LIONEL v. AMAZON.COM, INC.
Filing
15
OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 1/24/2020. (dmr)(n.m.)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
LIONEL J. MISSOURI,
Civil No. 19-13525(RMB/JS)
Plaintiff,
OPINION
v.
AMAZON.COM, INC.,
Defendant.
APPEARANCES:
LIONEL J. MISSOURI
1 MILLBANK COURT
VOORHEES, NJ ZIP
Pro se.
JAMES N. BOUDREAU
CHRISTIANA L. SIGNS
GREENBERG TRAURIG LLP
1717 ARCH STREET
SUITE 400
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19103
On behalf of Defendant Amazon.com, Inc.
BUMB, District Judge
This case concerns a pro se suit by a former employee of
Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”).
Currently before the Court is
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss.
For the reasons discussed
herein, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss will be granted, the
Complaint will be dismissed without prejudice, and Plaintiff
will be granted leave to file an Amended Complaint.
BACKGROUND
The facts of this matter are not disputed by the parties.
In the fall of 2018, Plaintiff Lionel J. Missouri sought and
obtained an “at-will” employee position at an Amazon warehouse
in Bellmawr, New Jersey.
Mr. Missouri intended to work
overnight shifts for Amazon on a part-time basis to supplement
the income from his daytime job working in downtown
Philadelphia.
Mr. Missouri was instructed to use an Amazon
online portal, by means of which which employees can review
shift availability and sign up for desired timeslots.
After
working for three days in early November 2018, however, Mr.
Missouri was unable to obtain subsequent overnight shifts, due
to an apparent lack of availability of shifts which matched his
desired hours.
After trying, and failing, to obtain additional shifts over
the course of several weeks, Mr. Missouri contacted Amazon Human
Resources via email on November 26, 2018.
That same day, he
received an initial response from an Amazon HR representative,
Ms. Caitlyn HayGlass, requesting a copy of his offer letter for
her review.
Mr. Missouri responded on November 27 and attached
a copy of that letter.
More than a month passed, during which time Mr. Missouri
experienced a continuing inability to acquire shifts that met
his desired time parameters.
He did not have further contact
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with Amazon HR, however, until January 14, 2019.
On that date,
Mr. Missouri wrote a lengthy email to Ms. HayGlass.
This email
was prompted by Mr. Missouri’s discovery of deposits made by
Amazon into his bank account – deposits which he presumed had
been made in error, as he had not worked any shifts for Amazon
in over two months.
In that same email, Mr. Missouri took the
opportunity to reiterate his frustration with the Amazon shift
acquisition process.
Ms. HayGlass responded via email on January 15.
She
indicated to Mr. Missouri that she had initiated an
investigation into the provenance of the bank deposits.
She
also requested further information from Mr. Missouri regarding
his concerns with his Amazon employment.
Mr. Missouri responded
briefly that same day, but did not provide any additional
information to Ms. HayGlass.
Instead, he expressed his general
disappointment with his experience as an Amazon employee.
After further email communication between Amazon
representatives and Mr. Missouri, and while the investigation
into the bank deposits was still apparently in progress, Mr.
Missouri submitted his notice of resignation, via a January 21
email to Ms. HayGlass.
Ms. HayGlass replied via email that same day, accepting Mr.
Missouri’s resignation and expressing sympathy to him for the
fact that available shifts had not coincided with his own
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availability.
She also assured him that he had earned the money
deposited in his account, which her investigation had revealed
consisted of pay for orientation and training, as well as the
November and December holidays.
On April 15, 2019, Mr. Missouri filed a Complaint against
Amazon in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Civil Division,
Camden County, alleging that on November 27, 2018 Amazon had
“violated its own policy against [its] employee.”
In his
Complaint, Mr. Missouri made reference to both the “Amazon
Owner’s Manual and Guide to Employment – December 2017”
(hereinafter the “Amazon Employment Manual” or the “Manual”) and
his initial November 26, 2018 email to Human Resources, which he
referred to as “his grievance as an employee of Amazon.”
ANALYSIS
A.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1332, as there is complete diversity between Plaintiff
and Defendants and the amount in controversy is alleged to
exceed $75,000.
B.
Standard for Motion to Dismiss
When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a court
must accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as
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true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 351 (3d Cir. 2005).
It is well
settled that a pleading is sufficient if it contains “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief.”
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a
plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his
‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more than labels and
conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do . . . .”
Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted) (first citing Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
47 (1957); Sanjuan v. Am. Bd. of Psychiatry & Neurology, Inc.,
40 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 1994); and then citing Papasan v.
Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint, a
court must take three steps.
First, the court must
“tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to
state a claim.”
Second, the court should identify
allegations that, “because they are no more than
conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of
truth.” Third, “whe[n] there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and
then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an
entitlement for relief.”
Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (alterations
in original) (citations omitted) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
5
U.S. 662, 664, 675, 679 (2009)).
A court may “generally
consider only the allegations contained in the complaint,
exhibits attached to the complaint and matters of public
record.”
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014)
(citing Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus.,
Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993)).
A district court, in weighing a motion to dismiss, asks
“not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the
claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claim.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 n.8 (quoting Scheuer v. Rhoades, 416
U.S. 232, 236 (1974)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (“Our
decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for ‘all
civil actions’ . . . .”); Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Iqbal . . . provides the final nail in
the coffin for the ‘no set of facts’ standard that applied to
federal complaints before Twombly.”).
“A motion to dismiss
should be granted if the plaintiff is unable to plead ‘enough
facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’”
Malleus, 641 F.3d at 563 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570).
The Third Circuit, however, has noted that “[t]he
obligation to liberally construe a pro se litigant’s pleadings
is well-established.”
Higgs v. Atty. Gen. of the U.S., 655 F.3d
333 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106
6
(1976) and Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)); see
also Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting
that the Third Circuit has “traditionally given pro se litigants
greater leeway where they have not followed the technical rules
of pleading and procedure.”).
When a plaintiff files a
complaint pro se and is faced with a motion to dismiss, “unless
amendment would be futile, the District Court must give a
plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint.”
Phillips v.
County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J.))
(emphasis added).
This is the case even when leave to amend has
not been sought; in such a situation, a district court is
directed to set a time period for leave to amend.
Shane, 213
F.3d at 116 (citing Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950,
951 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976)).
C.
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss
Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for failure to
state a claim.
It approaches Plaintiff’s complaint under the
assumption that, absent reference to any state or federal law or
common law cause of action, Mr. Missouri may have attempted to
allege a “breach of implied employment contract” claim. (Def’s
Motion Brief at 5.)
Defendant argues that the Amazon Employment
Manual does not create an implied contract, is due to its
explicit, immediate, and reiterated disclaimer of formation of a
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contract.
Defendant argues that such disclaimers mean that Mr.
Missouri could not have reasonably believed that the Manual
constituted a legally binding contract.
Moreover, Defendant
argues that Mr. Missouri has failed to allege breach by Amazon
of any such contract, as the Complaint acknowledges that Amazon
HR responded to his communications, albeit neither within the
timeframe he would have liked, nor to his ultimate satisfaction.
Defendant notes that the Manual contains no promises regarding
the timeframe for resolution of employee complaints, nor any
regarding outcomes.
Plaintiff opposes Defendants’ motion.
not cite to any state or federal law.
In so doing, he does
Rather, he states
repeatedly that “Plaintiff asserts his matter involves his
Grievance / Employment Act 2002.”
8.
See, e.g., Pltf.’s Opp. at 6-
This appears to be an invocation of an Act of the British
Parliament which amended labor laws in the United Kingdom.
Plaintiff repeatedly disclaims potential legal arguments
referenced in Defendant’s brief.
See, e.g., Pltf. Opp. at 6
(“Plaintiff in the aforementioned and present matter did not
allege a claim of wrongful termination and nor was Plaintiff
terminated”); id. at 7 (“Plaintiff in the aforementioned and
present matter did not allege a claim of breach of contract”);
id. at 8 (“Plaintiff did not allege a claim of an Employment
Contract nor did Plaintiff make an implication”); see also id.
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at 6 (asserting that a case cited by Defendant “has no relevancy
in the matter” because it “involves a Plaintiff’s claim in lieu
of a contract between the parties . . . and whether or not
Defendant breached their contractual obligations.”).
a. Whether the Complaint States a Claim Upon Which Relief
Can Be Granted
The Court agrees with Defendant that Plaintiff’s Complaint,
even when read in conjunction with the supporting documentation
provided and in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, does
not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
As noted
above, Plaintiff does not allege termination, wrongful or
otherwise, by Amazon.
Nor does he allege that Amazon violated
any New Jersey or federal statute, or breached any supposed
duty, in its treatment of him.
Defendant presents perhaps the most charitable
interpretation of Plaintiff’s position: that Amazon HR’s failure
to address Mr. Missouri’s complaint regarding shift allocation
in a timeframe and with an outcome satisfactory to him
constituted a breach of an implied pseudo-contractual obligation
created by the terms of the Amazon Employee Manual.
Endorsing
this interpretation, however, would require the Court to ignore
Plaintiff’s repeated and explicit disavowal of this theory of
the case.
Additionally, the Court finds Defendant’s analysis of
such a claim’s lack of viability compelling given the set of
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facts alleged in the Complaint.
b. Whether the Court Should Dismiss With Prejudice
Defendant requests that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s
Complaint with prejudice, and cites Jackson v. Division of
Developmental Disabilities, 394 F. App’x 950 (3d Cir. 2010), for
the proposition that dismissal with prejudice is proper in
circumstances where allowing a pro se plaintiff to amend would
be futile.
Defendant argues that Mr. Missouri’s Complaint
should be similarly handled.
Jackson may be distinguished from Mr. Missouri’s situation,
however, by the sheer volume of materials submitted by the
plaintiff that the district court had at its disposal.
The
Circuit Court’s rationale is compelling:
Ordinarily, a plaintiff must be given leave to
amend before his or her complaint is dismissed with
prejudice on that basis.
See Phillips v. County of
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 235 (3d Cir. 2008). In this
case, however, we have the benefit of the 106 letters
that Jackson sent the District Court (as well as the
over 50 letters that he has sent this Court during the
pendency of his appeal). Regardless of whether these
letters were properly filed with the District Court or
with ours, they have given Jackson ample opportunity to
elaborate on his claims. Like his complaint, however,
they contain nothing suggesting that the DDD has engaged
in actionable conduct. Thus, we are satisfied that any
amendment of Jackson’s complaint would be futile.
Jackson, 394 F. App’x at 952 (emphases added).
The District Court in Jackson had at its disposal, in addition
to Jackson’s initial Complaint and his response to Defendant’s
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Motion to Dismiss, a veritable cornucopia of correspondence from
the Plaintiff regarding his claims.
Here, by contrast, the
Court has at hand only Mr. Missouri’s initial Complaint and his
Opposition to Defendant’s Motion.
The Court does not have at
the ready so much material from Mr. Missouri as to overcome the
Circuit’s reminder that “ordinarily” the pro se plaintiff “must
be given leave to amend” prior to a dismissal with prejudice.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this Opinion, this Court will
grant Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, dismiss the Complaint
without prejudice, and grant Plaintiff leave to amend his
Complaint and re-file within thirty days.
An appropriate Order will be entered.
Dated: January 24, 2020
s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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