SAMS v. PINNACLE TREATMENT CENTERS, INC. et al

Filing 87

OPINION. Signed by Judge Joseph H. Rodriguez on 5/20/2021. (rss, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

TALBIRD REEVE SAMS
Plaintiff,

Case No. 1:18-CV-09610-JHR-AMD

v.

Opinion

PINNACLE TREATMENT CENTERS,
INC., JOHN DOES (1-10) (said names being
fictitious individuals) and ABC-XYZ
CORPORATIONS (said names being
fictitious business entities), Individually, Jointly and
Severally,

This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Talbird Reeve Sams’s (“Plaintiff”)
Motion for Summary Judgment as to his claim for unlawful termination under the New Jersey
Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”) (Count I) [Dkt. 61] and Defendant Pinnacle Treatment
Centers, Inc.’s (“Defendant” or “Pinnacle”) renewed opposition and cross-motion for summary
judgment as to Plaintiff’s NJLAD, common law fraud (Count II), equitable fraud (Count III), and
fraud in the inducement (Count IV) claims. [Dkt. 74]. Also before the Court is Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike [Dkt. 85] and Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions [Dkt. 86]. For the reasons
discussed below, the Court will deny both summary judgment motions as to Count I and grant
Defendant’s summary judgment motion as to counts II–IV. The Court will also deny Plaintiff’s
Motion to Strike and Defendant’s Motion for Sanctions.
I.

Overview
Defendant provides substance abuse and addiction treatment services through its in-

patient and out-patient clinics nationwide. Sams v. Pinnacle Treatment Centers, Inc., No.
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118CV09610JHRAMD, 2021 WL 567986, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 16, 2021). Early in 2014, Joseph
Pritchard, Chief Executive Officer for Pinnacle, offered at-will employment to Plaintiff as an
“OTP Developer.” [Dkt. 61-14, Pl’s SUMF ¶ 1; Dkt. 74-3, Def’s SUMF ¶¶ 3–5]. Plaintiff
began work shortly thereafter. While the parties dispute the exact scope of Plaintiff’s job duties,
Plaintiff was required to scout potential locations for Pinnacle facilities and help Pinnacle to
open these new facilities. Sams, 2021 WL 567986, at *1. Plaintiff was fifty-four (54) years old
when he began working for Defendant. [Pl’s SUMF ¶ 4]. Plaintiff performed his job without
complaint or discipline. [See Pl’s SUMF ¶ 9].
Plaintiff’s employment offer letter established a two-tier compensation plan whereby
Plaintiff would receive a $60,000 annual base salary, and $37,500 incentive bonuses when
Plaintiff “opened” a Pinnacle clinic and when a clinic attained one-hundred clients. [Compl. ¶
15]. Plaintiff’s compensation plan changed twice during his tenure with Pinnacle. In January
2015, Plaintiff’s base salary increased to $100,000, but his incentive bonuses reduced to $12,500
“upon opening” of each new clinic and $12,500 “at 100 census,” for a possible incentive bonus
of $25,000 per clinic (the “Second Incentive Plan”). [Compl. ¶ 17]. In January 2017, Plaintiff’s
base salary increased to $110,000. [Compl. ¶ 18].
In the fall of 2016, Pinnacle hired Robert O’Sullivan as Chief Development Officer.
O’Sullivan was approximately thirty-eight (38) years old when Pinnacle hired him. [Pl’s SUMF
at ¶¶ 10–11]. As Chief Development Officer, O’Sullivan supervised Plaintiff. On or around
October 16, 2017, O’Sullivan informed Plaintiff that his position was being eliminated due to
corporate restructuring and that Plaintiff would be terminated as a result. [Pl’s SUMF ¶ 14; Dkt.
61, Exh. A at 42:9–13]. Plaintiff was fifty-eight (58) years old when he was terminated, and
O’Sullivan was approximately thirty-nine (39) years old. [Pl’s SUMF ¶¶ 10–11]. Around the

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same time, Defendant also terminated Plaintiff’s colleague in Pinnacle’s development
department, Matthew Rice, who was forty-six (46) years old. [Pl’s SUMF ¶¶ 6, 16]. O’Sullivan
assumed Plaintiff’s job responsibilities for a time. [Dkt. 77 at 20]. Pinnacle did not hire new
employees to replace Plaintiff or Rice because Pinnacle eliminated those positions. [Def’s
SUMF ¶ 38].
On May 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant in this Court, alleging
unlawful termination under the NJLAD (Count I); common law fraud (Count II); equitable fraud
(Count III); fraud in the inducement (Count IV); unjust enrichment (Count V); quantum meruit
(Count VI); breach of contract (Count VII); and breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing
(Count VIII). [Dkt. 1]. After discovery, Plaintiff filed this Motion for Summary Judgment on
his NJLAD claim (Count I). [Dkt. 61]. Defendant cross-moved for summary judgment on
Plaintiff’s NJLAD (Count I) and fraud (Counts II–IV) claims. [Dkt. 66]. On February 5, 2021,
the Court denied Defendant’s motion without prejudice because Defendant failed to attach a
statement of material undisputed facts to its motion as Local Rule 56.1 requires,1 but permitted
Defendant to refile its motion in compliance with Local Rule 56.1. [Dkt. 70]. Defendant filed a
renewed motion that complied with Rule 56.1 and this Court’s February 5, 2021 order. [Dkt.
74–77; 82].2

Local Rule 56.1 states, in part, “[o]n motions for summary judgment, the movant shall furnish a
statement which sets forth material facts as to which there does not exist a genuine issue, in
separately numbered paragraphs citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in
support of the motion. A motion for summary judgment unaccompanied by a statement of
material facts not in dispute shall be dismissed.”
1

Plaintiff disagrees with the Court’s decision to permit Defendant to re-submit its summary
judgment and the Court’s interpretation of its own order [See Dkt. 72, 83]. Plaintiff also states
that its disagreement “remains unchallenged by both defendant and the Court.” [Dkt. 83 at 7].
But Plaintiff never filed a motion for reconsideration to properly place his disagreement before
the Court. See Max's Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 677 (3d
2

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II.

Motion to Strike and Motion for Sanctions
Before addressing the merits of the parties’ summary judgment motions, the Court will

briefly address Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike. [Dkt. 85-1]. Plaintiff argues that the Court should
strike Defendant’s reply brief [Dkt. 84] because Defendant filed this brief against local rules and
the Court’s February 5, 2021 order. However, that order expressly permitted Defendant to file a
reply brief, and Defendant did so in a timely manner. [See Dkt. 70]. The Court therefore denies
Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike.
In response to Plaintiff’s Motion to Strike, Defendant filed a Motion for Sanctions urging
the Court to award sanctions under 28 U.S.C § 1927 or the Court’s inherent power. [Dkt. 86].
The Court declines to award sanctions and will deny Defendant’s motion.
III.

Summary Judgment Standard
Courts will grant a motion for summary judgment if there is no genuine issue of material

fact and if, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pearson v. Component Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d
471, 482 n.1 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S. Ct. 2548,
91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). Thus, this Court will grant summary
judgment if “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c).

Cir. 1999) (noting that motions for reconsideration are the proper vehicle for raising putative
“manifest errors of law or fact” in a court’s prior decision). The Court again rejects Plaintiff’s
arguments that Defendant failed to comply with its February 5, 2021 Order and that Defendant’s
renewed motion is not properly before the Court. [Dkt. 83 at 8–11].
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An issue is “genuine” if supported by evidence such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106
S. Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986). A fact is “material” if, under the governing substantive
law, a dispute about the fact might affect the outcome of the suit. Id. In determining whether a
genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must view the facts and all reasonable inferences
drawn from those facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue
of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. Once the moving party has met this burden, the
nonmoving party must identify specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id.;
Maidenbaum v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 870 F. Supp. 1254, 1258 (D.N.J. 1994). Thus, to
survive a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must identify
specific facts and affirmative evidence that contradict those offered by the moving party.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256–57. Indeed, Rule 56(c) requires the entry of summary judgment
against a party who fails to sufficiently establish an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 322.
When deciding a party's motion for summary judgment, the court must determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial rather than evaluate the evidence and decide the truth of
the matter. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Credibility determinations are the province of the finder
of fact. Big Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 1363 (3d Cir. 1992).

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IV.

Application
a. Count I—NJLAD
The NJLAD prohibits discrimination in the workplace based on age. N.J.S.A. § 10:5-1,

et seq. NJLAD claims follow the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. Hellman v.
Am. Water Works Serv. Co., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-12961, 2020 WL 2189967, at *5 (D.N.J. May 6,
2020) (citing Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, 130 F.3d 1101, 1108-12 (3d Cir. 1997)); see also
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973).
Under this framework, where a plaintiff claims that he was unlawfully discharged, the plaintiff
bears the burden to establish a prima facie case by showing that “(1) he was in the protected
group; (2) he was performing his job at a level that met his employer's legitimate expectations;
(3) he nevertheless was fired; and (4) the employer sought someone to perform the same work
after he left. Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 450, 867 A.2d 1133, 1141 (2005)
(citation omitted).
If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden then shifts to the defendant to offer
a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 411 U.S. at 802-03, 93 S. Ct. 1817. “This burden is relatively light and defendants can
easily meet the threshold in a variety of ways.” Hellman v. Am. Water Works Serv. Co., Inc.,
2020 WL 2189967, at *5 (citations and quotations omitted) (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d
759, 765 (3d Cir. 1994)). The burden then shifts back to the plaintiff to show, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s offered reason for the adverse employment
action is mere pretext for discrimination. Id. (citing Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789,
797 (3d Cir. 2003)).

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i. Prima Facie Case of Age Discrimination
While it is undisputed that Plaintiff (1) belongs to a protected class due to his age, (2) that
he was qualified for the position, and (3) that his termination constitutes an adverse employment
action, the parties disagree as to whether Plaintiff has satisfied element (4) of his prima facie
case. Plaintiff argues that “upon plaintiff having been terminated, the work that was assigned to
him be [sic] defendant was reassigned to the significantly younger Mr. O’Sullivan.” [Dkt. 61-1
at 7]. Defendant responds that “Plaintiff’s duties were assumed on a temporary basis by
[O’Sullivan]” but that “the entire department was eliminated and a new group was formed”
which assumed the role of locating and opening new facilities. [Dkt. 74-2 at 13].
Satisfying the fourth element does not necessarily require Plaintiff to prove that
Defendant hired new employees or moved existing employees into Plaintiff’s position. Instead,
“the fourth prong of the prima facie case consists of proof that the discharged employee's job
functions survived and that a younger person or persons assumed the discharged employee's job
functions.” Mamola v. Trucolor Labs, No. A-6021-98T1, 2000 WL 34229945, at *6 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. Dec. 8, 2000) (citing Geldreich v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 299 N.J. Super. 478, 489
(App. Div. 1997)). Thus, by arguing that O’Sullivan and other employees assumed Plaintiff’s
responsibilities, Defendant concedes that those job functions “survived” and that a “younger
person assumed” Plaintiff’s responsibilities, at least temporarily.
The parties also dispute the standard governing element (4). In his briefing, Plaintiff cites
Zive, which only requires a plaintiff to show that “the employer sought someone to perform the
same work after he left.” Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 450, 867 A.2d 1133, 1141
(2005) (citing Clowes v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 109 N.J. 575, 597, 538 A.2d 794, 805 (1988)).
Relying on Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, Defendant argues that Plaintiff must show that he

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was “was replaced with ‘a candidate sufficiently younger to permit an inference of age
discrimination.’” [Dkt. 66-1 at 12] (citing Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler, 723 A.2d 944, 956
(N.J. 1999)).
State and federal courts alike have long disagreed as to the applicable standard in cases
analogous to this: where an older plaintiff alleges discriminatory discharge under the NJLAD
after he was fired and replaced by a younger employee. See Monaco v. Am. Gen. Assur. Co., 359
F.3d 296, 300–04, 309 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing inconsistency in case law and applying the
“sufficiently younger” standard to an age-based workplace reduction claim) and compare Arenas
v. L'Oreal USA Prod., Inc., 790 F. Supp. 2d 230, 236 (D.N.J. 2011), aff'd, 461 F. App'x 131 (3d
Cir. 2012) (holding that Monaco applies only to workforce reductions, not performance-related
firings) with Von Rudenborg v. Di Giorgio Corp., No. CIV.A. 08-5791 KSH, 2011 WL 4594220,
at *4–5 (D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2011) (interpreting Monaco to have upheld the “sufficiently younger”
standard in discharge and reduction-in-force cases).
The Court need not wade into this legal quagmire to conclude that Plaintiff has met his
obligation under element (4) regardless of the applicable standard. Plaintiff has shown—and
Defendant has not disputed—that O’Sullivan took over Plaintiff’s responsibilities following
Plaintiff’s termination, and that O’Sullivan was nineteen years younger than Plaintiff when this
occurred. See Sempier v. Johnson & Higgins, 45 F.3d 724, 729 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that an
age difference of five years “can be sufficient” to infer age discrimination (citing Douglas v.
Anderson, 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981))); Gutknecht v. SmithKline Beecham Clinical Labs.,
Inc., 950 F. Supp. 667, 672 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 135 F.3d 764 (3d Cir. 1997) (“Although no
uniform rule exists, it is generally accepted that when the difference in age between the fired
employee and his or her replacement is fewer than five or six years, the replacement is not

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considered ‘sufficiently younger,’ and thus no prima facie case is made.” (citations omitted)).
Because the age gap between Plaintiff and O’Sullivan exceeds five years, Plaintiff has satisfied
element (4) and established his prima facie case under the NJLAD.
ii. Legitimate Non-Discriminatory Reason
Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not carried its burden to produce evidence of a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating Plaintiff. [Dkt. 61-1 at 5–6]. Defendant
has submitted a declaration from Joseph Pritchard, Pinnacle’s CEO, stating that Plaintiff was
terminated as part of corporate restructuring where Pinnacle “eliminated its Development
Department and created an Operations Department.” [Dkt. 74-1 at ¶¶ 35–38 (citing Dkt. 56-5,
Pritchard Decl. ¶¶ 10–11)]. Plaintiff argues on reply that “defendant’s reliance on Mr.
Pritchard’s Declaration as the basis to support its ‘reorganization’ and/or ‘restructuring’ is
disingenuous when the same was sought by way of discovery but not produced.” [Dkt. 83 at 15].
To the extent this argument questions the credibility of Mr. Pritchard’s declaration, it confirms
that there are issues of fact for juror consideration. Indeed, “it is inappropriate for a court … to
make credibility determinations. Thus an opponent may not prevail merely by discrediting the
credibility of the movant's evidence; it must produce some affirmative evidence.” Big Apple
BMW, Inc., 974 F.2d at 1363 (citations omitted).
Plaintiff’s argument against Pritchard’s declaration fails for several other reasons.
Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that a party must produce declarations submitted to
support a motion for summary judgment during discovery. Cf. Webster v. Dollar Gen., Inc., 314
F.R.D. 367, 370–71 (D.N.J. 2016) (permitting declarations from eight individuals not identified
in the defendant’s initial disclosures or otherwise disclosed to the plaintiff before summary
judgment, and reopening discovery to permit depositions of these eight individuals). Plaintiff

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also does not allege that he did not know of Mr. Pritchard or lacked the opportunity to depose
Pritchard during discovery.3 See id. Moreover, Plaintiff fails to show that Pritchard’s statements
set forth in his declaration would not be admissible at trial. See Webster v. Dollar Gen., Inc., 197
F. Supp. 3d 692, 700 (D.N.J. 2016) (“[O]n summary judgment, the Court may credit a factual
declaration ‘only to the extent [that it] constitutes evidence at least potentially admissible at
trial.’” (quoting Leese v. Martin, No. 11–5091, 2013 WL 5476415, at *6 (D.N.J. Sept. 30,
2013))). Thus, Plaintiff has not shown why the Court should decline to consider this declaration
as evidence supporting Defendant’s legitimate non-discriminatory reason for terminating
Plaintiff. At best, Plaintiff’s arguments create an issue of fact for jury consideration.
As further evidence of its legitimate non-discriminatory reason, Defendant points out that
Plaintiff was terminated at or around the same time as Mr. Rice, a “significantly younger coworker,” and that Defendant did not hire new employees to replace Plaintiff or Mr. Rice. [Dkt.
74-2 at 15]. As discussed below, Rice’s termination alongside Plaintiff’s is ambiguous because
Rice was twelve years younger than Plaintiff and a member of a protected age class upon
termination, see Lawrence v. Nat'l Westminster Bank New Jersey, 98 F.3d 61, 65 (3d Cir. 1996)
(noting “Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, a plaintiff must first present a prima facie
case by establishing that (1) he is over 40 years old…”), even though Rice was seven years older
than O’Sullivan. Thus, Rice’s contemporaneous termination can support Defendant’s legitimate
non-discriminatory reason position or Plaintiff’s pretext argument depending on how one draws
inferences.

Plaintiff’s own initial disclosures state that Mr. Pritchard “possesses knowledge and
information pertaining to the wrongful termination of plaintiff’s employment with defendant.”
[Dkt. 75-1 ¶ A].
3

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Considering this evidence, Defendant has satisfied its “light” burden “to articulate a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for” terminating Plaintiff. Sgro v. Bloomberg L.P., 331 F.
App'x 932, 937 (3d Cir. 2009). This evidence also undermines Plaintiff’s argument that he is
entitled to summary judgment on his NJLAD claim because defendant lacks evidence of a
legitimate non-discriminatory reason for Plaintiff’s termination.
iii. Pretext
To meet its burden on the pretext issue, a plaintiff must “present evidence ‘from which a
factfinder could reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or
(2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating factor
or determinative cause of the employer's action.’” Hellman v. Am. Water Works Serv. Co., Inc.,
No. 1:17-CV-12961, 2020 WL 2189967, at *6 (D.N.J. May 6, 2020) (Rodriguez, J.) (quoting
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 764 (3d Cir. 1994)). Plaintiffs may satisfy the first option by
presenting direct or circumstantial evidence that shows the “weaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons
for its actions, such that a jury could disbelieve that it was the real reason behind the negative
employment action.” Id. (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765); see also Fuentes, F.3d at 764.
“Plaintiffs must show that the defendant’s decision was ‘so plainly wrong that it cannot have
been the employer's real reason,’ and that the only logical explanation is that defendant was
motivated by discrimination.” Id. (quoting Dunleavy v. Montville Twp., No. CIV.A. 041154(KSH), 2005 WL 1917610, at *3 (D.N.J. Aug. 9, 2005), aff'd, 192 F. App'x 100 (3d Cir.
2006)). This is a “rigorous” standard. Dunleavy, 2005 WL 1917610, at *3.
Plaintiff relies on two pieces of circumstantial evidence to support his pretext argument.
First, Plaintiff points out that Defendant did not produce business records or other materials

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documenting the corporate restructuring that led to Plaintiff’s termination. [Dkt. 61-1 at 11; Pl’s
SUMF ¶¶ 22–23]. According to Plaintiff, this lack of a paper trail shows that no restructuring
occurred and that Defendant fired him because of his age. [Id.]. Second, Plaintiff points to the
undisputed fact that his colleague Rice was terminated around the same time as Plaintiff and that
Rice was approximately forty-six years old at the time of his termination. [Pl’s SUMF ¶¶ 16–
17]. Plaintiff argues that these multiple firings show that O’Sullivan targeted older employees
under his supervision. [See SUMF ¶ 17].
This evidence is sufficient for Plaintiff to survive Defendant’s summary judgment motion
but does not entitle Plaintiff to summary judgment. A reasonable juror might expect Defendant
to have created at least a single email, memo, or internal document discussing “corporate
restructuring” before terminating Plaintiff as part of this “corporate restructuring.” When viewed
in a light most favorable to Plaintiff as the Court must when considering Defendant’s motion,
this absence of documentation provides a basis for jurors to “disbelieve the employer's
articulated legitimate reasons.” Hellman, No. 2020 WL 2189967, at *6. However, when
considering Plaintiff’s motion and construing facts in favor of Defendant, this lack of paperwork
does not necessarily prove discriminatory animus. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (“[E]vidence of
the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”).
As mentioned above, Plaintiff’s evidence regarding Mr. Rice’s termination is similarly
ambiguous. A reasonable juror could agree with Plaintiff to find that Rice’s termination shows
that O’Sullivan sought to terminate older employees in Pinnacle’s development department. But
a juror could also find that Rice’s termination proves nothing because Rice is approximately
twelve years younger than Plaintiff, but only seven years older than O’Sullivan. Likewise, a

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juror could find that Defendant’s decision not to hire replacement employees suggests innocent
consolidation rather than discrimination.
Ultimately, the Court finds that this sparse evidentiary record does not support summary
judgment in favor of either party. Summary judgment is appropriate only where “the evidence
… is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Neither party has made such an overwhelming showing. Moreover, the parties disagree on how
to interpret some of the limited circumstantial evidence that exists. A jury—rather than the
Court—must determine which party’s interpretation is correct. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249.
b. Fraud Claims
Plaintiff’s common law fraud (Count II), equitable fraud (Count III), and fraudulent
inducement (Count IV) claims rely on the same factual basis. [See Compl. ¶¶ 35–53]. Plaintiff
alleges that Pinnacle amended Plaintiff’s Incentive Plan in January 2017 knowing that it would
terminate Plaintiff shortly thereafter. Plaintiff claims that Pinnacle’s representations to Plaintiff
regarding the change to his compensation structure were fraudulent and “deprived plaintiff of
receiving payments pursuant to the ‘Incentive Plan’ that was in effect and existence at the time of
plaintiff’s wrongful termination when seven (7) OTP clinics were in the pipeline for anticipated
and upcoming openings.” [Id. ¶ 52]. Pinnacle argues that Plaintiff’s fraud claims cannot survive
summary judgment because there is no evidence that Pinnacle defrauded Plaintiff. [Dkt. 74-2 at
21]. Pinnacle also argues that Plaintiff’s equitable fraud claim (Count III) must be dismissed
because monetary damages are not available for equitable fraud but Plaintiffs only seeks
monetary damages. [Dkt. 74-2 at 29–32]. The Court agrees and will grant Pinnacle’s motion as
to Plaintiff’s fraud claims.

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For common law fraud and fraud in the inducement, a plaintiff must establish “(1) a
material misrepresentation of a presently existing or past fact; (2) knowledge or belief by the
defendant of its falsity; (3) an intention that the other person rely on it; (4) reasonable reliance
thereon by the other person; and (5) resulting damages.” Gennari v. Weichert Co. Realtors, 148
N.J. 582, 610, 691 A.2d 350, 367 (1997) (citing Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. Whale, 86 N.J.
619, 624–25, 432 A.2d 521 (1981)); RNC Sys., Inc. v. Mod. Tech. Grp., Inc., 861 F. Supp. 2d
436, 451 (D.N.J. 2012) (citing Metex Mfg. Corp. v. Manson, No. 05–2948, 2008 WL 877870, at
*4 (D.N.J. March 28, 2008)). “[T]he key distinction between legal and equitable fraud is that
legal fraud requires proof of intent while equitable fraud does not… Further, a plaintiff that
asserts equitable fraud is not entitled to recover monetary damages; he or she may recover only
in equity.” Dutton Rd. Assocs. LP v. Sunray Solar, Inc., No. CIV.A. 10-5478 FLW, 2011 WL
1375681, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 12, 2011) (citations omitted).
Pinnacle argues that Sams lacks evidence to support elements (1), (3), and (4) of his
common law fraud and fraudulent inducement claims. [Dkt. 74-2 at 27–29]. In his reply brief,
Plaintiff does not dispute Pinnacle’s arguments. Nor does he offer evidence to refute Pinnacle’s
position or create an issue of material fact for a jury’s consideration. See Celotex Corp., 477
U.S. at 324 (explaining that, to survive a motion for summary judgment a nonmoving party that
bears the burden of proof at trial must “go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by
the ‘depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,’ designate ‘specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56)). Plaintiff has
therefore not carried his burden at summary judgment, and the Court will grant Defendant’s
motion as to Plaintiff’s common law fraud (Count II), fraud in the inducement (Count IV), and
equitable fraud (Count III) claims.

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V.

Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, the Court will deny Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary

Judgment as to his NJLAD claim (Count I), deny Defendant’s cross-motion as to Count I, and
grant Defendant’s motion as to Counts II–IV. An appropriate order will follow.

May 20, 2021

/s/ Joseph H. Rodriguez
Hon. Joseph H. Rodriguez, U.S.D.J.

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