HANN v. THE HOME DEPOT
Filing
26
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 2/7/2019. (tf, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
DAVID HANN,
1:18-cv-10223-NLH-JS
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
THE HOME DEPOT,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
LOUIS M. BARBONE
TIMOTHY CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER
JACOBS & BARBONE, ESQS.
1125 PACIFIC AVENUE
ATLANTIC CITY, NJ 08401
On behalf of Plaintiff
CLARA H. RHO
PATRICK G. BRADY
EPSTEIN BECKER & GREEN, P.C.
ONE GATEWAY CENTER
NEWARK, NJ 07102-5003
On behalf of Defendant
HILLMAN, District Judge
Pending before the Court is the motion of Plaintiff, David
Hann, to remand his case to New Jersey Superior Court Law
Division, Atlantic County.
Plaintiff claims that Defendant,
Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., violated the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq., when it terminated his
nine-year employment with Home Depot despite Plaintiff reporting
for over a year that he had been subject to a hostile work
environment.
Home Depot removed Plaintiff’s case to this Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), averring subject matter jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), which provides that a district
court has original jurisdiction over all civil actions where the
amount in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000,
exclusive of interests and costs, and the dispute is between
citizens of different states.
As for the parties’ citizenship,
Home Depot’s notice of removal averred that it is diverse from
Plaintiff because Plaintiff is a citizen of New Jersey, and Home
Depot is a citizen of Delaware (its state of incorporation) and
Georgia (its principal place of business).
See 28 U.S.C. §
1332(c)(1) (“[A] corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of
every State and foreign state by which it has been incorporated
and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal
place of business . . . .”).
For the amount in controversy
requirement, Home Depot’s notice of removal averred that even
though Plaintiff’s complaint did not demand a specific amount of
damages, the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint established
that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000.
Plaintiff seeks to remand his case on two bases.
First,
Plaintiff argues that Home Depot has not established the
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location of its principal place of business so that it can
satisfy the diversity of citizenship requirement.
Second,
Plaintiff argues that Home Depot has not established the $75,000
amount in controversy requirement.
Home Depot refutes both of
Plaintiff’s arguments.
1.
Home Depot’s citizenship
Jurisdiction under § 1332(a)(1) requires complete diversity
of the parties - no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state
as any of the defendants.
McCollum v. State Farm Ins. Co., 376
F. App’x 217, 219 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Grand Union
Supermarkets of the Virgin Islands, Inc. v. H.E. Lockhart
Management, Inc., 316 F.3d 408, 410 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing
Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990)).
For
diversity purposes, citizenship of the parties is determined as
of the time the complaint was filed.
Grand Union, 316 F.3d at
410 (citations omitted).
As noted above, a corporation is deemed a citizen “of any
State by which it has been incorporated and of the State where
it has its principal place of business.”
at 2019 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)).
McCollum, 376 F. App’x
Although a company may
conduct business in multiple places, the “principal place of
business” is its “nerve center,” which is “the place where a
corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate the
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corporation’s activities.”
Id. (citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend,
559 U.S. 77, 96 (2010) (establishing the “nerve center” test as
uniform approach for determining corporate citizenship)).
“It is now settled in this Court that the party asserting
federal jurisdiction in a removal case bears the burden of
showing, at all stages of the litigation, that the case is
properly before the federal court.”
Frederico v. Home Depot,
507 F.3d 188, 193 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Samuel–Bassett v. KIA
Motors America, Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir. 2004)).
Plaintiff argues that Home Depot has not met its burden in
its notice of removal because it avers, without any evidence,
that its principal place of business is Georgia.
Plaintiff
contends that there are thousands of Home Depot stores across
the country, and there are 67 in New Jersey alone.
Plaintiff
therefore argues that the Court must remand his case for lack of
diversity of citizenship.
In response, Home Depot has filed a declaration by Liselle
Bartholomew, a Legal Specialist in Home Depot’s employment law
department.
(Docket No. 12-1.)
Bartholomew’s certification
relates that Home Depot’s headquarters and executive offices are
located at 2455 Paces Ferry Road, Atlanta, Georgia 30339.
(Id.)
It also relates that all major business decisions and Home
Depot’s annual shareholder meeting occur at the Atlanta, Georgia
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location.
(Id.)
The declaration also states that in addition
to the 67 stores in New Jersey, there are 90 in Georgia, 153 in
Florida, 232 in California, 76 in Illinois, 70 in Michigan, 100
in New York, 70 in Ohio, 70 in Pennsylvania, and 79 in Texas.
(Id.)
Plaintiff has not presented any evidence, other than his
own supposition, to refute that Georgia is the location of Home
Depot’s nerve center.
Moreover, Plaintiff does not actually
contend that New Jersey is Home Depot’s principal place of
business render the parties non-diverse.
Plaintiff merely
points out that New Jersey has 67 of Home Depot’s 2,284 retail
locations.
Thus, the Court finds that Home Depot has properly
established that its principal place of business is in Georgia,
and accordingly that its citizenship is diverse from
Plaintiff’s.
See, e.g., Hertz Corp, 559 U.S. at 81 (“[T]he
‘nerve center’ will typically be found at a corporation’s
headquarters.”); McCollum, 376 F. App’x at 219-20 (“State Farm
averred by sworn affidavit that it is incorporated in Illinois,
and has its principal place of business in Illinois.
Although
State Farm concedes that it does business in Delaware, there is
no indication that Delaware is where State Farm conducts its
corporate affairs.
the contrary.
Brooks–McCollum has submitted no evidence to
The District Court is permitted to rely on State
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Farm's affidavit, and we find no clear error in the District
Court's fact-finding.
Because Brooks–McCollum was a citizen of
Delaware at the time the complaint was filed, and State Farm was
a citizen of Illinois, the District Court correctly concluded
that the parties are diverse as to citizenship.” (citing Murray
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 782 F.2d 432, 434 (3d Cir. 1986)
(establishing corporate citizenship via affidavit)); Frederico
v. Home Depot, 2006 WL 624901, at *1 (D.N.J. 2006), aff’d 507
F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Jurisdiction is premised on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d). Plaintiff is a resident of New Jersey.
Defendant
[Home Depot] is a Delaware corporation which maintains its
headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia.”); Delehanty v. KLI, Inc.,
2008 WL 11449308, at *2–3 (E.D.N.Y. 2008) (rejecting the
plaintiff’s argument that Home Depot’s principal place of
business was New York, finding “it is clear that Home Depot
conducts its business policy and makes management decisions in
Georgia. . . .
Plaintiffs’ sole evidence is a printout of an
internet search showing that Home Depot operates approximately
140 retail stores in the State of New York.
Based on this
evidence, and without citing any supporting case law, Plaintiffs
argue that it is preposterous for Home Depot to claim that it
does not have a principal place of business in New York,” but it
was clear that Home Depot’s day-to-day corporate activity and
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management occur in Georgia, and the fact that Home Depot
operates numerous retail stores in New York does not affect that
finding); Demaria v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 2007 WL 9701101,
at *1 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (“I also do not agree with Plaintiffs
that Home Depot’s principal place of business is in Florida,
instead of Georgia where Home Depot asserts it is.
Home Depot
is a large corporation with retail locations throughout North
America.
The presence of such retail locations in a certain
state does not demonstrate its principal place of business is
there.
Home Depot’s position that its principal place of
business is in Georgia is not a new one. Plaintiffs provide no
facts to rebut this position, nothing which indicates Florida,
rather than Georgia is the principal place of business for Home
Depot.
Therefore, I will not grant Plaintiffs' Motion [to
remand] on the basis of incomplete diversity.”).
2.
Amount in Controversy
When a plaintiff has challenged the removal of his
complaint based on the amount in controversy requirement, a
federal court determines the amount in controversy by starting
with the complaint itself.
See Angus v. Shiley, Inc., 989 F.2d
142, 145 (3d Cir. 1993) (“The general federal rule is to decide
the amount in controversy from the complaint itself.”);
Frederico, 507 F.3d at 194 (“In removal cases, determining the
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amount in controversy begins with a reading of the complaint
filed in state court.”).
If a plaintiff has not specifically averred that the amount
in controversy is less than the jurisdictional minimum, the test
espoused by Samuel-Bassett v. KIA Motors America, Inc., 357 F.3d
392 (3d Cir. 2004) applies to the review of the complaint.
Frederico, 507 F.3d at 196.
Under Samuel-Bassett, the
challenger to subject matter jurisdiction has to prove, to a
legal certainty, that the amount in controversy cannot exceed
the statutory threshold.
Id.
In contrast, where the complaint
specifically avers that the amount sought is less than the
jurisdictional minimum, the standard set forth by Morgan v. Gay,
471 F.3d 469, 473 (3d Cir. 2006) applies.
Under Morgan, a
defendant seeking removal must prove to a legal certainty that
the plaintiff can recover the jurisdictional amount.
Id. at
196-97.
Here, Plaintiff’s complaint does not specify a particular
amount of damages, so to prevail on his motion to remand,
Plaintiff must show to a legal certainty that he cannot recover
damages in excess of $75,000, or that he was never entitled to
recover that amount.
Id.
The Court finds that Plaintiff has
not done so.
In its notice of removal, Home Depot set forth the basis
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for its contention that the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000:
b. Plaintiff asserts that he was subjected to hostile
work environment sexual harassment in violation of the
NJLAD. He alleges that as a direct result of Home
Depot’s conduct, he has suffered “substantial and
severe damages, including, but not limited to,
emotional distress, anxiety, dignity violation,
physical pain and suffering, as well as the necessity
of Plaintiff to seek emergency medical treatment, and
has caused other damages to the Plaintiff.” (Complaint
¶ 24). Based on allegations of sexual harassment
discrimination, Plaintiff demands an unspecified
amount of damages arising from his employment with
Home Depot. Plaintiff specifically prays, predicated
on the above allegations, for judgment against
Defendant for compensatory damages, consequential
damages, punitive damages, attorneys’ fees, interest
and such other relief as the Court deems appropriate.
(Complaint, ¶ 24 and Wherefore Clause.).
c. Plaintiff seeks noneconomic losses for emotional pain,
suffering, anxiety, and dignity violation. (Complaint
¶ 24). The Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that
damages for emotional distress in a discrimination
case falls within a wide spectrum of acceptable
outcomes, and will not be reduced unless the award is
“so patently excessive, so pervaded by a sense of
wrongness, that it shocks the judicial conscience.”
Cuevas v. Wentworth Group, 226 N.J. 480 (2016)
(affirming emotional distress damages award to two
plaintiffs of $800,000 and $600,000, respectively).
d. Under the NJLAD, if successful, Plaintiff also would
be entitled to punitive damages. Punitive damages are
included when calculating the amount in controversy
required for diversity jurisdiction. Packard v.
Provident Nat’l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1046 (3d Cir.
1993) (“When both actual and punitive damages are
recoverable, punitive damages are properly considered
in determining whether the jurisdictional amount has
been satisfied.”); Hoffman v. Pharmacare US Inc., No.
17-3540 (CCC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213227, at *8
(D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2017) (“For the purposes of
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calculating the amount in controversy, reasonable
attorneys’ fees and punitive damages must be counted
if they are available under New Jersey state law.”).
Given the nature of his claims and the damages he
seeks, it appears with a reasonable degree of
certainty that Plaintiff’s claims exceed the value of
$75,000.00.
(Docket No. 1 at 5-6.)
Plaintiff argues that Home Depot’s “suspicion that
plaintiff’s claims may be worth more than the jurisdictional
amount falls far short of establishing by a preponderance of
evidence that removal was appropriate.
Any number of reasons
may account for plaintiffs declining to claim an amount in
excess of $75,000.00.
For instance, in this case, the plaintiff
does not yet know the value of his claim, he has not undergone
anticipated medical examinations, etc.”
(Docket No. 10-1 at 8.)
Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing for two reasons.
First,
under Samuel-Bassett it is Plaintiff’s burden as the challenger
to subject matter jurisdiction, and not Home Depot’s burden, to
show that his claims do not exceed $75,000.
Second, Plaintiff
has not refuted that his damages averred in his complaint, along
with the requested punitive damages and attorney’s fees, cannot
amount to over $75,000.
Indeed, Plaintiff admits that he does
not know the value of his case.
Plaintiff cannot have it both
ways and argue that his damages may be less than $75,000 while
at the same time preserve his right to pursue damages for more
10
than $75,000. 1
Home Depot’s notice of removal articulates why the amount
in controversy based on the allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint
exceeds $75,000.
Home Depot avers that Plaintiff’s alleged
damages for his NJLAD claims include compensatory damages for
economic loss and severe emotional noneconomic loss, in addition
to punitive damages and attorney’s fees.
In cases with NJLAD
claims alleging similar damages, courts have determined that
such allegations readily establish the jurisdictional threshold.
See Rodriguez v. Burlington County Corrections Dept., 2015 WL
790521, at *2 (D.N.J. 2015) (finding that the plaintiff’s
unquantified damages under the NJLAD for compensatory and
punitive damages and for attorney’s fees easily met the
jurisdictional threshold, and plaintiff could not refute to a
legal certainty the amount of his claimed damages) (discussing
Uddin v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 2014 WL 316988, at *4 (D.N.J.
1
The Court notes that even if Plaintiff filed a post-removal
stipulation that his damages do not exceed $75,000, such a
stipulation would not, by itself, provide a basis to remand.
Farren v. FCA US, LLC, 2018 WL 372168, at *3 (D.N.J. 2018)
(citing St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.
283, 292–93 (1938)) (“The Supreme Court announced long ago that
‘the plaintiff after removal, by stipulation, by affidavit, or
by amendment of his pleadings, reduces the claim below the
requisite amount, [ ] does not deprive the district court of
jurisdiction,’” and “‘events occurring subsequent to removal
which reduce the amount recoverable, whether beyond the
plaintiff's control or the result of his volition, do not oust
the district court's jurisdiction once it has attached.’”).
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2014) (same) and Frederico, 507 F.3d at 199 (explaining that
under New Jersey law, punitive damages can total up to five
times the amount of compensatory damages, and attorney’s fees
can be estimated to be as high as 30% of the final judgment).
To reiterate, when the plaintiff has not specifically
averred in the complaint that the amount in controversy is less
than the jurisdictional minimum, it is the plaintiff’s burden to
show to a legal certainty that he cannot recover the
jurisdictional amount.
Frederico, 507 F.3d 188 at 196-97.
Here, where Plaintiff fails to even argue that his damages are
less than $75,000, Plaintiff does not come close to showing to a
legal certainty that he cannot recover more than $75,000.
As this Court has previously noted, this is a court of
limited jurisdiction, and it must not exercise its considerable
power beyond the scope of its authority as conferred by the
Constitution and statute.
Farren, 2018 WL 372168, at *3; see
also Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d
Cir. 1985) (“Because lack of jurisdiction would make any decree
in the case void and the continuation of the litigation in
federal court futile, the removal statute should be strictly
construed and all doubts should be resolved in favor of
remand.”).
It is equally true, however, that this Court has an
unflagging obligation to maintain its jurisdiction, once
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conferred.
Id.; see also Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 195 (3d
Cir. 1997) (citing Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)) (“It is axiomatic that
federal courts have a ‘virtually unflagging obligation . . . to
exercise the jurisdiction given them’ by Congress,” which
“precept can be traced at least as far back as Cohens v.
Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).”).
Because
Plaintiff has not refuted that the parties’ citizenship is
diverse and the amount in controversy is in excess of $75,000,
Plaintiffs’ motion to remand must be denied.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
Date: February 7, 2019
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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