STIENER v. ROBINSON et al

Filing 9

OPINION. Signed by Judge Jerome B. Simandle on 3/21/2019. (dmr)(n.m.)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ARTHUR STIENER,

HONORABLE JEROME B. SIMANDLE
Plaintiff,
Civil Action
No. 18-8765 (JBS-JS)

v.
OFFICER J. ROBINSON, et al.,

OPINION
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
Arthur Stiener, Plaintiff Pro Se
7 Serviss Ave
East Brunswick, New Jersey 08816
SIMANDLE, District Judge:
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is Plaintiff Arthur Stiener’s
(“Plaintiff”), submission of a civil rights complaint. [Docket
Entry 1]. At this time, the Court must review the complaint,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to determine whether it should be
dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that the
complaint will proceed in part.

II. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff’s complaint alleges a conspiracy consisting of
extortion and assault during his confinement at Bayside State
Prison, New Jersey. [Docket Entry 1]. The following factual
allegations are taken from the complaint and are accepted for
purposes of this screening only. The Court has made no findings
as to the truth of Plaintiff’s allegations.
Plaintiff’s incarceration at Bayside began in 2015. He
began noticing after his arrival that several cells on his unit
would remain unlocked during “lockdown” periods and that the
inmates would be free to move about the unit. [Id. at 8]. He
states that many of these inmates were gang members. [Id. at 89]. Plaintiff alleges these inmates told him on one occasion
that they “‘got the door popped’” and would “‘go easy’” on him
the first time because he was new to Bayside. [Id. at 9].
Plaintiff further alleges that they proceeded to explain to him
“‘the way it is here.’” [Id.]. “This was to include payment to
use the phone, and commissary on demand. Plaintiff declined to
pay the runners anything and essentially told them he was
prepared to use violence to protect himself and his property.”
[Id.]. “Plaintiff consciously restricted his activity outside
his cell to movement he considered necessary to avoid
institutional infractions, i.e., work (not voluntary), shower,
meals, and phone usage when he could pay to use it.” [Id.].
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Plaintiff asserts he observed Officer Robinson open cell doors
for the inmates and laugh with them after they took commissary
items from other inmates’ cells. [Id.].
On approximately November 23, 2015, Plaintiff was waiting
to call his family when Officer Robinson asked him what he was
doing. [Id.]. Plaintiff explained that he was waiting to use the
phone, and Officer Robinson told Plaintiff to go downstairs.
[Id.]. Plaintiff refused, asserting that he would miss his
chance to use the phone if he left. [Id.]. Officer Robinson then
spat on Plaintiff’s shoe in what Plaintiff believed to be an
attempt to provoke Plaintiff into a confrontation. [Id.].
Shortly after this incident, Plaintiff’s cell was searched
by a friend of Officer Robinson. [Id. at 9-10]. The officer
claimed to have found a finger of a blue glove, allegedly
containing a controlled dangerous substance, on Plaintiff’s bed
in plain view. [Id.]. Before any testing was completed, officers
were claiming the substance was heroin. [Id.]. Plaintiff was
taken to medical and ordered to produce a urine sample. [Id.].
Plaintiff produced three clean urine samples over the next two
days. [Id.]. Special Investigations Division (“SID”) Officer
Gardner interviewed Plaintiff on the third day and informed him
that the substance tested positive for heroin. [Id.]. Plaintiff
told Officer Gardner about the inmate runners and Officer
Robinson and how he believed the substance was planted in his
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cell as retaliation because he had refused to participate in
their “extortion system.” [Id.].
Plaintiff states that SID investigated and two or three of
the inmate runners were moved to different prisons as a result
of his conversation with Officer Gardner. [Id.]. Other inmates
were moved to different units within Bayside and lost their
runner position. [Id.]. “Then Officer Gardner listened to
plaintiff’s pre-recorded collect phone calls. Officer Gardner
discussed the former and also specifically mentioned to
plaintiff that he listened to one of his phone calls and that
during the call, he could hear another inmate demanding money
for use of the phone.” [Id.]. Plaintiff asked Officer Gardner
for “keep separate” orders to be placed in his file to keep him
away from the inmates involved in the scheme as well as Officer
Robinson. “Officer Gardner told plaintiff that he would ‘take
care of it.’” [Id.].
Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing for possession of the
alleged heroin occurred on approximately December 3, 2015.
[Id.]. Officer Robinson escorted him to the hearing along with
an Unknown Sergeant and Unknown Officers 1 & 2. [Id. at 10-11].
The hearing officer, who was filling in for the regular hearing
officer, decided to postpone the hearing after Plaintiff
expressed discomfort revealing his discussions with SID about
Officer Robinson in front of Officer Robinson. [Id. at 11].
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Officer Robinson then “jerked” Plaintiff’s handcuffed arm
towards the door. [Id.]. Plaintiff asked to speak with the
hearing officer privately as he was afraid to leave with Officer
Robinson. [Id.]. Plaintiff alleges that Officer Robinson then
struck him in the face with a closed fist three times. [Id.].
The sergeant intervened by yelling at Officer Robinson to stop.
[Id.]. Officer Dick pulled the hearing officer out of the room,
and the unknown officers pulled Plaintiff out of the hearing
room. [Id.].
Plaintiff began requesting to see SID about the assault on
his way back to the medical unit when the sergeant and officers
escorting him “wrenched” Plaintiff’s arms behind his back.
[Id.]. The sergeant threatened to “call a ‘code’ and beat him
worse if he didn’t stop calling out.” [Id.]. When he got back to
segregation, Plaintiff requested medical attention and SID.
[Id.]. The sergeant came to Plaintiff’s cell about thirty
minutes later and said he would let Plaintiff see medical staff
if Plaintiff would stop talking about being assaulted. [Id.].
Plaintiff objected but said he would not talk to SID if the
sergeant would let him talk to medical staff. [Id. at 11-12].
The sergeant allowed Plaintiff to see medical staff about back
pain resulting from his mattress. [Id. at 12]. Officer Probst,
the medical officer, told Plaintiff that “‘we’ll finish what the
other guys started’” if Plaintiff attempted to ask for medical
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attention for anything other than the mattress-related injury.
[Id.]. When in medical, Plaintiff attempted to tell a lieutenant
and rookie officer about the assault. [Id.]. He also told mental
health staff about the assault on two occasions. [Id.].
Plaintiff’s disciplinary hearing took place on or about
December 7, 2015 with Hearing Officer Ralph. [Id.]. Plaintiff
states he was not permitted to present any evidence or other
defense to the charges. [Id.]. Officer Ralph found him guilty of
the charge and sentenced him to 180 days in administrative
segregation and 180 days loss of commutation time. [Id.].
Plaintiff was held in administrative segregation in New Jersey
State Prison for approximately 160 days before being transferred
back to Bayside in May 2016.1 [Id.].
When Plaintiff returned to Bayside, a corrections officer,
Mrs. Z, identified Plaintiff as the one who “‘ratted out Rob.’”
[Id. at 12-13]. She warned the unit runners to stay away from
Plaintiff’s cell or they would be fired. [Id. at 13]. On May 5,
2016, Plaintiff saw Office Robinson on his unit and called his
family “and advised that he was in fear for his safety from
Officer Robinson or his co-workers/friends in the facility.”

1

The Court presumes the statement that Plaintiff’s
New Jersey State Prison back to Bayside occurred in
was an error as Plaintiff previously stated that he
Jersey State Prison to serve out his administrative
sentence in December 2015.
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transfer from
“May 2015”
entered New
segregation

[Id.]. Later that day, Plaintiff was moved to a different unit
within the prison where Officer Robinson searched his cell.
[Id.]. After Plaintiff’s cellmate left for the dayroom, Officer
Robinson and Officer Doughtery assaulted Plaintiff. [Id.].
Plaintiff states he was handcuffed at the time. [Id.]. He was
placed in medical segregation before being transferred to
Southern State Correctional Facility (“SSCF”). [Id.].
Plaintiff received medical attention upon arriving at SSCF
on May 6, 2016. [Id.]. SID Officer Gardner interviewed Plaintiff
and told him that Plaintiff would not be charged with a “street
charge” for assault. [Id.]. Plaintiff stated that he wanted to
press charges against the officers, but, according to Plaintiff,
Officer Gardner said that they’d “‘handle this in-house.’”
[Id.]. Plaintiff tried to give a statement but Officer Gardner
purportedly stated that Plaintiff looked “‘pretty banged up’”
and he would be back later. [Id.]. Plaintiff states Officer
Gardner never returned to take a statement from him regarding
the assault. [Id.]. Plaintiff saw the dentist the next day, May
7, and reported a pain and “clicking” in his jaw. [Id. at 1314].2

2

Plaintiff directs the Court to see attached medical records and
requests to SID. [Id. at 13-14]. Other than Plaintiff’s in forma
pauperis application, no attachments to the complaint were
docketed.
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Plaintiff had an administrative hearing on May 27, 2016.
[Id. at 14]. Plaintiff asserts that “[b]efore the hearing even
started, [Plaintiff’s] inmate paralegal advised that the Court
line Hearing Officer Mrs. Ralph indicated her intent to find him
guilty and sentence him to the maximum penalty allowed.” [Id.].
Officer Ralph did not permit Plaintiff access to video footage
or a polygraph examination. [Id.]. Plaintiff was found guilty of
assault and refusing a search. [Id.]. Plaintiff alleges SID
Officer Achinko permitted video footage that would have
exonerated Plaintiff and proved Officers Robinson and Dougherty
assaulted him to “loop.” [Id. at 7 ¶ 6].
Plaintiff argues defendants are engaged in a conspiracy to
deprive him of his rights and have subjected him to extortion,
assault, retaliation, and false arrest or imprisonment. He
alleges defendants have engaged in a “Blue Code” or “Blue Wall
of silence” to protect each other from investigation or
prosecution. He seeks damages in the amount of $1,500,000.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A. Standards for a Sua Sponte Dismissal
Per the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§§ 801-810, 110 Stat. 1321-66 to 1321-77 (April 26, 1996)
(“PLRA”), district courts must review complaints in those civil
actions in which a prisoner is proceeding in forma pauperis, see
28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), seeks redress against a governmental
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employee or entity, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), or brings a claim
with respect to prison conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1997e. The
PLRA directs district courts to sua sponte dismiss any claim
that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief. This action is subject
to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915
because Plaintiff is a prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis.3
In determining the sufficiency of a pro se complaint, the
Court must be mindful to construe it liberally in favor of the
plaintiff. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93–94 (2007)
(following Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)); see also
United States v. Day, 969 F.2d 39, 42 (3d Cir. 1992). According
to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, “a
pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To survive sua sponte
screening for failure to state a claim,4 the complaint must

3

Although Plaintiff is no longer in custody, the screening
provisions of the PLRA apply because he was confined in a state
prison at the time the complaint was filed.
4 “[T]he legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim . . . is identical to the legal standard employed
in ruling on 12(b)(6) motions.” Courteau v. United States, 287
F. App’x 159, 162 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Allah v. Seiverling,
229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)).
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allege “sufficient factual matter” to show that the claim is
facially plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210
(3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind
Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). Moreover, while pro se
pleadings are liberally construed, “pro se litigants still must
allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim.”
Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013)
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).
B. Section 1983
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 for certain violations of his constitutional rights.
Section 1983 provides in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory
... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the
United
States
or
other
person
within
the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding
for redress ....
§ 1983. Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a
plaintiff must allege, first, the violation of a right secured
by the Constitution or laws of the United States and, second,
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that the alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person
acting under color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S.
42, 48 (1988); Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir.
2011).
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Eleventh Amendment
Plaintiff brings claims against defendants in their
individual and official capacities. The claims against
defendants in their official capacities must be dismissed with
prejudice as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”
U.S. CONST. amend. XI. A suit against a public official “‘in his
or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but
rather is a suit against the official's office . . . .’” Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 930–31 (1997) (quoting Will v.
Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). These
claims are dismissed with prejudice. Claims against defendants
in their individual capacities remain.

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B. Civil Rights Conspiracy Under § 1985
Plaintiff alleges a civil rights conspiracy under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985. [Docket Entry 1 ¶ 1(a)]. “Section 1985(3) permits an
action to be brought by one injured by a conspiracy formed ‘for
the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any
person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws,
or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws.’” Farber
v. City of Paterson, 440 F.3d 131, 134 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting
42 U.S.C. § 1985(3)). The Supreme Court has “emphasized that
because § 1985(3) requires the ‘intent to deprive of equal
protection, or equal privileges and immunities,’ a claimant must
allege ‘some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators’
action’ in order to state a claim.” Id. at 135 (quoting Griffin
v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)) (emphasis in
original).
Plaintiff has alleged no racial or class-based animus
behind the alleged conspiracy. His civil conspiracy claim under
§ 1985 is therefore dismissed without prejudice.
C. Monell liability
Plaintiff also argues liability exists under Monell v. New
York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). [Docket
Entry 1 ¶ 1(a)]. Under Monell, municipalities may only be liable
when the government itself supported a violation of
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constitutional rights; it “cannot be held liable solely because
it employs a tortfeasor — or, in other words, a municipality
cannot be held liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior
theory.” Monell, 436 U.S. at 691 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiff does not name a municipal entity as a defendant,
and there is no reasonable basis for the Court to construe the
complaint as being against Cumberland County, the location of
Bayside State Prison, because Bayside is not a county jail.
Plaintiff has not alleged facts indicating there was an
“affirmative proclamation of a policy or acquiescence in a wellsettled custom” of a municipality that caused his injuries.
Bielevicz v. Dubinon, 915 F.2d 845, 850 (3d Cir. 1990).5
Plaintiff’s Monell claim is dismissed without prejudice.
D. Conspiracy - § 1983
Plaintiff also alleges a conspiracy under § 1983 wherein
defendants extorted him, retaliated against him, assaulted him,
deprived him of due process, and covered-up the actions of other
corrections officers. “To prevail on a conspiracy claim under §

5

“Policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final
authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the
action issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict.
Government custom can be demonstrated by showing that a given
course of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or
authorized by law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually
to constitute law.” Kirkland v. DiLeo, 581 F. App’x 111, 118 (3d
Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)
(alteration in original).
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1983, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of
state law ‘reached an understanding’ to deprive him of his
constitutional rights.” Jutrowski v. Twp. of Riverdale, 904 F.3d
280, 293–94 (3d Cir. 2018).
After construing the complaint liberally and giving
Plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences, the Court
will permit the § 1983 conspiracy claim to proceed. See id. at
294 (“A ‘conspiracy of silence’ among officers is actionable as
a § 1983 conspiracy because the coordinated officer conduct
‘impede[s] an individual’s access to courts’ and renders
‘hollow’ a victim’s right to redress in a court of law. (quoting
Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325, 328–29 (7th Cir. 1995))).
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the official capacity claims

are dismissed with prejudice, and Plaintiff’s § 1985 conspiracy
and Monell claims are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiff’s
conspiracy claim under § 1983 will proceed. An appropriate order
follows.

March 21, 2019
Date

s/ Jerome B. Simandle
JEROME B. SIMANDLE
U.S. District Judge

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