HARRISON v. HARISS

Filing 19

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 9/10/2020. (tf, n.m.)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE

BOBBY HARRISON,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 18-10463 (RMB/AMD)
v.
SHARON L. HARRIS,

OPINION

Defendant.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE:

I.

INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Bobby Harrison commenced this action

alleging that pro se Defendant Sharon L. Harris fraudulently
discharged a debt owed to him, related to the sale of real
property in 2009, through a 2018 bankruptcy proceeding in the
Northern District of Georgia. See In Re Sharon Lynn Harris, Case
No. 17-42560 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.).

Now, this matter comes before

the Court upon pro se Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. No.
15] pro se Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint [Dkt. No. 4].
On May 29, 2020, the Court ordered pro se Plaintiff to show
cause why this case should not be dismissed based on his failure
to timely commence an adversary proceeding during the bankruptcy
process.

Finding that Plaintiff has not alleged any good cause

reasoning for his failure to commence a timely adversary

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proceeding and cannot state a claim for revocation of discharge,
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint will be dismissed with prejudice.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that in June of

2009, Defendant approached him at his deli in Whitesboro, New
Jersey and inquired about his interest in purchasing her
neighboring property.

After some negotiation, Plaintiff claims

that he agreed to purchase Defendant’s next-door property for a
total of $145,000, to be paid through a $9,000 down-payment,
followed by monthly payments of $2,000.

Plaintiff states

Defendant was supposed to transfer the title to the property
over to Plaintiff upon his final monthly payment, which was
scheduled to occur in July 2014.
Plaintiff claims that, although he abided by his
obligations under the agreement with Defendant, she did not make
good on her promise to transfer title to the property after
receiving payment in full.

Instead of transferring the title,

Plaintiff contends that Defendant defaulted on her mortgage on
the property, causing the property to be foreclosed upon by a
bank.

Furthermore, Plaintiff’s children (who had moved into the

property) were evicted by the bank through the foreclosure
process.
On October 27, 2017, Defendant filed for Chapter 7
bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Northern
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District of Georgia, Rome Division, seeking discharge of various
debts, including a $145,000 debt owed to Plaintiff.

In

response, Plaintiff, who had apparently received notice that he
had been listed as a creditor in Defendant’s bankruptcy
proceeding, submitted an objection to the bankruptcy court.
In a November 21, 2017 Order, the bankruptcy court noted
that Plaintiff’s attempted objection to the discharge of the
Defendant’s debt was procedurally improper and instructed
Plaintiff that he was required to commence an adversary
proceeding if he wished to object to the discharge of the debt.
See Dkt. No. 15, at p. 2.

In unequivocally clear terms, the

Honorable Paul W. Bonapfel, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, stated as
follows:
On November 13, 2017, the Court received a
document from Bobby Harrison objecting to the
dischargeability of a debt owed by the Debtor.
An objection to the Debtor's discharge or to
the dischargeability of a debt requires the
commencement of an adversary proceeding. FED.
R. BANKR. P. 7001(4) and (6). Accordingly, the
Court takes no action on this document and the
self-calendared hearing of December 7, 2017,
is cancelled. The meeting of creditors
scheduled for December 7, 2017, at 9:30 a.m.,
remains unchanged.
The meeting of the creditors was held on December 7, 2017,
as scheduled, meaning that Plaintiff’s initial deadline to
commence an adversary proceeding was February 5, 2018 (sixty
days after the meeting of the creditors).

The bankruptcy court,

however, issued an Order on February 8, 2018, extending the
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deadline to file a motion objecting to discharge through April
5, 2018.

Despite notice that he had been named as a creditor

(and almost five months’ worth of time since the bankruptcy
court explicitly directed him to file an adversary proceeding),
Plaintiff failed to commence a timely adversary proceeding.
Defendant’s debt was ultimately discharged on April 11, 2018.
See Dkt. No. 15, at p.4.
Plaintiff commenced this suit on June 11, 2018, alleging
that Defendant intentionally defrauded him by selling property,
failing to transfer title, defaulting on the mortgage, and then
discharging the debt through the bankruptcy proceeding.

On May

29, 2020, in response to Defendant Sharon L. Harris’ Motion to
Dismiss [Dkt. No. 15], this Court ordered Plaintiff to show
cause why this case should not be dismissed based on the basis
of the bankruptcy court’s order discharging Defendant’s debt to
Plaintiff. [Dkt. No. 16].

III. LEGAL STANDARD
To withstand a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), “a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw
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the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Id. at 662. “[A]n unadorned, the defendantunlawfully-harmed-me accusation” does not suffice to survive a
motion to dismiss. Id. at 678. “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to
provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires
more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of
the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550
U.S. at 555 (quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286
(1986)).
When reviewing a plaintiff’s complaint on a motion to
dismiss, the district court “must accept as true all well-pled
factual allegations as well as all reasonable inferences that
can be drawn from them, and construe those allegations in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Bistrian v. Levi, 696
F.3d 352, 358 n.1 (3d Cir. 2012).

When undertaking this review,

district courts may not “go beyond the facts alleged in the
Complaint and the documents on which the claims made therein
[are] based.” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114
F.3d 1410, 1425 (3d Cir. 1997). The district court may, however,
rely upon “exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of
public record.” Bruni v. City of Pittsburgh, 824 F.3d 353, 360
(3d Cir. 2016)(quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White
Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
In considering a motion to dismiss a pro se complaint, a
court must bear in mind that pro se complaints are held to less
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stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
See Dickerson v. New Jersey Inst. of Tech., 2019 WL 6032378, at
*4 (D.N.J. Nov. 14, 2019)(citing Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229,
234 (3d Cir. 2004). This more liberal construction of pro se
complaints does not, however, absolve a pro se plaintiff of the
need to adhere to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See,
e.g., Fantone v. Latini, 780 F.3d 184, 193 (3d Cir. 2015)(“a pro
se complaint ... must be held to ‘less stringent standards than
formal pleadings drafted by lawyers;’ ... but we nonetheless
review the pleading to ensure that it has ‘sufficient factual
matter; accepted as true; to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on [its] face.’ ”); Badger v. City of Phila. Office of
Prop. Assessment, 563 F. App’x 152, 154 (3d Cir.
2014)(“Complaints filed pro se are construed liberally, but even
a pro se complaint must state a plausible claim for relief.”).

IV.

DISCUSSION
As evidenced by the filings from Defendant’s bankruptcy

proceeding in the Northern District of Georgia,1 Plaintiff was
aware that he had been listed as a creditor in Defendant’s

1

The filings from Defendant’s bankruptcy proceedings in the
Northern District of Georgia are matters of public record and,
therefore, may be considered on a motion to dismiss. See Hoffman
v. Nordic Nats., Inc., 837 F.3d 272, 280 (3d Cir. 2016)(holding
that the judgment and pleadings in a prior case were matters of
public record and properly considered on a motion to dismiss).

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petition for bankruptcy under Chapter 7 and that Defendant was
seeking to discharge a debt in relation to the sale of the
Whitesboro property.

Despite notice and opportunity to object,

Plaintiff failed to properly contest the discharge of
Defendant’s debt through a timely adversary proceeding.
Furthermore, although the debt has already been discharged by
the bankruptcy court, Plaintiff’s allegations do not state a
claim for revocation of such discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727.
First, Plaintiff ignored the bankruptcy court’s
instructions, in its November 21, 2017 Order, to commence an
adversary proceeding to object the dischargeability of
Defendant’s debt.

By disregarding this guidance, Plaintiff

failed to adhere to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure
4007(c), which requires a creditor to file a object to the
dischargeability of a debt, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. S 523, within
sixty days after the initially scheduled meeting of creditors.
Even after the bankruptcy court extended the deadline by two
months, Plaintiff still did not commence an adversary
proceeding.

Neither Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint nor his June

22, 2020 Response to this Court’s Order to Show Cause
(“Plaintiff’s OSC Response”)[Dkt. No. 17] allege any good cause
reason for Plaintiff’s failure to commence a timely adversary
proceeding.
Second, neither Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint nor his OSC
Response state a valid claim for revocation of Defendant’s
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discharge pursuant to § 727(d).

As noted by Plaintiff, a

creditor may request the revocation of a discharge that “was
obtained through the fraud of the debtor, and the requesting
party did not know of such fraud until after the granting of
such discharge.” § 727(d)(1). In this case, however, Plaintiff
has not alleged that he learned of any additional information
regarding fraud of the debtor between the date of discharge
(April 11, 2018) and the date he commenced this action (June 11,
2018).2

Because Plaintiff has not alleged (and cannot allege)

that he only became aware of “fraud” after the date of
discharge, Plaintiff fails to state a claim for revocation.
Although Plaintiff is understandably frustrated by
Defendant’s failure to make good on her promise to transfer
title to the Whitesboro property, Plaintiff had an opportunity
to challenge the discharge of that debt through an adversary
proceeding.

Despite explicit guidance and instruction from the

bankruptcy court regarding the proper mechanism for objecting to
the dischargeability of Defendant’s debt, Plaintiff missed his
window to be heard because he ignored court rules and deadlines.
Even when construed liberally, it is clear that Plaintiff cannot
state a claim or cure the deficiencies in his complaint; he is

2

Plaintiff has not alleged that he was unaware of any of the
alleged “fraud” until after the date of discharge. On the
contrary, it appears that all of the alleged fraud occurred
throughout the course of his transaction with Defendant or at
the time Defendant filed the voluntary petition for bankruptcy.
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quite simply too late.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint

will be DIMSISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

An appropriate Order shall

issue on this date.

DATED: September 10, 2020

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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