RANSOM v. WILLIAMS et al

Filing 3

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER Granting #1 Plaintiff's IFP application and Directing the Clerk to file the complaint; Denying #2 Plaintiff's Motion to Appoint Pro Bono Counsel; Plaintiff has twenty (20) days to amend his complaint etc. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 10/13/2020. (cry, n.m.)

Case 1:20-cv-12933-NLH-AMD Document 3 Filed 10/13/20 Page 1 of 6 PageID: 20

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

ANTHONY A. RANSOM,
1:20-cv-12933-NLH-AMD
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM
OPINION & ORDER

v.
ROBERT WILLIAMS (“MEEK
MILL”), VINCENT YOUNG, JR.,
TAWANDA MORIE SHRIVER, and
ANDREA DELORES MITCHELL,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
ANTHONY A. RANSOM
3001 ROUTE 130
APT. 36K
DELRAN, NJ 08075
Appearing pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
WHEREAS, Plaintiff, Anthony A. Ransom, appearing pro se,
has filed a complaint against Defendants Robert Williams (“Meek
Mill”), Vincent Young, Jr., Tawanda Morie Shriver, and Andrea
Delores Mitchell; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff claims that Defendants “gave him herpes
by kissing on [him] through the internet and super computers”;
and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff also claims that Defendant Robert

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Williams (“Meek Mill”) stole the songs “Dangerous” and “24/7”
from him;
WHEREAS, Plaintiff seeks, among other relief, $500,000; and
WHEREAS, Plaintiff has filed a motion for the appointment
of pro bono counsel (Docket No. 2) and an application to proceed
without prepayment of fees (“in forma pauperis” or “IFP”
application) (Docket No. 1-1); and
WHEREAS, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), a court may
allow a litigant to proceed without prepayment of fees if she
submits a proper IFP application; and
WHEREAS, although § 1915 refers to “prisoners,” federal
courts apply § 1915 to non-prisoner IFP applications, Hickson v.
Mauro, 2011 WL 6001088, *1 (D.N.J.2011) (citing Lister v. Dept.
of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309, 1312 (10th Cir. 2005) (“Section
1915(a) applies to all persons applying for IFP status, and not
just to prisoners.”) (other citations omitted); and
WHEREAS, the screening provisions of the IFP statute
require a federal court to dismiss an action sua sponte if,
among other things, the action is frivolous or malicious, or if
it fails to comply with the proper pleading standards, see 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Ball v. Famiglio, 726 F.3d 448,
452 (3d Cir. 2013); Martin v. U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, 2017 WL 3783702, at *1 (D.N.J. August 30, 2017)
(“Federal law requires this Court to screen Plaintiff's
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Complaint for sua sponte dismissal prior to service, and to
dismiss any claim if that claim fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
and/or to dismiss any defendant who is immune from suit.”); and
WHEREAS, pro se complaints must be construed liberally, and
all reasonable latitude must be afforded the pro se litigant,
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 107 (1976), but pro se litigants
“must still plead the essential elements of [their] claim and
[are] not excused from conforming to the standard rules of civil
procedure,” McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993)
(“[W]e have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary
civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes
by those who proceed without counsel.”); Sykes v. Blockbuster
Video, 205 F. App’x 961, 963 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding that pro se
plaintiffs are expected to comply with the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure); and
WHEREAS, the Court finds Plaintiff’s complaint to be
deficient in two significant ways:
1.

Plaintiff has failed to establish this Court’s subject

matter jurisdiction.

On the form complaint provided to pro se

plaintiffs, Plaintiff checked the box for diversity
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, which provides that a district
court has jurisdiction over a matter based on the diversity of
citizenship of the parties and an amount in controversy in
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excess of $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.

Even

though Plaintiff appears to provide the citizenship of himself
(New Jersey), Defendant Vincent Young, Jr. (Delaware), Defendant
Tawanda Morie Shriver (Georgia), and Defendant Andrea Delores
Mitchell (Georgia), Plaintiff fails to provide the citizenship
of Defendant Robert Williams (“Meek Mill”).

Without the

averment as to the citizenship of all Defendants, Plaintiff
cannot establish subject matter jurisdiction under § 1332. 1
2. Even though Plaintiff alleges Defendants gave him herpes
through the internet and Robert Williams stole two of his songs,
Plaintiff’s complaint is deficient because Plaintiff has failed
to state a specific legal bases for his claims, which is also
necessary to establish subject matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a) (“A pleading that states a claim for relief must

1

Plaintiff did not check the box for federal question
jurisdiction. In order to invoke federal question jurisdiction,
Plaintiff must plead a violation of the U.S. Constitution or the
laws of the United States. See U.S. Const, Art III, Section 2
(providing that federal courts can hear “all cases, in law and
equity, arising under this Constitution, [and] the laws of the
United States . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United
States.”). Plaintiff has not pleaded any Constitutional
provision or federal law that Defendants allegedly violated. To
the extent that Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant Robert Williams
“stole” two songs from him, and such a contention could suggest
a violation of federal copyright law, the Court finds that this
allegation is too vague upon which to base this Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction under § 1331.
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contain . . . a short and plain statement of the grounds for the
court's jurisdiction.”); 2 and
WHEREAS, the Court further finds that Plaintiff’s motion
for appointment of counsel is premature.

There is no right to

counsel in a civil case, see Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 153-54
(3d Cir. 1993); Parham v. Johnson, 126 F.3d 454, 456-57 (3d Cir.
1997), but pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), “[t]he court may
request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford
counsel.”

In deciding whether counsel should be appointed, the

Court first considers whether a claim or defense has “arguable
merit in fact and law,” and, if it does, the Court then
considers additional factors, which include: (1) the applicant's
ability to present his or her case; (2) the complexity of the
legal issues presented; (3) the degree to which factual

2

The Court also finds that the allegation that Plaintiff was
infected with herpes through the internet and super computers is
a “fantastic or delusional” scenario that is factually baseless.
See Hager v. Young, 2019 WL 4187812, at *3 (D.N.J. 2019)
(quoting Perkins v. New Jersey Dep't of Labor, Div. of Workers
Comp., 154 F.R.D. 132, 133–34 (E.D. Pa. 1994)) (other citation
omitted) (“A claim is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis in
fact or in law. If a claim is fanciful or describes ‘fantastic
or delusional scenarios,’ then it is factually baseless.”); id.
(finding that the allegations that the plaintiff was being
harassed by radio broadcasts capable of “us[ing] the vocal voice
of any radio commentator, personality, and at times even
musicians” and by telepathic voices were “fantastic or
delusional scenarios,” and such claims were dismissed with
prejudice as no further amendment could cure the plaintiff’s
pleading deficiencies).
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investigation is required and the ability of the applicant to
pursue such investigation; (4) whether credibility
determinations will play a significant role in the resolution of
the applicant's claims; (5) whether the case will require
testimony from expert witnesses; and (6) whether the applicant
can afford counsel on his or her own behalf.
155-157.

Tabron, 6 F.3d at

Plaintiff’s motion does not address any of these

factors;
THEREFORE,
IT IS on this

13th

day of

October

, 2020

ORDERED that Plaintiff’s IFP application (Docket No. 1-1)
be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED, and the Clerk is directed
to file Plaintiff’s complaint; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for the appointment of pro
bono counsel (Docket No. 2) be, and the same hereby is, DENIED
WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is finally
ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have twenty (20) days to amend
his complaint to properly cure the deficiencies noted above.
Plaintiff fails to do so, this case will be dismissed for lack

If

of subject matter jurisdiction.

See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

s/ Noel L. Hillman
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

At Camden, New Jersey

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