FARRINGTON v. FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION

Filing 127

OPINION. Signed by Judge Karen M. Williams on 6/30/2023. (alb, )

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
STEVEN R. FARRINGTON,

HONORABLE KAREN M. WILLIAMS

Plaintiff,
Civil Action

v.
FREEDOM MORTGAGE CORPORATION,

No. 20-04432 KMW-AMD

Defendant.
OPINION
APPEARANCES:
Cary L. Flitter, Esquire
Jody Thomas Lopez-Jacobs, Esquire
Andrew M. Milz, Esquire
Flitter Milz, P.C.
1814 East Route 70, Suite 350
Cherry Hill, NJ 08003
Counsel for Plaintiff Steven R. Farrington
Richard A. O’Halloran, Esquire
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP
100 Berwyn Park
850 Cassatt Road, Suite 110
Berwyn, PA 19312
Counsel for Defendant Freedom Mortgage
Corporation

WILLIAMS, District Judge:
I.

INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the Court by way of Plaintiff Steven R. Farrington’s Motion for
Reconsideration of the Court’s October 31, 2022 opinion and order (ECF Nos. 101-102) granting
in part and denying in part Defendant Freedom Mortgage Corporation’s motion for summary
judgment (ECF No. 86) and denying Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment as to his
Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FRCA”) claim (ECF No. 90). The motion is decided without oral
argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b). For the reasons below, Plaintiff’s Motion is denied.
II.

BACKGROUND

The factual background and procedural history of this case are set forth more fully in the
Court’s October 31, 2022 Opinion. (ECF No. 101). Accordingly, this Opinion and Order will
focus on the details pertinent to the pending motion. Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the
FRCA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq., alleging that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. 1681s-2(b) by
reporting false information about him to the “Big 3” credit bureaus. Compl. ¶ 58. Plaintiff
contends he disputed credit reporting information, Defendant performed an insufficient
investigation after Plaintiff disputed the reporting, and Defendant failed to accurately report the
results of the investigation. Compl. ¶¶ 58-67.
On February 25, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. (ECF No. 86). On
April 4, 2022, Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment as to the FRCA claim.
(ECF No. 90). Thereafter, Defendant filed a reply and opposition to Plaintiff’s cross-motion.
(ECF No. 94). On October 31, 2022, the Court granted in part and denied in part Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment and denied Plaintiff’s cross-motion for summary judgment as to
the FRCA claim. (ECF Nos. 101-102). On November 14, 2022, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

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Reconsideration (ECF No. 106) which Defendant opposed (ECF No. 108). Plaintiff’s Motion
asks the Court to reconsider granting summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s FRCA claim because
Defendant should have reported Plaintiff’s mortgage account on his credit report as “disputed”
and failure to provide this context for the account rendered Defendant’s reporting “misleading by
omission.” Pl.’s Br. at 1-2. He further argues the Court did not address in its October 31, 2022
opinion Seamans v. Temple University, 744 F.3d 853 (3d Cir. 2014), a case he argues applies to
the instant FRCA claim.
III.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Local Civil Rule 7.1(i), a party may seek reconsideration by the court of matters
“which [it] believes the Judge has overlooked” when it ruled on the initial motion. To prevail on
such a motion, the moving party must demonstrate “(1) an intervening change in controlling law;
(2) the availability of new evidence; or (3) the need to correct [a] clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice.” Lazaridis v. Wehmer, 591 F.3d 666, 669 (3d Cir. 2010). “To prevail under
the third prong, the movant must show that ‘dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions
of law were brought to the court’s attention but not considered.’” D’Argenzio v. Bank of
America Corp., 877 F. Supp. 2d 202, 207 (D.N.J. 2012) (quoting P. Schoenfeld Asset Mgmt. LLC
v. Cendant Corp., 161 F. Supp. 2d 349, 353 (D.N.J. 2001)). The Court will grant the motion
only “upon a showing that dispositive factual matters or controlling decisions of law were
overlooked by the court in reaching its prior decision.” Bowers v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic
Ass’n, 130 F. Supp. 2d 610, 612 (D.N.J. 2001).
A motion for reconsideration, however, “may not be used by parties to ‘restate arguments
that the court has already considered.’” Rush v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs. LLC, 977 F. Supp.
2d 414, 438 (D.N.J. 2013) (quoting Lawrence v. Emigrant Mortg. Co., No. 11-3569, 2012 WL

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5199228, at *2 (D.N.J. Oct. 18, 2012)). Nor may a motion for reconsideration be used “to
relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior
to the entry of judgment.’” Id. (quoting NL Indus., Inc. v. Comm. Union Ins. Co., 935 F. Supp.
513, 516 (D.N.J. 1996)). The motion “should not provide the parties with an opportunity for a
second bite at the apple.” Id. (quoting Tishcio v. Bontex, Inc., 16 F. Supp. 2d 511, 532 (D.N.J.
1998)). Rather “a difference of opinion with the court’s decision should be dealt with through
the normal appellate process.” Id. (quoting Dubler v. Hangsterfer’s Laboratories, No. 09-5144,
2012 WL 1332569, at *2 (D.N.J. Apr. 17, 2012)).
IV.

DISCUSSION

Here, Plaintiff has provided no reason to justify reconsideration. Plaintiff does not point to a
change in controlling law, availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error of law
or prevent manifest injustice. The only support Plaintiff provides in his motion is restating an
argument he presented in his cross-motion for summary judgment and reciting a case he used in
his cross-motion to support that argument. Simply repeating an argument and law to support that
argument is inappropriate in a motion for reconsideration. See Facteon, Inc. v. Comp Care
Partners, LLC, No. 13-6765, 2015 WL 519414, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 9, 2015) (“A party seeking
reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, and
‘recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original
decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden.’” (quoting G-69 v. Degnan, 784 F. Supp. 274,
275 (D.N.J. 1990))).
Plaintiff claims that the Court erred in finding that “the dispute concerning whether the
insurance proceeds should have been applied to the mortgage balance was a legal, not a factual,
dispute that did not impact that factual accuracy of the information reported by [Defendant] to
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the CRA.” Pl.’s Br. at 1. He asserts the Court overlooked or otherwise did not address
controlling Third Circuit precedent from Seamans. Plaintiff uses that case to support his
argument that Defendant should have reported that his account was disputed and failure to report
this information rendered Defendant’s credit reporting “misleading by omission.” Pl.’s Br. at 12. Plaintiff raised this argument in his briefings on the motions for summary judgment and
ultimately the Court rejected that argument. (ECF No. 101, Page 22-28). The Court explains
why Plaintiff’s repeated attempts to apply the reasoning of Seamans to the instant action are
misplaced.
Seamans concerned a dispute over the accuracy of a university reporting a student loan to a
consumer reporting agency (“CRA”). 744 F.3d at 857. When the plaintiff paid the loan in full
approximately 19 years after the student loan went into default, the university reported to the
CRA certain information about the loan. Id. at 857. Plaintiff disputed that information,
including the account’s collections history and listed date of first delinquency and, following
multiple investigations, filed an action against the university for negligently or willfully violating
the FRCA. Id. at 859. Multiple questions were presented to the Third Circuit on appeal
following a grant of summary judgment for the university, including whether a furnisher’s
continuing failure to flag an account as disputed constitutes a violation of the FRCA. Id. at 86667. The Third Circuit held, in part, that a private cause of action arises under the FRCA when,
“having received notice of a consumer’s potentially meritorious dispute, a furnisher subsequently
fails to report that the claim is disputed.” Id. at 867.
Here, Plaintiff misses the mark in arguing his dispute is “potentially meritorious” just as the
Third Circuit categorized the dispute presented by the plaintiff in Seamans. As this Court stated
in its October 31, 2022 Opinion, a plaintiff must show inaccuracy to state a claim under 15
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U.S.C. 1681s-2(b). (ECF No. 101, Page 24). Information that is technically considered correct
may be considered inaccurate if it creates a “materially misleading impression.” Id. In Seamans,
the Third Circuit considered the plaintiff’s claim to be “potentially meritorious” because the
information the university provided “may have been incomplete and inaccurate insofar as it did
not disclose the account’s date of first delinquency or the fact that the account had been placed
for collection.” Id. at 866. Here, unlike in Seamans, there is no evidence establishing that
Plaintiff’s claim could be “potentially meritorious.” Plaintiff has not demonstrated that
Defendant had any obligation under the FRCA to apply the insurance proceeds to Plaintiff’s loan
balance which could render his claim “potentially meritorious.” Moreover, Plaintiff has not
demonstrated any genuine dispute as to any material fact that the information furnished by
Defendant, including Plaintiff’s loan balance and arrearages, was inaccurate or misleading.
Accordingly, the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Seamans does not support Plaintiff’s claims in the
instant case.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons expressed above, the Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. An
accompanying Order shall issue.
Dated: June 30, 2023
____________________________________
KAREN M. WILLIAMS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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