DAVIS v. MCBRIDE et al

Filing 8

OPINION. Signed by Judge Noel L. Hillman on 6/7/2021. (dmr)(n.m.)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
REGINAL LEE DAVIS,

No. 20-cv-17578 (NLH) (KMW)

Plaintiff,

OPINION

v.
EDWARD J. MCBRIDE, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
Reginal Lee Davis
4331835
Camden County Correctional Facility
330 Federal Street
Camden, NJ 08103
Plaintiff Pro se
HILLMAN, District Judge
Plaintiff Reginal Lee Davis filed a complaint under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.

ECF No. 1.

At this time, the Court must review

the Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to determine
whether it should be dismissed as frivolous or malicious, for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or
because it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune
from such relief.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court

will dismiss the complaint without prejudice.
Section 1915(e)(2) requires a court to review complaints
prior to service in cases in which a plaintiff is proceeding in
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forma pauperis.

The Court must sua sponte dismiss any claim

that is frivolous, is malicious, fails to state a claim upon
which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a
defendant who is immune from such relief.

This action is

subject to sua sponte screening for dismissal under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(e)(2)(B) because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis.
To survive sua sponte screening for failure to state a
claim, the complaint must allege “sufficient factual matter” to
show that the claim is facially plausible.
Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009).

Fowler v. UPMC
“‘A claim has

facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”

Fair Wind

Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 308 n.3 (3d Cir. 2014)
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)).

“[A]

pleading that offers ‘labels or conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic
recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’”
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)).
Plaintiff’s amphigory makes a few allegations but is mostly
a string of meaningless words and citations.

He states Judge

Edward McBride “denied me relief in 2015, recharging me on a
issue wherein I was released . . .” and that Camden County
Department of Corrections Director David Owens “detained
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illegally refused transcripts years COPScams restraints used
special security eval law library . . . stealing evidence
estoppel name change appeal since 4-20-17 ERROR.”
3-4.

ECF No. 1 at

He also asserts Camden County Prosecutor Jill Mayer

engaged in “misconduct acts discrimination duress event blues
trial application reverse remand equal suit title ILLEGALaws due
process double jeopardy violations on pro se et al . . . .”

Id.

at 5.
From what the Court can discern, Plaintiff was taken to
trial in September 2013 before Judge Blue in Camden County.
at 6.

Id.

He states his “hearing to proceed (pro se) have been

(derailed) estoppel . . . rules of professional conduct Jill
Mayer (discovery) transcripts on these (cases) haven’t been
(produced) Interstate Agreement on Detainers (denied) stealing
mail to (coverup) their (illegal acts) they claim excludable
time its been 3 ½ years (Speedy Trial).”

Id. at 7.

He claims

that Judge McBride “never (proved) probable cause” and asserts
that “[t]hese matters constitute a (Constitutional Court)
because all my (Jurisdictional) arguments are being stopped
treaties eliminated see: numbers on name extortion existence
(birth certificate) definition on legal name.”

Id.

The Court presumes that Plaintiff is attempting to
challenge various aspects of his state court criminal
proceedings based on allegations of misconduct by the prosecutor
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and various rulings by the trial court.

Such claims would be

barred by Heck v. Humphrey, which prohibits a plaintiff from
bringing a § 1983 claim that would necessarily imply the
invalidity of his conviction “unless the plaintiff can
demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been
invalidated.”

512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994).

Moreover, Judge

McBride “is absolutely immune from liability for his judicial
acts even if his exercise of authority is flawed by the
commission of grave procedural errors.”
U.S. 349, 359 (1978).

Stump v. Sparkman, 435

Prosecutor Mayer would also enjoy

absolute immunity for certain claims, including malicious
prosecution.

Prosecutors are afforded absolute immunity for

acts that are “intimately associated with the judicial phase of
the criminal process,” such as “initiating a prosecution and ...
presenting the State’s case.”

Yarris v. Cty. of Delaware, 465

F.3d 129, 135 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409, 431 (1976))) (recognizing that absolute immunity
applies to all activities intimately associated with
prosecutorial duties).
To the extent Plaintiff alleges a speedy trial violation,
he may not proceed with that claim in a civil rights action.
The “only possible remedy” for a speedy trial violation is the
dismissal of the indictment, so this claim may only be brought

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in a habeas corpus proceeding.

See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S.

514, 522 (1972).
The Court will dismiss the complaint without prejudice for
failure to state a claim and will allow Plaintiff to submit a
proposed amended complaint.

In the event he elects to file a

proposed amended complaint, the Court urges Plaintiff to state
his allegations in a short, plain matter without resorting to
“pointless rhetoric, senselessly-picked Latin terms, irrelevant
constitutional excerpts, etc.”

El Ameen Bey v. Stumpf, 825 F.

Supp. 2d 537, 557 (D.N.J. 2011).
An appropriate order follows.

Dated: _June 7, 2021
At Camden, New Jersey

__s/ Noel L. Hillman ____
NOEL L. HILLMAN, U.S.D.J.

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