EL v. KOOB et al

Filing 6

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 4/1/2021. (dmr)(n.m.)

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[Docket No. 4]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
MARK EL, a/k/a Mark Smith,
Plaintiff,
Civil No. 19-17577 (RMB/KMW)
v.
SGT. ROBERT KOOB, et al.,

OPINION

Defendants.

RENÉE MARIE BUMB, United States District Judge
This matter comes before the Court upon the filing of a pro
se Amended Complaint [Docket No. 4] by Plaintiff Mark El a/k/a
Mark Smith (“Plaintiff”) against Sgt. Robert Koob, Officer Sean
Donohue, and Warden Donald J. Lombardo (“Defendants”). In the pro
se Complaint, Plaintiff attempts to assert causes of action under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants deprived him of his
constitutional rights through false arrest, false imprisonment,
and unconstitutional conditions of confinement.1
The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s application for
permission to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). [Docket No. 3.]
However,

1

in

fulfilling

its

obligation

to

screen

Plaintiff’s

The initial Complaint included allegations of malicious
prosecution by Defendant Marylou McAdams Corson, which the Court
dismissed. [See Docket No. 2, at 7-8.] Plaintiff does not attempt
to resuscitate that claim in his Amended Complaint.

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initial Complaint for sua sponte dismissal, the Court dismissed
Plaintiff’s initial Complaint without prejudice. [Docket Nos. 23.] Plaintiff timely filed the Amended Complaint, which is also
subject to screening by the Court. For the reasons expressed
herein, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint with
prejudice.
I.

LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
Once an application to proceed IFP has been granted, the Court

is required to screen the complaint (or, as here, the Amended
Complaint) and dismiss the action sua sponte “if, among other
things, the action is frivolous or malicious, or if it fails to
comply with the proper pleading standards.” See 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448, 452 (3d
Cir. 2013). Indeed, the Court must dismiss any claim, prior to
service, that fails to state a claim under which relief may be
granted under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and/or dismiss any defendant
who is immune from suit. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b);
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) requires that a complaint
contain:
(1)

[A] short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has
jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional
support;

(2)

[A] short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief; and
2

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(3)

[A] demand for the relief sought, which may include
relief in the alternative or different types of
relief.

FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
To survive a sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, a complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to show
that the claim is factually plausible. Fowler v. UPMS Shadyside,
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). “A claim has
facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows

the

court

to

draw

the

reasonable

inference

that

the

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Fair Wind Sailing,
Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014). “[A]
pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). In screening a
complaint to verify whether it meets these standards, however,
this Court is mindful of the requirement that pro se pleadings
must be construed liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Haines v.
Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
A complaint is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis either
in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)
(interpreting

the

predecessor

of

§

1915(e)(2),

the

former

§

1915(d)). The standard for evaluating whether a complaint is

3

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“frivolous” is an objective one. Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d
1080, 1086-87 (3d Cir. 1995). A determination of “maliciousness”
requires a subjective inquiry into the litigant’s motivations at
the time of the filing of the lawsuit to determine whether the
action is an attempt to vex, injure, or harass the defendant. Id.
at 1086. Examples of malicious claims can include those that
“duplicate . . . allegations of another . . . federal lawsuit by
the same plaintiff.” Pittman v. Moore, 980 F.2d 994, 995 (5th Cir.
1993).
II.

JURISDICTION
The Court exercises subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1331, as Plaintiff’s claims arise under federal laws.
III. DISCUSSION
In

his

Amended

Complaint,

like

his

initial

Complaint,

Plaintiff challenges the constitutionality of his arrest, his
imprisonment, and the conditions of his confinement. The Court
dismissed the initial Complaint in its entirety, as the allegations
therein were insufficient to state a claim. [Docket No. 2, at 511.]

The

Court

will

briefly

recap

the

deficiencies

that

it

discussed in its previous Opinion, before analyzing whether the
Amended Complaint adequately addressed those deficiencies.2

2

In its previous Opinion, the
to “clarify and specifically
amended complaint” if he felt
his claims.” [Docket No. 2,

Court explicitly directed Plaintiff
state his causes of action in an
that the “Court ha[d] misconstrued
at 11.] Because Plaintiff did not
4

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A.

False Arrest & Imprisonment (Officers Koob & Donohue)

To state a claim for false arrest, a plaintiff must allege
that there was an arrest and that the officers did not have
probable cause to believe the plaintiff committed the offense for
which he was arrested. See Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d
628, 635 (3d Cir. 1995); Dowling v. City of Philadelphia, 855 F.2d
136, 141 (3d Cir. 1988). Likewise, a false imprisonment claim in
this type of case only exists where the police lack probable cause
to make the initial arrest. See Groman, 47 F.3d at 636. Plaintiff’s
claims for false arrest and false imprisonment, therefore, require
him to plead an absence of probable cause.
Probable cause exists if, at the time of arrest, “the facts
and circumstances within [the officers’] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to
warrant

a

prudent

man

in

believing

that

the

petitioner

had

committed or was committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S.
89, 91 (1964). Courts recognize that probable cause determinations
must be made “on the spot” under pressure and do “not require the
fine resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or
even a preponderance standard demands.” Paff v. Kaltenbach, 204

indicate that the Court misconstrued his claims, and because the
Amended Complaint does not appear to add any new claims, the Court
will construe the claims of the Amended Complaint as being the
same as those in the initial Complaint.
5

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F.3d 425, 436 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 121 (1975)).
In its previous Opinion, the Court found that Plaintiff had
“fail[ed] to allege facts that would support [his] conclusory
statements” that the Officers’ initial stop of his vehicle “was
based on racial animus, as plaintiff was racially profiled by these
defendants,” and that the Officers “were aware that plaintiff had
not violated any laws.” [See Docket No. 2, at 6.] “Notably,” the
Court continued,
Plaintiff does not allege that the Officers made any
statements or took any actions that would suggest the
stop was based on race. For example, although Plaintiff
alleges that the Officers made statements suggesting a
discriminatory animus against Plaintiff based on his
Moorish faith (after Plaintiff presented his “Moorish
National Identification Card”), Plaintiff does not claim
that the Officers made any similar statements about his
race.
[Id. at 6-7.] The Court further found that the Complaint itself
suggested that there was probable cause for the arrest: “Indeed,
Plaintiff admits that the Officers found contraband in the vehicle
. . . and that Plaintiff refused to comply with the Officers’
repeated requests to provide a valid government ID.” [Id. at 7.]
Therefore, the Court dismissed the false arrest and imprisonment
claims, though it granted Plaintiff the opportunity to amend his
Complaint, provided that he could “support his allegation of racial
profiling with ‘more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfullyharmed-me accusation.’” [Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).]
6

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Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint does not adequately address the
deficiencies

the

Court

previously

noted.

With

respect

to

Plaintiff’s allegations of racial discrimination, the Amended
Complaint adds only one arguably relevant new accusation: that the
Officers asked, “Are you Black guys selling drugs to the White
guy?” [Docket No. 4, at 5.] This comment, even when considered
with

all

of

the

allegations

of

the

Amended

Complaint,

is

insufficient to support Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that
racial

discrimination

was

the

reason

behind

his

arrest.

Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint still offers nothing “more than an
unadorned,

the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me

accusation.”

Therefore, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s claims of false
arrest and imprisonment.
B.

Conditions of Confinement (Lombardo)

Pursuant

to

the

Due

Process

Clause

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment, prison officials must satisfy “basic human needs — e.g.,
food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety.”
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993). However, “a detainee
seeking to show unconstitutional conditions of confinement must
clear

a

‘high

bar’

by

demonstrating

‘extreme

deprivations.’”

Cartegena v. Camden Cnty. Corr. Facility, 2012 WL 5199217, at *3
(D.N.J. Oct. 19, 2012) (citing Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d 1278,
1298 (11th Cir. 2004)). The due process analysis requires courts
to consider whether the totality of the conditions “cause inmates
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to endure such genuine privations and hardship over an extended
period of time, that the adverse conditions become excessive in
relation to the purposes assigned to them.” Hubbard v. Taylor, 538
F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S.
520, 542 (1979)).
A plaintiff alleging a § 1983 claim for a constitutional
violation must allege facts showing each defendant’s personal
involvement in the alleged misconduct. Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d
347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.3d
1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)). In its previous Opinion, the Court
noted that,
[i]n this case, the extent to which Plaintiff claims
that Lombardo was personally involved in the conditions
are (1) that Plaintiff lodged a complaint with Lombardo,
who visited Plaintiff’s jail cell and refused to move
him “because of his religious beliefs,” and (2) that
Lombardo held Plaintiff “incommunicado” for an extended
period of time by denying visits and intercepting
Plaintiff’s mail.
[Docket No. 2, at 8-9.]
“However,” the Court continued, “Plaintiff does not state
when he first complained to Lombardo about the unsatisfactory
conditions. For that matter, he does not even allege that Lombardo
caused Plaintiff to be subjected to the alleged conditions.” [Id.
at 9.] Unable to “decipher the nature or timing of Lombardo’s
personal involvement in the alleged conditions of confinement,”
the Court dismissed the claim. [See id.] Nevertheless, the Court

8

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indicated that Plaintiff could file an amended complaint “to
clarify

Lombardo’s

involvement

in

the

allegedly

deficient

conditions or name other officials or guards who were personally
involved.”

[Id.]

The

Court

instructed

Plaintiff

to

“include

specific facts” in the Amended Complaint, “such as the dates and
length of his confinement, any specific individuals who were
involved in creating or failing to remedy the conditions of
confinement, and any other relevant facts regarding the conditions
of confinement.” [Id.]
In

his

Amended

Complaint,

Plaintiff

added

two

factual

allegations relevant to this claim. First, he alleges that “[w]hen
[he] complained to officers that he needed a shower and a bed to
sleep on he was told that defendant Lombardo had ordered that
Plaintiff be treated harshly so that he would know ‘who runs the
jail.’” [Docket No. 4, at 8.] Second, Plaintiff alleges that
“Warden Lombardo stated to Plaintiff that [Plaintiff] would be
taught a lesson on being submissive while in [Lombardo’s] jail.”
[Id.]
While these changes do provide more context with respect to
Lombardo’s alleged involvement, they do not fully address the
deficiencies previously noted. The Amended Complaint still does
not specify the dates of Plaintiff’s confinement

or when he

allegedly contacted Lombardo. Nor does it allege that Plaintiff’s
complaints were not remedied in any way. If Plaintiff is truly
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making the troubling allegation that he had no access — whether in
his cell or elsewhere — to running water, toilet facilities, a
sink, a shower, or any other basic necessities for the entire time
that he was being held, then he should allege that specifically.3
However,

his

failure

to

have

done

so

thus

far

renders

his

conditions of confinement claim insufficient. Therefore, the Court
will dismiss that claim.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Because

Plaintiff

has

failed

to

remedy

the

deficiencies

outlined in the Court’s previous Opinion, and for the reasons
expressed

above,

the

Court

will

DISMISS

Plaintiff’s

Amended

Complaint. The false arrest and false imprisonment claims will be
dismissed WITH PREJUDICE. The conditions of confinement claim will
be dismissed WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff may seek to file a second
amended complaint, remedying the deficiencies of his conditions of
confinement claim outlined above, within twenty-one (21) days of
this Opinion and the corresponding Order. An accompanying Order
shall issue.
April 1, 2021
Date

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

3

The Court takes this opportunity specifically to warn Plaintiff.
During the course of the litigation, if it becomes evident that
Plaintiff did not in fact have a good faith belief that his factual
contentions had evidentiary support, the Court will not hesitate
to consider the full range of appropriate sanctions, up to and
including filing preclusion. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
10