VICTOR URBAN RENEWAL GROUP LLC v. THE CITY OF CAMDEN et al
Filing
13
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 3/31/19. (dd, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
VICTOR URBAN RENEWAL GROUP
LLC and DRANOFF PROPERTIES,
INC.,
1:18-cv-10841-NLH-AMD
OPINION
Plaintiffs,
v.
THE CITY OF CAMDEN, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
AARON RICHARD KRAUSS
COZEN O'CONNOR
1650 MARKET STREET
Ste. 2800
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
On behalf of Plaintiff
MICHAEL J. WATSON
WILLIAM M. TAMBUSSI
BROWN & CONNERY, LLP
360 HADDON AVE
P.O. BOX 539
WESTMONT, NJ 08108
On behalf of Defendants
HILLMAN, District Judge
This matter concerns claims by Plaintiffs, Victor Urban
Renewal Group LLC and Dranoff Properties, Inc., against the City
of Camden, among others, arising out of Plaintiffs’ attempt to
sell The Victor Building in Camden, New Jersey.
allege:
Plaintiffs
Victor Urban Renewal Group LLC came into the City of
Camden almost 16 years ago - long before any other
major developers even considered the possibility of
doing business in Camden - to redevelop The Victor
Building, a blighted and long-abandoned RCA
manufacturing facility on Camden’s waterfront, into a
thriving luxury apartment building. Despite being
turned down by 49 banks, Victor Urban Renewal was able
to complete the redevelopment and make The Victor
Building the keystone of Camden's revival. Absent the
tax exemptions granted by the City of Camden, Victor
Urban Renewal would not have been able to do so.
However, in a classic bait-and-switch, now that Victor
Urban Renewal has signed a contract to sell The Victor
Building for more than $71 million to Aimco One Market
Street Urban Renewal, LLC, the City of Camden, through
its officials such as Jason Asuncion and Michelle
Banks-Spearman, has refused to keep up its end of the
bargain and transfer the tax exemptions as it
contractually promised to do.”
(Amended Complaint, Docket No. 7 at 1-2.)
Plaintiffs claim that the City of Camden has breached its
contractual obligations and has deprived Victor Urban Renewal of
its property without due process of law.
Plaintiffs also claim
that in an effort to exert pressure on Victor Urban Renewal, the
City of Camden has acted in concert with the Camden
Redevelopment Agency to deny a related company – Dranoff
Properties, Inc. – the benefit of its option to buy the Radio
Lofts building in Camden. 1
(Id. at 2.)
Plaintiffs filed their original complaint on June 20, 2018.
1
Plaintiffs have brought claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and
New Jersey state law. This Court has jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ federal claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
2
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss on July 2, 2018.
20, 2018, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.
On July
Defendants
renewed their motion to dismiss on August 3, 2018, and that
motion is pending before the Court.
In addition to challenging
the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ claims under Federal Civil
Procedure Rule 12(b)(6), Defendants’ main basis for the
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint is the forum selection clause
in the parties’ agreements.
Defendants argue that the forum
selection clause requires any dispute between the parties to be
brought in New Jersey state court, and failing that, submitted
to arbitration.
On August 9, 2018, Plaintiffs filed their
opposition to Defendants’ motion, arguing, among other things,
that the forum selection clause is permissive and not mandatory,
thus causing their complaint filed in this Court to be proper.
While Defendants’ motion has been pending, Defendants filed
a complaint against Plaintiffs in New Jersey Superior Court, Law
Division, Camden County on December 10, 2018.
See City of
Camden, et al. vs Victor Urban Renewal, LLC, et al., Docket No.
CAM-L-004612-18.
On December 13, 2018, Victor Urban Renewal
moved to dismiss the City of Camden’s state court complaint,
arguing that under the entire controversy doctrine, Camden
should have filed counterclaims in this action rather than
institute a separate action in New Jersey state court.
The
state court judge denied that motion on January 11, 2019.
3
On January 22, 2019, Victor Urban Renewal filed an answer
in the state court action and asserted a counterclaim complaint
against the City of Camden. 2
On March 18, 2019, the state court
judge ordered the case to proceed with discovery.
This Courts sets forth the procedural history in this Court
and state court because it compels the dismissal of this action
for two reasons – the forum selection clause in the parties’
agreement and the Younger abstention doctrine.
1.
Forum Selection Clause
The Court must dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to
the parties’ forum selection clause in their agreement because
the Court is constrained to follow the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the exact same forum selection clause
in an urban renewal agreement containing tax exemptions.
The forum selection clause in the parties’ agreement
provides:
In the event of a breach of the within Agreement by either
of the parties hereto or a dispute arising, between the
parties in reference to the terms and provisions as set
forth herein, either party may apply to the Superior Court
of New Jersey by an appropriate proceeding, to settle and
resolve said dispute in such fashion as will tend to
2
On February 26, 2019, the City of Camden moved to dismiss one
of Victor Urban Renewal’s counterclaims. A motion hearing on
the City’s motion to dismiss was scheduled for March 15, 2019.
Victor Urban Renewal filed an amended answer and amended
counterclaims on March 11, 2019. On March 14, 2019, the City of
Camden withdrew its motion to dismiss, and indicated that it
reserved its right to renew its motion under the applicable
rules.
4
accomplish the purpose of the Long Term Act. In the event
the Superior Court shall not entertain jurisdiction, then
the parties shall submit the dispute to the American
Arbitration Association in Camden, New Jersey to be
determined in accordance with its rules and regulations. .
. .
(Financial Agreement ¶15(a), Docket No. 10-2 at 34-35.)
In McMahon v. City of Newark, 951 A.2d 185 (N.J. 2008), the
New Jersey Supreme Court was tasked with interpreting the
identical forum selection clause. 3
There, One Washington Urban
Renewal Association (the “Entity”) had entered into a financial
agreement with the City of Newark concerning the construction of
an urban renewal project.
The agreement was governed by what is
now called the Long Term Tax Exemption Law, N.J.S.A. 40A:20–1 to
–22 (“LTTEL”), which provides for certain tax exemptions for the
redeveloper. 4
Due to various events, the City cancelled the tax
abatement, and the receiver for the Entity filed a verified
complaint in New Jersey Superior Court seeking (1) a declaratory
judgment that “the purported cancellation of the tax abatement
was wrongful and therefore null and void;” (2) an order
requiring that the City, its finance department and its tax
3
The only difference between the clause in McMahon and the one
here is that in McMahon, any arbitration was to take place in
New York. McMahon, 951 A.2d at 188.
4
As discussed below, the Long Term Tax Exemption Law governs the
agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendants in this case.
5
assessor “reinstate the tax abatement retroactively ... and to
rescind all tax bills issued subsequent to its purported
cancellation of the tax abatement;” (3) an order requiring that
the City issue restated tax bills and properly account for all
payments made; (4) “[i]nterest, attorneys' fees and costs of
suit;” and (5) such other relief “as the Court may deem just and
proper.”
McMahon, 951 A.2d at 535-36.
Pursuant to a motion to dismiss filed by the City, the case
was transferred to the Tax Court.
Id. at 536.
The City then
moved for summary judgment, claiming that the cause was properly
before the Tax Court, and that the statute of limitations barred
the receiver's complaint.
The receiver opposed that motion,
arguing that because the action was one for breach of contract
and not a tax appeal, it was not cognizable in the Tax Court.
Id.
The Tax Court agreed with the City and dismissed the case.
Id. at 537.
The appellate division affirmed.
Id. at 539.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the lower courts’
decisions.
The court explained that if the receiver’s complaint
had addressed the quantum or methodology applied in respect of
the assessments issued by the City’s tax assessor, his complaint
would have fallen squarely within the band of cases subject to
the established tax appeal process, thus implicating the tax
appeal deadlines and the resulting lack of jurisdiction in the
Tax Court because of the receiver’s failure to file an appeal by
6
those deadlines.
Id. at 543-44.
The court found, however, that
the receiver’s complaint did not assert such claim, and instead
found:
At its core, this is a contract and estoppel case, nothing
more. The nature of plaintiff's challenge does not speak
to the issues uniquely cognizable within the tax appeal
process, but to the more fundamental question of whether
the tax assessor had the authority to determine
unilaterally that the bargained-for tax abatement was no
longer operative. Stated differently, plaintiff claims
that the City breached the financial agreement when the tax
assessor concluded that, because the Project had been
transferred to the Trust and no “transfer of the tax
abatement has been approved by the Newark Municipal
Council,” the financial agreement no longer was operative
and the Project could be separately taxed and the Project
placed “on the 1997 Added/Omitted Assessment List.” . . .
. [T]he controversy presented by plaintiff is not
cognizable within the context of a tax appeal, but
constitutes instead, in the plain words of the financial
agreement, “a breach of the [financial a]greement by either
of the parties hereto or a dispute arising between the
parties in reference to the terms and provisions as set
forth [t]herein[.]”
Id. at 544-45.
Because the plaintiff’s claims against the City sounded in
contract, the court looked to the parties’ agreement, which
provided that “the forum for the resolution of that breach of
contract dispute was not by means of a tax appeal; Paragraph 7
of the financial agreement plainly sets forth that such dispute
is cognizable in the Superior Court or, failing Superior Court
jurisdiction, arbitration under the rules of the American
Arbitration Association.”
Id. at 545.
The court concluded that
“the parties bargained for and settled on a forum to resolve
7
that breach or dispute: either the Superior Court or, failing
that, arbitration.
We envision no reason these obviously
sophisticated parties should not be bound by the covenants into
which they freely and voluntarily entered.
bargain.”
We will enforce that
Id. at 546.
Defendants in this case argue that the New Jersey Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the identical forum selection clause
compels this Court to view it the same way, thus requiring
dismissal of Plaintiffs’ complaint because it was not filed in
the bargained-for forum.
In their opposition, Plaintiffs argue
that the McMahon case is distinguishable because the forum
selection clause in that case was decided in the context of
whether the tax court had jurisdiction over a case that did not
constitute a tax appeal.
Plaintiffs further argue that the
language in the forum selection clause regarding the forum for
bringing suit is permissive rather than mandatory – that is,
either party “may” apply to the Superior Court of New Jersey,
not either party “shall” apply to the Superior Court of New
Jersey.
Defendants respond that Plaintiffs’ interpretation
would render the forum selection clause meaningless because if
the forum of New Jersey Superior Court was simply an option to
other forums, there would be no purpose to the forum selection
clause being in the agreement at all.
The Court does not discount Plaintiffs’ argument that the
8
clause’s use of the word “may” instead of “shall” connotes a
permissive tone as to where a party “may apply” to “settle and
resolve” their dispute, and that if the parties intended New
Jersey Superior Court to be the only forum to resolve the
dispute, the clause could have been easily drafted to be more
definitive.
But as the court in McMahon observed, “[T]he
judicial task is clear: the court must discern and implement the
common intention of the parties [and its] role is to consider
what is written in the context of the circumstances at the time
of drafting and to apply a rational meaning in keeping with the
expressed general purpose.”
McMahon, 951 A.2d at 197 (citation
omitted).
This Court agrees with the New Jersey Supreme Court that
the parties intended the forum in which to resolve any breach or
dispute to be either the New Jersey Superior Court or, failing
that, arbitration. 5
The Court views the permissive nature of
“may” as addressing a party’s option of whether or not to bring
a proceeding against the other party, rather than a party’s
option regarding where to bring that proceeding.
The forum
selection clause would simply lose any rational purpose or
5
Although federal law controls the question of whether to
enforce a forum selection clause, “[Third Circuit] case law
directs [a federal court] to use state law to determine the
scope of a forum selection clause. . . .” In re McGraw-Hill
Global Education Holdings LLC, 909 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 2018)
(citations omitted).
9
meaning if it were intended to state the obvious state of
affairs without such a clause – namely that the parties could
choose any forum to resolve their disputes.
Consequently, because the parties did not select this Court
as a forum to resolve their dispute over their agreements, and
New Jersey Superior Court is a viable forum, the Court must
dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint.
See Atlantic Marine Const. Co.,
Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Western Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S.
49, 66 (2013) (explaining that “the appropriate way to enforce a
forum-selection clause pointing to a state or foreign forum is
through the doctrine of forum non conveniens,” rather than
through a transfer of venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), and
“[w]hen parties have contracted in advance to litigate disputes
in a particular forum, courts should not unnecessarily disrupt
the parties' settled expectations,” and “[i]n all but the most
unusual cases, therefore, ‘the interest of justice’ is served by
holding parties to their bargain”); id. at 64 (“When parties
agree to a forum-selection clause, they waive the right to
challenge the preselected forum as inconvenient or less
convenient for themselves or their witnesses, or for their
pursuit of litigation.
A court accordingly must deem the
private-interest factors to weigh entirely in favor of the
preselected forum.”); see also Podesta v. Hanzel, 684 F. App’x
213, 216 (3d Cir. 2017) (referencing Atlantic Marine and finding
10
that although “a party may move under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to
transfer a case to another federal court based on a valid forum
selection clause, a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is also an
acceptable means of enforcing such a clause when the clause
allows for suit in either a state or federal forum); Salovaara
v. Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 289, 298 (3d Cir. 2001)
(explaining that transfer is not available when a forum
selection clause specifies a non-federal forum, and in that
case, “it seems the district court would have no choice but to
dismiss the action so it can be filed in the appropriate forum
so long as dismissal would be in the interests of justice”).
2.
Younger abstention doctrine
Even if the forum selection clause was permissive as
Plaintiffs argue and this Court is a proper venue for their
case, the Court is compelled to abstain from considering the
matter under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). 6
The Younger
abstention doctrine “reflects a strong federal policy against
federal-court interference with pending state judicial
proceedings absent extraordinary circumstances.”
Cresci v. BCB
Community Bank, 728 F. App’x 145, 148 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting
Gwynedd Properties, Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Twp., 970 F.2d 1195,
6
Abstention doctrines may be raised by the court sua sponte.
Gray v. Paqano, 287 F. App’x 155, 157 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
O'Neill v. City of Phila., 32 F.3d 785, 786 n.1 (3d Cir.1994)).
11
1200 (3d Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
A
federal court should abstain under the Younger doctrine when
there are (1) ongoing state proceedings that are judicial, (2)
the proceedings implicate important state interests, and (3) the
proceedings afford an adequate opportunity to raise the federal
claims.
Id. (citing Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden
State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)) (other citation
omitted).
In these circumstances, federal courts should abstain
unless there is a showing of “bad faith, harassment, or some
other extraordinary circumstance that would make abstention
inappropriate[.]”
Id. (quoting Middlesex County Ethics Comm.,
457 U.S. at 435).
All three requirements for abstention under Younger are
satisfied here, and there is no showing of bad faith,
harassment, or other extraordinary circumstance to weigh against
abstention.
For the first factor, the same controversy between
Plaintiffs and Defendants is currently pending in New Jersey
state court.
Even though the state court action was instituted
several months after this action, the Younger abstention
doctrine is still applicable when no “proceedings of substance
on the merits” have taken place in federal court, and the
federal action is still in its “embryonic stage.”
Tucker v. Ann
Klein Forensic Center, 174 F. App’x 695, 697 (3d Cir. 2006)
(quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975); Doran v.
12
Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 929 (1975); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v.
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 238 (1984) (concluding that the federal
action should be dismissed in favor of the state action if there
have been no “proceedings on the merits . . . in the federal
court”)).
Plaintiffs’ amended complaint is at the motion to
dismiss stage here, while the state court has denied Victor
Urban Renewal’s motion to dismiss the City’s state court
complaint against it in favor of the federal action, and the
state court action has proceeded to discovery.
Thus, the first
element of abstention under Younger is satisfied.
As to the second factor, the heart of the dispute arises
from tax exemptions provided under New Jersey’s LTTEL.
The
LTTEL permits municipalities to “agree with private entities for
the private entities to undertake redevelopment projects in
return for tax exemptions,” and “provides a new partnership
between the public and private sectors to redevelop and
rehabilitate New Jersey's urban centers, older suburbs, and
other communities that are in need of redevelopment.”
N.J.S.A.
40A:20-1, Senate County and Municipal Government Committee
Statement. 7
7
The LTTLE’s Legislative findings and declarations further
provide,
The Legislature finds that in the past a number of laws
have been enacted to provide for the clearance, replanning,
development, and redevelopment of blighted areas pursuant
13
In Plaintiffs’ complaint here, and in their counterclaims
in New Jersey state court, Plaintiffs claim that the tax
exemptions provided by the LTTEL enabled the redevelopment of
The Victor Building, and the City of Camden’s refusal to grant
the transfer of the tax exemptions to a prospective buyer of The
Victor Building is fatal to the sale.
The City’s claims against
Victor Urban Renewal and its related entities also center around
their alleged violations of the LTTEL, and it seeks a
to Article VIII, Section III, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey
Constitution. These laws had as their public purpose the
restoration of deteriorated or neglected properties to a
use resulting in the elimination of the blighted condition,
and sought to encourage private capital and participation
by private enterprise to contribute toward this purpose
through the use of special financial arrangements,
including the granting of property tax exemptions with
respect to land and the buildings, structures,
infrastructure and other valuable additions to and
amelioration of land, provided that the construction or
rehabilitation of buildings, structures, infrastructure and
other valuable additions to and amelioration of land
constitute improvements to blighted conditions. The
Legislature finds that these laws, separately enacted,
contain redundant and unnecessary provisions, or provisions
which have outlived their usefulness, and that it is
necessary to revise, consolidate and clarify the law in
this area in order to preserve and improve the usefulness
of the law in promoting the original public purpose.
The Legislature declares that the provisions of this act
are one means of accomplishing the redevelopment and
rehabilitation purposes of the “Local Redevelopment and
Housing Law,” P.L.1992, c. 79 (C.40A:12A-1 et al.) through
the use of private entities and financial arrangements
pertaining thereto, and that this act should be construed
in conjunction with that act.
N.J.S.A. 40A:20-2.
14
declaratory judgment for noncompliance with the terms of the
parties’ agreements, which were fashioned pursuant to the terms
of the LTTEL. 8
(See CAM-L-004612-18 at Docket Entry 1.)
The
New Jersey’s Legislature’s oversight of how municipalities may
offer tax incentives to private entities in exchange for
redevelopment is an important interest of the State of New
Jersey.
See Ocean Grove Camp Meeting Ass'n of United Methodist
Church v. Vespa-Papaleo, 339 F. App’x 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2009)
(quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv. Inc. v. Council of New Orleans,
491 U.S. 350, 365 (1989)) (explaining that when evaluating
Younger's second prong, a court must look to “the importance of
the generic proceedings to the state,” not to the specific
concern of the particular proceeding). 9
8
See, e.g., N.J.S.A. 40A:20-9, Financial agreement; form and
contents; N.J.S.A. 40A:20-10, Optional provisions of financial
agreement; municipal consent to sale and continuation of
exemption.
9
As the New Jersey Supreme Court explained:
Taxation of real property in New Jersey is of
constitutional dimension. In addition to requiring that
“[p]roperty shall be assessed for taxation under general
laws and by uniform rules[,]” N.J. Const. art. VIII, § 1, ¶
1(a), New Jersey's Constitution requires that “[a]ll real
property assessed and taxed ... shall be assessed according
to the same standard of value, [and] shall be taxed at the
general tax rate of the taxing district in which the
property is situated, for the use of such taxing district.”
Ibid.
A comprehensive statutory scheme seeks to implement that
constitutional mandate. Thus, the Legislature has required
15
Finally, the third prong of Younger abstention is met
because the state court action affords Plaintiffs the ability to
raise their federal due process claims there.
Younger requires
only “an opportunity to present federal claims in a state
proceeding,” and the “burden on this point rests on the federal
plaintiff to show that state procedural law bar[s] presentation
of its claims.”
Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 670–71 (3d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 337 (1977);
Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1987)).
By
Plaintiffs already filing a counterclaim complaint in state
court which includes claims under § 1983 for due process
violations, it is clear that Plaintiffs are not barred from
proceeding on those claims there.
See Bennett v. White, 865
F.2d 1395, 1406 (3d Cir. 1989) (“State courts have concurrent
jurisdiction with the federal courts over section 1983
actions.”) (citing Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 67 (1947) (state
courts of general jurisdiction are under constitutional
obligation to enforce federal causes of action); Mondou v. New
York New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 32 (1912)
(same)).
The rule in Younger is designed to “permit state courts to
that all real property taxes in New Jersey be assessed
annually at the local or municipal level.
McMahon v. City of Newark, 951 A.2d 185, 194 (N.J. 2008).
16
try state cases free from interference by federal courts,
particularly where the party to the federal case may fully
litigate his claim before the state court.”
New Jersey-
Philadelphia Presbytery of the Bible Presbyterian Church v. New
Jersey State Bd. of Higher Educ., 654 F.2d 868, 897 (3d Cir.
1981) (quoting Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975)
(quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 43)).
Here, not only did the
parties choose New Jersey state court as a forum for any dispute
arising from their agreements, it is the proper forum for the
dispute even if they did not.
See Middlesex County Ethics
Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 437 (1982)
(“It would trivialize the principles of comity and federalism if
federal courts failed to take into account that an adequate
state forum for all relevant issues has clearly been
demonstrated to be available prior to any proceedings on the
merits in federal court.”). 10
10
The same analysis also implicates the Colorado River abstention
doctrine. “[A]bstention under the Colorado River doctrine is
appropriate under principles of ‘wise judicial administration,
giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and
comprehensive disposition of litigation.’” Chambers v. Wells
Fargo Bank, N.A., 726 F. App’x. 886, 888 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting
Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 817 (1976)). Whether abstention under Colorado River
is appropriate is a two-part inquiry: First, is there a parallel
state proceeding that raises substantially identical claims and
nearly identical allegations and issues? If so, does the action
present extraordinary circumstances by evaluating the following
factors: “(1) [in an in rem case,] which court first assumed
jurisdiction over [the] property; (2) the inconvenience of the
17
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs are already pursuing the same claims brought
here in state court as a counterclaim complaint, and the New
Jersey state court, having already declined to dismiss the City
of Camden’s complaint in favor of this litigation, has taken on
the task of assessing the relative merits of the parties’
claims.
A federal trial court should be loath to step in where
an adequate forum exists in state court and the issues to be
litigated implicate important matters of state and local policy.
Based on the parties’ forum selection clause and to promote
comity between state and federal courts, Plaintiffs’ complaint
must be dismissed.
The proper venue for the claims in this
matter is the New Jersey state court.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
Date: March 31, 2019
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
federal forum; (3) the desirability of avoiding piecemeal
litigation; (4) the order in which jurisdiction was obtained;
(5) whether federal or state law controls; and (6) whether the
state court will adequately protect the interests of the
parties.” Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. George
V. Hamilton, Inc., 571 F.3d 299, 308 (3d Cir. 2009) (other
citations omitted).
18
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