FARRELL v. WARDEN
Filing
17
OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 11/8/2021. (pr,n.m)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
___________________________________
:
SEAN FARRELL, a/k/a
:
SEAN FERRELL,
:
:
Petitioner,
:
Civ. No. 20-4414 (NLH)
:
v.
:
OPINION
:
WARDEN FCI FAIRTON,
:
:
Respondent.
:
___________________________________:
APPEARANCES:
Sean Farrell
58966-066
Fairton
Federal Correctional Institution
P.O. Box 420
Fairton, NJ 08320
Petitioner Pro se
Rachael A. Honig, Acting United States Attorney
John T. Stinson, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney
Office of the U.S. Attorney
402 East State St.
Suite 420
Trenton, NJ 08608
Counsel for Respondent
HILLMAN, District Judge
Petitioner Sean Farrell, 1 a prisoner presently confined at
FCI Fairton, New Jersey, filed this petition for writ of habeas
corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 arguing that his conviction is
Petitioner’s criminal cases spell his surname both as “Farrell”
and “Ferrell.”
1
invalid due to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rehaif v. United
States, 139 S. Ct. 2191 (2019).
ECF No. 1.
The Court denied
Respondent United States’ motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction after consideration of the Third Circuit’s
precedents In re Dorsainvil, 119 F.3d 245 (3d Cir. 1997) and
Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP, 868 F.3d 170 (3d Cir. 2017).
No. 10. 2
ECF
Respondent has since filed a full answer to the
petition, ECF No. 14, and Petitioner filed a reply, ECF No. 15.
For the reasons that follow, the Court concludes that
Petitioner has not satisfied the actual innocence standard.
Therefore, the Court will deny the § 2241 petition.
I.
BACKGROUND
On September 21, 2004, Petitioner was indicted for being a
convicted felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1); and being a convicted felon in possession of
ammunition, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
United States v. Farrell,
No. 2:04-cr-00575 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2004) (ECF No. 1)
(“Farrell I”). 3
He pled guilty on April 9, 2007 to possession of
a firearm, and the court dismissed the ammunition charge.
(ECF No. 60).
Id.
The trial court sentenced Petitioner to 120
A challenge to the validity of a federal conviction or sentence
must be brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 except when the remedy
under § 2255 is inadequate or ineffective. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
2
The Court takes judicial notice of the public documents filed
in Petitioner’s criminal cases.
3
2
months imprisonment.
Id. (July 12, 2007) (ECF No. 71).
He was
also sentenced on a separate indictment to a consecutive term of
240 months imprisonment after a jury found him guilty of
possession with intent to distribute cocaine and other charges.
United States v. Ferrell, No. 2:04-cr-00730 (E.D. Pa. July 12,
2007) (ECF No. 110) (“Farrell II”). 4
The United States Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions and
sentences.
United States v. Ferrell, 293 F. App’x 934 (3d Cir.
2008).
Petitioner filed this habeas corpus petition on April 17,
2020.
ECF No. 1.
The United States moved to dismiss the
petition for lack of jurisdiction under § 2241.
ECF No. 6.
The
Court denied that motion and instructed Respondent to file a
full answer on January 22, 2021.
II.
ECF No. 10.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Title 28, Section 2243 of the United States Code provides
in relevant part as follows:
A court, justice or judge entertaining an application
for a writ of habeas corpus shall forthwith award the
writ or issue an order directing the respondent to
show cause why the writ should not be granted, unless
it appears from the application that the applicant or
person detained is not entitled thereto.
Petitioner stipulated at trial that “prior to 10/5/04, [he] had
previously been convicted in a court of the Commonwealth of Pa.
of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year, within the [meaning] of Title 18:921(3) and Section
922(g).” Farrell II, (Mar. 9, 2007) (ECF No. 96).
4
3
A pro se pleading is held to less stringent standards than
more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.
Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972).
A pro se habeas petition must be construed liberally.
See Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002).
III. DISCUSSION
Section 922(g) of Title 18 makes it unlawful for certain
persons to possess “any firearm or ammunition.”
As is relevant
here, persons “who [have] been convicted in any court of, a
crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year”
are included in the statute’s list of prohibited persons.
U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
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“A separate provision, § 924(a)(2), adds
that anyone who ‘knowingly violates’ the first provision shall
be fined or imprisoned for up to 10 years.”
Rehaif, 139 S. Ct.
at 2194 (emphasis omitted).
In Rehaif, the Supreme Court held that “the Government must
prove both that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm and
that he knew he belonged to the relevant category of persons
barred from possessing a firearm” to obtain a conviction under §
922(g).
139 S. Ct. 2191, 2200 (2019).
Petitioner asserts in
this § 2241 petition that the United States had not proved “that
the Petitioner knew that he was aware of his status, as a person
barred at the time of his arrest/sentence that he was not
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allowed to possess a firearm” and that his § 922(g) conviction
should be vacated as a result.
ECF No. 1 at 8.
“When actual innocence relies on an intervening
interpretation of substantive criminal law, the actual-innocence
gateway standard requires a petitioner to show that, in light of
all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable
juror properly instructed on the intervening interpretation
would have convicted him.”
Cordaro v. United States, 933 F.3d
232, 241 (3d Cir. 2019) (citing Bruce v. Warden Lewisburg USP,
868 F.3d 170, 184 (3d Cir. 2017)).
“‘[A]ctual innocence’ means
factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.”
United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998).
Bousley v.
“In other words, the
Government is not limited to the existing record to rebut any
showing that petitioner might make. Rather . . .
the Government
should be permitted to present any admissible evidence of
petitioner's guilt even if that evidence was not presented
during petitioner's plea colloquy . . . .”
Id. at 624.
Significantly, Rehaif does not require the United States to
prove that Petitioner knew that he was not permitted to carry
firearms; the United States must only prove that Petitioner knew
he was a felon.
See Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090,
2095 (2021) (“In felon-in-possession cases after Rehaif, the
Government must prove not only that the defendant knew he
possessed a firearm, but also that he knew he was a felon when
5
he possessed the firearm.” (emphasis in original)); United
States v. Sanabria-Robreno, 819 F. App’x 80, 83 (3d Cir. 2020)
(“[T]he Government would have had to prove that [defendant] knew
at the time that he possessed the firearm that he had been
convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment.”), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2817 (2021).
The
Court has reviewed the parties’ submissions and concludes that
in light of all the evidence, a reasonable, properly-instructed
juror could have concluded that Petitioner knew at the time of
the relevant offense that he had a prior conviction punishable
by more than a year incarceration.
As such, Petitioner has not
satisfied the actual innocence standard.
The Supreme Court noted in a different yet instructive
context that defendants “face[] an uphill climb” with arguments
that their status as a felon was unknown at the time of a later
crime.
“The reason is simple: If a person is a felon, he
ordinarily knows he is a felon.
Felony status is simply not the
kind of thing that one forgets.”
Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2097
(holding a Rehaif error is not a basis for plain-error relief
unless the defendant first makes a sufficient argument that he
would have presented evidence at trial that he did not in fact
know he was a felon) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner’s federal indictment listed two prior
convictions from the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas and the
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Commonwealth of Virginia.
1 at 3).
Farrell I, (Sept. 21, 2004) (ECF No.
Both convictions are charged as being “punishable by a
term of imprisonment exceeding one year.”
Id.
The indictment
itself is not evidence of Petitioner’s mental state at the time
of the offense, but it put Petitioner on notice of the United
States’ allegations against him and what it was prepared to
prove to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Bousley, 523
U.S. at 618 (noting that the receipt of a copy of indictment
prior to pleading guilty gives rise to a presumption that
defendant was informed of the nature of the charge against him).
Additionally, Petitioner’s plea agreement states that the United
States would submit to the jury “[a] certified copy of the
defendant’s prior convictions” if Petitioner elected to proceed
to trial.
Farrell I (Apr. 9, 2007) (ECF No. 60 at 4).
The United States produced copies of Petitioner’s
Philadelphia and Virginia convictions at sentencing on June 26,
2007.
ECF No. 14-5 (transcript of sentencing in Farrell I and
Farrell II).
“As reflected in the certified judgment of
conviction, on February 21, 1997, Ferrell pled guilty in the
Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas to possession with
intent to deliver a controlled substance, arising from his
possession of 356 vials of crack cocaine.
Ferrell was sentenced
to time-served to 23 months and was granted immediate parole.”
ECF No. 14 at 9; ECF No. 14-1.
“The certified copy of the
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judgment of conviction in the Virginia case confirms that on
December 19, 1997, Ferrell was convicted by a jury of one count
of use of a firearm in commission of a felony offense, and one
count of maiming.
According to the records, the jury fixed the
sentence at five years for the maiming offense, and three years
for the firearms offense.”
ECF No. 14 at 9 (citing ECF Nos. 14-
3, 14-4).
It is not likely at all, let alone more likely than not,
that a reasonable juror presented with this information would
believe Petitioner did not know on August 28, 2004 that he had
been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year
imprisonment.
This is especially true considering Petitioner
committed the instant offense approximately four months after
completing his eight-year sentence from Virginia, according to
the United States.
Farrell I, (Sept. 21, 2004) (ECF No. 1 at
3); ECF No. 14-5 at 20.
It strains credulity to believe that
Petitioner could have forgotten his eight-year prison sentence
in such a short amount of time.
“[A]bsent a reason to conclude
otherwise, a jury will usually find that a defendant knew he was
a felon based on the fact that he was a felon.”
Ct. at 2097, (emphasis in original).
Greer, 141 S.
Petitioner has provided
the Court with no such reason to conclude otherwise.
Petitioner appears to abandon his claim that he did not
know he was a felon at the time of the offense and instead
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argues in his reply that he never admitted he knew he was a
felon during his plea colloquy in Farrell I.
“Farrell never
admitted in open court to being convicted of a felony that
qualifies a 922(g) offense and conviction . . . .”
at 3.
ECF No. 15
This is not the argument that the Court found could
proceed under § 2241, and “the voluntariness and intelligence of
a guilty plea can be attacked on collateral review only if first
challenged on direct review.”
U.S. 614, 621 (1998).
Bousley v. United States, 523
However, it makes little difference
because Petitioner would have to show actual innocence to
overcome the procedural default of his claim of plea colloquy
error.
Id. at 623.
Even if the plea colloquy claim were
properly before the Court, Petitioner would ultimately still be
required to prove that in light of all the evidence, it is more
likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted
him.
Id.
Having reviewed the parties’ submissions, the Court finds
that Petitioner has not shown that it is more likely than not
that no reasonable juror properly instructed on the intervening
interpretation of § 922(g) would have convicted him in light of
all the evidence.
Therefore, he has not satisfied the actual
innocence standard, and the Court will deny the habeas petition.
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will deny the habeas
petition.
An appropriate order will be entered.
Dated: November 8, 2021
At Camden, New Jersey
s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.
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