WHITE v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY

Filing 20

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Vacating the decision of the Administrative Law Judge and remanding the case for further proceedings. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 7/17/2019. (dmr)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

JOHN CHARLES WHITE,
Civil No. 18-10317 (RMB)

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

v.
COMMISSIONER, SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

BUMB, United States District Judge:
This matter comes before the Court upon an appeal by
Plaintiff John Charles White from a denial of social security
disability benefits on June 4, 2014. The denial of benefits was
upheld by the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) on May 7, 2017.
[Record of Proceedings, “R.P.”, p. 37]. The ALJ’s decision is the
final decision of the Commissioner. [Id.]. Plaintiff commenced
this civil action seeking review of the Commissioner’s final
decision pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
For the reasons set forth below, the Court VACATES the
decision of the ALJ and REMANDS for proceedings consistent with
this Memorandum Opinion and Order.

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I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing a final decision of an ALJ with regard to

disability benefits, a court must uphold the ALJ’s factual
decisions if they are supported by “substantial evidence.” Knepp
v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g),
1383(c)(3). “Substantial evidence” means “‘more than a mere
scintilla.

It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Cons. Edison Co. v.
NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422,
427 (3d Cir. 1999).
In addition to the “substantial evidence” inquiry, the court
must also determine whether the ALJ applied the correct legal
standards. See Friedberg v. Schweiker, 721 F.2d 445, 447 (3d Cir.
1983); Sykes v. Apfel, 228 F.3d 259, 262 (3d Cir. 2000).

The

Court’s review of legal issues is plenary. Sykes, 228 F.3d at 262
(citing Schaudeck v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 181 F.3d 429, 431 (3d
Cir. 1999)).
The Social Security Act defines “disability” as the inability
“to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected
to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months.” 42
U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A).

The Act further states,
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[A]n individual shall be determined to be under a
disability only if his physical or mental impairment
or impairments are of such severity that he is not
only unable to do his previous work but cannot,
considering his age, education, and work experience,
engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work
which exists in the national economy, regardless of
whether such work exists in the immediate area in
which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy
exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he
applied for work.
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).
The Commissioner has promulgated a five-step, sequential
analysis for evaluating a claimant’s disability, as outlined in 20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i-v).

In Plummer, 186 F.3d at 428, the

Third Circuit described the Commissioner’s inquiry at each step of
this analysis:
In step one, the Commissioner must determine whether
the claimant is currently engaging in substantial
gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 1520(a). If a claimant
is found to be engaged in substantial activity, the
disability claim will be denied. Bowen v. Yuckert,
482 U.S. 137, 140 (1987).
In step two, the Commissioner must determine whether
the claimant is suffering from a severe impairment.
20
C.F.R. § 404.1520(c). If the claimant fails to show
that [his] impairments are “severe,” she is ineligible
for disability benefits.
In step three, the Commissioner compares the medical
evidence of the claimant’s impairment to a list of
impairments presumed severe enough to preclude any
gainful work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). If a claimant
does not suffer from a listed impairment or its
equivalent, the analysis proceeds to steps four and
five.

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Step four requires the ALJ to consider whether the
claimant retains the residual functional capacity to
perform her past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. §
404.1520(d). The claimant bears the burden of
demonstrating an inability to return to her past
relevant work. Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43, 46 (3d
Cir. 1994). If the claimant is unable to resume her
former occupation, the evaluation moves to the final
step.
At this [fifth] stage, the burden of production shifts
to the Commissioner, who must demonstrate the claimant
is capable of performing other available work in order
to deny a claim of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(f).
The ALJ must show there are other jobs existing in
significant numbers in the national economy which the
claimant can perform, consistent with her medical
impairments, age, education, past work experience, and
residual functional capacity.
The ALJ must analyze
the
cumulative
effect
of
all
the
claimant’s
impairments in determining whether she is capable of
performing work and is not disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §
404.1523. The ALJ will often seek the assistance of a
vocational expert at this fifth step. See Podedworny v.
Harris, 745 F.2d 210, 218 (3d Cir. 1984).

II.

FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.

Procedural History

The Court recites only the facts that are necessary to its
determination on appeal, which is narrow.
Plaintiff was born on November 11, 1960, and was 51 years old
at the alleged onset date. [Pl.’s Br., p. 4].

He applied for

Social Security Disability Benefits on February 1, 2014, alleging
an onset of disability beginning June 1, 2012. [R.P., p. 29].
Plaintiff meets the insured status requirements of the Social
Security Act through December 31, 2013. [Id.]. Plaintiff alleges
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disability due to high blood pressure, high cholesterol, diabetes
with neuropathy and retinopathy, acid reflux disease, bowel issues
from pancreas hernia, a double transplant, osteoporosis, tunnel
vision and a weak immune system.”. [Id. at 33-34].
A disability hearing was held on January 19, 2017.

The ALJ

heard testimony from Plaintiff and a Vocational Expert. The ALJ
found Plaintiff was not disabled under sections 216(i) and 223(d)
of the Social Security Act from June 1, 2012 through December 31,
2013. [Id. at 29].
In addition, Plaintiff filed an application for supplemental
security income on January 24, 2014. Based on findings from a May
1, 2014 ophthalmological exam, the claimant was awarded benefits.
Because the ALJ’s decision deals only with the relevant time
period starting June 1, 2012 through December 31, 2013, the ALJ
stated that her decision did not disturb the supplemental security
income benefits finding. [Id.]
B.

Plaintiff’s Medical History and Testimony

In January 2001, Plaintiff underwent surgery for a pancreas
and kidney transplant. [Id. at 33]. In addition, Plaintiff has
undergone 18 eye surgeries, all of which occurred prior to his
disability onset date. [Id. at 34]. Plaintiff received medical
care through the Bureau of Prisons Health Services while he was
incarcerated from 2009 through February 2014.

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Plaintiff’s treatment records from 2010 through 2013
consistently revealed that Plaintiff’s confrontation visual fields
are extremely limited in both eyes. These records also indicated
that Plaintiff has significant scarring in both eyes. Medical
professionals informed Plaintiff that he would eventually lose his
peripheral vision. [Id.].
Plaintiff testified at his hearing that he previously worked
in maintenance/carpentry. [Id. at 58]. Plaintiff ceased working in
June 2012 when he was incarcerated. [Id. at 54]. While in prison,
Plaintiff worked in the woodshop, and “eventually weaned himself
off the machines in towards the end of 2012/beginning of 2013
because of the potential danger due to his eye issues.” [Id. at
34]. When asked about his peripheral vision, Plaintiff testified
that his side peripheral vision is impacted, as well as above and
below. [Id. at 55, 68]. Plaintiff also testified that he drives
short distances in the daytime, on familiar roads, turning his
head side to side in order to see peripherally. [Id.].
An impartial vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the
Plaintiff’s hearing. The VE stated that the Plaintiff’s past
relevant work as a carpenter was medium to heavy in exertion and
skilled in nature. [Id. at 73]. The ALJ consistently asked the VE
hypothetical questions regarding depth perception, but not
peripheral vision. [Id. at 73, 74, and 75]. The VE testified that
a hypothetical person could not perform Plaintiff’s past relevant
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work as a carpenter, but could perform a number of jobs existing
in the national economy, such as small products assembler,
electrical accessories assembler, and plastic hospital products
assembler,” all of which the VE stated did not require changes in
depth perception.[Id. at 75-76].

III.

ALJ’S DETERMINATION
The ALJ concluded that the Plaintiff was not “under a

disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, at any time
from June 1 2012, the alleged onset date through December 31,
2013, the date of last insured.” [Id. at 37].

Relevant to the

issues presented on appeal, the ALJ found that the plaintiff has
the following severe impairments: “diabetes with retinopathy and
status-post kidney pancreas transplant.” 1 [Id. at 31]. The ALJ also
found Plaintiff has non-severe impairments of “hypertension,
gastroesophageal reflux disease, status-post cataract surgery in
the right eye and osteopenia.”. [Id. at 32].
The ALJ determined Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity
(RFC) concluding that he was able to perform light work with

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Diabetic retinopathy “affects blood vessels in the lightsensitive tissue called the retina that lines the back of the eye.
It is the most common cause of vision loss among people with
diabetes and the leading cause of vision impairment and blindness
among working-age adults.” Facts About Diabetic Eye Disease,
National Eye Institute, (Sept. 2015),
https://nei.nih.gov/health/diabetic/retinopathy.
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postural and physical limitations. [Id. at 33]. Specifically, the
ALJ’s RFC determination states that Plaintiff “requires a job
involving no more than occasional changes in depth perception; and
was expected to be off-task 5% of the workday in addition to
normal breaks due to symptoms.”[Id.].
During her Step Four analysis, the ALJ determined that the
Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work, and at Step
Five, concluded that Plaintiff could perform a significant number
of jobs that exist in the national economy such as an assembler
for small products, assembler for electrical accessories, and an
assembler for plastic hospital products. [Id.].

IV.

ANALYSIS
Remand is appropriate for the following reason as set forth

below.
A. ALJ’s Formulation of the RFC
Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ erred in her RFC assessment
because she did not account for Plaintiff’s significant deficits
in his peripheral vision. This Court finds that the ALJ did not
properly explain how her depth perception limitation in the RFC
translates to the Plaintiff’s severe impairment of diabetic
retinopathy and Plaintiff’s resulting peripheral vision
limitations.

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During the relevant time period, numerous visual field tests
performed by Plaintiff’s medical examiners revealed Plaintiff’s
“confrontation visual fields [are] limited” in both eyes. 2 [Pl.’s
Br., p. 5-6]. Furthermore, Plaintiff testified at length as to his
limited peripheral vision:
Q: Okay. Tell me a little bit about what visual
problems you were having back then . . . What do you
– how do you see the world?
A: I – my peripheral vision is bad on both sides, and
lower . . . when I walk, I will usually look down most
of the time, because I don’t see what’s below me to
walk into . . .
Q: And with regard to – you said that you have
difficulty looking down, you know, you have to look
down when you walk.
A: Yea. Peripheral vision, to most people, just think
it’s the sides . . . Maybe there is another term for
it. But the peripheral, also for me, is above and below.
[R.P., p. 55, 67-68].
In formulating the RFC, the ALJ concluded without
explanation, that the Plaintiff had the residual functioning
capacity to perform light work, involving “no more than occasional
changes in depth perception.” [Id. at 33]. This Court notes that
there is a significant difference between depth perception, which

2

A confrontation visual field exam asks the patient to cover one
eye and look directly at an object straight ahead. The examiner
moves his hand in and out of the patient’s peripheral visual field
to screen for problems. Kierstan Boyd, Visual Field Test, American
Academy of Ophthalmology, (Jan. 17, 2019),
https://www.aao.org/eye-health/tips-prevention/visual-fieldtesting.com.
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is the ability to perceive relative distance, and peripheral
vision, which is the visual field outside of the direct line of
vision. Peripheral vision loss is also commonly referred to as
“tunnel vision.”
Given the Plaintiff’s lengthy testimony detailing his
symptoms of his tunnel vision and the medical records detailing
his 18 eye surgeries and medical exams that consistently noted
Plaintiff’s limited peripheral vision, it appears that there may
have been a disconnect between the ALJ’s RFC determination which
provides for a depth perception limitation, which may not
necessarily account for the Plaintiff’s diabetic retinopathy, and
related tunnel vision symptoms. It is especially perplexing with
respect to the VE’s testimony that a person who had to turn his
head to significant degree in order to locate the items on the
left and the right, “would not be able to meet competitive
production standards” of the jobs the ALJ found the Plaintiff had
the ability to perform. [R.P., p. 81].
While the ALJ is entitled to establish any RFC appropriate to
a claimant supported by the evidence, the ALJ’s RFC must “be
accompanied by a clear and satisfactory explication of the basis
on which it rests.” Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 704 (3d Cir.
1981). See also Fargnoli v. Halter, 247 F.3d 34, 41 (3d Cir.
2001). The ALJ did not provide any clear explanation or
evidentiary support that the depth perception limitation accounted
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for the Plaintiff’s tunnel vision symptoms, even though the record
evidence could potentially support such limitation, if credited by
the ALJ. However, this Court will not speculate as to the reason
the ALJ chose this particular limitation, or whether this
limitation is appropriate. “The Court cannot weigh the evidence or
substitute its conclusions for those of the ALJ[.] . . . Without
the ALJ performing the analysis, the Court also cannot determine
whether the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence.”
Curry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29798, *12
(D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2017).
Therefore, the Court finds that this matter must be remanded
for further proceedings so that the ALJ can set forth her
reasoning, based on the record evidence, for whether or not the
depth perception limitations is appropriate.
Lastly, the Court declines to address Plaintiff’s remaining
claims of error as they may be affected by the ALJ’s review of
this case on remand to include Plaintiff’s additional arguments.

V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, the Court vacates the ALJ’s

decision and remands for proceedings consistent with the above
analysis.
ACCORDINGLY, it is on this 17th day of July, 2019,
ORDERED that the decision of the Administrative Law Judge is
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VACATED and this case is REMANDED for further proceedings
consistent with this Memorandum Opinion; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of Court shall close this case.

___s/ Renée Marie Bumb___
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, U.S.D.J.

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