
that
Laura
denied
having
any
mental
health
issues
when
she
completed ACJF’s classification questionnaire, her medical intake
evaluation did not reveal any mental health issues, her family did
not believe she had mental health issues apart from addiction, and
she did not personally request any mental health treatment at ACJF.
In sum, Plaintiffs rely on vicarious liability based on the
alleged failure of a corrections officer to recognize Laura’s need
for treatment of depression. Even if the officer should have
responded differently to Renart’s concern over Laura, Atlantic
County is entitled to summary judgment because municipalities are
not vicariously liable under § 1983 for the actions of their
employees. Connick, 563 U.S. 51, 60 (2011). Likewise, Warden
21
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 22 of 24 PageID: 760
Geraldine
Cohen
supervisors
are
is
entitled
liable
to
under
§
summary
1983
only
judgment
for
because
their
own
constitutional violations. See Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904
F.3d 280, 290 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 676 (2009) (“a plaintiff must plead that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official's own individual actions,
has violated the Constitution” (emphasis added in Jutrowski.)
C.
Plaintiffs’ Claims under the NJCRA
Plaintiffs
brought
their
constitutional
claims
under
U.S.C. § 1983 and under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act,
42
N.J.S.A.
10:6-1 et seq. “The NJCRA was modeled after § 1983, and “courts in
New Jersey have consistently looked at claims under the NJCRA
‘through the lens of § 1983,’” thereby construing the NJCRA in
terms similar to its federal counterpart. O'Neal v. Middletown
Twp., No. 3:18-CV-5269-BRM-LHG, 2019 WL 77066, at *8 (D.N.J. Jan.
2, 2019) (quoting Samoles v. Lacey Twp., No. 12–3066, 2014 WL
2602251, at *15 (D.N.J. June 11, 2014) (additional citations
omitted)). Here, Plaintiffs have not distinguished their § 1983
and NJCRA claims in any manner. Therefore, the Court concludes
that
the
Atlantic
County
Defendants
are
entitled
to
summary
judgment on Plaintiffs’ NJCRA claims for the same reasons they are
entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims.
22
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 23 of 24 PageID: 761
D.
John Doe Defendants
The Atlantic County Defendants request that the Court dismiss
the John Doe Defendants because discovery has not revealed their
identities and the statute of limitations has expired. Plaintiffs
oppose dismissal, stating they still might identify the John Doe
Defendants. “[A] court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop
a party.” Blakeslee v. Clinton Cty., 336 F. App'x 248, 250 (3d
Cir. 2009) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 21.) A district court does not
abuse its discretion when it dismisses John Doe Defendants if
discovery does not yield their identities. Id. (citing Scheetz v.
Morning Call, Inc., 130 F.R.D. 34, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1990)). Discovery
has been completed and Plaintiffs have not described any defendant
whose identity they would continue to seek. It is appropriate to
dismiss
the
John
Doe
Defendants
under
these
circumstances,
although dismissal is without prejudice.
E.
Plaintiffs’ Remaining State Claims
The
only
Plaintiffs'
New
basis
Jersey
for
federal
wrongful
court
death,
jurisdiction
survivor
action,
over
and
negligence claims is supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1367(a), which provides:
In any civil action of which the district
courts
have
original
jurisdiction,
the
district
court
shall
have
supplemental
jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to the claims in the action within
such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy ...
23
Case 1:18-cv-01953-RMB-AMD Document 83 Filed 11/30/20 Page 24 of 24 PageID: 762
The statute also provides that “district courts may decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection
(a) if-- … the district court has dismissed all claims over which
it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(3). If a
district court decides not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
and therefore dismisses state-law claims, it should do so without
prejudice.” Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 650 (3d Cir. 2009). The
Court
declines
to
exercise
supplemental
jurisdiction
over
Plaintiffs’ state law claims and dismisses those claims without
prejudice.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court grants summary
judgment to Defendants Atlantic County and Warden Geraldine Cohen
on Plaintiffs’ claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the NJCRA. The
Court dismisses the John Doe Defendants without prejudice, and
declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s
state law claims.
An appropriate order follows.
Date:
November 27, 2020
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
24
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?