ANDRE v. TRINITY HEALTH CORPORATION et al

Filing 12

OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 3/14/2019. (rtm, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
:
MARIE ANDRE,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
v.
:
:
TRINITY HEALTH CORPORATION,
:
LOURDES CARDIOLOGY SERVICES,
:
HEALTH MANAGEMENT SERVICES
:
ORGANIZATION, INC., MERCEDES
:
FUSCELLARO (individually), JENNIFER :
GARRON (individually), GAYLE WEXLER :
(individually), BARBARA HOELFNER
:
(individually), and JILLIAN (“JILL”) M.
:
KOERNER (individually),
:

Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-03183-RBK-AMD
OPINION

Defendants.
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Motion of Trinity Health Corporation
(“Defendant THC”), Lourdes Cardiology Services (“Defendant LCS”), Health Management
Services Organization, Inc. (“Defendant HMS”) (collectively “Corporate Defendants”),
Mercedes Fuscellaro, Jennifer Garron, Gayle Wexler, Barbara Hoelfner, and Jillian Koerner
(collectively “Individual Defendants”) (Corporate Defendants and Individual Defendants are
collectively “Defendants”) to dismiss Plaintiff Marie Andre’s aiding and abetting claim under the
New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) against the Corporate Defendants, each of
Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant THC, and Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims under the New
Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJWHL”) and Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) against the
Individual Defendants. (Doc. 6). For the reasons articulated in the Opinion, the motion is
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I.

BACKGROUND1

This case arises from alleged unlawful employment discrimination and wage issues.
Plaintiff is a woman of Black and Haitian descent who was employed at Defendant Lourdes
Cardiology Services (“Defendant LCS”). Amended Complaint (Am. Compl.) [Doc. No. 5] at ¶
24. In May 2015, Plaintiff applied for the position of Registered Medical Assistant with
Defendant LCS. Id. at ¶ 25. Daniele Dobbins and Defendant Mercedes Fuscellaro each
interviewed Plaintiff for the position. Following her interview with Defendant Fuscellaro,
Plaintiff was informed she was hired for the position. Id. at ¶ 27. About one month into her
employment, Defendant Fuscellaro and her co-workers started discriminating against Plaintiff
because of her Haitian accent. Id. at ¶ 30. Soon after, Plaintiff complained to Defendant
Fuscellaro about one instance when one of Plaintiff’s co-workers “hit [her] in the back with
objects.” Id. at ¶ 31. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Fuscellaro never investigated her report or
took corrective action, and as a result, she continued to experience discrimination at the hands of
her co-workers and Defendant Fuscellaro. Id. at ¶ 35.
Plaintiff further claims that Defendant Fuscellaro also made her work additional hours
before clocking in and after clocking out. Id. at ¶ 44. Plaintiff states that these unpaid hours
totaled approximately six to seven hours per week. Id. After, Plaintiff complained to Defendant
Jillian Koerner, the Human Resource Manager, about Defendant Fuscellaro’s actions. Id. at ¶
45. In response, Defendant Koerner instructed Plaintiff to “stop working without pay or we
[indicating Defendants] will get in trouble.” Id. Following this complaint, Defendant Koerner

1

On this motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the facts pled in the Complaint and
construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515
F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008).

informed Plaintiff that she will be in touch; however, Defendant Koerner did not speak to
Plaintiff until after her alleged wrongful termination. Id. at ¶ 36.
A few days later, Defendant Jennifer Garron approached Plaintiff regarding her previous
complaints to Defendant Koerner. Id. at ¶ 47. As the alleged discrimination continued, Plaintiff
complained again to Defendant Garron, who then scheduled two meetings: the first meeting
included only Defendant Garron and Plaintiff; the second meeting included Plaintiff, Defendant
Garron, and Defendant Fuscellaro. Id. at ¶ 53.
Despite these complaints, the alleged discrimination continued. Again, Plaintiff states
that Defendant Fuscellaro continued to force her to work unpaid hours. Id. at ¶ 59–60. In
response, Plaintiff asked Defendant Fuscellaro to be compensated. Defendant Fuscellaro
allegedly told Plaintiff to comply or face termination. Id. at ¶ 61–62.
Soon after, Plaintiff entered the emergency room at Lourdes Hospital because of stress
regarding her treatment at work. The emergency staff diagnosed her with gastric issues. Id. at ¶
67. A few days later, Plaintiff arrived at work but soon realized that she forgot her stethoscope at
home. Id. at ¶ 68. Plaintiff then rushed home to get the stethoscope, and about three days later,
Defendant Fuscellaro came forward with a videotape which showed Plaintiff leaving the office
for approximately seven minutes after she had clocked into work. Id. at ¶ 69. In response to the
tape, Plaintiff explained she suffered from serious health problems and that, on the day in
question, she had rushed home to retrieve her stethoscope. Id. After, Plaintiff had a compliance
meeting regarding the tape that Defendant Fuscellaro discovered. Id. at ¶ 75.
During Plaintiff’s compliance meeting she met with Defendant Hoelfner, Defendant
Wexler, and Defendant Fuscellaro. In this meeting, she explained that she had left her
stethoscope at home, and she shared her emergency room records to prove her recent

hospitalization. Id. at ¶ 80. Plaintiff also complained about Defendant Fuscellaro’s actions.
Then Defendant Wexler allegedly informed Plaintiff that the company would investigate her
reports of discriminatory treatment. Id. at ¶ 81.
The following day, Plaintiff again met with Defendant Wexler to discuss Defendant
Fuscellaro’s alleged discriminatory conduct. Id. at ¶ 85. Following this meeting, Plaintiff spoke
with Defendant Garron who informed her that the decision to fire Plaintiff its left up to
Defendant Barbara Hoelfner. Id. at ¶ 90. After, Plaintiff had a meeting with both Defendant
Garron and Hoelfner, during which they accused her of stealing company time and terminated
her. Id. at ¶ 91. Following her termination, Plaintiff received a phone call from Defendant
Koerner who added that termination further stemmed from an “incident” that happened earlier in
January. Id. at ¶ 94. Plaintiff claims that Defendant Koerner refused to identify this incident.
Id.
Plaintiff filed several claims related to the allegations above. Plaintiff alleges violations
of 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964, New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination (“NJLAD”), Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA), Fair Labor Standards Act
(“FLSA”), and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJWHL”). Plaintiff asserts nine causes of
action related to these laws. Count I alleges a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for discrimination
and retaliation. Count II alleges a violation of Title VII for discrimination. Count III alleges a
violation of Title VII for retaliation. Count IV alleges a violation of FMLA for discrimination.
Count V alleges a violation of NJLAD for discrimination. Count VI alleges a violation of
NJLAD for retaliation. Count VII alleges a violation of NJLAD for aiding and abetting. Count
VIII alleges a violation of FLSA for failure to pay overtime wages. Count IX alleges a violation
of NJWHL for failure to pay overtime wages.

Defendant now moves to dismiss Count VII against the Corporate Defendant, Count VIII
and IX against the Individual Defendants, and each of Plaintiff’s claims against THC.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a court to dismiss an action for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted. When evaluating a motion to dismiss, “courts
accept all factual allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the
plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff
may be entitled to relief.” Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). In other words, a
complaint survives a motion to dismiss if it contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
“state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009);
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
To make this determination, a court conducts a three-part analysis. Santiago v.
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must “tak[e] note of the
elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 675). Second,
the court should identify allegations that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are not
entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 131 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680). Finally, “where
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then
determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 680). This plausibility determination is a “context-specific task that requires the
reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
A complaint cannot survive where a court can only infer that a claim is merely possible rather
than plausible. Id.

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendants’ motion to dismiss raises three issues. First, Defendants have moved to
dismiss all claims against Defendant THC on the ground that Plaintiff has failed to plead any
relevant factual allegations against it. Second, Defendants have moved to dismiss Count VII for
aiding and abetting against the Corporate Defendants on the ground that this cause of action only
applies to individual supervisors. Third, Defendants have moved to dismiss Counts VIII and IX
for wage and hour violations against the Individual Defendants on the ground that the Individual
Defendants are not “employers” within the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”)
and New Jersey Wage and Hour Law (“NJWHL”). The Court will address these issues in turn.
A. Claims against Defendant Trinity Health Corporation
Defendants argue that each of the claims must be dismissed against Defendant THC
because Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts, beyond mere threadbare allegations, against
Defendant THC. Defendants’ Brief (Defs. Br.) [Doc. No. 6] at 9–12. In response, Plaintiff
alleges that the “joint and solo employer” language in the complaint as well as the Plaintiff’s
paystub with Defendant THC’s name on it are sufficient factual allegations that Defendant THC
was her employer. Plaintiff’s Brief (Pl. Br.) [Doc. No. 7] at 22–24.
The central issues are whether Plaintiff has pled enough factual allegations against
Defendant THC and whether the Court can consider the Plaintiff’s paystub in determining
whether Defendant THC was the Plaintiff’s employer. Defendants contend that each claim
against Defendant THC relies on Plaintiff having either a contractual relationship with Defendant
THC or that Defendant Trinity Health Corporation was Plaintiff’s employer. The only two
allegations in the complaint against Defendant THC are that Defendant THC “was and is a
foreign corporation authorized to do business in the State of New Jersey” and it was Plaintiff’s

“joint and solo employer.” Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 8, 21. In response, the Plaintiff contends, the
“joint and solo employer” language is a sufficient allegation that Defendant THC was her
employer. In addition, the Plaintiff relies on her paystub that lists Defendant THC as her
employer.
The Plaintiff alleges this Court can consider the Plaintiff’s paystub, which is not attached
to the complaint, because: (1) in considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the
complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record; and (2) this Circuit held that the
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 mandates a notice pleading whereby the Plaintiff is only
required to set forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
evidence of the necessary element.
Plaintiff’s first argument fails because it is contrary to this Circuit’s case law. Plaintiff
incorrectly broadens language from a case in this Court that states, “In considering a motion to
dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public
record.” Michelon v. FM Home Improvement, Inc., No. 9-4646, 2010 WL 3614209, at *3
(D.N.J. Sept. 8, 2010); however, the reference to “attached exhibits” is not exhibits attached to a
motion. Instead, the Third Circuit has held that “courts generally consider only the allegations
contained in the complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public record.”
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)
(emphasis added).
Plaintiff’s second argument falls equally short because Plaintiff has not pled enough facts
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery would reveal evidence of this paystub. As
Defendant notes, Plaintiff has failed to plead any facts establishing that Defendant THC was her
employer beyond the conclusory statement that it was her “joint and solo employer.” Defs. Br.

at 10. Plaintiff is correct that a plaintiff “need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable
expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element.” See Thompson v. Real
Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014); however, Plaintiff’s sole allegation
that Defendant THC was her “joint and solo employer” is simply a conclusory allegation that is
not enough to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence that Defendant
THC was her employer. This Court will not ignore the rules of civil procedure simply because
this paystub could have been revealed through discovery. Since the Complaint fails to reference
the paystub or earning statements and plead more than just threadbare allegations regarding
Defendant THC, this Court cannot and will not consider the paystub as part of the Complaint.
See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).
Since the paystub and earning statements cannot be considered, the claims against
Defendant THC must be dismissed for Plaintiff’s failure to plead more than just one conclusory
allegation that Defendant THC was and is her “joint and solo employer.” Therefore, Defendants’
motion to dismiss all claims against Defendant THC is GRANTED.
B. Plaintiff’s claim of aiding and abetting against Corporate Defendants (Count
VII)
Defendants have also moved to dismiss Count VII against the Corporate Defendants on
the ground that corporate entities cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting alleged
discriminatory conduct. Defs. Br. at 6. In response, Plaintiff contends that § 10:5-12(e) of the
NJLAD is not confined to individual supervisory liability. Pl. Br. at 26.
The central issue is whether corporate entities can be held liable under § 10:5-12(e) for
aiding and abetting allegedly discriminatory conduct. Defendants’ argument appears to turn on
Defendants’ reading of well-established Third Circuit cases, Hurley and Failla.

In Hurley, the Third Circuit held that despite the broad language of N.J. Stat. Ann. §
10:5-12(e), “a nonsupervisory employee cannot be liable as an aider and abettor for his own
affirmative acts of harassment.” Id. at 141. Defendants’ contend that Hurley stands for the
proposition that “New Jersey courts would impose aiding and abetting liability only on
supervisory employees.” Def. Br. at 6.
In Failla, the Third Circuit has also stated Ҥ 12(e) by its express terms contemplates
individual liability of the employees for aiding and abetting a LAD violation.” Failla v. Cty. of
Passaic, 146 F.3d 149, 155 (3d Cir. 1998). Defendants insist Failla stands for the proposition
that aiding and abetting liability applies only to individuals. Defendants’ Reply Brief (Defs.
Reply Br.) [Doc. No. 9] at 5–6. According to Defendants’ interpretations of Hurley and Failla,
the corporate entities cannot be held liable for aiding and abetting.
This Court rejects Defendants’ arguments because their reading of the case law is
contrary to the language of § 10:5-12(e) of the NJLAD. First, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e) & §
10:5-5(a) by their terms, contemplate liability for any person, including corporations. The
NJLAD states in pertinent part that it shall be unlawful “for any person, whether an employer or
not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing any of the acts forbidden under this act, or to
attempt to do so.” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e). The NJLAD defines “person” to include “one or
more individuals, partnerships, associations, organizations, labor organizations, corporations,
legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, and fiduciaries.” Id. § 10:5-5(a).
Contrary to Defendants’ attempts to parse this statute, this Court finds it clear and
unambiguous. The United States Supreme Court has held that unambiguous statutory language
must be read according to its plain reading. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249,
253–54 (1992). The New Jersey Supreme Court has also emphasized repeatedly that “[i]n the

interpretation of a statute our overriding goal has consistently been to determine the Legislature’s
intent.” Young v. Schering Corp., 141 N.J. 16, 25 (1995) (quoting Roig v. Kelsey, 135 N.J. 500,
515 (1994)). The New Jersey Supreme Court has held that the “overarching goal of the [LAD] is
nothing less than the eradication ‘of the cancer of discrimination.’” Fuchilla v. Layman, 109 N.J.
319, 334 (1988) (quoting Jackson v. Concord Co., 54 N.J. 113, 124 (1969)). With this goal in
mind, the Legislature has directed that the LAD “shall be liberally construed.” N.J. Stat. Ann. §
10:5-3. Thus, this Court rejects Defendants’ narrow reading of the statute.
This Court further rejects Defendants’ reading of Hurley and Failla. Defendants are
using Hurley and Failla to overly narrow a broad statutory reading. Defendants’ contention that
§ 12(e) is limited only to supervisory employees finds no support in the text of Hurley or Failla.
Both Hurley and Failla acknowledge that the NJLAD contemplates individual liability for
supervisory employees; however, this does not mean that the NJLAD is limited to only
supervisory employees.
Based on the above, this Court finds that Corporate Defendants may be potentially liable
under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e) for aiding and abetting an alleged NJLAD violation against
Plaintiff. This holding appears consistent with others in this District as well. See KamdemOuaffo v. Task Mgmt. Inc., No. 7506, 2018 WL 3360762, at *17 (D.N.J. July 9, 2018) (holding
that all defendants, including a corporate defendant, are subject to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:5-12(e)
because § 12(e) “applies broadly to persons” (emphasis added)); Stengart v. Loving Care
Agency, Inc., No. BER-L-868-08, 2010 N.J. Super. LEXIS 3086, at *18 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. Nov. 4, 2010) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss because LCA, a corporation, fit
within the NJLAD’s definition of a person and there was enough evidence for a reasonable jury

to conclude that LCA aided and abetted a hostile work environment). Thus, Defendants’ motion
to dismiss Count VII against Corporate Defendants is DENIED.
C. Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims against Individual Defendants (Counts VIII
and IX)
Defendants next move to dismiss Counts VIII and IX against Individual Defendants
because they are not “employers” within the meaning of the FLSA and NJWHL. Defendants
contend that Plaintiff has failed to allege that Individual Defendants had significant ownership
interests in the company or had operational control. Defs. Br. at 6.
The definitions of “employer” and “employee” under the FLSA and NJWHL are virtually
identical. An employer under the FLSA is defined as someone “who acts in the interest of an
employer in relation to the employee.” 29 U.S.C. § 203(d). Similarly, the NJWHL defines
“employer” as “any individual, partnership, association, corporation or any person or group of
persons acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.”
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:11-56a1(g).
The NJWHL definition of “employer,” like the FLSA definition, allows for individual
liability and is to be given liberal construction. See DOL v. Pepsi-Cola Co., 170 N.J. 59, 62
(2001). Aside from the corporate entity itself, a company’s owners, officers, or supervisory
personnel may also constitute “joint employers” for purposes of liability under the FLSA. When
assessing whether a “joint employer” relationship exists, the Third Circuit has held that “a court
should consider the following non-exhaustive list of relevant factors:

(1) the alleged employer’s authority to hire and fire the relevant
employees; (2) the alleged employer’s authority to promulgate work
rules and assignments and to set the employees' conditions of
employment: compensation, benefits, and work schedules, including
the rate and method of payment; (3) the alleged employer’s
involvement in day-to-day employee supervision, including

employee discipline; and (4) the alleged employer’s actual control of
employee records, such as payroll, insurance, or taxes.

Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2014). The focus is on the
“totality of the circumstances rather than on technical concepts of the employment relationship.”
Id. at 154.
As Plaintiff points out, the test for whether someone is an employer under the FLSA and
NJWHL is not limited to individuals who have ownership interests in the company. This Court
agrees and finds that the appropriate test is laid out by the Third Circuit in Thompson, and
Plaintiff has pled enough factual allegations that Individual Defendants may be employers within
the meaning of FLSA and NJWHL. The factual allegations against each Individual Defendant
regarding these factors is examined below.
1. Defendant Fuscellaro
Defendant Fuscellaro may be considered an employer within the meaning of FLSA and
NJWHL for several reasons. First, Defendant Fuscellaro appears to play a role in Defendant
LCS’s hiring and firing process. For example, Defendant Fuscellaro interviewed Plaintiff for the
position she was ultimately hired for and has used her control to threaten Plaintiff with
termination. Am. Compl. at ¶¶ 20, 62. Second, Defendant Fuscellaro appears to have the
authority to discipline employees, including Plaintiff. By way of example, Defendant Fuscellaro
supervised Plaintiff in the workplace and received Plaintiff’s complaints of assault and
discrimination. Id. at ¶ 26–27, 34. Third, Defendant Fuscellaro appears to have the authority to
promulgate work rules and assignments. For example, the Complaint alleges: (1) Defendant
Fuscellaro forced Plaintiff to work additional hours without compensation before clocking in and
after clocking out; (2) Defendant Fuscellaro informed Plaintiff that she had to complete extra

work in order to keep her job because there was insufficient funding for the approval of overtime
hours; (3) Plaintiff would ask Defendant Fuscellaro for permission to leave work early; and (4)
Defendant Fuscellaro informed Plaintiff that she had to work extra hours or she would be fired.
2. Defendant Hoelfner
Defendant Hoelfner may be considered an employer within the meaning of FLSA and
NJWHL. The complaint alleges that Defendant Hoelfner is the ultimate decision maker to fire
an employee. Id. at ¶ 90.
3. Defendants Garron, Wexler, and Koerner
Defendants Garron, Wexler, and Koerner may be considered employers within the
meaning of FLSA and NJWHL. Each of the following allegations, when accepted as true,
suggest that Defendants Wexler, Garron, and Koerner could play a substantial role in the day-today employee supervision, including employee discipline. First, the Complaint alleges that
Plaintiff complained directly to Defendant Koerner regarding Defendant Fuscellaro’s alleged
discriminatory conduct towards her as well as Defendant Fuscellaro forcing her to work unpaid.
Id. at ¶ 45. In response, Defendant Koerner informed Plaintiff to “stop working without pay or
we [indicating Defendants] will get in trouble.” Id. Second, the Complaint further alleges that
Defendant Garron approached Plaintiff in follow-up to Plaintiff’s complaints to Defendant
Koerner regarding Defendant Fuscellaro, and that at one-point Defendant Garron set up three
different meetings: one with Defendant Fuscellaro, another one with Plaintiff, and then a final
one with Defendant Fuscellaro and Plaintiff together. Id. at ¶ 53–55.
Third, during a compliance meeting with Defendant Hoelfner and Defendant Wexler,
Plaintiff allegedly complained about Defendant Fuscellaro’s discriminatory actions. Id. at ¶ 80.
At this meeting, Plaintiff asked Defendant Wexler to look into Plaintiff’s reports of

discriminatory conduct. Id. at ¶ 81. The following day Plaintiff met with Defendant Wexler to
further complain about Defendant Fuscellaro’s actions. Id. at ¶ 83. Fourth, the Complaint
further alleges that Defendant Garron was present at the meeting when Plaintiff was ultimately
terminated and even accused Plaintiff of stealing company time. Id. at ¶ 91. Fifth, after Plaintiff
was terminated, the Complaint alleges that Defendant Koerner advised Plaintiff that she was also
being terminated for a separate incident in January that Defendant Koerner “refused to identify.”
Id. at ¶ 94.
Finally, the Court notes that its assessment rests heavily on the procedural posture of this
litigation. Plaintiff, a low-level employee with each of the Defendant companies, has had no
opportunity for discovery as to payroll and taxation documents, disciplinary records, internal
corporate communications, or leadership and ownership structures. It may well be that a fully
developed factual record will preclude a finding that Individual Defendants were joint employers
of Plaintiff for any of the pay periods at issue. But under these circumstances, the Court cannot
say that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Thus,
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Counts VIII and IX against Individual Defendants is DENIED.

IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims against
Defendant Trinity Health Corporation is GRANTED, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
aiding and abetting claim against Corporate Defendants is DENIED, and Defendants’ motion to
dismiss Plaintiff’s wage and hour claims against Individual Defendants is DENIED. Plaintiff
may amend the claims against Defendant THC within fourteen (14) days of this Opinion.

Dated: _3/14/2019______

s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge