BITTNER et al v. WATERFORD TOWNSHIP SCHOOL DISTRICT et al
Filing
122
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 4/13/2021. (rss, )
[Case No. 18-10990, Docket No. 110]
[Case No. 18-12084, Docket No. 96]
[Case No. 18-12121, Docket No. 96]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
DANIEL BITTNER and PAULINE
BITTNER,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 18-10990 (RMB/KMW)
OPINION
WATERFORD TOWNSHIP SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
PATRICIA CHIODI,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 18-12084 (RMB/KMW)
v.
WATERFORD TOWNSHIP SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants.
DEBORAH BORRELLI and DAVID
BORRELLI,
Plaintiffs,
v.
Civil No. 18-12121 (RMB/KMW)
OPINION
WATERFORD TOWNSHIP SCHOOL
DISTRICT, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
SAUL J. STEINBERG
ZUCKER STEINBERG & WIXTED, PC
415 FEDERAL STREET
CAMDEN, NEW JERSEY 08103
On behalf of Plaintiffs Daniel Bittner, Pauline Bittner,
Patricia Chiodi, Deborah Borrelli, and David Borrelli
ROSHAN DEVEN SHAH
ANDERSON & SHAH, LLC
457 HADDONFIELD ROAD
CHERRY HILL, NEW JERSEY 08002
On behalf of Defendants Waterford Township Board of
Education, Roseanna Iles, Francis Dirocco, Marie Yeatman,
Robert Walsh, and Ava Suriani
ANDREW WEI LI
PARKER MCCAY, P.A.
9000 MIDLANTIC DRIVE
SUITE 3000
MOUNT LAUREL, NEW JERSEY 08054
On behalf of Defendant Jason Eitner
ASHLEY LAUREN TOTH and MATTHEW J. BEHR
MARSHALL, DENNEHEY, WARNER, COLEMAN & GOGGIN
15000 MIDLANTIC DRIVE
SUITE 200
P.O. BOX 5429
MOUNT LAUREL, NEW JERSEY 08054
On behalf of Third-Party Defendant New Jersey School Boards
Association
RENÉE MARIE BUMB, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court on the Motions to Dismiss
Third-Party
Plaintiffs’
Complaints
brought
by
Third-Party
Defendant New Jersey School Boards Association (“NJSBA”). For the
2
reasons expressed below, the Court will grant NJSBA’s Motions, in
part, and deny them, in part.
I.
BACKGROUND1
These cases (the “Cases”) stem from the hiring of Defendant
Jason Eitner to be the Superintendent of co-Defendant/Third-Party
Plaintiff
improperly
Waterford
pled
as
Township
Board
“Waterford
of
Education
Township
School
(the
“BOE,”
District”).
Plaintiffs are all employees or former employees of the District
who allege that they were discriminated against by Eitner during
his time as Superintendent.2 The Motions before the Court stem from
the Third-Party Complaints filed by the BOE in each of the Cases
before the Court.3 The BOE alleges that it entered into a Standard
Superintendent Search Agreement (the “Agreement”) with the NJSBA
on April 3, 2015. [Third-Party Complaints, ¶ 1.] The Agreement
1
This factual background is taken from the Complaints, exhibits
attached thereto, and matters of public record. See Schmidt v.
Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that a court may
“generally consider only the allegations contained in the
complaint, exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public
record”) (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol.
Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
2
There
For the
between
each of
each of
are three suits pending before the Court, as listed above.
purposes of this Opinion, the Court will not differentiate
the three Cases, as the Third-Party Complaints filed in
them, as well as the reasoning for the Court’s decision on
the Motions to Dismiss, are essentially identical.
3
These Third-Party Complaints were also brought by Roseanna Iles,
Francis DiRocco, Maria Yeatman, Robert Walsh, and Eva Suriani.
However, those individuals conceded that their claims can be
dismissed. Therefore, the Court will dismiss their claims.
3
allegedly provided that the BOE would pay the NJSBA $6,850 for, in
essence, assisting the BOE in its search for a new Superintendent.
[See id., ¶¶ 1-6.] Specifically, the BOE alleges that
NJSBA was required to perform superintendent search
services including an initial visit, obtain community
and staff input, develop criteria, provide an initial
report, secure candidates, process applications, provide
a second report, screen applicants including delivering
search materials to [the BOE] and provide a transition
workshop within 90 days of the superintendent’s
commencement of services.
[Id., ¶ 6.]
The BOE alleges that the NJSBA breached the Agreement because
it
did
not
“properly
evaluate
the
qualifications
of
the
applicants,” nor did it “properly screen” the applicants. [Id., ¶¶
7-8.] Ultimately, the BOE hired Eitner for the position with the
assistance of the NJSBA. [Id., ¶ 9.] The BOE relies on Plaintiffs’
Complaints, which allege that “Eitner . . . had previously been
placed on leave as the Assistant Principal at Long Valley Middle
School and that Long Valley declined to discuss the circumstances
involved in Eitner’s leave of absence or resignation.” [Id.] The
BOE also alleges that Eitner was the subject of a grievance,
including “a claim of alleged harassment similar to those now
raised by” Plaintiffs, while he “was employed at the Lower Alloways
Creek school district from 2013 to 2015.” [Id., ¶ 12-13.] The BOE
alleges that the NJSBA never notified the BOE of this, even though
the NJSBA “knew about . . . or should have known about” Eitner’s
4
prior employment history. [Id., ¶¶ 10-11, 14-15.] Plaintiffs’
Complaints
now
allege
that
the
BOE,
inter
alia,
“act[ed]
negligently, carelessly and/or in a palpably unreasonable manner
in hiring Eitner.” [Id., ¶ 16.] In its Third-Party Complaint, the
BOE places the blame on the NJSBA, who it alleges “failed to
perform
[its]
contractual
duties
to
[the
BOE]
including
the
screening and evaluation of qualifications of potential candidates
for superintendent including candidate Eitner.” [Id., ¶ 17.] This,
the BOE argues, constituted a breach of the Agreement and caused
the BOE to suffer damages. [Id., ¶ 19.] Therefore, the BOE seeks
compensatory damages and costs and attorneys’ fees, plus interest.
[See id.]
The BOE filed its Third-Party Complaints in each of the Cases
on January 24, 2020. They each allege one count of breach of
contract against the NJSBA. The NJSBA filed its Motions to Dismiss
on October 23, 2020. The BOE timely responded on November 23, 2020.
Finally, the NJSBA timely replied on November 30, 2020. The ThirdParty
Complaints,
Motions,
Responses,
and
Replies
are
all
essentially identical, respectively, across the three Cases.
II.
STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court must accept all well-pleaded
allegations in the complaint as true and view them in the light
5
most favorable to the plaintiff. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347,
351
(3d
Cir.
2005).
It
is
well-settled
that
a
pleading
is
sufficient if it contains “a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P.
8(a)(2).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff’s
obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to
relief’ requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do . . .
.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration
in original) (citations omitted) (citing Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. Of Psychiatry & Neurology,
Inc., 40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); Papasan v. Allain, 478
U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a court
must take three steps. First, the court must “tak[e]
note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a
claim.” Second, the court should identify allegations
that, “because they are no more than conclusions, are
not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Third, “whe[n]
there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court
should assume their veracity and then determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.”
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (alterations
in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662, 664, 675, 679 (2009)). A court may “generally consider
only the allegations contained in the complaint, exhibits attached
6
to the complaint and matters of public record.” Schmidt, 770 F.3d
at 249 (citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 998 F.2d at 1196).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks “not
whether
a
plaintiff
will
ultimately
prevail
but
whether
the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 236 (1974)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (“Our decision
in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all civil actions’
. . . .”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir.
2009) (“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail in the coffin for the
‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to federal complaints
before Twombly.”). “A motion to dismiss should be granted if the
plaintiff is unable to plead ‘enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face.’” Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).
III. ANALYSIS
In New Jersey, “[t]o state a claim for breach of contract, [a
plaintiff] must allege (1) a contract between the parties; (2) a
breach of that contract; (3) damages flowing therefrom; and (4)
that the party stating the claim performed its own contractual
obligations.” Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 203 (3d Cir.
2007); see also Lukoil N. Am. LLC v. Turnersville Petroleum Inc.,
Civil No. 14-3810 (RMB/AMD), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50088, at *15
(D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2015) (listing the same first three elements —
7
contract, breach, and damages — and noting that “[o]ther Courts in
this Circuit have required a fourth element: that the party
asserting the claim for breach of contract allege that it was
performing its obligations under the contract”).
The NJSBA’s Motions to Dismiss puts forth three arguments.
First, NJSBA argues that the Individual Defendants cannot state a
claim because they were not parties to the contract, which was
between only the NJSBA and the BOE. [Motions, at 7.] As noted
above,
the
BOE
conceded
this
argument
and
the
Individual
Defendants’ claims will be dismissed. [Responses, at 6.]
Second, the NJSBA argues that the BOE fails to allege that it
performed
its
duties
under
the
contract.
[Motions,
at
6-7.]
Howeover, the BOE explicitly alleges in the Third-Party Complaints
that it “paid in full the payment owed to [the] NJSBA.” [ThirdParty Complaints, ¶ 4.] That satisfies the fourth element of a
breach of contract claim. See Rotante v. Franklin Lakes Bd. of
Educ., Civil Action No. 13-3380 (JLL)(JAD), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
162670, at *18 (D.N.J. Nov. 20, 2014) (dismissing a breach of
contract claim because the plaintiff “fail[ed] to provide any facts
which point to the Plaintiff performing his own contractual duties”
(emphasis
added)).
Because
Plaintiff
has
alleged
facts
that
suggest that it performed its obligations under the Agreement, the
NJSBA’s argument with respect to this element is unavailing and
the Third-Party Complaints will not be dismissed on that basis.
8
Finally, the NJSBA argues that the BOE should be precluded
from seeking any damages in excess of $6,850 — the contract price.
[Motions, at 7-10.] The NJSBA argues that any damages beyond the
contract price were not foreseeable to the parties at the time of
the Agreement. [Id.] The NJSBA is correct that a breaching party’s
liability is limited to foreseeable damages. See Totaro, Duffy,
Cannova & Co., L.L.C. v. Lane, Middleton & Co., L.L.C., 921 A.2d
1100, 1107-08 (N.J. 2007) (“Under contract law, a party who
breaches a contract is liable for all of the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of that contract.” (quoting Pickett v.
Lloyd’s, 621 A.2d 445, 454 (N.J. 1993)). This, the New Jersey
Supreme Court has noted, effectuates the goal of compensatory
damages “to put the injured party in as good a position as . . .
if performance had been rendered.” Id. at 1108 (quoting Donovan v.
Bachstadt, 453 A.2d 160, 165 (N.J. 1982)). “What that position is
depends upon what the parties reasonably expected. It follows that
the defendant is not chargeable for loss that he did not have
reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when the
contract was made.” Id. (quoting Donovan, 453 A.2d at 444).
However, under certain circumstances, a plaintiff can recover
attorneys’
fees
and
costs
in
a
breach
of
contract
case.
“A
plaintiff has the right to recover attorney’s fees incurred in
other litigation with a third person, if he became involved in
that litigation as a result of a breach of contract or tortious
9
act by the present defendant.” In re Estate of Lash, 776 A.2d 765,
771-72 (N.J. 2001) (citation omitted). As above, “[i]f a breach of
contract is the cause of litigation between the plaintiff and third
parties that the defendant had reason to foresee when the contract
was
made,
the
plaintiff’s
reasonable
expenditures
in
such
litigation are included in estimating his damages.” Verhagen v.
Platt, 61 A.2d 892, 895 (N.J. 1948).
Therefore,
the
question
foreseeability.
The
BOE
of
argues
damages
that
the
turns
entirely
damages
here
on
were
foreseeable because the NJSBA knew or should have known about
Eitner’s spotty work history. The BOE argues that Eitner’s past
behaviors made it foreseeable that if he was hired, he would engage
in the behavior Plaintiffs allege he engaged in, and the BOE would
be sued by Plaintiffs.
At this stage, the Court finds that, accepting the BOE’s
allegations to be true and viewing them in the light most favorable
to the BOE, the allegations in the Third-Party Complaint are
sufficient to “entitle[]” the BOE “to offer evidence to support
the claim.” See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer, 416
U.S. at 236).4 Therefore, the Court will not grant that aspect of
the NJSBA’s Motions, either.
4
The Court is unconvinced by the NJSBA’s argument that the economic
loss doctrine prohibits the BOE from recovering more than the
contract amount. If the BOE proves its claims, its damages will be
limited to the amount that was reasonably foreseeable at the time
10
IV.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons expressed above, the Court will deny the
NJSBA’s Motions to Dismiss. An accompanying Order shall issue.
April 13, 2021
Date
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge
the parties entered the contract. To put a cap on that amount,
given the above analysis, would be inappropriate.
11
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?