RANSOM v. UNITED STATES FEDERAL GOVERNMENT et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Granting Plaintiff's IFP application and Directing the Clerk to file the complaint; Denying #2 Plaintiff's Application for Pro Bono Counsel WITHOUT PREJUDICE; Plaintiff has twenty (20) days to amend his complaint etc. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/13/2020. (cry, n.m.)

Case 1:20-cv-12932-NLH-AMD Document 3 Filed 10/13/20 Page 1 of 6 PageID: 21

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANTHONY A. RANSOM,
1:20-cv-12932-NLH-AMD
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
OPINION & ORDER

v.
UNITED STATES FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT and WILLIAM CLARK,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
ANTHONY A. RANSOM
3001 ROUTE 130
APT. 36K
DELRAN, NJ 08075
Appearing pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
WHEREAS, Plaintiff, Anthony A. Ransom, appearing pro se,
has filed a complaint against Defendants “United States Federal
Government” and William Clark; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff claims that he was implanted with
microchips so his family and Defendant William Clark could
monitor him; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff seeks, among other relief, $5 million
for his pain and suffering; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff has filed a motion for the appointment

Case 1:20-cv-12932-NLH-AMD Document 3 Filed 10/13/20 Page 2 of 6 PageID: 22

of pro bono counsel (Docket No. 2) and an application to proceed
without prepayment of fees (“in forma pauperis” or “IFP”
application) (Docket No. 1-1); and
WHEREAS, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), a court may
allow a litigant to proceed without prepayment of fees if she
submits a proper IFP application; and
WHEREAS, although § 1915 refers to “prisoners,” federal
courts apply § 1915 to non-prisoner IFP applications, Hickson v.
Mauro, 2011 WL 6001088, *1 (D.N.J.2011) (citing Lister v. Dept.
of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Section
1915(a) applies to all persons applying for IFP status, and not
just to prisoners.”) (other citations omitted); and
WHEREAS, the screening provisions of the IFP statute
require a federal court to dismiss an action sua sponte if,
among other things, the action is frivolous or malicious, or if
it fails to comply with the proper pleading standards, see 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448,
452 (3d Cir. 2013); Martin v. U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2017 WL 3783702, at *1 (D.N.J. August 30, 2017)
(“Federal law requires this Court to screen Plaintiff's
Complaint for sua sponte dismissal prior to service, and to
dismiss any claim if that claim fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
and/or to dismiss any defendant who is immune from suit.”); and
2

Case 1:20-cv-12932-NLH-AMD Document 3 Filed 10/13/20 Page 3 of 6 PageID: 23

WHEREAS, pro se complaints must be construed liberally, and
all reasonable latitude must be afforded the pro se litigant,
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), but pro se litigants
“must still plead the essential elements of [their] claim and
[are] not excused from conforming to the standard rules of civil
procedure,” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)
(“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary
civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel.”); Sykes v. Blockbuster
Video, 205 F. App’x 961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that pro se
plaintiffs are expected to comply with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure); and
WHEREAS, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s complaint is
deficient in two significant ways:
1.

While it would appear that Plaintiff’s claim against

the “United States Federal Government” is sufficient to invoke
the Court’s federal question jurisdiction, his complaint is
otherwise void of any citation to the Constitutional or
statutory provision or provisions upon which he bases his claim.
Plaintiff only generally alleges that Defendants committed cyber
stalking and human torture without reference to any specific
laws.

Plaintiff’s failure to state a specific legal basis for

his claims complicates the Court’s analysis of the basis for the
Court’s jurisdiction which has limits and is a required element
3

Case 1:20-cv-12932-NLH-AMD Document 3 Filed 10/13/20 Page 4 of 6 PageID: 24

of pleading.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (“A pleading that states

a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain
statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction.”).

This

is true even if Plaintiff’s case were premised on diversity of
citizenship, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, instead of federal question
jurisdiction; and
2.

The Court also finds that the allegation that

Plaintiff was implanted with microchips on several occasions
between 1971 and 2007 a “fantastic or delusional” scenario that
is factually baseless.

See Hager v. Young, 2019 WL 4187812, at

*3 (D.N.J. 2019) (quoting Perkins v. New Jersey Dep't of Labor,
Div. of Workers Comp., 154 F.R.D. 132, 133–34 (E.D. Pa. 1994))
(other citation omitted) (“A claim is frivolous if it lacks an
arguable basis in fact or in law.

If a claim is fanciful or

describes ‘fantastic or delusional scenarios,’ then it is
factually baseless.”); id. (finding that the allegations that
the plaintiff was being harassed by radio broadcasts capable of
“us[ing] the vocal voice of any radio commentator, personality,
and at times even musicians” and by telepathic voices were
“fantastic or delusional scenarios,” and such claims were
dismissed with prejudice as no further amendment could cure the
plaintiff’s pleading deficiencies).

The Court further notes

that Plaintiff states in his complaint that he is currently on
medication for “hearing voices and toxic psychosis.”
4

Case 1:20-cv-12932-NLH-AMD Document 3 Filed 10/13/20 Page 5 of 6 PageID: 25

WHEREAS, the Court further finds that Plaintiff’s motion
for appointment of counsel is premature.

There is no right to

counsel in a civil case, see Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153-54
(3d Cir. 1993); Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir.
1997), but pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), “[t]he court may
request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel.”

In deciding whether counsel should be appointed, the

Court first considers whether a claim or defense has “arguable
merit in fact and law,” and, if it does, the Court then
considers additional factors, which include: (1) the applicant's
ability to present his or her case; (2) the complexity of the
legal issues presented; (3) the degree to which factual
investigation is required and the ability of the applicant to
pursue such investigation; (4) whether credibility
determinations will play a significant role in the resolution of
the applicant's claims; (5) whether the case will require
testimony from expert witnesses; and (6) whether the applicant
can afford counsel on his or her own behalf.
155-157.

Tabron, 6 F.3d at

Plaintiff’s motion does not address any of these

factors;
THEREFORE,
IT IS on this

13th

day of

October

, 2020

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s IFP application (Docket No. 1-1)
5

Case 1:20-cv-12932-NLH-AMD Document 3 Filed 10/13/20 Page 6 of 6 PageID: 26

be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED, and the Clerk is directed
to file Plaintiff’s complaint; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of pro
bono counsel (Docket No. 3) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is finally
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have twenty (20) days to amend
his complaint to properly cure the deficiencies noted above.
Plaintiff fails to do so, this case will be dismissed for lack

If

of subject matter jurisdiction.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

At Camden, New Jersey

6