POWERHOUSE EQUIPMENT & ENGINEERING CO., INC. v. POWER MECHANICAL, INC. et al

Filing 45

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 7/25/2019. (dmr)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

POWERHOUSE EQUIPMENT &
ENGINEERING CO., INC.,

1:18-cv-10744-NLH-JS
OPINION

Plaintiff,
v.
POWER MECHANICAL, INC. and
POWERHOUSE VALVE SERVICES,
LLC,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
WILLIAM P. RUBLEY
EDWARD A. CORMA
SUBRANNI ZAUBER, LLC
750 ROUTE 73 SOUTH
SUITE 307B
MARLTON, NJ 08053
On behalf of Plaintiff
DAVID J. SHANNON
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN
WOODLAND FALLS CORPORATE PARK
200 LAKE DRIVE EAST
SUITE 300
CHERRY HILL, NJ 08002
On behalf of Defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge
In this matter that concerns claims of trademark
infringement, pending before the Court is Defendants’ motion to
dismiss the matter for lack of personal jurisdiction.

For the

reasons expressed below, Defendants’ motion will be granted, and
the matter shall be transferred to the U.S. District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Powerhouse Equipment & Engineering Co, Inc., a
New Jersey-based company, claims that Defendants, Power
Mechanical, Inc. (“Power Mechanical”) and Powerhouse Valve
Services LLC (“PVS”), both based in Virginia, have infringed on
Plaintiff’s mark “Powerhouse.”

Plaintiff claims that beginning

in 1982, Plaintiff used “Powerhouse” as a trademark, which has a
distinctive flame logo, lettering, and color scheme.

Plaintiff

claims that in October 2016, Defendant Power Mechanical formed
PVS, which Plaintiff claims markets valve repair services, plant
shutdown services, valve inventory management, and sales of
valves and parts.

Plaintiff claims that soon thereafter, PVS,

and its parent company Power Mechanical, started using the
trademark “Powerhouse Valve” which has a similar flame logo
design, lettering, and color scheme used by Plaintiff in its
“Powerhouse” mark.
On September 6, 2018, this Court denied Plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction.

(Docket No. 19.)

The Court also

dismissed without prejudice Defendants’ motion to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction.

(Id.)

2

The Court directed the

parties to undertake limited discovery relevant to personal
jurisdiction over Defendants. 1

(Id.)

The parties have completed

jurisdictional discovery, and Defendants have again moved to
dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against them for lack of personal
jurisdiction.

In the alternative to dismissal, Defendants seek

to have the case transferred to the Eastern District of
Virginia.

Plaintiff has opposed Defendants’ motion, except that

Plaintiff argues that if the Court finds that personal
jurisdiction is lacking, the Court should transfer, and not
dismiss, its case.
DISCUSSION
A.

Subject matter jurisdiction

This is an action for trademark infringement, unfair
competition, and dilution of trademark arising under the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.

Subject matter jurisdiction is

based on 15 U.S.C. § 1121 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1338(b).
B.

Standard for Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides for

1

The Federal Rules and this Circuit permit liberal discovery of
jurisdictional facts which are relevant and not privileged.
Formula One Licensing BV v. F1 New Jersey, LLC, 180 F. Supp. 3d
330, 340 (D.N.J. 2015) (citing Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover, Inc.
v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 107 F.3d 1026, 1041 (3d Cir. 1997)) (beginning
the personal jurisdiction analysis under the presumption in favor
of allowing discovery to establish personal jurisdiction).

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dismissal of an action when the Court does not have personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.

“Once challenged, the plaintiff

bears the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction.”
O’Connor v. Sandy Lane Hotel Co., Ltd., 496 F.3d 312, 316 (3d
Cir. 2007) (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150
(3d Cir. 2001)).

In deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of

personal jurisdiction, the Court must “accept all of the
plaintiff’s allegations as true and construe disputed facts in
favor of the plaintiff.”

Carteret Sav. Bank v. Shushan, 954

F.2d 141, 142 n.1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 817 (1992)
(citations omitted).
A defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of a United
States district court if the defendant “is subject to the
jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction in the state
where the district court is located[.]”
4(k)(1)(A).

Fed. R. Civ. P.

“A federal court sitting in New Jersey has

jurisdiction over parties to the extent provided under New
Jersey state law.”

Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d

93, 96 (3d Cir. 2004)(citations omitted).

The New Jersey long-

arm statute “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to
the fullest limits of due process.”

IMO Indus., Inc. v. Kiekert

AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing DeJames v.
Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 284 (3d Cir. 1981)).

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Under the Due Process clause, the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is appropriate when
the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the forum
state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).

A defendant

establishes minimum contacts by “‘purposefully avail[ing] itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State,’” thereby invoking “‘the benefits and protections of [the
forum State’s] laws.’”

Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Sup. Ct.

of California, 480 U.S. 102, 109 (1987) (quoting Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)).

This “purposeful

availment” requirement assures that the defendant could
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in the forum and is
not haled into a forum as a result of “random,” “fortuitous” or
“attenuated” contacts with the forum state.

See World-Wide

Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980); see also
Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472, 475 (internal citations
omitted).
In deciding whether a defendant’s contacts with a forum are
sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction over that party, the
Court must consider whether such contacts are related to or

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arise out of the cause of action at issue in the case.

The

Court may exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a
defendant where the cause of action is related to or arises out
of activities by the defendant that took place within the forum
state.

Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466

U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).

If the cause of action has no

relationship to a defendant’s contacts with a forum state, the
Court may nonetheless exercise general personal jurisdiction if
the defendant has conducted “continuous and systematic” business
activities in the forum state.

Id. at 416.

Once the Court determines that the defendant has minimum
contacts with the forum state, it must also consider whether the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
“comport[s] with ‘fair play and substantial justice’” to satisfy
the due process test.

Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 476

(quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320).

In this regard, it must

be reasonable to require the defendant to litigate the suit in
the forum state, and a court may consider the following factors
to determine reasonableness: the burden on the defendant, the
forum state’s interest in adjudicating the dispute, the
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, the interstate judicial system’s interest in obtaining
an efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared

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interest of the several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies.

Id. at 477 (citing World Wide

Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
In the case of an intentional tort, the “effects test” is
applied. 2

The Calder “effects test” requires the plaintiff to

show the following:
(1) The defendant committed an intentional tort;
(2) The plaintiff felt the brunt of the harm in the forum
such that the forum can be said to be the focal point of
the harm suffered by the plaintiff as a result of that
tort;
(3) The defendant expressly aimed his tortious conduct at
the forum such that the forum can be said to be the focal
point of the tortious activity.
IMO Industries, Inc. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265–66 (3d
Cir. 1998) (discussing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984))).
“[I]n order to make out the third prong of this test, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant knew that the plaintiff
would suffer the brunt of the harm caused by the tortious
conduct in the forum, and point to specific activity indicating
that the defendant expressly aimed its tortious conduct at the
forum.”

Id.

2

Because a trademark violation is generally considered an
intentional tort, the “effects test” is applicable. AT&T v.
Winback & Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.3d 1421, 1433 (3d Cir.
1994).

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C.

Analysis

One significant aspect of a court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over a defendant is the court’s consideration of
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.

To show their

contacts with New Jersey – or lack thereof - Defendants explain
their corporate structure and their business activities, most of
which Plaintiff does not dispute.
Power Mechanical is a family owned and operated business
founded in 1985 that provides rapid support for steam and
chilled water users.

Power Mechanical offers boiler rentals,

boiler installation, boiler repair, burner service, mechanical
contracting, steam relief valve testing, and boiler room
engineering and design.

Power Mechanical leases boilers to

industrial and commercial customers.

(Docket No. 39-1 at 5.)

Power Mechanical was incorporated in Virginia and maintains
its principal place of business in Newport News, Virginia; its
only location is in Newport News, Virginia; Power Mechanical has
one hundred ten employees, all of whom work at the facilities in
Newport News, Virginia; Power Mechanical has no outside sales
staff; and none of its employees are dedicated to the New Jersey
market.

Power Mechanical offers boiler services to customers

nationwide, and currently only one of Power Mechanical’s boilers
is being leased to a customer in New Jersey.

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(Id. at 6.)

As part of its boiler repair services, Power Mechanical
rebuilds gas valves, oil valves, steam valves, blow-down valves
and others that wear out and require repair or replacement, but
one exception is the repair of relief valves.

A boiler pressure

relief valve is a safety valve designed to relieve an excessive
build-up of pressure inside the boiler.
fails, the boiler blows up.

If a relief valve

Power Mechanical does not perform

relief valve repair because that work requires certifications,
collectively referred to as the “VR Stamp,” a process which
takes approximately two and a half years to complete and entails
a rigorous amount of training and testing.

The market requires

that relief valve repair be performed locally because relief
value repair is often done on an emergency basis, requiring
companies to obtain the services of a local company which can
perform the work quickly. (Id.)
Powerhouse Valve Services, LLC was formed in 2016
specifically for the purpose of performing relief valve repair.
PVS is a Virginia limited liability company that maintains its
principal place of business in Newport News, Virginia and has
five employees.
mid-2018.

PVS obtained the VR Stamp certification in

PVS primarily services Power Mechanical, which is

essentially Powerhouse Valve's only customer.

Previously, Power

Mechanical subcontracted its relief valve servicing to

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local vendors.

PVS performs the work for Power Mechanical in

its shop in Virginia before it leaves the shop.

(Id. at 7.)

With regard to PVS’s contacts with New Jersey, PVS states:
•

PVS performs valve work only in its machining and testing
facility in Newport News, Virginia.

•

PVS does not perform relief valve services outside of its
machine shop in Newport News, Virginia, because PVS can
only perform relief valve repair work in Virginia pursuant
to its certification.

•

PVS cannot perform any repairs in New Jersey.

•

PVS has not performed any repairs in New Jersey.

•

In 2018, there were only four customer orders to PVS that
were not placed by Power Mechanical.

•

PVS only markets to the region within two hundred fifty
miles of its location in Newport News, Virginia, which
includes North Carolina, Washington D.C. and Maryland.

•

PVS advertises and promotes itself only though its website,
a paper flier handed out at local trade shows, and word-ofmouth within sixty miles of its facilities.

The flier

distributed at trade shows consists of a single four-by-six
card made available at the Power Mechanical booth.
•

PVS does not advertise, promote or market its services in
New Jersey.

None of its advertising, marketing or
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promotional materials have been distributed in New Jersey.
•

PVS has not made any sales to any customers in New Jersey.

(Id. at 8-9.)
Plaintiff does not necessarily dispute PVS’s contacts – or
lack of contacts – with New Jersey.

Instead, Plaintiff focuses

on Power Mechanical’s contacts with New Jersey, and argues that
because PVS is simply an alter ego of Power Mechanical, all of
Power Mechanical’s contacts with New Jersey can be imputed to
PVS.

Plaintiff argues that PVS is nothing more than Power

Mechanical’s machine shop, and whether viewed from an agency
standpoint or a veil-piercing standpoint, Power Mechanical
controls the activities of PVS, including the adoption and use
of the infringing trademark.

Thus, because Power Mechanical

completely controls PVS, Plaintiff argues that it is Power
Mechanical’s contacts with New Jersey that matter for purposes
of jurisdiction.
As to Power Mechanical’s contacts with New Jersey,
Plaintiff contends:
•

Power Mechanical conducts substantial business in locations
throughout New Jersey.

•

Power Mechanical provides boiler rentals lasting several
months, it bids for projects in New Jersey, it buys used
boilers from New Jersey, and it sells equipment to

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customers in New Jersey.
•

Power Mechanical communicates with New Jersey customers and
assists with state-specific concerns such as welding
certification requirements.

•

The than 4000 pages of discovery prove that Power Mechanical
has purposely availed itself of this forum through its
repeated business transactions with New Jersey customers.

•

Plaintiff and Power Mechanical compete for the same
customers in New Jersey and elsewhere.

•

Power Mechanical sells equipment directly to Plaintiff in
New Jersey.

•

“Power Mechanical has adopted a mark for its department
Powerhouse Valve that infringes on Plaintiff’s rights.

It

cannot be said that Power Mechanical is being unexpectedly
haunted by its frequent boiler sales and rentals in New
Jersey by being made to defend a trademark infringement
suit against a competing New Jersey-based boiler company in
a New Jersey court.

The suit is directly related to the

competition between the two companies, which includes
significant business conducted in New Jersey.

Power

Mechanical enjoys the benefits and protections of New
Jersey’s laws when it rents and sells boilers and related
equipment to customers in New Jersey.

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It is perfectly fair

and reasonable for this Court to exercise jurisdiction over
Power Mechanical in a suit concerning trademark
infringement against a major New Jersey-based competitor.”
(Docket No. 41 at 30-31, 32-33.)
In response, Defendants reject Plaintiff’s argument that
PVS is a mere instrumentality or agent for Power Mechanical, but
even if it were, Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s position is
an attempt to support general jurisdiction rather than specific
jurisdiction.

Defendants contend that Plaintiff cannot

establish general jurisdiction under the facts or the law, and
Defendants further contend that the fatal flaw in Plaintiff’s
argument is the lack of any evidence that Defendants
purposefully directed their use of the allegedly infringing
trademark to New Jersey.
The Court agrees with Defendants.

With regard to

Plaintiff’s argument that Power Mechancial may be considered
one-and-the-same as PVS such that Power Mechanical’s contacts
may be imputed to PVS, the U.S. Supreme Court has squarely
rejected such a position in all but the most extraordinary
circumstances.

In Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 121

(2014), a group of Argentinian plaintiffs filed suit against in
California against Diamler, a German company that manufactures
Mercedes–Benz vehicles in Germany, arising out of alleged human

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rights violations that occurred Argentina.

Jurisdiction over

the lawsuit was predicated on the California contacts of
Mercedes–Benz USA, LLC (MBUSA), a subsidiary of Daimler
incorporated in Delaware with its principal place of business in
New Jersey.

MBUSA distributed Daimler-manufactured vehicles to

independent dealerships throughout the United States, including
California.
After a period of jurisdictional discovery, the district
court dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.
The district court found Daimler's own affiliations with
California were insufficient to support the exercise of allpurpose jurisdiction over the corporation, and the district
court declined to attribute MBUSA's California contacts to
Daimler on an agency theory, concluding that plaintiffs failed
to demonstrate that MBUSA acted as Daimler's agent.

Daimler,

571 at 124.
After the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.

Id.

The Supreme Court noted

that it had not yet addressed whether a foreign corporation may
be subjected to a court’s general jurisdiction based on the
contacts of its in-state subsidiary, but it observed that the
Ninth Circuit's agency theory appeared “to subject foreign
corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-

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state subsidiary or affiliate, an outcome that would sweep
beyond even the ‘sprawling view of general jurisdiction’ we
rejected in Goodyear [Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,
564 U.S. 915, 929 (2011).]”

Id.

The Supreme Court continued, finding “[e]ven if we were to
assume that MBUSA is at home in California, and further to
assume MBUSA’s contacts are imputable to Daimler, there would
still be no basis to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction in
California, for Daimler's slim contacts with the State hardly
render it at home there.”

Id. at 136.

The Supreme Court

explained that “Goodyear made clear that only a limited set of
affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to
all-purpose jurisdiction there”; “for an individual, the
paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the
individual's domicile; for a corporation, it is an equivalent
place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at
home.”

Id. (citations omitted).

“With respect to a

corporation, the place of incorporation and principal place of
business are paradigm bases for general jurisdiction,” and
“[t]hese bases afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear
and certain forum in which a corporate defendant may be sued on
any and all claims.”

Id. at 137 (quotations, citations, and

alterations omitted).

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The Supreme Court reiterated that for general jurisdiction
the focus is not on where the corporation “engages in a
substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business,”
which is the standard for specific jurisdiction, but instead
“instances in which the continuous corporate operations within a
state are so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit
on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from
those activities.”

Id. at 138 (quotations, citations, and

alterations omitted).

In other words, the Supreme Court

explained that all-purpose jurisdiction concerns whether the
corporation’s “affiliations with the State are so continuous and
systematic as to render it essentially at home in the forum
State.”

Id. (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted).

The Supreme Court concluded:
[N]either Daimler nor MBUSA is incorporated in California,
nor does either entity have its principal place of business
there. If Daimler's California activities sufficed to
allow adjudication of this Argentina-rooted case in
California, the same global reach would presumably be
available in every other State in which MBUSA's sales are
sizable. Such exorbitant exercises of all-purpose
jurisdiction would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants
“to structure their primary conduct with some minimum
assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render
them liable to suit.”
Id. at 139 (citation omitted).
In this case, even if the Court viewed PVS to be an agent
or instrumentality of Power Mechanical, Plaintiff has not

16

demonstrated that Power Mechanical can be considered “at home”
in New Jersey.

Just like Daimler and MBUSA, neither Power

Mechanical nor PVS is incorporated in New Jersey or has a
principal place of business in New Jersey.

Power Mechanical’s

contacts with New Jersey as described by Plaintiff concern
general business activities of selling boilers, which do not
relate to Plaintiff’s claims of trademark infringement.
Moreover, Power Mechanical’s contacts cannot be classified as so
substantial that they are akin to being a New Jersey-based
company.

“‘A corporation that operates in many places can

scarcely be deemed at home in all of them.’”

Malik v. Cabot Oil

& Gas Corporation, 710 F. App’x 561, 564 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting
Daimler, 571 U.S. at 139 n.20) (further explaining that
“[o]therwise, ‘at home’ would be synonymous with ‘doing
business’ tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved in
the United States”).
As the Third Circuit has recognized, it is “‘incredibly
difficult to establish general jurisdiction [over a corporation]
in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal
place of business.’”

Malik, 710 F. App’x at 564 (quoting

Chavez v. Dole Food Company, Inc., 836 F.3d 205, 223 (3d Cir.
2016) (quoting Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 768 F.3d
429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014)).

Power Mechanical’s performance of

17

its boiler services in New Jersey, among other states, does not
make this the “exceptional case” to extend general jurisdiction
to an entity that is not incorporated in New Jersey and does not
have any places of business in New Jersey.

See Daimler, 571

U.S. at 139 n.19 (“We do not foreclose the possibility that in
an exceptional case, a corporation's operations in a forum other
than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of
business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render
the corporation at home in that State.

But this case presents

no occasion to explore that question, because Daimler's
activities in California plainly do not approach that level.

It

is one thing to hold a corporation answerable for operations in
the forum State, quite another to expose it to suit on claims
having no connection whatever to the forum State.”).
Without the availability of general jurisdiction, Plaintiff
must establish specific jurisdiction over the Defendants in
order to maintain its case in this Court.

Plaintiff must show

that (1) Defendants purposefully availed themselves of the
privilege of conducting activities in New Jersey, Asahi Metal
Indus., 480 U.S. at 109; (2) Defendants’ contacts with New
Jersey arise from their alleged use of Plaintiff’s trademark,
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414; and (3) Defendants expressly
aimed their tortious conduct at New Jersey such that this forum

18

constitutes the focal point of the tortious activity, IMO
Industries, 155 F.3d at 266.
Plaintiff has not shown that Defendants’ alleged use of
Plaintiff’s trademark in the marketing for PVS is specifically
directed to New Jersey.

Plaintiff does not refute that PVS does

not perform relief valve work outside its machine shop in
Virginia, and that PVS has not, and cannot, perform any repairs
in New Jersey because of the special certification requirement.
Plaintiff also does not refute that PVS is only marketed to the
region within two hundred fifty miles of its location in Newport
News, Virginia, which includes North Carolina, Washington D.C.
and Maryland, but not New Jersey.

To the extent that Power

Mechanical’s website and trade show flier reveal or link
customers to the allegedly infringing PVS logo, Plaintiff has
not pointed to any evidence that Defendants have purposefully
targeted New Jersey in those marketing materials.
In addition to PVS’s complete lack of any contact with New
Jersey whatsoever, PVS’s alleged use of Plaintiff’s trademark in
PVS’s relief valve services is unrelated to the contact Power
Mechanical has with New Jersey because Power Mechanical does not
perform relief valve repair in New Jersey.

Additionally, any

presence of the allegedly infringing logo used by PVS in New
Jersey is incidental – and far from directly targeted to New

19

Jersey - because PVS has not and does not do any relief valve
repair work in New Jersey.
In short, Plaintiff has not met its burden of showing that
the Virginia-based Defendants’ alleged use of its trademark has
been expressly aimed at New Jersey so that this Court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over them.
At this juncture, the Court must decide whether to dismiss
Plaintiff’s complaint or transfer it to another court that can
exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants.

The applicable

statutory provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1631, which governs transfer
when there is “a want of jurisdiction.”

See Chavez, 836 F.3d at

224 (explaining that where a court determines that personal
jurisdiction over the defendants is lacking, the determination
of whether to dismiss or transfer is governed by 28 U.S.C. §
1631 and not 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a), which concerns improper
venue).

Section 1631 provides in relevant part:

[Where a] court finds that there is a want of jurisdiction,
the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice,
transfer such action or appeal to any other such court . .
. in which the action or appeal could have been brought at
the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal
shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the
court to which it is transferred on the date upon which it
was actually filed in or noticed for the court from which
it is transferred.
28 U.S.C. § 1631 (“Transfer to cure want of jurisdiction”).
In this case, Defendants concede that personal jurisdiction

20

exists over them in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia.

The Court does not find any factors that

compel the harsh result of dismissal rather than transfer.

See,

e.g., Chavez, 836 F.3d at 224 (affirming the district court’s
finding that the defendant was not “at home” in Delaware under
general jurisdiction, but reversing the district court’s
dismissal, rather than transfer, of the action, finding that the
interests of justice supported transfer, particularly when the
plaintiff sought transfer to New Jersey in the event that the
district court determined that personal jurisdiction was lacking
in Delaware).

Consequently, the Court will transfer the action

to the Eastern District of Virginia.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, the Court finds that
personal jurisdiction over Defendants for Plaintiff’s claims
against them is lacking.

The Court will transfer the case to

the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.
An appropriate Order will be entered.

Date: July 25, 2019
At Camden, New Jersey

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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