FLYNN v. DELAWARE RIVER & BAY AUTHORITY et al
Filing
23
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER granting in part and denying in part 13 Motion to Preclude Plaintiffs' Liability Expert's Report and Testimony. Signed by Magistrate Judge Joel Schneider on 11/5/2019. (dmr)
[Doc. No. 13]
THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
DENNIS FLYNN,
Plaintiff,
v.
Civil No. 18-10505 (JS)
DELAWARE RIVER & BAY
AUTHORITY, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the “Motion to Preclude
Plaintiff’s Expert Report and Testimony” (“motion”) filed by
defendant Delaware River & Bay Authority (“defendant” or “DRBA”)
[Doc. No. 13]. The Court received plaintiff’s opposition [Doc.
No. 17] and defendant’s reply [Doc. No. 18].
The Court
exercises its discretion to decide plaintiff’s motion without
oral argument. See FED. R. CIV. P. 78; L. CIV. R. 78.1. For the
reasons to be set forth in this Memorandum Opinion and Order,
defendant’s motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. All
opinions relating to prognosis and causation contained in Dr.
Skolnick’s expert report are STRICKEN. Defendant’s motion is
DENIED as to Dr. Skolnick’s findings and observations concerning
plaintiff’s physical examination.
Background
Plaintiff Dennis Flynn (“plaintiff”) commenced this action
on June 13, 2018 in the United States District Court of New
Jersey, asserting various claims against defendants Delaware
River & Bay Authority (“DRBA”), John Does 1-10, and The Doe
Legal Entity 1-10, including causes of action under the Jones
Act, 46 U.S.C. § 30104, and general maritime law. See Compl. ¶
5-10 [Doc. No. 1]. On August 16, 2018, the parties consented to
the jurisdiction of this Court to handle this matter pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and FED. R. CIV. P. 73. See Doc. No. 10.
Plaintiff’s claim arises from an incident which allegedly
took place on or about February 11, 2016. See Mot. at 1.
Plaintiff was the pilot of a passenger ferry vessel and
allegedly suffered injuries from an accident that occurred on
the M/V Cape Henlopen. See Compl. ¶ 5. Plaintiff alleges he was
thrown from his chair and suffered injuries to his shoulder and
neck as a result of the accident. See Aff. of Counsel Oliver T.
Barry ¶ 3 [Doc. No. 17].
At the time of the accident, plaintiff was being treated
for neck problems, diagnosed as “moderate to severe degenerative
discogenic disease with foraminal encroachment.” Mot. at 2. On
April 15, 2015, plaintiff consulted an orthopedic surgeon, Dr.
Stephen Dante, for his neck condition. Id. Dr. Dante recommended
2
a laminectomy and fusion surgery to address plaintiff’s neck
complaints. Id. The record indicates plaintiff was planning to
move forward with the cervical surgery to address persistent
pain and worsening numbness in his fingers. Id. (citing Exs. 6,
7). On the day of the accident, ambulance records indicate
plaintiff complained of injuries to his right shoulder and knee,
and specifically denied neck or back pain. Id. at 3. Further,
when plaintiff was taken to Cape Regional Medical Center, he
only complained about his right shoulder and knee. Id. After the
accident, even though plaintiff continued seeing Dr. Dante, his
records do not mention the February 11, 2016 incident, nor do
they indicate it was ever discussed. Id.
Fact discovery ended on March 29, 2019 and plaintiff’s
expert reports were due on April 30, 2019. Doc. No. 9. On or
about February 5, 2019, plaintiff served a copy of the November
27, 2018 report of his trial expert, Orthopedic Surgeon Cary
Skolnick, M.D. Defendant then served a narrative report from
Orthopedic Surgeon Dr. Jeffrey Malumed, M.D. See Aff. of Counsel
Oliver T. Barry ¶ 7. The parties’ medical experts agree that
plaintiff suffered a rotator cuff tear as a result of the
accident. Id. ¶ 9. However, the medical experts disagree whether
plaintiff suffered any aggravation of preexisting damage in his
cervical spine, with complications in his left upper extremity.
Id. ¶ 10.
3
As noted, Dr. Skolnick issued a report in which he opined
on plaintiff’s injuries. See Dr. Skolnick’s Report (“Skolnick
Rep.”) [Doc. No. 13-3]. Dr. Skolnick’s report contains three
types of opinions: (1) present symptomology opinions; (2)
prognosis opinions; and (3) causation opinions.1 After providing
a detailed review of plaintiff’s medical history, Dr. Skolnick
discusses plaintiff’s present symptoms, the physical examination
he conducted, and his diagnosis based on his physical
examination. Id. at 8-11. Next, Dr. Skolnick discusses
plaintiff’s alleged work-related disability and states, “[a]fter
this accident, [plaintiff] has been unable to work, in any
regard.” Id. at 11. Last, Dr. Skolnick makes conclusory
statements about plaintiff’s injuries and states, for example,
“[t]he cervical spine, right shoulder and left upper extremity
were weakened by this injury and damaged, and will be
predisposed to further injury from aggravation and trauma which
would not have otherwise bothered the patient prior to the
accident.” Id. Dr. Skolnick further opines with “a reasonable
For purposes of clarity, Dr. Skolnick’s “present symptomology
opinions” refers to all information included in the report
sections labeled “present symptomology,” “physical exam,”
“records reviewed,” and “diagnoses”. See Skolnick Rep. at 8-11.
Dr. Skolnick’s “prognosis opinions” refers to all information
included in the report sections labeled “discussion” and
“permanency, prognosis and recommendations.” Id. at 11. Dr.
Skolnick’s “causation opinions” refers to information included
in the report section labeled “conclusion.” Id. at 12.
1
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degree of medical probability” that plaintiff’s injuries and
treatment are directly and causally related to the February 11,
2016 accident. Id. at 12. Dr. Skolnick contends the injuries
sustained by plaintiff have “produced demonstrable medical
evidence, of an objective nature, of restriction in the
function, and in the material lessening, of the patient’s
working ability . . . [and] ability to fully perform activities
of daily life.” Id. Further, Dr. Skolnick opined “with a
reasonable degree of medical certainty” that plaintiff suffered
permanent injury to “the cervical spine, right shoulder and left
upper extremity” as a result of the accident. Id.
Defendant moves to strike Dr. Skolnick’s report contending
it fails to satisfy the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence
702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579
(1993). Defendant argues Dr. Skolnick’s report should be
stricken because it “fails to reveal any methodology used to
reach his opinions, and fails to set forth any verifiable
standards or any medical evidence in the record to support his
opinion. As such, it is a net opinion and should not be
admitted.” Mot. at 8. Defendant also argues Dr. Skolnick’s
report should be stricken because he fails to explain how he
concluded plaintiff’s injuries were caused or aggravated by the
February 11, 2016 accident. Id. at 10. Defendant further argues
that Dr. Skolnick has been involved in numerous cases like the
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one at hand where courts found his report constituted net
opinions and excluded his report and testimony. Id. at 12. Last,
defendants argue Dr. Skolnick’s report contains incorrect
information about the plaintiff, specifically relating to his
ability to work, which is likely to confuse the jury. Id.
In opposition, plaintiff argues that if defendant’s motion
is granted, it should be limited to barring testimony relating
to any aggravation of the condition of plaintiff’s neck but
permit testimony as to the shoulder injury plaintiff suffered.
See Pl.’s Opp’n at 3 [Doc. No. 17]. Plaintiff argues that
because both defendant and plaintiff’s experts come to the same
conclusion regarding plaintiff suffering a rotator cuff tear,
Dr. Skolnick should be allowed to testify about that subject
matter. Id. at 2. Plaintiff further argues Dr. Skolnick’s report
is not a net opinion because he reviewed plaintiff’s medical
records and conducted a physical examination, and it is
generally accepted that medical experts can reach conclusions
based on a review of medical records and a physical examination
of the patient. Id. at 4. Last, plaintiff argues Dr. Skolnick’s
testimony will assist the trier of fact in assessing what
injuries or aggravation of preexisting injuries were causally
related to the accident. Id. at 5.
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Discussion
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of
expert testimony, permitting a witness “qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education” to
testify in the form of an opinion, provided that:
(a) the expert’s scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue;
(b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data;
(c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and
(d) the expert has reliably applied the principles and
methods to the facts of the case.
FED. R. EVID. 702; see generally Daubert, supra. Because Rule
702 “clearly contemplates some degree of regulation of the
subjects and theories” to which an expert may testify, the
Supreme Court has stated:
[I]n order to qualify as “scientific knowledge,” an
inference or assertion must be derived by the scientific
method. Proposed testimony must be supported by
appropriate validation – i.e., “good grounds” based on
what is known. In short, the requirement that an expert’s
testimony pertain to “scientific knowledge” establishes
a standard of evidentiary reliability.
Id. at 590; see also Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136, 14445 (3d Cir. 2000). In practice, this requires the Court to act
as a “gatekeeper” to prevent expert testimony running afoul of
Rule 702 from ever reaching the jury. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at
596-97. Thus, the Court “must determine ... whether the expert
is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2)
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will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact
in issue.” Id. at 592. “This entails a preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or
methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.” Id.
at 592-93.
The Third Circuit has described Rule 702 as embodying a
“trilogy of restrictions on expert testimony: [1] qualification,
[2] reliability, and [3] fit.” Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp.,
U.S.A., 350 F.3d 316, 321 (3d Cir. 2003) (quoting Schneider v.
Fried, 320 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003)). First, the witness
must be qualified to testify as an expert, which requires “that
the witness possess specialized expertise.” Id. This
requirement, however, has been interpreted liberally to
encompass “a broad range of knowledge, skills, and training.”2 In
re Paoli T.T. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 741 (3d Cir. 1994).
Second, the testimony must be reliable, which demands that “the
expert’s opinion must be based upon the ‘methods and procedures
of science,’ rather than on ‘subjective belief or unsupported
speculation.’” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590; see Calhoun, 350 F.3d
at 321. Thus, the Court must assess the “reliability of
scientific evidence under Rule 702” in order to determine “its
2
Defendants have not objected to Dr. Skolnick’s qualifications.
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scientific validity.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590. Third, the
expert’s testimony must “fit” the case. Id. at 592. Otherwise
known as the “helpfulness” standard, this requires there be “a
valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility.” Id. at 591-92. The fit
requirement “goes primarily to relevance.” Id. “[T]he expert’s
testimony must be relevant for the purposes of the case and must
assist the trier of fact.” Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404 (citations
omitted). The party that proffers the expert testimony bears the
burden of establishing its admissibility by a preponderance of
the evidence. Daubert at 592 n.10 (citing Bourjaily v. United
States, 483 U.S. 171, 175-76 (1987)).
Here, defendants primarily contest the opinions expressed
by Dr. Skolnick in his report by alleging they fail to satisfy
the reliability and fit requirements of Daubert. Defendants
argue Dr. Skolnick’s opinions lack a proper foundation and
amount to net opinions, and as such, are inadmissible. The Court
finds Dr. Skolnick’s opinions regarding prognosis and causation
leave too large a gap between the data presented and the
conclusions rendered, and consequently, fail to satisfy
Daubert’s reliability and fit requirements. Because Dr.
Skolnick’s opinions on plaintiff’s present symptomology are
based on his physical examination of plaintiff, the Court finds
they satisfy Daubert’s reliability and fit requirements.
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1. Qualification
Since defendants do not specifically object to Dr.
Skolnick’s qualifications, it will be assumed for present
purposes Dr. Skolnick is qualified.
2. Reliability
The Court must decide whether the opinions offered by Dr.
Skolnick are based on reliable principals and methods. In
determining the reliability of expert testimony, the Court is
guided by the following principles:
(1) whether a method consists of a testable hypothesis;
(2) whether the method has been subject to peer review;
(3) the known or potential rate of error; (4) the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the
technique's operation; (5) whether the method is
generally accepted; (6) the relationship of the
technique to methods which have been established to be
reliable; (7) the qualifications of the expert witness
testifying based on the methodology; and (8) the
nonjudicial uses to which the method has been put.
Calhoun, 350 F.3d at 321 (quoting In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 742
n.8). However, the Court is not restricted to any “definitive
checklist or test.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. This inquiry is “a
flexible one” focusing “solely on the principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate.” Id. at
595. While reliability does not require “correctness,” it does
prohibit “too great a gap between the data and the [expert’s]
opinion proffered.” Oddi, 234 F.3d at 146 (quoting Gen. Elec.
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)). Thus, the court “must
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examine the expert's conclusions in order to determine whether
they could reliably flow from the facts known to the expert and
the methodology used.” Id. (quoting Heller v. Shaw Indus., Inc.,
167 F.3d 146, 153 (3d Cir. 1999)).
Further, the inadmissibility of net opinions is a
longstanding rule that dictates exclusion of expert testimony
that contains “bare conclusions, unsupported by factual
evidence.” Holman Enter. v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 563
F.Supp.2d 467, 472 n. 12 (D.N.J. 2008). The net opinion rule
requires an expert to give the “why and wherefore” of the
opinion, rather than a mere conclusion. See Curtis v. Besam
Group, No. 05-CV-2807 (DMC), 2008 WL 1732956, at * 6 (D.N.J.
Apr. 10, 2008) (citing Rosenberg v. Tavorath, M.D., 352
N.J.Super. 385, 800 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)). Expert
testimony, therefore, is not admissible if it appears that the
witness is unable to articulate a reasonably accurate
conclusion, as distinguished from a mere guess or conjecture.
See id. (citing Vuocolo v. Diamond Shemrock Chem. Co., 240
N.J.Super. 289, 299 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990)). As stated
by the court in Lasorsa v. Showboat: The Mardi Gras Casino, Civ.
No. 07-4321, 2009 WL 2929234, at *5 (D.N.J. Sept. 9, 2009),
“[w]ithout a reliable, objective basis for [an expert’s]
testimony, stemming from identifiable industry standards, codes,
publications or training, it must be precluded under Rule 702.”.
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Defendant argues Dr. Skolnick’s report does not meet the
element of reliability because he fails to reveal any
methodology used to reach his conclusions. Mot. at 8. Plaintiff,
on the other hand, argues Dr. Skolnick’s report is reliable
because he based his opinions on plaintiff’s medical history and
physical examination. Pl.’s Opp’n at 4. The Court agrees with
plaintiff regarding Dr. Skolnick’s opinions on present
symptomology but disagrees with plaintiff regarding Dr.
Skolnick’s opinions on prognosis and causation. As discussed
above, Dr. Skolnick’s report provides his opinion on plaintiff’s
present symptomology based on the physical examination he
conducted. The Court finds Dr. Skolnick’s opinions on present
symptomology are reliable because they are opinions based on the
physical examination he conducted. The physical examination
conducted by Dr. Skolnick plus his years of experience as an
Orthopedic Surgeon allow the Court to conclude his opinions
regarding plaintiff’s present symptomology reasonably flow from
the facts known to him.
The Court, however, agrees with defendant regarding Dr.
Skolnick’s opinions on prognosis and causation. As noted above,
Dr. Skolnick’s report includes opinions about plaintiff’s workrelated disability, permanency and prognosis, and causation of
plaintiff’s injuries. The Court finds that nothing in the record
or in plaintiff’s medical reports links plaintiff’s cervical
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spine and left upper extremity injuries to the February 11, 2016
accident.
Having read all relevant factual and medical records, the
Court finds there is no material evidence indicating that
plaintiff injured his cervical spine or left upper extremity
when he fell on February 11, 2016. Dr. Skolnick did not
articulate in his report the reason why he concluded plaintiff’s
injuries resulted from the incident. Dr. Skolnick also did not
point to any evidence in the record to support his opinions.
Further, Dr. Skolnick’s report fails to rule out the possibility
that plaintiff’s injuries resulted from his preexisting
condition and not from the February 11, 2016 incident. In fact,
Dr. Skolnick does not even meaningfully address plaintiff’s
prior injuries and their effect on his current condition. The
Court, therefore, is unable to conclude Dr. Skolnick’s opinions
on prognosis and causation “reliably flow from the facts known”
to him. See Oddi, 234 F.3d at 146. Plaintiff’s own statements
make clear that plaintiff only injured his right shoulder and
right knee and never complained about his neck or left upper
extremity. See Mot. Ex. 9-10. The Court also finds Dr.
Skolnick’s opinion that plaintiff’s “material loss of
productivity . . . is causally related to [the] accident” is not
reliable because plaintiff was able to return to work after the
13
accident. See Skolnick’s Rep. at 11. Therefore, Dr. Skolnick’s
opinion is based on a false fact and is not reliable.
The Court finds plaintiff has failed to show that Dr.
Skolnick’s opinions regarding prognosis and causation are
reliable. See In re Paoli, 35 F.3d at 743-44 (stating that the
proponent of an expert report must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the expert’s opinions are
reliable). Therefore, the sections in Dr. Skolnick’s report
regarding prognosis and causation fail the reliability prong.
3. Fit
In contrast to the reliability prong of Daubert, the fit
restriction “goes primarily to relevance,” which requires the
testimony “fit” the issues in dispute and assist the trier of
fact in understanding them. Krys v. Aaron, 112 F. Supp. 3d 181,
190 (D.N.J. 2015) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591). Put
simply, the expert’s testimony must be relevant to the case and
helpful to the jury in deciding the issues therein. This
“‘helpfulness’ standard requires a valid scientific connection
to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility.”
Schneider, 320 F.3d at 404 (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 59192).
Defendant argues Dr. Skolnick’s report does not pass the
test of fitness because he provides no causation analysis or
explanation for the mechanics of the alleged aggravation to
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plaintiff’s neck or left upper extremity. See Mot. at 9.
Defendant further argues Dr. Skolnick’s report will not assist a
jury because it discusses incorrect statements of fact about
plaintiff’s ability to work. Id. Plaintiff, however, argues that
Dr. Skolnick’s report and testimony will assist a trier of fact
in comprehending the extent of plaintiff’s injuries. See Opp’n
at 5.
The Court disagrees with defendant’s argument regarding Dr.
Skolnick’s opinions on present symptomology but agrees with
defendant’s argument regarding Dr. Skolnick’s opinions on
prognosis and causation. Dr. Skolnick’s opinions on present
symptomology will assist a jury in understanding the extent of
plaintiff’s current symptoms. However, Dr. Skolnick’s opinions
on prognosis and causation will not assist a jury because he
does not explain how the accident caused or aggravated
plaintiff’s injuries to his neck and left upper extremity. His
opinions on prognosis and causation consist of only net
opinions. For example, Dr. Skolnick states, plaintiff’s injuries
are “directly and causally related to the accident” that
occurred on February 11, 2016. However, nowhere in his report
does Dr. Skolnick explain how plaintiff’s fall resulted in
injury to his cervical spine or left upper extremity. Further,
Dr. Skolnick’s opinion that plaintiff has been “unable to work
in any regard” after the accident is false. See Skolnick Rep. at
15
11. Plaintiff passed the Coast Guard Physical and returned to
work in the same position he was working before the incident
just weeks after his fall.3 See Mot. Ex. 13-14. Therefore, Dr.
Skolnick’s report will not assist a jury in understanding and
deciding the cause of his injuries.
This is not the first time Dr. Skolnick presents a court
with an inadmissible net opinion. In Mahmood v. Narisco, No. 092656(DEA), 2012 WL 1067700, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 29, 2012). In
Mahmood, Dr. Skolnick’s report provided no basis for his
conclusion that plaintiff could only perform sedentary work and,
without reference to any medical or factual evidence, concluded
that cervical fusion is indicated. Id. The court stated, “while
such an opinion may be within his area of expertise, there are
insufficient references in the Plaintiff’s medical records and
reports of other physicians to support this opinion.” Id.
Similarly, the Court finds Dr. Skolnick’s opinions regarding
prognosis and causation should be stricken because they are
inadmissible net opinions.4 Like the court in Mahmood, this Court
As part of the paperwork for the Coast Guard Physical,
plaintiff answered “no” when asked about any “back pain, joint
problem, or orthopedic surgery” and denied any medical issue
other than high blood pressure. Mot. Ex. 13. Further, the
medical practitioner checked “normal” when asked about
plaintiff’s “upper/lower extremities.”
4 See also Chapnick v. U.S., No. 07 Civ. 0577(BMC), 2009 WL
5511188, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2009) (striking Dr.
Skolnick’s report because “there is no contemporaneous evidence
of any kind proving that plaintiff suffered a shoulder injury”);
3
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finds there is not sufficient evidence in the record to support
Dr. Skolnick’s opinions on prognosis and causation.
In addition to Mahmood, the Superior Court of New Jersey
determined Dr. Skolnick’s opinions should be stricken in
Beausejour v. Chamberlin Plumbing & Heating, Inc., A-1459-12T4,
2014 WL 300929, at *2 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 29, 2014).
In Beausejour, plaintiff appealed a judgment of the Division of
Workers’ Compensation which dismissed his claim petition against
respondent Chamberlin Plumbing & Heating for a pre-existing
lower back condition allegedly worsened or aggravated by a workrelated injury. Id. at *1. Dr. Skolnick provided an expert
report after he examined appellant on one occasion. Id. at *2.
Specifically, Dr. Skolnick opined that the accident aggravated
and exacerbated appellant’s pre-existing lumbar degenerative
disc disease. Id. The court affirmed the lower court’s ruling
and found plaintiff failed to prove the exacerbation of his preexisting condition was causally connected to the injury he
sustained at work. Id. at 4. Similarly, Dr. Skolnick now
provides an expert report based on his one interaction with
Pugliese ex rel. Pugliese v. Red Bank Armory, Inc., A-3715-11T4,
2013 WL 1492867, at *4 (N.J.Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 12, 2013)
(striking Dr. Skolnick’s report because he “offered no opinion
pertaining to the propriety of supplying a walker for the use of
skaters, or, indeed, any opinion at all relating to the walker
that was used.”).
17
plaintiff and fails to provide reasoning for his opinion that
plaintiff’s injuries resulted from the accident.
Therefore, the Court finds Dr. Skolnick’s opinions
regarding prognosis and causation fail the “fit” requirement
because he provides no opinion that would assist a jury in
understanding how the February 11, 2016 accident caused or
aggravated plaintiff’s neck or left upper extremity injuries.
The Court also finds Dr. Skolnick’s report contains false
information such as his claim that “after this accident,
[plaintiff] has been unable to work in any regard.” See
Skolnick’s Rep. at 11. Further, Dr. Skolnick’s report contains
net opinions as he does not explain how he reaches his
conclusions. Therefore, the Court finds Dr. Skolnick’s opinions
regarding prognosis and causation do not satisfy the “fit”
requirement as they would not assist a jury.
Conclusion
The Court finds Dr. Skolnick’s opinions regarding prognosis
and causation leave too large a gap between the data presented
and the conclusions rendered, and consequently, fail to satisfy
Daubert’s reliability and fit requirements. Therefore, Dr.
Skolnick’s opinions regarding prognosis and causation do not
meet the Daubert admissibility standard and must be stricken.
Dr. Skolnick’s opinions regarding plaintiff’s present
18
symptomology pass the Daubert admissibility standard and will
not be stricken.
Order
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED this 5th day of November 2019, that
defendants’ “Motion to Preclude Plaintiffs’ Liability Expert’s
Report and Testimony” [Doc. No. 13] is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. Dr. Skolnick’s opinions regarding prognosis and
causation included within his November 27, 2018 liability expert
report are hereby STRICKEN. The only opinions and testimony of
Dr. Skolnick that will not be stricken are his findings and
observations regarding plaintiff’s physical examination.
s/ Joel Schneider
JOEL SCHNEIDER
United States Magistrate Judge
Date: November 5, 2019
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