SARAVIA v. DOE et al

Filing 2

OPINION. Signed by Judge Renee Marie Bumb on 4/28/2021. (pr,n.m)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
CAMDEN VICINAGE
ERIK Y. SARAVIA,
Plaintiff
v.
CAMDEN COUNTY SUPERIOR COURT
CRIMINAL DIVISION
and JUDGE JOHN DOE,
Defendants

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Civil

No. 20-9799(RMB-SAK)
OPINION

BUMB, District Judge:
Plaintiff Erik Y. Saravia, a pretrial detainee confined at
Camden County Correctional Facility in Camden, New Jersey, seeks
to bring this action in forma pauperis, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1983. He alleges violations of his due process rights by a state
court judge presiding over his criminal case(s). Based on his
affidavit
dismissals

of

indigence

within

28

and

U.S.C.

the
§

absence

1915(g),

of

three

the

Court

qualifying
will

grant

Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), and order the Clerk of the Court to file the
Complaint.
At this time, the Court must review the Complaint pursuant to
to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A to determine whether it
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should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for failure to state
a claim upon which relief may be granted, or because it seeks
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.
I. THE COMPLAINT
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he appeared before
a judge in Camden County Superior Court, Criminal Division for a
pretrial release hearing on June 11, 2020. (Compl., ECF No. 1 at
4.) The Office of the Public Defender appointed Attorney Steven
Salinger to represent Plaintiff. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges
that Judge “John Doe” did not allow him to make a statement during
the hearing, despite his “repeated attempts to do so,” in violation
of his right to due process. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff further alleges
that he attempted to appeal the pretrial release decision on two
separate occasions, June 12, 2020 and June 4, 2020, before the
seven-day deadline to appeal. (Id. at 4-6.) Plaintiff claims both
appeal attempts were “ignored” by the Camden County Court, Criminal
Division, in violation of his right to due process. (Id. at 6.)
Finally, he states that he attempted to reach out to his public
defender, Steven Salinger, but has not received a response. (Id.)
For relief, Plaintiff asks the Court to sanction Judge John
Doe, and to have his pretrial release hearing heard by a “different
and impartial judge.” 1 (Id. at 6-7). Finally, he seeks monetary
Petitioner filed a complaint for damages and injunctive relief,
instead of a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Courts must
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compensation

for

the

pain

and

suffering

he

experienced

and

“permanent PTSD” he suffered as a result. (Id. at 7.)
II. STANDARDS FOR A SUA SPONTE DISMISSAL
“The legal standard for dismissing a complaint for failure to
state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the
same as that for dismissing a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).” Schreane v. Seana, 506 F. App'x 120,
122 (3d Cir. 2012).

A pleading must contain a “short and plain

statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survive a motion to dismiss,
a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic
liberally construe pro se complaints; therefore, this Court has
considered whether Petitioner states a habeas claim under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241. Federal courts have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241
“to issue a writ of habeas corpus to any pretrial detainee who ‘is
in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of
the United States’” Duran v. Thomas, 393 F. App'x 3, 4 (3d Cir.
2010) (quoting Moore v. DeYoung, 515 F.2d 437, 442 n. 5 (3d Cir.
1975) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2241). “Nevertheless, that jurisdiction
must be exercised sparingly … to prevent … ‘pre-trial habeas
interference by federal courts in the normal functioning of state
criminal processes.’” Id. at 4 (quoting Moore, 515 F.2d at 445–
46.)) Pretrial habeas relief should be granted only under
extraordinary circumstances, which are not present here because
relief, if appropriate, is available in state court. See e.g.,
Gibbs v. Att'y Gen. of the State of New Jersey, No. CV 16-680
(SDW), 2016 WL 632228, at *2 (D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2016) (finding no
extraordinary circumstances and failure to exhaust where the
petitioner was “free to request further reductions in his bail in
the state courts, or to otherwise appeal the denial of such
requests.”)
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Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows
the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 556.)
“[A]

court

must

accept

as

true

all

of

the

allegations

contained in a complaint.” Id. A court need not accept legal
conclusions

as

true.

Id.

Legal

conclusions,

together

with

threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, do not
suffice to state a claim.

Id.

Thus, “a court considering a motion

to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that,
because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the
assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. “While legal conclusions can
provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by
factual allegations.” Id. If a complaint can be remedied by an
amendment, a district court may not dismiss the complaint with
prejudice, but must permit the amendment. Grayson v. Mayview State
Hospital, 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

A court must liberally

construe a pro se complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007).
III. SECTION 1983 ACTIONS
A plaintiff may have a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for violations of his constitutional rights. Section 1983 provides
in relevant part:
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Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory ... subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress
....
Thus, to state a claim for relief under § 1983, a plaintiff
must allege, first, the violation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States and, second, that the
alleged deprivation was committed or caused by a person acting
under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988);
Piecknick v. Pennsylvania, 36 F.3d 1250, 1255–56 (3d Cir. 1994).
A.

Judicial Immunity

“A judicial officer in the performance of his duties has
absolute immunity from suit and will not be liable for his judicial
acts.” Capogrosso v. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d
180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Azubuko v. Royal, 443 F.3d 302,
303 (3d Cir. 2006)). “A judge will not be deprived of immunity
because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or
was in excess of his authority; rather, he will be subject to
liability only when he has acted ‘in the clear absence of all
jurisdiction.’” Id. (citations omitted). Section 1983 claims for
injunctive

relief

against

judicial

officers

acting

in

their

judicial capacities are also barred unless the plaintiff alleges
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a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was
unavailable. Azubuko, 443 F.3d at 304 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
Plaintiff has not alleged any facts that suggest Judge John
Doe acted in clear absence of jurisdiction in presiding over his
state court case or that he violated a declaratory decree or that
declaratory relief is unavailable in the state courts. Therefore,
Judge John Doe is immune from Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, and the
Court will dismiss the claims with prejudice.
B.

Sovereign Immunity

The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
The Supreme Court stated:
That a State may not be sued without its
consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence
having so important a bearing upon the
construction of the Constitution of the United
States that it has become established by
repeated decisions of this court that the
entire
judicial
power
granted
by
the
Constitution does not embrace authority to
entertain a suit brought by private parties
against a State without consent given . . .
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984)
(quoting Ex parte State of New York No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497
(1921)). “The State of New Jersey has not waived its sovereign
immunity with respect to § 1983 claims in federal court.”
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Mierzwa

v. U.S., 282 F. App’x 973, 976 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Ritchie v.
Cahall, 386 F.Supp. 1207, 1209–10 (D.N.J. 1974)).
Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies when “the
state is the real party in interest.”

Beightler v. Office of Essex

County Prosecutor, 342 F. App’x 829, 832 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Fitchik v. New Jersey Transit Rail Operations, 873 F.2d 655, 658
(3d Cir.1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 850 (1989)).
Courts

consider

three

factors

to

determine

whether

Eleventh

Amendment immunity applies to a state agency: “(1) the source of
the agency's funding——i.e., whether payment of any judgment would
come from the state's treasury; (2) the status of the agency under
state law; and (3) the degree of autonomy from state regulation.”
Id. (quoting Fitchik, 873 F.2d at 659)).
New Jersey Superior Courts are subject to Eleventh Amendment
immunity. Ray v. New Jersey, 219 F. Appx. 121, 124 (3rd Cir. 2007)
(“the

Eleventh

Amendment

bars

[the

plaintiff]

from

obtaining

relief against this party”); Stewart v. City of Atlantic Police
Department, 14-cv-4700 (NLH), 2015 WL 1034524 at * (D.N.J. Mar. 10,
2015) (“the Superior Court of Atlantic County is part of the
judicial branch of New Jersey and is thus immune pursuant to the
Eleventh Amendment”) (citation omitted). Therefore, the Camden
County Court, Criminal Division has Eleventh Amendment immunity
from Plaintiff’s claims for damages, and the Court will dismiss
the § 1983 claims with prejudice.
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IV.

CONCLUSION
The Court will grant Plaintiff’s IFP application. Pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and § 1915A, the Court will dismiss the
Complaint with prejudice.

An appropriate order follows.

s/Renée Marie Bumb
RENÉE MARIE BUMB
United States District Judge

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