VAN ELSLAND v. THOMAS JEFFERSON UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS, INC. et al
Filing
11
OPINION. Signed by Judge Robert B. Kugler on 1/17/2019. (tf, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
CORRY VAN ELSLAND,
Plaintiff,
v.
THOMAS JEFFERSON
UNIVERSITY HOSPITALS, INC.,
AIR METHODS CORP., and
CHRISTIAN COAKLEY, in his
capacity as supervisor of
JeffSTAT,
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Civil Action No. 18-cv-10185 (RBK/JS)
OPINION
Defendants.
KUGLER, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Thomas Jefferson University
Hospitals, Inc., Air Methods Corp., and Christian Coakley (collectively “Defendants”) to dismiss
this case for failure to state a claim. (Doc. 5). The Court does not reach the merits of the claim
because there is no subject matter jurisdiction. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
REMANDS the matter to state court.
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 4, 2018, Corry Van Elsland (“Plaintiff”), a New Jersey citizen, filed a complaint
in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Camden County against Defendants. On June 5, 2018,
Defendants removed the action to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and § 1441. The Notice
of Removal states that the Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because
Defendant Christian Coakley (“Defendant Coakley”), a New Jersey citizen, was fraudulently
joined as a Defendant to the lawsuit to deprive the Defendants of its right to remove this case to
federal court. (Doc. 1 ¶ 12). The Notice of Removal states that Defendants were served with a
copy of the Complaint on May 7, 2018. (Doc. 1 ¶ 1). Thus, Defendants assert that removal on the
basis of diversity jurisdiction was timely because they removed the case within thirty days of
receiving copies of the Summons and Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (requiring removal
within thirty days).
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, a defendant may remove an action filed in state court to a federal
court with original jurisdiction over the action. A district court may remand an action to state court
for either a lack of subject matter jurisdiction or a defect in the removal process. 28 U.S.C. §
1447(c); PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 352 (3d Cir. 1993). “[C]ourts construe removal
statutes strictly with all doubts resolved in favor of remand.” USX Corp. v. Adriatic Ins. Co., 345
F.3d 190, 205 n.5 (3d Cir. 2003).
“[B]ecause subject-matter jurisdiction is non-waivable, courts have an independent
obligation to satisfy themselves of jurisdiction if it is in doubt.” Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc.,
347 F.3d 72, 76–77 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274, 278 (1977)). A necessary corollary is that a court can raise sua sponte subject matter
jurisdiction concerns. Nesbit v. Gears Unlimited, Inc., 347 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2003). The federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and may only decide cases as authorized by the
Constitution. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). Congress has authorized
federal subject matter jurisdiction in civil suits where the amount in controversy exceeds the sum
or value of $75,000 and the parties are citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The
statutory requirement that parties be citizens of different states means that complete diversity must
exist; if any two adverse parties are co-citizens, there is no jurisdiction. See State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967); Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267–68
(1806).
When a non-diverse party has been joined as a defendant, then in the absence of a
substantial federal question the removing defendant may avoid remand only by demonstrating that
the non-diverse party was fraudulently joined. But the removing party carries a “heavy burden of
persuasion” in making this showing. Steel Valley Author. v. Union Switch & Signal Div., 809 F.2d
1006, 1012 n.6 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 484 U.S. 1021 (1988); see also Boyer v. Snap-On
Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085 (1991).
Fraudulently named parties are generally those that have been “named or joined solely to
defeat diversity jurisdiction.” In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d 201, 216 (3d Cir. 2006). The Third Circuit
has explained:
Joinder is fraudulent where there is no reasonable basis in fact or
colorable ground supporting the claim against the joined defendant,
or no real intention in good faith to prosecute the action against the
defendants or seek a joint judgment. But, if there is even a
possibility that a state court would find that the complaint states a
cause of action against any one of the resident defendants, the
federal court must find that joinder was proper and remand the case
to state court.
Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). A claim is colorable when it is not “wholly insubstantial and frivolous.” Id. at 852.
In evaluating the alleged fraud, the district court must “focus on the plaintiffs’ complaint
at the time the petition for removal was filed. In so ruling the district court must assume as true
all factual allegations of the complaint.” Steel Valley, 809 F.2d at 1010 (citation omitted). The
Third Circuit has held that “[t]he plaintiff’s mere failure to state a claim does not satisfy this
standard, and the plaintiff’s claim must instead be so ‘wholly insubstantial and frivolous’ as to fail
to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the District Court.” Hogan v. Raymond Corp., 536 F.
App'x 207, 210 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Batoff, 977 F.2d at 852).
III.
DISCUSSION
The Defendants argue that Defendant Coakley was fraudulently joined as a party because
Plaintiff failed to plead that he engaged in protected activity, an essential element to a retaliation
claim under LAD. (Doc. 1 ¶ 23); See Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 409 (2010). Thus, the
Defendants contend that Defendant Coakley’s New Jersey citizenship should not be considered
for diversity purposes because there is no valid claim alleged against Defendant Coakley in
Plaintiff’s Complaint. (Doc. 1 ¶ 24–25).
The central issue before the Court is whether the Complaint includes only frivolous or
“non-colorable claims” against Defendant Coakley. See In re Briscoe, 448 F.3d at 219. First,
the Court considers the face of the complaint. This action appears to be one involving wrongful
discharge and retaliation. Only the state retaliation claim is aimed at Defendant Coakley.
During Plaintiff’s employment, Defendant Coakley was the Plaintiff’s direct manager and
supervisor. (Doc. 5). The Complaint also makes specific allegations of Defendant Coakley.
First, it states that he retaliated against Plaintiff by “undermining and belittling him and his
judgment.” (Doc. 1 Ex. A ¶ 59). Second, the Complaint states that Defendant Coakley “made
derogatory comments about Plaintiff which negatively reflect upon Plaintiff and his medic
partner, Eric Consorte.” (Id.). Third, the Complaint states that Defendant Coakley retaliated
against Plaintiff by “wrongfully accusing Plaintiff of violating the policies and protocols of
JeffSTAT.” (Id. at Ex. A ¶ 86). These facts, on the face of the complaint, not only appear to be
non-frivolous, but also they seem to comport with Rule 8’s plain and simple pleading standard.
Defendants, however, confuse the test of fraudulent joinder with a 12(b)(6) standard. By
arguing that the Plaintiff failed to plead facts which may give rise to a retaliation claim against
Defendant Coakley, Defendants are presenting to the Court a merits analysis that is more
appropriately reserved for a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. This inquiry is well beyond the scope of
review for fraudulent joinder. See Batoff, 977 F.2d at 852. On the face of the complaint,
Plaintiff’s retaliation claim against his own supervisor, Defendant Coakley, is far from “patently
frivolous.” If anything, the claim is wholly consistent with the general claim of wrongful
discharge and retaliation.
Ultimately, Defendants have not carried the heavy burden of establishing that Defendant
Coakley was fraudulently joined in this matter. As such, because Defendant Coakley and Plaintiff
are both citizens of New Jersey, there is no complete diversity and this Court has no subject matter
jurisdiction.
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court REMANDS the matter to state court for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
Dated: ____January 17, 2019
s/ Robert B. Kugler
ROBERT B. KUGLER
United States District Judge
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